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Abstract 
This thesis involves an examination of the elements of effective appellate advocacy in terms of the 
ideal and the reality in the context of Sir Garfield Barwick's advocacy in constitutional law cases, 
particularly, the Bank Nationalisation Case and the Communist Party Case. The fundamental 
question which the thesis aims to answer is: whether Sir Garfield Barwick's reputation as one of 
Australia's greatest appellate advocates, especially in constitutional law cases, was justified. The 
analysis of Barwick's advocacy in these two cases also examines whether the ideals of appellate 
advocacy are achievable. 
To be in a position to determine whether Barwick's reputation as a great appellate advocate was 
justified, it is necessary to establish a framework of appellate advocacy through which to conduct 
such an assessment. The framework or methodology established is the result of a critical exploration 
of the elements of appellate advocacy as well as the ideals of appellate advocacy and this is then 
contrasted to appellate advocacy in reality. The elements are divided into three categories, namely: 
preparation, presentation and personation. Throughout the thesis, the assessment of Barwick's 
advocacy occurs against the elements and ideals of appellate advocacy, referred to as the 'three 
category analysis'. A significant part of this thesis is dedicated to undertaking a critical exploration of 
the elements and ideals of appellate advocacy. 
This methodology is then used to assess Barwick's approach to each category generally before being 
extended to assess Barwick's appellate advocacy in reality in the context of the Bank Nationalisation 
Case and the Communist Party Case. 
The thesis concludes that Barwick's reputation as one of Australia's greatest appellate advocates was 
justified following the Bank Nationa/isation Case and despite the result in the Communist Party Case. 
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Preface 
The inspiration for this thesis was a burning desire to understand why Sir Garfield Barwick became 
• 
known as one of Australia's greatest appellate advocates. It was a question that no one had 
previously attempted to answer or analyse in any substantive or comprehensive way. How is it that 
someone can apparently excel in the field of appellate advocacy yet we know little about how they 
earned this reputation and whether it was justified? 
Gaining an understanding of whether Barwick's reputation as a great appellate advocate was 
justified would also reveal the key elements and ideals of appellate advocacy. These are important 
to identify for the purposes of assessing Barwick's appellate advocacy as well as understanding 
modern day appellate advocacy in that they continue to apply to appellate advocacy today despite 
the different environment in which such advocacy is conducted. 
The thesis commences by examining the origins of advocacy and the differences between trial 
advocacy and appellate advocacy. It then progresses to examining Barwick's early years at the Bar 
before embarking on a critical exploration of the elements and ideals of appellate advocacy based on 
three categories, namely, preparation, presentation and personation. At this point, this 
methodology is then used to assess Barwick's approach to each category before being extended to 
assess appellate advocacy in reality by examining Barwick's appellate advocacy in the Bank 
Natiana/isatian Case before the High Court and Privy Council as well as his appellate advocacy in the 
Communist Party Case. 
The critical exploration of the elements and ideals of appellate advocacy within each category draws 
upon material from judges, former judges, barristers, academics and legal commentators (including 
interviews with judges, former judges and renowned barristers undertaken with ethics approval) as 
well as the author's own views, and synthesises this material for the purposes of both identifying and 
formulating the elements and ideals of appellate advocacy. The observations made by such persons 
also assisted in terms of analysing Barwick's appellate advocacy generally and his appellate advocacy 
in the relevant cases. 
The thesis is my own original work. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
"The law is a mystery and those that have mastered its intricacy have indeed great power in their 
hands and great responsibility." 
Sir Garfield Barwick, 19951 
'Your Honour, Barwick for the appellant'. 
From the 1930s and until the 1950s this was a common phrase heard in the High Court of Australia. 
During this period, Garfield Edward John Barwick appeared regularly in the High Court and 
established himself as the leading advocate during his time at the Bar. Throughout the 1940s and 
50s, Barwick appeared almost exclusively in both the High Court and the Privy Council.2 
Sir Garfield Barwick was renowned as Australia's leading appellate advocate when he was in practice 
at the Bar. He was a leading advocate in many of the historically significant constitutional cases that 
have been before the High Court' such as the Bank Nationa/isation Case4 and the Communist Party 
Case. s Barwick then turned his attention to politics and was the federal member for Parramatta from 
1958 until1964. During this time, he was the Attorney-General in the Liberal/Country Party Coalition 
government led by Prime Minister, Robert Menzies," and was responsible for many major reforms 
including, amongst others, significant reforms to the law of marriage and divorce using a previously 
unused constitutional power (s 51(xxi)), as well as trade practices reform and companies legislation-' 
He later served as Minister for External Affairs. 
In 1964, Barwick was appointed Chief Justice of the High Court. He became Australia's longest 
serving Chief Justice, retiring in 1981. During this time, he delivered judgments in more than 1,000 
1 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, 1995, Federation Press, Sydney. 
2 George Winterton, 'Barwick, Garfield Edward John' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Caper & George Williams 
(eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia, (2001), Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 
pp.SG-57. 
3 During Barwick's time at the Bar, the Federal Court of Australia, the Federal Magistrates Court, the Family 
Court and other specialist courts and tribunals did not exist so the High Court would hear a greater range of 
cases than it does today. Also, with the High Court sitting in Sydney or Melbourne in those times, the 
appearances were dominated by barristers from the Sydney and Melbourne Bars respectively. Since the 
opening of the High Court in Canberra in 1980, it now sits predominantly in Canberra but does have sitting 
weeks in the major capital cities around Australia as well as conducting special leave applications by video link. 
It should also be noted that when Barwick was at the Bar, there were fewer barristers at the Bar comparatively, 
including Senior Counsel, and therefore less competition for work (the volume of work was also less). 
4 This refers to both Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 (High Court) and 
Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales (1949) 79 CLR 497; [1950] AC 235 (Privy Council). 
s Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1. 
6 Later Sir Robert Menzies. 
7 Winterton, 'Barwick, Garfield Edward John', above n 2, pp.SG-57. See also Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield 
Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1. 
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cases, many of which shaped the Australian Constitution and the Australian legal system generally. 
In 1975, during his period as Chief Justice, Barwick was embroiled in controversy following the 
constitutional advice he provided to Sir John Kerr, the then Governor-General, with respect to the 
difficulties faced by the Whitlam Labor Government in obtaining supply.• 
Barwick's career can be neatly divicfed into three stages: barrister, politician and judge.' 
This thesis focuses solely on Barwick's career as a barrister up to and including his appearance in the 
Communist Party Case. It was during this time that he established his reputation as one of Australia's 
greatest appellate advocates. 
The fundamental question which this thesis aims to answer is: whether Sir Garfield Barwick's 
reputation as one of Australia's greatest appellate advocates, especially in constitutional law cases, 
was justified. 
The approach and methodology that will be developed to answer this question are outlined in the 
next section. 
1.1 Approach and Methodology 
To address this question will require an examination of the elements of effective appellate advocacy 
in terms of the ideal and the reality and an examination of Barwick's advocacy. 
The starting point is that Barwick was, as far as is known, universally regarded as one of Australia's 
greatest appellate advocates.10 The two major constitutional law cases in which Barwick appeared 
were the Bank Nationalisation Case (both in the High Court and the Privy Council) and the 
Communist Party Case. Both will be examined in this thesis. The focus in this thesis will be on 
Barwick's advocacy in constitutional cases, given the paucity of material available on his advocacy in 
other cases, and the fact that constitutional law cases are conducted before a multi-member court. 
To determine whether Barwick's reputation as a great appellate advocate was justified, it is 
necessary to establish a framework through which to conduct such an assessment. The framework 
or methodology that will be established is the result of a critical exploration of the elements and 
8 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1; David Marr, Barwick: The 
Classic Biography of a Man of Power, (1992). Allen & Unwin Pty Limited, North Sydney. A brief biographical 
account of the life of Sir Garfield Barwick can be found in Winterton, 'Barwick, Garfield Edward John', above n 
2, pp.56-57. 
9 Former Justice Michael Kirby recalls that he once heard Barwick describe his life as divisible, almost neatly 
into four different phases- the barrister, the politician, the minister and the judge: see Jocelynne A. Scutt (ed), 
Lionel Murphy: A Radical Judge, (1987), McCulloch Publishing Pty Ltd, Melbourne, p.7 (Foreword by Michael 
Kirby, 17 March 1987). 
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ideals of appellate advocacy and these will then be contrasted to appellate advocacy in reality. A 
significant part of this thesis is therefore dedicated to undertaking a critical exploration of the 
elements and ideals of appellate advocacy. Since the question relates to Barwick's reputation as a 
leading appellate advocate, the elements of appellate advocacy are analysed and not (except where 
relevant) the elements of trial advocacy (any future reference to 'advocate' is thus a reference to an 
'appellate advocate' unless otherwise stated). 
The classification of 'elements' is designed to encompass the qualities, skills and techniques of 
appellate advocacy. To develop the analysis further, the elements are then divided into three 
categories, namely: preparation, presentation and personation. Whilst the first two categories are 
self-explanatory, the term 'personation' has been coined by the authors for the purposes of 
describing the elements that relate to the advocate's personal qualities or dimensions such as 
courage, emotion, voice and so forth. Throughout this thesis, the assessment of Barwick's advocacy 
occurs against these elements and ideals of appellate advocacy and will be referred to as the 'three 
category analysis'. 
The elements of appellate advocacy that are identified include some basic or even obvious aspects. 
However, the manner in which these elements are applied, employed or adhered to can differ 
markedly. For example, preparation is an important element of appellate advocacy. However, 
advocates can engage in a basic or minimal preparation but can also engage in a comprehensive and 
detailed preparation. Whilst the fundamental element of appellate advocacy is preparation, the 
manner in which preparation is undertaken is highly relevant. Therefore, the critical exploration of 
the elements of appellate advocacy and the three category analysis encompass the basic and 
fundamental principles of appellate advocacy as well as the ability to apply, employ or adhere to 
those principles in a manner that exhibit standards of perfection or excellence. The principles in the 
latter category are described as the 'ideals of appellate advocacy' or exemplary appellate advocacy. 
Whilst the discussion will refer to the basic elements of appellate advocacy, the focus in this thesis 
will be the 'ideals of appellate advocacy'. 
The ideals of appellate advocacy will be contrasted with appellate advocacy in practice or reality. 
The discussion of appellate advocacy in reality will highlight circumstances and examples where the 
application of the elements of appellate advocacy did or did not meet the ideals of appellate 
10 For example, Anthony Mason stated that: 'Barwick was certainly the greatest advocate I ever saw or heard' 
(Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 
21 February 2006)). Ellicott agreed that Barwick was the leading appellate advocate of all the appellate 
advocates that he knew (Interview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006)). Porter agreed that 
Barwick was the best appellant advocate during Barwick's time at the Bar (Interview with Chester Porter QC 
(Sydney, 2 April 2006)). See further support for Barwick's status as one of the greatest appellate advocates 
based on comments made at the time of his death in Appendix A. 
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advocacy. This discussion is then extended for the purposes of conducting an assessment of 
Barwick's advocacy and contrasting this to the ideals of appellate advocacy. Primarily, this is 
undertaken by using the Bank Nationalisation Case in both the High Court and Privy Council as well 
as the Communist Party Case. 
Any reference to 'effective appellate advocacy' in this thesis relates to the ability to apply, employ or 
adhere to the elements of appellate advocacy in reality in such a manner that approximates the 
ideals of appellate advocacy or typifies exemplary appellate advocacy to the extent possible. 
However, while success in persuading an appellate court is clearly the objective for every advocate, 
effective appellate advocacy does not necessarily mean succeeding in a case by obtaining a 
favourable outcome. There are various reasons for this; namely, the opposing advocate may be 
equally skilled or adept, the case may be inherently difficult to win or the court disinclined to find in 
favour of a particular outcome. 
The critical exploration of the elements of appellate advocacy, including the ideals of appellate 
advocacy, together with the three category analysis, will provide a methodology for assessing 
appellate advocacy. This methodology will then be applied to assessing Barwick's advocacy in 
constitutional law cases leading up to, and including, the Bank Nationalisation Case and the 
Communist Party Case. 
Such a methodology has not previously been developed for the purposes of assessing appellate 
advocacy (or even trial advocacy). Whilst judges, former judges, barristers, academics and legal 
commentators have discussed appellate advocacy in a range of contexts, 11 there has not been an 
11 For example, see J.L. Glissan, Advocacy in Practice, (2005), LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney; Justice Michael 
Kirby, 'Appellate Advocacy- New Challenges', (Speech delivered for the Dame Ann Ebsworth Memorial 
Lecture, London, 21 February 2006); Justice Michael Kirby, 'The future of appellate advocacy' (2006) 27 
Australian Bar News 141; David F Jackson, 'Appellate Advocacy' (Paper presented at the Bar Association of 
Queensland Conference, Sheraton Noosa, n.d.) (provided to me by David F Jackson at the interview on 2 
August 2006); P A Talmadge, 'New Technologies and Appellate Practice' (2000) 2 Journal of Appellate Practice 
and Process 363; Judge Brian Donovan, 'The Seven Pillars of Advocacy' (Paper presented at the CLE Centre, 
State Library of NSW, 3 March 2006); Alvin B Rosenberg and Marvin J Huberman, Appellate Advocacy, (1996), 
Carswell Thomson Professional Publishing, Ontario; Harry Gibbs, 'Appellate Advocacy' (September, 1986) 60 
Australian Law Journal496; Justice Robert H Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court' (Fall, 
1951) 37(1) Cornell Law Quarterly 1; Kate Gibbs, 'Chief Justice scrutinises personality and justice', the new 
lawyer, 11 May 2009; Stephen Nathanson, Non-Trial Advocacy: A case study approach, (2001), Cavendish 
Publishing Ltd, London; Justice Kenneth Hayne, 'Advocacy and Special Leave Applications in the High Court of 
Australia' (Speech delivered for the Victorian Bar- Continuing Legal Education, Melbourne, 22 November 
2004) <http://www.highcourt.gov.au/speeches/haynej/haynej_22novo4.html> at 16 March 2005; Justice 
Michael Kirby, 'Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy' (December, 1995) 69 Australian Law Journal964, 968; John C 
Godbold, 'Twenty Pages and Twenty Minutes- Effective Advocacy, on Appeal' (1976) 30 Southwestern Law 
Journal801; Justice P.W. Young, 'Current issues: Appellate advocacy' (2010) 84 Australian Law Journal143; 
Graeme Blank & Hugh Selby (eds), Appellate Practice, (2008), Federation Press, Sydney 181; Justice Anthony 
Mason, 'The Role of Counsel and Appellate Advocacy' (October, 1984) 58 Australian Law Journal537; Chester 
Porter, The Gentle Art of Persuasion, (2005) Random House Australia Pty Ltd, Sydney. 
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attempt to unify the commentary on appellate advocacy in a comprehensive manner by undertaking 
a critical exploration of the elements. 
Secondly, there has been no attempt at systematically assessing the advocacy of any individual 
appellate advocate, let alone assessing the advocacy of a leading appellate advocate against the 
elements of appellate advocacy or a'gainst any methodology generally. 
Thirdly, there has been no systematic examination or assessment of Barwick's advocacy. The closest 
attempts were a biography of Barwick and his own autobiography. The biography by David Marr 
focused on Barwick's career generally, with a particular emphasis on his role in the Whitlam dismissal 
in 1975.12 Despite this initial narrow objective," this biography became a broader examination of 
Barwick's life and career beyond that which Marr had anticipated. This suggests that Barwick's 
extensive career and the important role he played in Australia's legal and political history could not 
be ignored. Barwick himself penned an autobiography entitled 'A Radical Tory' which provided an 
insight into various aspects of his life, including his time at the Bar.14 Whilst both books discuss 
Barwick's advocacy and his success at the Bar as well as provide valuable information and insights 
that contribute to the assessment undertaken in this thesis, as they are biographical and 
autobiographical works respectively, they understandably fall short of assessing Barwick's advocacy 
with the completeness or rigour that is proposed in this thesis. In neither book is a methodology for 
assessing appellate advocacy developed. 
This thesis aims to make a significant contribution to knowledge in four key areas, namely, by: 
1. establishing a methodology for assessing appellate advocacy following the critical 
exploration ofthe elements of appellate advocacy and the identification of the ideals of 
appellate advocacy; 
2. employing the methodology for the purposes of assessing the appellate advocacy of a 
leading appellate advocate and contrasting the ideals of appellate advocacy to appellate 
advocacy in reality; 
3. providing an insight into Barwick's advocacy in the lead-up to, and in, the Bank 
Nationa/isatian Case; and 
4. providing an insight into Barwick's advocacy in the lead-up to, and in, the Communist Party 
Case. 
12 Marr, above n 8. 
13 For example, Marr stated that: 'I began to write Sir Garfield Barwick's life with a single purpose: to pin on 
the man his responsibility for the crimes of 11 November, 1975. Along the way this book grew into something 
else- perhaps something more': ibid, p.xi. 
14 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1. 
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One may ask why an understanding of appellate advocacy is important. In the common law system 
where notions of fairness, justice and consistency are key values, appellate advocates assist an 
appellate court to uphold these values. In the common law system, an appellate court relies heavily 
on advocates to advance arguments that it uses as the basis for formulating its decision. For this 
reason, appellate advocates are in a position to influence the decisions made by appellate courts and 
therefore the administration of justice generally.15 Sir Owen Dixon16 once remarked: 
· For my part, I have never wavered in the view that the honourable practice of the profession of 
advocacy affords the greatest opportunity of contributing to the administering of justice according to 
law. There is no work in the law that admits of a greater contribution." 
Members of society, as key stakeholders in the administration of justice and the common law 
system, therefore have a vested interest in appellate advocates performing their functions and 
discharging their duties, in an efficient, effective and ethical manner. 
In modern times, the nature of appellate advocacy is changing with the introduction of time limits for 
oral advocacy, the greater reliance on written submissions and the introduction of technology. An 
understanding of the elements of appellate advocacy, as well as the ideals of appellate advocacy, 
may also assist with the development of possible reforms with respect to the manner in which 
appellate advocacy is conducted. For example, the use of video link technology in courts has 
impacted on the style of appellate advocacy adopted; the elements of appellate advocacy may assist 
to guide and inform the discussion of such developments. 
Despite the fact that Barwick was regarded as one of Australia's leading appellate advocates, there is 
relatively little examination of Barwick's advocacy, especially in two of the most significant 
constitutional law cases in Australia's history, the Bank Nationa/isation Case and the Communist 
Party Case, in which Barwick played such a critical role. Little academic attention has been given to 
the analysis or examination of the importance of the role played by leading advocates in some of 
history's most significant cases and this thesis provides the opportunity to make a positive 
contribution in this regard.18 
15 It is important to note at this point that the discussion in this thesis centres around appellate advocacy and 
does not presuppose anything about the justice or fairness of the law or any outcome referred to. 
16 Sir Owen Dixon was admitted to practice as a barrister in 1910 and appointed silk in 1922. He was appointed 
as a High Court Justice in 1929 and served as Chief Justice from 1952 to 1964. He was also Australia's Minister 
(Ambassador) to the United States from 1942 to 1944. 
17 Sir Owen Dixon, 'Address when first sitting as Chief Justice of the High Court in Melbourne, 7 May 1952', 
Jesting Pilate, Law Book Co, Sydney, 1965, p.250. 
18 One exception is: George Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellant Argument in the Communist Party 
Case' (1993) 15(3) Sydney Law Review 3. 
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This thesis draws upon various key sources in developing the methodology for assessing appellate 
advocacy as well as assessing Barwick's advocacy using the three category analysis. The 
autobiographical and biographical accounts of Barwick's life, including his career as an advocate, 
provide useful background information and insights which have been incorporated into the analysis 
at various stages. 
In assessing Barwick's advocacy, a significant amount of primary material is used, including 
transcripts of the Bank Natianalisatian Case from both the High Court and the Privy Council, 
transcript of the Communist Party Case, interview material from judges, former judges and 
prominent appellate advocates as well as archival material related to Barwick, the Bank 
Nationa/isation Case and the Communist Party Case. The judgments of the High Court and the Privy 
Council in the Bank Nationalisation Case as well as the High Court's judgment in the Communist Party 
Case are also important for the purposes of this analysis. In addition, secondary sources are used, as 
well as insights gained from books and articles by constitutional law academics and commentators. 
In addition, there is considerable reliance upon interview material from interviews conducted by 
various persons with Barwick- some of which have not been reviewed previously." 
From these sources emerge a number of elements of appellate advocacy and a number of ideals. 
The most revealing aspect of the research is the almost universal acknowledgment of the elements 
and the ideals by judges, former judges, barristers and legal commentators based on their respective 
research, experiences, observations and anecdotes. It is this confluence of thought and commonality 
of perspectives that this thesis seeks to capture and codify. 
1.2 Outline 
The first part of the thesis is dedicated to identifying the elements and ideals of appellate advocacy 
by adopting the 'three category analysis', namely, preparation, presentation and personation. The 
second part of the thesis examines Barwick's appellate advocacy in the Bank Nationa/isation Case 
and the Communist Party Case, two seminal constitutional law cases, to assess the manner in which 
the ideals of appellate advocacy have functioned in reality. The analysis of Barwick's advocacy in 
these two cases will also examine whether the ideals of appellate advocacy are achievable. 
19 See National Library of Australia, Canberra, Oral History Section (ORAL TRC 499/1), J.D.B.Miller, Interview 
with Sir Garfield Barwick (Sydney, 1 February 1977); Tom Molomby & Paul Donohoe, 'Bar News interviews Sir 
Garfield Barwick GCMG', (Summer, 1989) Bar News 9; CD Bailey, 'Conversation with Sir Garfield Barwick' 
(1983) 57 Law Institute Journa/1302; Hon. Clyde Cameron, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick (Audio MP3 on 
CD, 30 January 1981-1 December 1981). 
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The first part of the 'three category analysis' is preparation which is discussed in Chapter 3. One of 
the elements and ideals of appellate advocacy is preparation itself. This includes 'thinking about the 
case' 20 and 'identifying the strengths and weaknesses'" of the advocate's case. Preparation also 
plays a vital part in terms of anticipating judicial questions. Often the extent of an advocate's 
preparation is evident in their presentation. This is apparent from Barwick's presentation in the Bank 
Nationa/isatian Case and the Communist Party Case as the discussion in Chapters 7, 8 and 9 reveals. 
In the former case, it appears that Barwick's preparation was detailed and comprehensive such that 
it met the ideal, whereas, in the latter case, aspects of his presentation suggest that it was not as 
effective as in the former. Barwick was renowned for his 'ground up' approach to preparation which 
is discussed in Chapter 3. He spent considerable time thinking about the case and formulating key 
propositions during the preparation stage. Barwick's preparation was also aided by his strong work 
ethic which is also discussed in Chapter 3. Generally, Barwick's preparation accorded with the ideal. 
However, the reality of appellate advocacy is that, on occasions, there may be less than a 
comprehensive preparation undertaken for many reasons, including the time constraints associated 
with a busy practice. Barwick experienced this on occasions as will be discussed. It was also easier in 
some respects to adopt a 'ground up' approach in Barwick's times when there were fewer cases to 
review in relation to each area of law, especially constitutional law. 
Knowledge of the law relevant to a particular case as well as knowledge of the procedure of the 
particular court in which an advocate is appearing also falls within the category of preparation. This 
is discussed in Chapter 3. Barwick derived considerable confidence from his comprehensive 
preparation, particularly in relation to the relevant law and procedure. As will be seen, however, this 
resulted in him being prone to bouts of arrogance. This assessment is supported by those who knew 
him during his time at the Bar as discussed in Chapter 6. His knowledge of the law (specifically, 
section 92 of the Constitution) was particularly apparent in the Bank Natianalisation Case, courtesy 
of his involvement in several section 92 cases in the lead up to this case, whereas it was probably not 
at the same comparative level in the Communist Party Case despite his earlier challenges to various 
wartime regulations. 
Knowing the court, including knowing the attitudes of the individual judges, is also critical to 
preparation. This assists an advocate in terms of their submissions. Barwick attributed considerable 
importance to knowing the court and the judges who comprised the court; this is discussed in 
Chapter 3. This is also apparent from an examination of Barwick's preparation in the Bank 
Natianalisation Case discussed in Chapter 7 and 8. This was a feature of his overall preparation and 
20 Hayne, 'Advocacy and Special Leave Applications in the High Court of Australia', above n 11, p.2. 
21 Ibid, p.S. 
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was also assisted by his practice of employing a 'ground up' preparation. In the Bank Natianalisation 
Case, Barwick analysed the likely approach of each judge and decided that he would target Chief 
Justice latham as the judge least likely to find the legislation invalid. Whilst this strategy may have 
been sound based on the existing case law, he did not succeed in convincing Chief Justice latham (or 
Justice McTiernan) although he wa~able to convince the other judges. The reason for this will be 
explored in Chapter 7. However, in the Communist Party Case, Barwick misjudged the attitudes of 
the individual judges and particularly the influence of Justice Dixon at the time. This was an example 
of Barwick's failure in terms of both preparation and presentation and represented a failure to 
adhere consistently to the ideals of appellate advocacy. This is discussed in Chapter 9. 
The second aspect of the 'three category analysis' is presentation which is discussed in Chapter 4. 
Conceptual ising the case and its relevance include elements and ideals that fall within the category 
of presentation. One of Barwick's strengths as an advocate was his ability to reduce his submissions 
to simple and concise statements as well as to identify the key issues and arguments that were 
relevant. This is supported by many who knew him during his time at the Bar as discussed in Chapter 
6. However, in reality, Barwick's ability to do so proved a weakness in his early days before the High 
Court which considered his submissions too brief. Barwick's later presentation, as evident in the two 
critical constitutional cases, seems to accord with this ideal of appellate advocacy. Barwick often 
used his opening to inject humour into the proceedings or summarise and outline his arguments in a 
memorable way. On occasions, Barwick's reply involved 'trailing his coat' when he was acting for the 
appellant or plaintiff, withholding aspects of his submissions to allow his opponent to address these 
issues before he did so in reply. Barwick's reply featured more prominently in the Bank 
Nationalisation Case than the Communist Party Case. However, in the Communist Party Case, at one 
point, Barwick's tactics in reply were the subject of complaint by his opponent as will be discussed in 
Chapter 9. Barwick's approach to the opening and the reply is discussed in Chapter 6. 
Watching the bench and dealing with judicial questions are key ideals of appellate advocacy within 
the category of presentation. Observing a judge's reactions and listening carefully to their comments 
or questions, provides an advocate with an insight into their thinking enabling the advocate to 
modify their submissions accordingly. The advocates who are most effective at watching the bench 
are those who engage in dialogue with the individual members of the court. Judicial questions are 
particularly important as they provide invaluable information about the attitudes of the members of 
the court but the reality is that it is not possible to anticipate all judicial questions or answer all such 
questions. Barwick's engagement with the bench was one of his great strengths as observed by 
those who knew him and discussed in Chapter 6. As will be seen in Chapters 7, 8 and 9, Barwick's 
approach to judicial questioning in the two seminal constitutional law cases differed. In the Bank 
Nationa/isation Case, he welcomed judicial questions and used his answers to convey his submissions 
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whereas in the Communist Party Case, as discussed in Chapter 9, he seemed to consider judicial 
questions as interruptions which led him to become frustrated and irritated as is evident in his 
responses. In the latter case, he also failed to listen to the bench effectively and ignored a possible 
argument offered by Justice Dixon that may have ultimately succeeded. The analysis of presentation 
in both cases will reveal that Barwick largely achieved this ideal of appellate advocacy in the Bank 
Notionalisation Case but fell short of doing so in the Communist Party Case. 
Barwick focused heavily on the substance of his submissions both in preparation and presentation. 
In saying this, as will be seen in Chapter 9, the substance of his submissions in the Communist Party 
Case may have benefited from less focus on the policy implications and more attention to the legal 
arguments in support of the legislation based on the Commonwealth's powers under the 
Constitution. In terms of elegance, Barwick was not considered a particularly elegant advocate as 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
Flexibility, discretion and tact are ideals of appellate advocacy. Barwick's ability to deal with the 
court was one of his great strengths according to those who knew him during his time at the Bar as 
discussed in Chapter 6. His approach in the Bank Natianalisation Case epitomised the ideals of 
flexibility, discretion and tact to a large extent as will be seen in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. However, in the 
Communist Party Case, he became more obstinate as well as frustrated and irritated at times, 
especially when dealing with the persistent questions from the bench, and failed consistently to 
meet these ideals. 
The ability to explain policy and principle is another ideal of appellate advocacy. The principle and 
policy behind a law are relevant to an appellate court. Barwick outlined the policy implications of 
upholding the nationalisation of the banking industry in the Bank Nationa/isation Case during the 
course of his submissions. He also did likewise in the Communist Party Case by alluding to the 
consequences of not upholding the validity of the legislation as will be seen in Chapter 9; however, 
he may have focused on this aspect too heavily in this case. 
Citing authority with care is also an ideal of appellate advocacy. This refers to using authority to 
support an argument rather than as a substitute and ensuring that the relevance of each authority is 
explained. Barwick did this effectively in both cases. However, at one point during the Communist 
Party Case, Barwick referred to an authority and misquoted its application which was detected by 
Justice Dixon. Whilst this was an isolated instance, it does represent a failure to adhere to this ideal 
and may have impacted on Barwick's credibility. 
The third part of the 'three category analysis' is personation, discussed in Chapter 5. Personation 
includes courage as an ideal of appellate advocacy. Advocates are required to maintain their 
submissions, within reason and where appropriate to do so. Courage needs to be balanced against 
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other ideals such as flexibility, discretion and tact. Barwick was renowned for demonstrating great 
courage and maintaining his arguments in the face of often robust judicial questioning. Whilst this is 
generally respected, in circumstances where it may not be appropriate, it may be counterproductive. 
Barwick's 'courage', on occasions, led to him becoming arrogant and possibly discourteous when 
addressing an appellate court, as 9everal persons recalled. This is discussed in Chapter 6. There does 
not appear to have been any evidence of these negative features in the Bank Natianalisatian Case as 
will be seen in Chapters 7 and 8, although there were times in the Communist Party Case where 
Barwick's attempts to be courageous may have led him to becoming frustrated and discourteous, as 
discussed in Chapter 9. 
Honesty, respect and candour are also ideals of appellate advocacy in the context of personation. 
This is discussed generally in Chapter 6 and specifically in the context of the Communist Party Case in 
Chapter 9. 
The effective expression of emotion is an ideal of appellate advocacy. The advocate may use 
emotion to assist their client's cause but this can also lead to a lack of objectivity. There is also the 
need to keep emotions under control and avoid losing one's temper. There is little evidence of 
Barwick's use of emotion in appellate advocacy, as discussed in Chapter 6. However, Barwick's 
performance in the Bank Natianalisation Case (discussed in Chapters 7 and 8) may have been 
enhanced by the fact that his arguments reflected his personal values. However, in the Communist 
Party Case, Barwick's arguments apparently accorded with his beliefs, yet he was unsuccessful. This 
is discussed in Chapter 9. Barwick did not achieve the ideal in this case. 
The 'extras' are aspects of presentation that increase the persuasive effect of an advocate's 
presentation and represent ideals of appellate advocacy. They are: voice, words, wit, presence and 
memory. A general discussion of these can be found in Chapter 6, including the observations of 
those who knew and observed Barwick during his time at the Bar. Barwick's choice of language in 
both cases was exceptional; it demonstrated considerable preparation and thought. It also enhanced 
the persuasive effect of his submissions. During both cases, Barwick used humour and wit to provide 
some light-hearted relief and did so appropriately, one clear example is discussed in Chapter 8. 
Barwick's memory was exceptional and there are countless examples in the transcript of both cases 
where he was able to respond immediately to questions by recalling principles from other cases or 
comments by judges in other cases. This also reflects a thorough preparation. While it is difficult to 
assess voice or presence in the transcript, generally Barwick appears to have achieved the ideals of 
appellate advocacy in terms of the 'extras'. 
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1.3 The Purpose of Advocacy 
It is undeniable that the objective of advocacy is to persuade." In a legal context, an advocate's role 
is to persuade a decision-maker, namely, a judge or group of judges. Professor George Hampel, 23 a 
former leading Victorian barrister and judge, has described advocacy as follows: 'Advocacy- or 
• 
persuasion- involves creating or changing perceptions to influence the result ... Great advocates are 
not necessarily better lawyers than others -they are better communicators'." 
From a psychologist's perspective, it has been suggested that: 'The art of persuasion requires 
empathy as well as a deep understanding of human psychology and the complex emotional and 
intellectual processes that result in perception and attitude change'." 
Persuasion can only be achieved through effective communication. 26 Communication is the means 
through which the ultimate objective of advocacy is achieved. Communication facilitates both the 
exchange of ideas and information generally between the advocate and the decision maker. This 
interaction is critical to advocacy. The current Chief Justice ofthe High Court, Robert French," has 
stated that 'advocacy is the human art of communication and persuasion'-'• An advocate's 
22 Former Justice of the High Court, Michael Kirby, stated that: 
The central aim of advocacy- being to persuade a decision maker- has remained the same throughout 
history. It will remain the aim of advocates in the future. The need for advocates to be able to communicate 
complex ideas and arguments will always constitute the touch-stone by which an advocate is judged. 
Kirby, 'Appellate Advocacy- New Challenges', above n 11, p.9. 
23 Chairman of the Australian Advocacy Institute; see <http://www.advocacy.com.au> at 24 March 2008. 
24 Quoted inK Marshall, 'War Crimes Prosecutors Set to Learn Art of Persuasion' (December, 2002) Monash 
News 8. See also Justice Michael Kirby, 'The 'rules' of appellate advocacy', Lawyers Weekly, 3 March 2006, 13; 
Kirby, 'Appellate Advocacy- New Challenges', above n 11, pp. 6-7. 
25 Kathryn M. Stanchi, 'The Science of Persuasion: An Initial Exploration' (May, 2006) 2 Michigan State Law 
Review 411, 412. 
26 Kirby, 'Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 965; Nathanson, above n 11, p.x; Justice James Douglas, 
'Oral Advocacy' in Blank & Selby (eds), above n 11, p.181. 
27 Robert Shenton French was appointed Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia in September 2008. At the 
time of his appointment he was a judge of the Federal Court of Australia, having been appointed to that office 
in November 1986. He was admitted in 1972 and practised as a barrister and solicitor in Western Australia until 
1983 when he went to the Western Australian Bar. From 1994 to 1998 he was President of the National Native 
Title Tribunal. At the time of his appointment he was an additional member of the Supreme Court of the 
Australian Capital Territory and a member of the Supreme Court of Fiji. He was also a Deputy President of the 
Australian Competition Tribunal and a part-time member of the Australian Law Reform Commission. He was 
highly regarded for his superlative appellate advocacy and art of persuasion according to WA Solicitor-General, 
Robert Meadows QC: 'Much more than black-letter law', Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 1 August 2008, 
52. 
28 Kate Gibbs, 'Chief Justice scrutinises personality and justice', above n 11, 1. 
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demeanour must be conducive to such communication and requires both respect and an even 
temperament." 
Aristotle and Rhetoric 
The origins of advocacy can be traced to Ancient Greece and through to Ancient Rome.'° From these 
times, it was identified that the objective of advocacy was persuasion and this has remained constant 
since that time. The study of advocacy and persuasiveness began in Ancient Greece, and early 
observations related to advocacy still remain relevant today. In many respects, the elements and 
ideals of appellate advocacy that apply today (and which are identified and critically analysed in this 
thesis) are an extension or expansion ofthese early observations. For example, Aristotle's seminal 
work on rhetoric from Ancient Greece reveals the connection between rhetoric and advocacy. 
29 Freidman, Paul L. and Lacavora, Philip A., extract from "Basic Principles of Effective Brief- Writing and Oral 
Argument- An Overview" in Peter J Carre, Azike A Ntephe and Helen C Trainor {eds) Appellate Advocacy, 
(1981), American Bar Association, Chicago, p.207. 
30 See J. Hall, 'Persuasion in Ancient Greece and Rome' (2007) 9(10) ADR 183. However, there is a considerable 
amount of literature relating to rhetoric from Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome and a thorough analysis of this 
literature is beyond the scope of this thesis. See generally: Michael H Frost, Introduction to Classical Legal 
Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage, (2005), Ash gate Publishing Limited, Aldershot; George A Kennedy, Art of Persuasion 
in Ancient Greece, (1963), Princeton University Press, Princeton; Wendy Olmsted, Rhetoric: An Historical 
Introduction, (2006), Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford; Plato, Gorgias (James H. Nichols Jr, trans 1998), (1998), 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London; Plato, Phaedrus (James H. Nichols Jr, trans 1998), (1998), Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca and London; A 0 Rorty (ed), Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric, (1996), University of 
California Press, Berkeley; Eugene Garver, Aristotle's Rhetoric: An Art of Character, (1994), The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago; Edward Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric, (2"' 
ed), (2003), University of South Carolina Press, South Carolina; Jon Hesk, Deception and Democracy in Classical 
Athens, (2000), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Michael Grant, The Classical Greeks, (2001), Phoenix 
Press, London; Frederick Copleston S.J., A History of Philosophy: Volume 1, Greece & Rome, Ports 1 & 2, (1962), 
Image Books, New York; Eric Voegelin, Plato, (2000), University of Missouri Press, Columbia; Michael Gagarin 
and David Cohen (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law, (2005), Cambridge University Press, 
New York; Edwin Carawan (ed), The Attic Orators (Oxford Readings in Classical Studies), (2007), Oxford 
University Press, New York; Claude Calame, The Craft of Poetic Speech in Ancient Greece (J Orion trans, 1995), 
(1995), Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London; Cicero, Selected Political Speeches, (1989), Penguin Group, 
London; J, Powell and J, Patterson (eds) Cicero the Advocate, (2004), Oxford University Press, New York; 
Augustus S Wilkins (ed), Cicero, De Oratore 1-111, (2002), Bristol Classical Press, London; John T Ramsey (ed), 
Cicero Philippics 1-11, (2003), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Latin and English versions of De Oratore 
and Phillips (Loeb Classical Library); Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal 
Reasoning, (2005), Oxford University Press, New York; Edward Corbett, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern 
Student, (3'' ed), (1990), Oxford University Press, New York; James J Murphy (ed), Quintilian on the Teaching of 
Speaking and Writing, (1987), Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardville; S Miller 'Classical 
Rhetoric and Contemporary Basics' in James J Murphy (ed), The Rhetorical Tradition and Modern Writing, 
(1982), Modern Language Association of America, New York. 
20 
Aristotle identified three kinds or persuasion, 31 namely: 
1. ethos- the character of the speaker; 
2. pathos- the disposition of the audience; that is, putting the audience into a certain frame of 
mind; and 
3. logos-the speech itself, that is, the logic or the words of the speech itself." 
In relation to the first, Aristotle suggested that character facilitates persuasiveness- that is, if a 
speech is delivered in such a way that the speaker appears worthy of credence then the speaker will 
be more persuasive. This is based on the notion that someone of good character is more likely to be 
believed than someone of bad character. However, evidence of the speaker's character should 
become apparent during the course of his or her speech and not through the speaker being believed 
to be of a certain character in advance." 
Aristotle believed that the second kind of persuasion could be achieved by altering the disposition of 
an audience such that the audience is induced by the speech into an emotional state. Individuals who 
give judgments in disputes do so in different ways depending on whether they are pleased or 
aggrieved, sympathetic or repelled and so forth. Speeches that stir the emotions of the audience are 
more likely to be persuasive.34 
Aristotle suggested that the third kind of persuasion can be achieved through the speech itself- that 
is, by demonstrating 'a real or an apparent persuasive aspect of each particular matter'35 That is, the 
inherent logic of the speech itself will be persuasive. 
Aristotle believed therefore that persuasion will be achieved by people who can understand 
character, the virtues and emotions, and how to employ these to great effect, as well as those who 
can master the syllogism (that is, reason logically).'6 
According to Aristotle, there are three reasons why speakers will be inherently persuasive, namely: 
'common sense, virtue and goodwill'.37 These factors inspire confidence in the speaker's own 
31 This is also referred to as the "three corners of persuasion" in Peter Thompson, 'The Art of Persuasion in 
Business, Negotiation and the Media' (Autumn 1999) The Sydney Papers 11, 13. See also Rosenberg and 
Huberman, above n 11, pp.48-49; Michael Hyam, Advocacy Skills, (1990), Blackstone Press Ltd, London, UK, 
p.145. 
32 Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric (H. C. Lawson-Tancred trans, 2004), (2004). Penguin Group, London, p.74; 
Thompson, above n 31, 13; see Michael E. Eidenmuller, American Rhetoric-Aristotle on Rhetoric, (2001-2008) 
<http://www.americanrhetoric.com/aristotleonrhetoric.htm> at 28 March 2007. 
33 Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, above n 32, pp.74-75; Thompson, above n 31, 13; see Eidenmuller, above n 32. 
34 Ibid. See also Donovan, above n 11, p.9. 
35 Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, above n 32, p. 75. 
36 Ibid; see Eidenmuller, above n 32. 
37 Ibid. See also Donovan, above n 11, p.6. 
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character and encourage an audience to believe the speaker irrespective of any evidence to 
substantiate what the speaker is saying. 
Although Aristotle focuses on the importance of emotions and character in persuasion, he was also 
concerned with aspects of the speech itself, such as style and composition. According to Aristotle, 
style consists of clarity, frigidity, simile, purity, amplitude, propriety, rhythm, syntax, wit and 
metaphor, vividness and suitability to genre. These are all factors that will impact on the speech 
itself and the manner in which it is delivered thereby impacting upon its persuasiveness. In terms of 
composition, the following features are important: narration, proof, introduction, prejudice, 
refutation, altercation and the epilogue.38 It is easy to see why the structure of a speech may aid its 
persuasive effect. 
The kinds of persuasion to which Aristotle referred, together with the other important elements of 
persuasion, are evident in the elements and ideals of appellate advocacy. Also, there are clear 
parallels between Aristotle's three kinds of persuasion and the elements and ideals of appellate 
advocacy. For example, one of the elements of personation is that an advocate should display 
honesty and candour at all times; otherwise, this will damage the advocate's credibility and will 
ultimately diminish the persuasive effect of the advocate's other arguments. This mirrors Aristotle's 
emphasis on character as one of the three kinds of persuasion. 
Another example can be found in Aristotle's statement: 'The fool tells me his reasons. The wise man 
persuades me with my own'.39 In this statement, Aristotle is emphasising the importance of 
advocates tailoring their submissions to the judge hearing the case. A judge's thinking is often 
revealed through judicial questions. Aristotle's statement reflects a number of the elements and 
ideals of appellate advocacy, including: an advocate undertaking a comprehensive preparation to 
anticipate likely judicial questions, becoming familiar with the previous decisions of the individual 
judges of the court and using this knowledge when responding to judicial questions. 
Advocacy, Persuasion and the Administration of Justice 
The goal of advocacy is persuasion and this is achieved through, among other things, the 
communication of information. Informing and persuading are inextricably linked. An appellate court 
'shares with counsel a common interest in the advocate's effective performance of his double-
38 See generally Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, above n 32. Also, see Thompson, above n 31, 16 who refers to 
five principles fundamental to the "three corners of persuasion", namely: invention (identifying the key 
question that has to be answered); arrangement (the structure of the argument); the style or choice of 
persuasive language; memory (the ability to accurately recall arguments); delivery (the use of voice and body 
language). 
"As quoted in Thompson, above n 31, 13. 
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barrelled task of informing and persuading' .40 Former Justice of the High Court of Australia, Michael 
Kirby41, believes that '[t]he need for advocates to be able to communicate complex ideas and 
arguments will always constitute the touchstone by which an advocate is judged'.42 
Without sufficient information, an appellate court may not be aware of all of the relevant issues or 
applicable law and may therefore hot be in a position to make a fully informed decision which is fair 
and just in all the circumstances. For this reason, an appellate court (just like other courts) relies on 
the advocates to provide the necessary information to enable the judges to make a fully informed 
decision. 
It is widely accepted that the adversarial system is based on the fundamental principle that justice is 
more likely to be achieved when opposing parties utilise professional advocates, who possess the 
necessary knowledge of the law and operate within the responsibilities and parameters of an 
organised legal profession. The members of the legal profession owe a duty to their clients but 
ultimately owe an overriding duty to the court. In such a system, the central role ofthe advocate is 
to present their client's case to its best advantage, to refute the opponent's case and 'to endeavour 
by all legitimate means to persuade the tribunal to a view of the facts and the law most likely to 
result in a decision in favour of the client'.43 
An advocate's task is essential to the proper performance of the court's work. As Justice Kenneth 
Hayne44 of the High Court remarked, those 'who must decide the cases look for as much help as we 
can get in performing our task' 45 During his time as Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, 
Barwick acknowledged this in commenting on a suggestion to increase the size of the judiciary: 
40 Godbold, above n 11, 807. This thesis will, from time to time, draw upon and refer to, the literature on 
advocacy and appellate advocacy found in overseas jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, United States of 
America and Canada. Whilst it is recognised that appellate advocacy in each of these jurisdictions must be 
understood in their respective contexts, they do contain fundamental elements of advocacy and appellate 
advocacy that transcend jurisdictional issues. For this reason, any reliance upon such literature can be 
assumed to occur in instances where the author believes that the principles discussed or espoused have 
general and widespread application as well as particular relevance unless otherwise stated. 
41 Michael Kirby was a judge of the High Court of Australia between 1996 and 2009. Prior to this, he was the 
Deputy President of the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, a tribunal which adjudicated 
labour disputes, from 1975 until1983. From 1983 to 1984, he was a judge in the Federal Court of Australia 
before being appointed as President of the New South Wales Court of Appeal until his appointment to the High 
Court of Australia in February 1996. 
42 Kirby, 'The 'rules' of appellate advocacy', above n 24, p.13. 
43 
'Extra-Judicial Notes' (May, 1998) 17(1) Australian Bar Review 9, 9. 
44 Justice Kenneth Hayne joined the Victorian Bar in 1971, and was appointed a Queen's Counsel in 1984. He 
was appointed as a judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria in 1992. From 7 June 1995 he sat in the Court of 
Appeals division of the Supreme Court of Victoria and was appointed as one of its foundation judges. Hayne 
was appointed as a judge ofthe High Court of Australia in September 1997. 
45 Hayne, 'Advocacy and Special Leave Applications in the High Court of Australia', above n 11, p.9. 
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... better preparation and presentation of cases by counsel can greatly contribute to the efficient 
disposal of cases and a better use of available judicial time. The rapport and understanding 
between Bench and Bar should greatly contribute to the economical use of that time." 
Barwick went on to state: 
More thorough preparation and a more selective approach to the matters on which reliance is 
placed should lead to greater economy in the use of judicial time. Basically, it is the skill and sense 
of responsibility of the practising profession which will obviate the undue and unnecessary 
increase in the workload of the judiciary by the grant and use of aid.47 
However, when advocates do not perform their functions effectively, the court system and the 
administration of justice are adversely affected. That is, '[t]he court system also suffers from poor 
advocacy because it is much harder to conduct cases and run an efficient system when they are 
receiving insufficient assistance from a barrister and other advocates' .48 It is essential that an 
advocate should understand the task that they49 are required to perform for the court, namely, to 
inform and to persuade within the parameters of their overriding duty to the court. The great 
advocate and former Chief Justice of the High Court, Sir Owen Dixon, however 'regarded advocacy as 
the soul of the law, [but] did not believe that the arguments of counsel should be the primary factor 
in the final judgment of the Court'.so This can be contrasted with the comments by Sir Anthony 
Mason 51 and Sir Harry Gibbs. 52 During his time as a judge on the High Court, Mason observed that 
advocates would often become distracted and lose sight of their objective: 'We do not always see 
counsel as we should, that is, as a legal representative whose primary function is that of persuading 
46 Garfield Barwick, 'The State of the Australian Judiciary' (August, 1977) Australian Current Law Digest 193, 
196. 
47 Ibid. During his time as Chief Justice, Barwick also suggested that: 
If you are committed to the adversary system, the function of the advocate in administration of the law is 
quite central and is becoming more so ... 
The advocate when drawn from the Bar is constantly with you. There are several relevant aspects of that 
fact. First of all as a judge you are able to rely upon him. You know him and he has to continue to work with 
you. You know whether he is likely to be right up-to-date with what he wants to say. You know whether or 
not he will respect the obligation he has to help you as a judge. He also comes to know you and to 
understand your manner of handling a case. 
'Barwick' (30 May 1980), 12 Justinian 9, 9. 
48 
'Vic: Barristers need more training, says ex-judge', CCH Australia- News Article, 10 October 2008 
<http://www.cch.com.au/au/ContactUS/Print.aspx?ID=27848> at 10 October 2008. 
49 The author has chosen to use 'they' in circumstances where the singular could be use in an effort to adopt 
gender neutral language and avoid the cluttering effect of 'he or she'. 
50 Philip Ayres, Owen Dixoa, {2003). The Miegunyah Press, Melbourne, p.44. 
51 Sir Anthony Mason was a Justice of the High Court of Australia between 1972 and 1987 and the Chief Justice 
of the High Court between 1987 and 1995. He was admitted to the NSW Bar in 1951 and appointed as Queen's 
Counsel in 1964. He was the Commonwealth Solicitor-General between 1964 and 1969 and a Judge of the NSW 
Court of Appeal between 1969 and 1972. 
52 Sir Harry Talbot Gibbs, GCMG, AC, KBE, QC (17 February 1917- 25 June 2005) was Chief Justice of the High 
Court of Australia from 1981 to 1987 after serving as a member of the High Court between 1970 and 1981. 
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the Court to accept his client's case'.53 While Chief Justice of the High Court, Gibbs indicated that an 
appellate advocate must do more than merely persuade in terms of their arguments alone- they 
must persuade the appellate tribunal to take a particular course of action.54 
This discussion leads to a broader issue of the general competence and ability of advocates, including 
appellate advocates. Whilst this thes'ls is concerned with the ideals and the reality of appellate 
advocacy, it must not be overlooked that courts and the administration of justice require that 
advocates meet certain minimum competencies to ensure that judges are able to discharge their 
duties and responsibilities effectively. These minimum competencies represent many of the 
elements of effective appellate advocacy. However, once these minimum standards are achieved, 
the manner in which appellate advocates apply and employ the elements of appellate advocacy will 
differ. It is this latter theme that this thesis seeks to explore. 
1.4 Appellate Advocacy Versus Trial Advocacy 
Appellate advocacy occurs before courts comprising more than one judge and without a jury. 
Traditionally, in common law jurisdictions, trial advocacy occurs before a single judge or single judge 
and jury. Whilst appellate advocacy includes an appeal to a multi-member court from a lower court, 
this kind of advocacy is also particularly relevant in the context of matters relating to the Australian 
Constitution heard before the High Court of Australia. 
Constitutional law cases are usually dealt with before a full bench of the High Court comprising five 
or seven judges. 55 The in-depth analysis of Barwick's advocacy in constitutional law cases is 
essentially an analysis of appellate advocacy. The record of Barwick's appearances in key 
constitutional cases provides a unique opportunity to test his reputation against the ideals of 
effective appellate advocacy. 
The literature on trial advocacy and appellate advocacy from overseas jurisdictions such as the 
United Kingdom, United States of America and Canada has some general application and relevance 
to Australia, as there are common features of each type of advocacy. In each such jurisdiction, 
advocacy occurs in an adversarial setting in circumstances where the role of an advocate is similar 
and where there is generally a heavy reliance on oral advocacy and an increasing reliance on written 
submissions. In addition, appellate advocacy in each jurisdiction occurs before multi-member courts. 
53 Mason, 'The Role of Counsel and Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 546. 
54 Harry Gibbs, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 496. 
55 However, a Full Court may be constituted by as few as two or more Justices of the High Court sitting together 
(see section 19, Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)). 
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For this reason, this literature is useful in drawing both comparisons and contrasts between both 
forms of advocacy. 
One common feature of both trial advocacy and appellate advocacy is that the main objective is 
persuasion. 56 Whilst there are qualities, skills and techniques of effective advocacy that are equally 
applicable to both trial and appellate advocacy, certain qualities, skills and techniques are only 
applicable to appellate advocacy. This is particularly the case where trial advocacy involves a jury as 
opposed to a judge-alone trial. The difference was explained by Leander Shaw Jr, a former judge of 
the Florida Supreme Court, as follows: 
there is a difference between the skills needed in litigating a case before trial and appellate court. 
Trial litigation- focusing on jury trials- requires jury arguments that are generally structured to 
lead ordinary people to decide something based on compelling emotional arguments ... In 
appellate advocacy, however, the emphasis switches and the attorney must stress the application 
of law to facts- keeping in mind the appellate court's concern for uniformity of the law and doing 
justice. Thus, the ability to present thoroughly researched legal arguments and to present them in 
a very orderly and logical manner becomes more important. 57 
A former Judge of the Supreme Court of Ontario, Alvin B. Rosenberg, believes that an advocate 
'should appreciate the unique nature, aims and processes of appellate advocacy'.58 For example, he 
notes that an appellate court 'is motivated by a desire to do justice and to deal with each case fairly 
and expeditiously, making effective use of its time'.59 
A court comprised of more than one judge presents unique and inherent challenges for an appellate 
advocate. The members of the court may not necessarily be of a single mind set; they may have 
differing views in relation to the case before them. One of the challenges that an appellate advocate 
encounters is advancing and tailoring submissions that will appeal to, and persuade, a majority of the 
members of the court. An appellate advocate must ascertain the likely views of each individual judge 
as well as assess and gauge judicial temperament and personality. 
Each member of the court will receive an advocate's submission differently. One member of the 
court may receive it with scepticism or even hostility, while another member may find the same 
submission attractive." An appellate advocate must be prepared for this eventuality. 
56 Glissan, above n 11, p.190; Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 11, in Foreword by Michel Proulx, Justice of 
the Court of Appeal of Quebec; Jennifer 5. Carroll, 'Appellate Specialization and the Art of Appellate Advocacy' 
(June, 2000) The Florida Bar Journa/107, 107; Nathanson, above n 11; Glissan, above n 11, p.190. 
57 Letter to Jennifer 5. Carroll dated 17 March 1999 and cited in Carroll, above n 56, 107. 
58 Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 11, in Foreword by Michel Proulx, Justice of the Court of Appeal of 
Quebec, p.xiv. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Justice Ronald Sackville, 'Appellate Advocacy' (1996-97) 15(2) Australian Bar Review 99, 101. 
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An appellate court is not bound by the decisions of lower courts although generally it will consider 
itself bound by its own decisions. The High Court stands at the apex of the Australian judicial system 
and is therefore not bound by the decisions of any other court in Australia although it may consider 
itself bound by its earlier decisions for the purposes of maintaining consistency- provided that it 
believes that these earlier decisions are correct." This is relevant for appellate advocates. Since 
1984, special leave is required before the High Court will hear an appeal from a decision of a 
Supreme Court of a state62 Although this did not apply during Barwick's time at the Bar, special 
leave applications provide their own unique challenges in terms of appellate advocacy. Due to the 
time limits applicable to special leave applications, some of the elements of appellate advocacy 
explored in this thesis assume greater significance. 
Developments in Appellate Advocacy before the High Court 
There have been a number of important developments in terms of practice and procedure in 
appellate proceedings, particularly in the High Court, since Barwick's time at the Bar. Kirby has 
stated that: 'Over the past decade significant changes have occurred to the environment in which 
appellate advocates, in particular, must work' 63 
The two major changes that have occurred since Barwick's time at the Bar, to which Kirby refers, are 
the increasing use of written submissions64 and the introduction of time limits for oral submissions. 
61 1bid. 
62 This is the position since the Judiciary Amendment Act (No 2) 1984 (Cth) was introduced in 1984 which 
amended the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (sees 35(2) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)). This occurred during the 
time that Sir Harry Gibbs was Chief Justice. Section 35A outlines the criteria for granting special leave to 
appeal. See Joan Priest, Sir Harry Gibbs: Without Fear or Favour (1995), Scribblers Publishing, Gold Coast, 
p.103. See also Anthony Mason, 'Judiciary Act' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper & George Williams (eds), 
The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia, (2001), Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, p.380; 
David Jackson, 'Leave to appeal' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Caper & George Williams (eds), The Oxford 
Companion to the High Court of Australia, (2001), Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, p.425; 
Jackson,'Practice in the High Court of Australia', above n 62, 189; Sir Anthony Mason, 'The Regulation of 
Appeals to the High Court of Australia: The Jurisdiction to Grant Special Leave to Appeal' (1996) 15 University of 
Tasmania Law Review 1; David Solomon, 'Controlling the High Court's Agenda' (1993) 23 University of Western 
Australia Law Review 33. 
"Kirby, 'Appellate Advocacy- New Challenges', above n 11, p.10. See also Kirby, 'The 'rules' of appellate 
advocacy', above n 24, p.13. 
64 In relation to written submissions generally see Glissan, above n 11, pp.194-197; The Hon. Justice K.M. 
Hayne, 'Written Advocacy' (Paper presented as part of the Continuing Legal Education Program of the Victorian 
Bar, 5 & 26 March 2007). Former Chief Justice Murray Gleeson noted that, since Barwick's day, the major 
change has been the requirement for advocates to submit a written summary of their argument which wasn't 
the case in the High Court in Barwick's day but was the case in the Privy Council: see Interview with Murray 
Gleeson, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 14 August 2006). 
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Kirby suggests that '[t]hese changes [have] had a significant impact on appellate advocacy." These 
changes stem from the growing workload of appellate courts as well as the increased focus on 
efficiency.66 The High Court has embraced such changes. 
For present purposes, it is important to identify these changes for two reasons. First, they reveal in 
an indirect way the environment in·which Barwick operated when appearing before the High Court 
during his time at the Bar and they help provide some context for High Court practice and procedure 
during that time. Secondly, they provide an insight into the manner in which appellate proceedings 
are presently conducted in the High Court and highlight the continued relevance of the elements and 
ideals of appellate advocacy- many of which may assume greater significance in the current climate. 
Prior to 1982, the High Court relied almost entirely on oral argument." After 1982, the parties had 
to submit a written outline of their arguments prior to commencing oral submissions. After 1984, 
the parties also had to submit a written list of authorities:• From 1997, parties have been required 
to file more detailed written submissions covering all main arguments:• The High Court Rules 2004, 
which commenced in January 2005, also placed further emphasis on the importance of written 
65 Kirby, 'Appellate Advocacy- New Challenges', above n 11, pp.l0-11. Kirby, 'The future of appellate 
advocacy', above n 11, 142. During the time that Barwick was Chief Justice of the High Court, he suggested 
that '[t]his Court, I may say, in the disposal of matters before it has favoured the hearing of oral argument and 
discussion with counsel of the points involved without the imposition of formal time limits': Sir Garfield 
Barwick, 'Ceremony to Commemorate 75'h Anniversary of Opening in 1903' (Speech delivered at the High Court 
of Australia, Melbourne, 6 October 1978). See also Garfield Barwick, 'Chief Justice Barwick: Speeches 1973-
1981', High Court of Australia Library, Canberra. This speech was also published in Sir Garfield Barwick, 'The 
Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of the Opening of the High Court of Australia: Commemorative Address' (1979) 53 
Australian Law Journal 36. 
66 Kirby, 'The future of appellate advocacy', above n 11, 142. 
67 Kirby, 'Appellate Advocacy- New Challenges', above n 11, p.12. Under Chief Justice Garfield Barwick (1964-
1981). the High Court had 'no disposition to move to written argument or to confine oral argument to rigid, 
invariant time limits'. Barwick's successor, Chief Justice Harry Gibbs (1981-1987), thought written submissions 
were 'not as effective as oral argument in bringing the attention of the court quickly to the heart of the 
problem' and therefore can 'never ... be a satisfactory substitute for oral argument'. See Anthony Mason, 
'Barwick Court' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper & George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High 
Court of Australia, (2001). Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, p.59; Harry Gibbs, 'Appellate Advocacy', 
above n 11, 496; Mason, 'The Role of Counsel and Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, p.546.; David Bennett, 
'Argument before the Court' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper & George Williams (eds), The Oxford 
Companion to the High Court of Australia, (2001), Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, p.32. 
68 Kirby, 'Appellate Advocacy- New Challenges', above n 11, p.12; Melissa Perry, 'The Art of Persuasion 
through the Written Word' (Paper presented at the Workshop on the Conduct of Appellate and Constitutional 
Litigation at the AACL National Conference (Adelaide), 4-5 August 2006), p.l. 
69 See High Court of Australia, Practice Direction No.1 of 2000 (see 
http://www .hcourt.gov .au/registry /Practice%20Direction%201 %20of%202000. pdf); See Sir Gerard Brennan, 
'Decision-making process' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper & George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion 
to the High Court of Australia, (2001), Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, pp.197-198. 
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submissions.70 All Australian appellate courts now require written submissions prior to the 
commencement of oral arguments." 
Written submissions have affected the manner in which an appellate advocate approaches oral 
advocacy. Appellate advocates cannot simply repeat their written submissions in oral argument nor 
can they merely read aloud their written submissions. In this context, oral argument is used to 
complement the advocate's written submissions. It also affords the advocate the opportunity to 
direct the court's attention to the critical aspects of the case and to clarify any matters that may be 
troubling the judges." 
Oral submissions allow an advocate's case to be tested by an appellate court in a manner that is not 
available when there is reliance upon written submissions. Whilst greater analysis of this issue is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, further analysis of effective appellate advocacy will provide insights 
that are relevant to this issue generally.73 Also, since 1984, an appeal to the High Court from other 
courts does not exist as of right but 'special leave' to appeal from the High Court must be obtained.74 
In applications for special leave, written summaries of argument are required and any oral arguments 
are limited to 20 minutes for each side with the applicant being granted 5 minutes in reply. The time 
limit was imposed in 1994.75 Kirby observed in relation to time limits for oral argument: 
70 See Part 44, High Court Rules 2004; Kirby, 'Appellate Advocacy- New Challenges', above n 11, p.13. 
71 Hayne, 'Written Advocacy', above n 64; D F Jackson, 'Appellate Advocacy' (1992) 8 Australian Bar Review 
245, 252; Kirby, 'The future of appellate advocacy', above n 11. 
72 Kirby, 'The future of appellate advocacy', above n 11, 145. At 145-146, former Justice of the High Court, 
Michael Kirby, observed that: 
A good advocate ordinarily uses oral argument to complement and strengthen written submissions, and not 
just to state them again in a slightly different way. More discerning advocates will keep in mind that some 
judges may not have had time to read the submissions carefully. In the particular case, some will be out of 
their familiar legal territory. Even in the age of written arguments, the advocate must tread a delicate path 
between keeping the interests of those judges who are 'hot' and 'have mastered the written materials' and 
those who are not and are not really focusing on what the case is about. It is quite a tall order. It is increased 
by the trend towards written argument. 
73 The issue that arises from this discussion is whether the move away from oral submissions to a greater 
reliance on written submissions is desirable from an administration of justice perspective. While there is 
efficiency associated with a heavier reliance on written submissions and less court time occupied with oral 
submissions, the question remains whether the trend away from oral submissions is ideal from the perspective 
of fairness and justice. It is here where the tension lies. 
74 See Judiciary Amendment Act {No 2) 1984 {Cth). The criteria for special leave are located in section 35A of 
the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and the formal procedure is outlined in Order 69A of the High Court Rules 2004. 
See Jackson, 'Leave to appeal', above n 62, p.426; Jackson, 'Practice in the High Court of Australia', above n 62; 
Jackson, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 71. See also Murray Gleeson, 'Australia's contribution to the common 
law' (2008) 82 Australian Low Journal247, 258. 
75 Alan Robertson, 'Procedure' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Caper & George Williams (eds), The Oxford 
Companion to the High Court of Australia, (2001), Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, pp.564-565. See 
also David F Jackson, 'Practice in the High Court of Australia' (1996-97) 15 Australian Bar Review 187, 198; 
Kirby, 'The future of appellate advocacy', above n 11. 
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They require a concentration of mind and focus of advocacy in a way that open-ended time does 
not. The time limits also demonstrate that most cases are susceptible [to] efficient presentation, 
so that their importance in legal and factual terms can be explained to experienced decision-
makers in twenty minutes. The need to do this ensures that advocates usually now go directly to 
the very heart of their case. 76 
Although strict time limits are not imposed in cases heard by the High Court of Australia at present, 
the duration of oral argument is significantly shorter than in the past. In most complex cases, the 
oral argument will span one day with very few stretching into the second day or beyond. The Bank 
Natiana/isatian Case which ran for 39 days in the High Court in 1948 is still the longest running High 
Court case, closely followed by the Communist Party Case in 1950 at 24 days. It is unlikely that any 
future High Court cases will even approach, let alone exceed, the length of these cases due to the 
requirement that parties file and serve a summary of arguments and written submissions.77 In recent 
times, one of the longest running High Court hearings was the challenge by various states to the 
Federal government's workplace relations law- the Work Choices Case.78 The hearing in May 2006 
lasted 6 days which is lengthy by modern day standards. The tendency towards shorter oral 
arguments is the result of the increasing reliance on written submissions.79 
These developments are important for two main reasons. First, the context in which Barwick 
appeared as an appellate advocate has changed80 and his ability as an appellate advocate needs to 
be examined in the context in which he appeared.81 However, the elements and ideals of appellate 
76 Kirby, 'Appellate Advocacy- New Challenges', above n 11, p.17. See also Kirby, 'The future of appellate 
advocacy', above n 11. 
77 Susan Priest and George Williams, 'Bank Nationalisation Case' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper & George 
Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia, (2001), Oxford University Press, South 
Melbourne, pp.52-53; George Williams, 'Communist Party Case' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper & George 
Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia, (2001), Oxford University Press, South 
Melbourne, pp.122-124; Kirby, 'Appellate Advocacy- New Challenges', above n 11, p.18. 
78 NSW v Commonwealth of Australia; Western Australia v Commonwealth of Australia (2006) 229 CLR 1. The 
High Court's judgment was delivered on 14 November 2006. 
79 Kirby, 'The future of appellate advocacy', above n 11; Jackson, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, p.18. 
80 This was noted by Oavid Jackson QC where he stated that: 
in the days when [Barwick) was appearing in the High Court, when he was counsel, and also at the Privy 
Council in the constitutional cases there, there were some differences. It was for practical purposes all oral 
advocacy. It was not until, when I think maybe he was Chief Justice, they even introduced skeleton argument, 
Outlines of Argument, we used to call them, there were no written submissions and that had a significant 
effect of course, because the oral advocacy now is ... more directed and a lot shorter than it was in his day. 
Interview with David Jackson QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). David Jackson QC also noted that Barwick had 
appeared in 'a lot of cases' and 'had probably more experience in constitutional matters than most other 
people to that point'. He also noted that the Bars, including the NSW Bar, were very small by comparison to 
the current size of the NSW Bar. However, David Jackson QC noted that 'Barwick was outstanding, but there is 
a sort of relativity in all this: 'You['ve] got to take people as they are, in the milieu of their day'. 
81 For example, the ranks of the NSW Bar were depleted due to World War II. This was acknowledged by 
former Chief Justice Murray Gleeson in his interview with the author (see Interview with Murray Gleeson, Chief 
Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 14 August 2006)) and also by Gough Whitlam in his 1997 book, 
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advocacy that are discussed are equally applicable to appellate advocacy in the High Court in the 
present and likely to be in the future. With the shorter time allowed for oral argument, it is now 
more important for an appellate advocate to arrive at the heart of the case, focus on the most critical 
aspects of the case, and discard the irrelevant points, particularly in an application for special leave 
to the High Court.82 This discussion inevitably leads to the question: would Barwick's ability as an 
appellate advocate have ensured success in the present day environment? In my view, the question 
can be answered in the affirmative. Many of the strengths and features of his advocacy that will 
become apparent from the analysis undertaken in this thesis would still be regarded as relevant and 
important although he would have had to adapt his style in the current environment where there is 
an increasing reliance on written submissions. 
From time to time, appellate advocates will face further challenges which will inevitably influence the 
way that appellate advocacy is conducted. One example is the increasing use oftechnology.83 
Appellate advocates will need to apply and adapt the elements and ideals of appellate advocacy to 
suit the prevailing environment84 Despite this, the fundamental objective of advocacy- persuasion-
remains constant. Advocacy 'is not only an ancient, honourable profession, venerable with tradition, 
it is a dynamic, adaptive art and vocation'.85 
'Abiding Interests' where he stated that '[t]here was still resentment that Barwick had surged ahead at the bar 
while his potential rivals were engaged in war service, such as Gordon Wallace, a Duntroon graduate, and 
Victor Windeyer, in command at Tobruk' (Gough Whitlam, Abiding Interests, (1997), University of Queensland 
Press, Queensland, p.15). 
82 Former Chief Justice Gleeson agrees: 
don't forget that nowadays a lot more advocacy is in writing ... but that capacity to go directly to the issue is 
even more important now where we give people limited time. We very rarely permit a case to last more than 
a day and that capacity of directness is of course most important in special leave applications where you only 
get 20 minutes. So if you can't go quickly to the point- you've had it. 
Interview with Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 14 August 2006). He also 
believed that imagination (in terms of creative arguments), which was one of Barwick's great strengths, 
remains an important quality and that advocates who used their imagination to recognise and address the 
consequences of particular arguments, in terms of their impact on future cases, were likely to get a good 
reception. Also, he believed that engaging the bench is now more important for an advocate in light of the 
limited timeframe and that the key to this is preparation. 
83 Kirby, 'Appellate Advocacy- New Challenges', above n 11, pp.20-21. See also A Stanfield, 'Dinosaurs to 
Dynamos: Has the Law Reached its Technological Age?' (1998) 21 University of NSW Law Journal540; 
Talmadge, above n 11; G Nicholson,' A Vision of the Future of Appellate Practice and Process' (2000) 2 Journal 
of Appellate Practice and Process 229; F I Lederer, 'The Effect of Court Room Technologies on and in Appellate 
Proceedings and Court Rooms' (2000) 2 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 251; Kirby, 'The future of 
appellate advocacy', above n 11. An example of technology that has directly impacted upon oral advocacy and 
appellate advocacy has been the introduction of video-link technology in the courts. 
84 Kirby, 'Appellate Advocacy- New Challenges', above n 11, p.19; Kirby, 'The future of appellate advocacy', 
above n 11, 142. 
85 Kirby, 'Appellate Advocacy- New Challenges', above n 11, pp.48-49. 
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1.5 The Elements and Ideals of Appellate Advocacy 
As noted, this thesis seeks to undertake a critical exploration ofthe elements and ideals of appellate 
advocacy and then use this as a framework to assess appellate advocacy in practice by examining, 
specifically, Barwick's advocacy in two constitutional law cases. This will be undertaken using the 
'three category analysis' discussed earlier. 
From the outset, it should be borne in mind that a critical exploration ofthe elements and ideals of 
appellate advocacy will encompass elements that can also be readily described as qualities, skills or 
techniques.•• 
Underlying the qualities, skills and techniques of appellate advocacy is the fundamental purpose, and 
ultimate objective, of advocacy- persuasion. The principles, skills and techniques of appellate 
advocacy are the means to achieving that end. Chief Justice French, when asked to name the 
qualities that best define the leading barristers to have appeared before him, stated: 'calm, 
reflective, well thought out and well-prepared presentations, where counsel can engage with the 
court in a real dialogue, is the most persuasive' .87 He added that 'of course, [if] counsel can underpin 
their legal propositions with a little bit of moral edge, that also helps ... Can counsel persuade you 
that it is not just the law, but justice that is on his or her side?'. The qualities that French effectively 
describes as key aspects of appellate advocacy can be traced back to the three categories, namely, 
preparation, presentation and personation. His statement also supports the view that the key 
elements and ideals of appellate advocacy remain relevant in the present day. 
Although some advocates may possess what might be thought of as an innate ability or an aptitude 
for advocacy which gives them a decided advantage,'' such an advantage is quickly eroded without 
86 For the purposes of this thesis, the author defines these terms as follows: 
1. qualities- refers to a characteristic or attribute; 
2. skills- refers to the ability, based on one's knowledge, practice, aptitude and so forth, to do 
something well, as well as the proficiency and facility that is acquired or developed through training or 
experience; 
3. techniques- refers to a practical method applied to some particular task, the manner and ability with 
which a person employs the technical skills of a particular field of endeavour and the body of 
specialised procedures and methods used in any specific field as well as the ability to apply the 
procedures or methods so as to effect a desired result. 
87 James Eyres, 'French for Justice', AFR Magazine (Sydney), July 2010, 30-33, at 33. 
88 Kirby, stated that: 
Talent in advocacy has traditionally been viewed as a natural gift rather than a skill to be developed. Good 
advocates were thought to be born, not made. I do not deny that there may be a gene or two in the 36,000 
genes on the human genome that is labelled 'top advocate'- 'skills of communication and persuasion'. Such 
talents may indeed be inherited, at least to some extent. 
Kirby, 'The 'rules' of appellate advocacy', above n 24, p.13. See also Justice Michael Kirby, 'In-temper 
advocacy', Lawyers Weekly, 14 July 2006, 26 at p.141; Donovan, above n 11, p.1. 
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application, practice and experience. Irrespective of an advocate's natural ability, it can be 
improved89 by refining the principles, skills and techniques through hard work: 
Advocacy is the art of persuasion. Advocacy is the technique of persuasion. Some of us have a 
natural talent for advocacy, some of us do not. Whatever the level of our talent and our innate 
ability in the art of advocacy, it am be improved, frequently vastly improved, by proper 
foundation and technique. The technique is something which we can all use. No advocate, no 
matter how talented, is good a II the time. 90 
Although advocacy can be taught, the relevant qualities, skills and techniques cannot be acquired by 
study alone. They are acquired and developed through practice, experience and observation. Gibbs 
stated: 
Advocacy is an art or a skill. Success as an advocate may come from the development of innate 
abilities, particularly by practice and experience, or by observing, and perhaps imitating, those 
who are expert, but it is not achieved, in my opinion, by study or instruction. Of course the 
appellate advocate must have acquired, by study or otherwise, a sufficient knowledge of the law 
to enable him to attempt his task, but that necessary precondition has little to do with the quality 
of advocacy. There are, it is true, certain general principles, mostly rather trite, of which anyone 
who aspires to be an advocate ought to be aware. 91 
In explaining why advocacy is described as an art, prominent barrister, Tom Hughes, stated: 'because 
it is a use of a variety of skills based upon knowledge and experience, developed and deployed with 
imagination and initiative' .92 Whilst advocacy is an art, it is one which is inherently personal -it 
requires individual preparation, presentation and personation. Consequently, it has been suggested 
that: 
... if not a lost art, advocacy is an exacting one. When he rises to speak at the bar, the advocate 
stands intellectually naked and alone. Habits of thought and speech cannot be borrowed like 
garments for the event. What an advocate gives to a case is himself; he can bring to the bar only 
what is within him. A part written for him will never be convincing." 
Hughes described advocacy as 'the deployment of a power to persuade: the projection of the 
advocate's personality into the presentation of a case is therefore a key factor' .94 Mason agreed that 
89 Kirby, stated that: 'in recent decades it has increasingly been recognised that advocacy skills can be improved 
and sharpened' (Kirby, 'The 'rules' of appellate advocacy', above n 24, p.13). 
90 Donovan, above n 11, p.l. A similar view was expressed in Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 11, in the 
Preface by The Honourable Charles Leonard Dubin, Chief Justice of Ontario. 
91 Harry Gibbs, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11,496. 
92 Tom Hughes, 'The Art of Advocacy', n.d., unpublished, p.S. Provided to the author by Tom Hughes on 2 
August 2006 during interview. 
"Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 14. 
94 Hughes, above n 92, p.S. 
33 
an advocate's style is heavily influenced by personality.95 Chief Justice French also believes that an 
advocate's personality, can properly inform an individual's advocacy'' 
Mason also stated: 
One thing you've got to bear in mind about advocacy is that the qualities that make one advocate 
• 
very successful aren't necessarily the qualities that are going to make another advocate very 
successful. It's rather like these things -lists of qualities you're looking for in a judge- you end up 
with about 20 qualities. If any one person had them all he'd be a paragon of all the virtues and 
I've never encountered anyone who did. It's rather like that with advocates. What made Barwick 
a great advocate is not what made somebody like Kitto or Douglas Menzies a great advocate. 97 
Mason identified some of the important elements of appellate advocacy but emphasised that it is 
critical as to how these are deployed: 
... you can't succeed unless you're intelligent, unless you've got a good knowledge of the law, 
unless you present an ordered argument and unless you deal with questions, but that said, how 
you go about it rather depends on the qualities that you are deploying."' 
The inference from these statements is that, whilst a critical exploration will reveal the key elements 
and ideals of appellate advocacy, these are applied by appellate advocates in differing ways in line 
with their individual personality and style. Therefore, whilst this thesis will assess Barwick's advocacy 
in constitutional law cases against the elements of effective appellate advocacy, it cannot be 
concluded that Barwick's application provides the only path to achieve effective appellate advocacy, 
but rather that Barwick was able to employ certain elements of appellate advocacy in a particularly 
effective manner, and was consistently recognised by others as doing so. 
95 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 
21 February 2006). 
96 Kate Gibbs, 'Chief Justice scrutinises personality and justice', above n 11, 1. 
97 1nterview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). 
98 1bid. 
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Chapter 2: Barwick's Early Years at the Bar 
"Now, my years connected with the low- they now span well over fifty years. Divided up, as I think of 
it, it is roughly four periods. There is a period when I was a junior barrister ... I was roughly 13 years 
or 14 years a junior counsel and tflen about 6 years a senior counsel in practice, and then for 
approximately six years in government, something which I much enjoyed. And then I have been here 
almost 17 years [as Chief Justice]. 
{l}f I had to answer which of those periods /liked the best, I think I would say, the first; when I was 
young, making my way; learning the art of advocacy; learning the art of presenting an argument 
clearly and succinctly and learning how to persuade the minds of others to come to your point of 
view. I think that was the nicest part of those four periods." 
Sir Garfield Barwick, 198199 
This chapter focuses on Barwick's formative years at the Bar. It will provide an insight into the 
manner in which Barwick developed and acquired an understanding of the elements and ideals of 
appellate advocacy. It will provide a foundation for analysing Barwick's advocacy in later chapters 
and for conducting an in-depth analysis of Barwick's advocacy in the Bank Nationalisation Case and 
the Communist Party Case. 
When Barwick was asked in an interview in 1989 to identify the skills and qualities required to be a 
good advocate, he stated: 
An advocate must have very quick cerebration. He must have acute appreciation of the relevance of 
what he hears or sees. And of course, he has to have a very quick recall of whatever he has heard or 
read. They are qualities which may be improved if you've got the basis for them but you cannot, I think, 
grow them or engineer them. 100 
Barwick acknowledged that the elements of advocacy can be improved and developed but that 
advocates need to possess them to begin with. This, it can be inferred, reflected his perception of his 
own qualities. 
99 Transcript of Proceedings, Ceremonial Sitting on the occasion of the Retirement of the Chief Justice, The 
Right Honourable Sir Garfield Barwick, P.C., G.C.M.G. at Canberra, Wednesday, 11 February 1981. 
100 Molomby & Donohoe, above n 19, 9. 
35 
2.1 Going to the Bar 
Barwick was born on 22 June 1903. He attended Bourke Street Primary, Cleveland Street High and 
Fort Street High in Sydney. He recalled that '[a]t the end of my schooldays I remained committed to 
following the law' .101 He graduated from the University of Sydney in 1922 after completing a 
• 
Bachelor of Arts and in 1925 after completing a Bachelor of Laws with Honours. He completed his 
articles of clerkship with a Sydney solicitor, HW Waddell, and was called to the Bar in 1927.102 
Barwick's early years at the Bar were difficult and he struggled to earn a living. This was not helped 
by the fact that he did not have the family or social connections that so often assist during the early 
years at the Bar.103 Nevertheless, his ability to meet these challenges and cope with the demands 
was greatly assisted by his passion for the law .104 
In his early days at the Bar, Barwick acknowledged that his success would depend on his own ability, 
including his ability to master the art of advocacy: 'The great adventure that was beginning had its 
obvious perils. I was to rely solely on my own abilities, attempting to master the art of advocacy, and 
then attract the attention of solicitors and their litigating clients' .105 
101 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.8. See also National 
Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 1. See also Senator George Brandis 
SC, 'The Lawyer's Duty To Public Life' (Speech delivered at the Inaugural Sir Garfield Barwick Address to the 
Legal Practitioners' Professional Branch of the New South Wales Division of the Liberal Party, Sydney, 28 June 
2010). 
102 Winterton, 'Barwick, Garfield Edward John', above n 2, p.56. HW Waddell's father was Tom Waddell, the 
Colonial Treasurer, and his cousin was George Waddell who had been at the Bar and was a partner at Minter 
Simpson's (see National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 8-9). 
According to Barwick, he received 'very good grounding in legal principle with the Law School plus the articles 
and the very great responsibility that I carried in that office' (see National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview 
with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 12). See also Brandis, above n 101; Mark Speakman SC, 'Introduction' 
(Speech delivered at the Inaugural Sir Garfield Barwick Address to the Legal Practitioners' Professional Branch 
of the New South Wales Division of the Liberal Party, Sydney, 28 June 2010). 
103 According to Barwick's son, Ross Barwick, during his early years at the Bar: 
I think its fair to say that he starved. In social terms he was caught on the wrong side of the tracks. The Bar 
at the time was dominated by wealthier families, old families, many of whom really had no need to work at 
all ... And I think in his early years he was probably ostracised if not isolated in his own profession because of 
his social background, and his economic background. 
See Interview with Ross Barwick (Sydney, 4 October 2006). 
104 Barwick described his passion for the law as follows: 
From my very early boyhood I wanted to become a lawyer. The desire to practise the law has been the 
leitmotif of my life, a childhood dream that remained with me and gave me the stimulus to apply myself to 
study. It would be true to say that the law, its practice and administration have dominated my life; 
throughout my practising days as a barrister, I never contemplated following any other occupation. 
Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.2. 
105 Ibid, p.19. 
36 
Part of Barwick's training consisted of sitting in courts and observing whenever he had spare time 
and 'devilling' for other junior barristers In doing so, he worked his way into favour with solicitors. 106 
According to his son, Ross Barwick,'07 
in terms of his advocacy, I think that that period of watching and learning, sitting in the backs of courts 
and hanging around other barristers and doing his best to ... work his way into practice, I think though 
they were clearly very formative years.'08 
This was confirmed by Barwick in an interview in 1989 where he was asked what the important 
things were to get a grasp of when a barrister was starting at the Bar. He responded: 
I think if I were beginning again I would want to go and sit to begin with in a courtroom and listen and 
observe ... 
So I'd go and sit in the court and listen and watch, particularly during a jury trial. 
I'd watch how my contemporaries or those who are older than myself handle witnesses and build up 
facts, how they deal with the judge, their approach to the judge, and I'd watch the judge's reaction to 
what they did and said 
... whenever I did have spare moments I didn't spend them playing dominos. I'd go over and watch and 
listen, choosing a case I'd know from rumour or the lists, a case from which I'd profit by observing.'09 
This demonstrates Barwick's keenness to learn at every opportunity. Whilst Barwick referred 
specifically to jury trials, as he acknowledged, he also saw advocates engaging with judges and learnt 
the importance of watching the bench. 
Whilst at the Bar, Barwick was aware of, and well-acquainted with, his own skills and abilities but was 
also conscious of his own constraints. He realised relatively early that he was more suited to 
appellate advocacy than trial advocacy. 110 History would suggest that although Barwick was regarded 
106 1nterview with Ross Barwick (Sydney, 4 October 2006). 
107 Ross Garfield Barwick was the eldest child of Sir Garfield Barwick and his wife Lady Norma Barwick. He was 
a Solicitor in NSW and a partner of Barwick Dechnicz & Boitano before being struck off the Roll of Legal 
Practitioners on 29 April 2002 for professional misconduct. 
108 Interview with Ross Barwick (Sydney, 4 October 2006). 
109 Molomby & Donohoe, above n 19, 9. 
110 According to Barwick, this stemmed from the fact that he could not employ the necessary drama and 
rhetoric required for trial advocacy: 
During my articled clerk days, the advocates at common law, or at least some prominent among them, were 
of a theatrical kind given to rhetoric, seeking thereby to influence the jury. I fear that at times they treated 
the jury much as some politicians treat the electors- as if they were only swayed by emotive considerations 
and unable by the exercise of common sense to form reasonable judgments. I realised early that I had little 
use for rhetoric, chiefly because it was somewhat beyond my talents. 
Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.19. 
Upon reflection, in relation to his ability as a trial advocate, Barwick conceded that he never fully mastered the 
art of cross examination: 'Cross-examination is an art I do not think I ever fully mastered, certainly not to the 
degree attained by others' (Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, 
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as a leading advocate during his time at the Bar, his reputation arose out of his exploits as an 
appellate advocate rather than as a trial advocate. 
Following this realisation, Barwick sought to master the art of advocacy and develop his own style of 
advocacy based on his own abilities as well as his strengths and weaknesses. Barwick described the 
style of advocacy that he adopted in the context of jury trials in a manner that has some parallels 
with the style he employed as an appellate advocate: 
I came to think that as an advocate I should adopt a quiet presentation, leaving room for raising the 
voice and for gesture when emphasis was needed, but concentrating on reducing to simple terms the 
issues to be decided and the principles of law to be applied .... I thought that my task would be to 
persuade them by logic and good sense. 111 
One of the common features of Barwick's trial advocacy and appellate advocacy, as will be discussed 
later, was his ability to reduce difficult concepts to simple terms. Inherent in the above statement is 
that Barwick was conscious that his primary task as an advocate was to persuade, and he never lost 
sight of this fundamental objective. 
During his time at the Bar, Barwick practised both in common law and in equity. He intentionally 
accepted a wide array of briefs involving diverse areas of the law to gain vital advocacy experience 
and increase his familiarity with various courts: 
... my practice in this respect was part of my overall desire to be an all-rounder, to prepare myself 
as a senior counsel to handle the law in any of its aspects, and to do so with equal efficiency. In 
this fashion, I began to be at home in the courtroom, no matter which courtroom it was and no 
matter which aspect of the law was being administered. 112 
According to Robert Ellicott QC113, it was: 
p.23). Therefore, whilst he was regarded as a superlative appellate advocate, Barwick admitted to being a poor 
cross-examiner. Sir Anthony Mason disagreed. He described Barwick as a 'very good counsel at first instance 
on the facts' and a 'good cross-examiner': Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High 
Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 August 2006). 
111 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.19. 
112 Ibid, p.29. Barwick stated that: 
... the Depression gave me a chance because the financial stringency, there was always a group who wanted 
to get out of the contract, or even in the mortgagee-mortgagor struggle, one had to use one's wits, so I got a 
great opportunity for taking points, working things out, and it suited my particular make-up, and that brought 
me a good deal of work and prominence. Then also, because of this work in the office, I was able to handle 
real property work, I was able to handle equity work and common law work, too, I had had experience with 
them all, and so I grew up fairly quickly, plus I think a capacity for long hours of work'. 
National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 14. 
113 Robert James "Bob" Ellicott QC was called to the Bar in 19SO and appointed a Queen's Counsel in 1964. He 
was the Commonwealth Solicitor-General from 1969 to 1973. He was the Member for Wentworth in 1974 until 
1981 and was the Attorney-General in the Fraser Ministry from 1975 to 1977. He was the Minister for Home 
Affairs and Minister for Capital Territory between 1977 and 1980 and was Minister for Home Affairs and the 
Environment from November 1980 until his resignation on 17 February 1981 to become a judge of the Federal 
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testimony to the breadth of his advocacy [that] he could appear across the board. I don't think 
he did a tremendous lot of criminal work but apart from that in all aspects of the common law, 
constitutional law obviously, commercial law, equity, he was at home in almost every branch of 
advocacy, and I go back to the nature of his mind, quick, able to [attack] a subject and command 
it fairly quickly114 
This approach to advocacy ensured that Barwick acquired a broad knowledge of the law generally as 
well. as the procedure in various jurisdictions. 
Barwick, as noted, recalled that the happiest times of his life were when he was a young barrister-
dashing from court to court, learning his craft and getting into the mind of the judge through 
persuasion and advocacy.'" In relation to Barwick's early years at the Bar, Sir John Kerr described 
him as a young man 'at the Bar doing very well handling big work'. 116 
2.2 Taking Silk 
As time went on, Barwick attracted the leading junior work with Alan Taylor and Jack Shand. Barwick 
was appointed a King's Counsel in 1941 after 14 years at the Bar.117 He then began to receive briefs 
from the prestigious firms of solicitors in Sydney to which he previously did not have access.'" 
Sir Maurice Byers119 recalled an occasion in 1942 or 1943, during the time when he was an Associate 
to Justice Kenneth Street, when he saw Barwick in action. He described Barwick as follows: 
Court of Australia. He resigned from the court in February 1983 and returned to practice at the private Bar. He 
is a prominent advocate who has in excess of 50 years experience practising as a barrister in NSW, Australia 
and in the Privy Council in the UK. 
114 Interview with Han. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
115 Scutt (ed), above n 9, p.7 (Foreword by Michael Kirby, 17 March 1987). 
116 John Kerr, Matters for Judgment: An Autobiography, (1988), Macmillan Company of Australia Pty Ltd, South 
Melbourne, p.45. 
117 Also known as taking silk. In 1940, a number of solicitors who regularly briefed Barwick suggested to him 
that he consider applying to be appointed a King's Counsel. At this time, Barwick declined for unknown 
reasons. 
118 Barwick had suggested to both Taylor and Shand that they all apply for silk together. However, they refused 
in light of the fact that at the time silks were not getting as much work as the leading juniors. Leading juniors 
like Barwick, Taylor and Shand were doing a disproportionate amount of work and were earning as much as a 
silk. Taylor and Shand remained reluctant. See Winterton, 'Barwick, Garfield Edward John', above n 2, p.56. 
Following his success, Taylor and Shand sought silk and were granted it 2 years later: see Barwick, A Radical 
Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, pp.30-31; Marr, above n 8, p.35. Whilst there is 
reference to Barwick taking silk in 1942, it appears that he in fact took silk in 1941 (see National Library of 
Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 14). See also Brandis, above n 101; High Court 
of Australia, Justices, <http://www.hcourt.gav.au/justices_02.html> at 28 November 2011. 
119 He was admitted to the Bar in 1944, and made a QC in 1960. He was Solicitor-General of Australia from 1973 
to 1983. 
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I remember as if it was yesterday, the face vibrant with life and vitality, the restless brown eyes, 
the questioning, slightly amused face and, above all, the powerful, winning and magnetic 
personality. While the details of that case are long forgotten, I do recall him arguing the invalidity 
of a price-fixing order before the Full Court. His fertility of illustration was unrivalled. His ability 
to support his own argument, or to ridicule his opponent's by apt and telling examples, enabled 
him to present his case in its most seductive garb. When to this was added the force and charm 
of his personality, his power as an appellant advocate at this time was unrivalled in Australia. 120 
By the early 1940s, Barwick had begun to develop into a fine advocate. He had the ability to guide a 
court through the intricacies and complexities of legislation with relative ease. He was able to grasp 
complex and difficult concepts and convey them to the court in simple terms and in a manner that 
was easily comprehensible. George Amsberg121, a former District Court judge, recalled his: 
gift of making the binomial theorem sound like the alphabet. He could make the dullest judge 
understand. It was always lightly done. Once when he argued before me, he made a submission 
which switched me right round. I don't know what it was, but he suddenly showed me the way as 
plain as blazing daylight."' 
Barwick appeared with regularity in the District Court and Supreme Court and had occasional cases 
before the High Court.123 The latter were mostly appeals resulting from cases which he had earlier 
conducted in the Supreme Court. 124 Whilst he was later to appear in the High Court regularly, he 
appeared 'only lightly in the earlier years' .125 After 15 years at the Bar, he was ideally placed to 
increase his constitutional law practice which, up until being appointed a senior counsel, had 
consisted of only one case before the High Court.'" After Barwick had made several appearances in 
120 Maurice Byers, 'Obituary: the Right Hon Sir Garfield Barwick AK, GCMG, QC' (1997) 71(9) Australian Law 
Journal723, 723. 
121 George Amsberg QC was appointed as a judge of the District Court on 15 October 1952. He was admitted to 
the Bar in 1928 and was appointed a Queens Counsel in 1951 (see 'Mr. Amsberg, Q.C., Appointed To District 
Court', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 16 October 1952, 2). Interestingly, George Amsberg shared the 
University Medal with Barwick: see Interview with Ross Barwick (Sydney, 4 October 2006) and Winterton, 
'Barwick, Garfield Edward John', above n 2, p.56. 
122 Marr, above n 8, p.37. 
123 He also appeared with regularity in the Supreme Court of Victoria: see National Library of Australia, Miller, 
Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 14. 
124 Woolworths Ltd v Crotty [1942] HCA 35; (1942) 66 CLR 603 (17 December 1942); White v Australian & New 
Zealand Theatres Ltd [1943] HCA 6; (1943) 67 CLR 266 (29 Apri11943); Hume v Monro (No 2) [1943] HCA 7; 
(1943) 67 CLR 461 (6 May 1943); Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Royal Sydney Golf Club [1943] HCA 26; 
(1943) 67 CLR 599 (30 September 1943); R v Dalgety & Co Ltd Suppliant [1944] HCA 2; (1944) 69 CLR 18 
(2 March 1944); Minister of State for the Army v Parbury Henty & Company Pty Ltd [1945] HCA 52; (1945) 
70 CLR 459 (10 August 1945). 
125 Transcript of Proceedings in the High Court of Australia at Sydney on Friday 1" May 1964 on the occasion of 
the Swearing In of Sir Garfield Barwick as Chief Justice of Australia, p.9; See also Garfield Barwick, 'Chief Justice 
Barwick: Speeches 1964-1972', High Court of Australia Library, Canberra. 
126 In fact, the first case where Barwick appeared in the High Court of Australia was as junior counselled by 
Flannery KC in Wolfson v Registrar-General (NSW) [1934] HCA 29; (1934) 51 CLR 300 (7 August 1934). Before 
40 
the High Court, 127 a senior member of the Bar informed him that it was his understanding that the 
Justices were impressed by Barwick's work but thought he was too brief in his presentations. 
Although this surprised Barwick, he later stated: 
I had a habit of condensing my submissions and no doubt expected them to be picked up quickly. 
Apparently I had to learn to elabbrate my propositions and perhaps sometimes to repeat them, 
maybe in different form and tailored to catch the eye of a particular judge. But despite this 
encouraging message, for which I was grateful, I did not seek to build a practice in that court. 128 
Apparently, Barwick responded to the senior member of the Bar: 'If they don't understand what I 
say, that's their business'. This statement suggests some arrogance on Barwick's part. However, he 
did concede that 'I had to alter my ways a little' .'29 
Following the sudden death of Edward Mitchell KC, 130 Barwick was briefed with cases that would 
have ordinarily been directed to Mitchell. Barwick's High Court practice grew considerably and 
quickly into what he described as 'almost unmanageable proportions'.'" Within a few months of 
Mitchell's death, Barwick recalled that he 'had a flood on my table' and that then he was 
'overworked in the High Court' .132 
Barwick appeared in 173 cases in the High Court between the 51'' volume of the Commonwealth Law 
Reports and the 106'h volume.'" It has been said of Barwick that '[i]n the late 1940's and early 
1950's he dominated the Australian legal profession in a way that has never been equalled' .134 
taking silk, Barwick appeared in eight cases in the High Court of Australia with only one involving constitutional 
law issues, namely, The King v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Ex parte Lowenstein (1937) 59 CLR 556 which is 
discussed later. See generally Tony Blackshield, Michael Caper & George Williams (eds). The Oxford Companion 
to the High Court of Australia, (2001), Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, pp.164-165. 
127 A leading barrister practising in the High Court at the time, Edward Mitchell KC, suggested that Barwick 
should attempt to practise more regularly in the High Court. Despite this suggestion, and for unknown reasons, 
Barwick still made no effort to do so. He may have been comfortable with the current state of his practice. 
128 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, pp.32-33. 
129 National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, lB. 
130 Edward Mitchell established himself at the Bar at the same time as Isaac Isaacs (later Chief Justice of the 
High Court of Australia) as 'an eminent constitutional and equity lawyer': see Max Gordon, Sir Isaac Isaacs: A 
Life of Service, (1963), Heinemann, Melbourne, p.37. 
131 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.33; National Library of 
Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 17-18. 
132 National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 18. 
133 Of advocates who later became judges of the High Court, only Sir Owen Dixon (with 175 appearances) and 
Sir Hayden Starke (with 211 appearances) have recorded more. See Tony Blackshield, Michael Caper, Graham 
Fricke and Troy Simpson, 'Counsel, notable' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Caper & George Williams (eds), The 
Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia, (2001), Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, pp.164-
165. 
134 Anthony R Blackshield, 'Barwick- Great and Vague Powers' (June, 1980) 21 Australian Book Review 1, 1. 
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Barwick conceded that over his career 'there would be many more losses than successes'135, but 
several of the latter were of great constitutional significance: Airlines Case, 136 Melbourne Corporation 
Cose137 and the Bank Nationalisation Case.138 Barwick's final appearance as counsel was in 1961 as 
Commonwealth Attorney-General before the Privy Council in Dennis Hotels v Victoria.'" According 
to former Chief Justice Murray Gle~son, 140 Barwick was the first Australian advocate to appear 
regularly in the Privy Council.141 
135 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.48. It is difficult to 
obtain statistics in relation to Barwick's win/loss record so as to give an accurate overall picture as some cases 
he was involved in were not reported. It would be possible to compile such statistics in relation to High Court 
and Privy Council cases but this would give a result in relation to a narrow sample of cases. 
136 Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29. 
137 Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31 (also referred to as the "State Banking Case"). 
138 Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 (High Court); Commonwealth v Bank of New 
South Wales (1949) 79 CLR 497; [1950] AC 235 (Privy Council). One notable loss was the Communist Party 
Case. 
139 Dennis Hotels Pty Ltd v Victoria (1961) 104 CLR 621. See Winterton, 'Barwick, Garfield Edward John', above n 
2, p.57. 
140 Anthony Murray Gleeson appeared frequently in the High Court of Australia as well as the Privy Council and 
was recognised as 'perhaps the finest appellate advocate in the British Commonwealth': T. Cole, 'People in the 
Law: Hon AM Gleeson AC, QC' (2008) 82 Australian Law Journal684. He was called to the Bar in 1963 and 
appointed a Queen's Counsel in 1974. He also appeared for the appellant in the last case that ever went from 
the High Court to the Privy Council. He was Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia between 1998 and 
2008. Before this, he was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of NSW between 1988 and 1998. 
141 1nterview with Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 14 August 2006). 
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2.3 Early Constitutional Law Cases 
Barwick's first reported constitutional case before the High Court, Ex parte Lowenstein142, was heard 
in 1937. Barwick was not led by a senior counsel and argued the case himself. He was briefed to 
appear for Lowenstein, a bankrupt hairdresser, who had been charged under section 209(g) of the 
• 
Bankruptcy Act 1924-1933 (Cth) for failing 'to keep such books of account as are usual and proper'. 
Section 217 allowed a court, in circumstances where a bankrupt had committed an offence under the 
Act, to charge the bankrupt with an offence and try him summarily or commit him for trial before a 
court of competent jurisdiction. Barwick argued, on behalf of Lowenstein, that the particular 
sections of the Bankruptcy Act were unconstitutional.143 
The majority ofthe High Court (comprising four judges)144 rejected Barwick's submissions.'45 
However, Barwick was able to achieve a joint dissent from Dixon and Evatt JJ. They stated that: 
We do not think that a legislative power to create courts, to invest them with jurisdiction and to 
make laws upon all matters incidental to the exercise of the judicial power extends to the kind of 
power which sec.217 ... attempt[s) to give. 146 
Despite the Lowenstein result, Barwick's reputation as an advocate flourished. The Lowenstein case 
was a 'very respectable defeat'147 as it was a case that was not considered winnable from 
142 The King v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Ex parte Lowenstein (1937) 59 CLR 556. 
143 Marr, above n 8, p.29; Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law (1929-1949), (1963}, Melbourne 
University Press, Parkville, p.121. See also 'BANKRUPTCY ACT TO BE TESTED', The Mercury (Hobart), 26 June 
1937, 11; 'LAW REPORT- A BANKRUPTCY CHARGE', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 19 August 1937, 7. 
144 Latham CJ, Rich, Starke and McTiernan JJ. 
145 In the High Court, Barwick made two main submissions: 
(1) that the section establishing the charge (section 209(g)) was ultra vires, that is beyond the powers of 
the Constitution (s 51 (xvii)); 
(2) there was an improper interference between executive and judicial power in the Court since, under 
the Bankruptcy Act, the Court would act as both the prosecutor and the judge of the particular 
offence. 
The case was argued before the High Court in Sydney on 22-23 November 1937 before Latham CJ, Rich, Starke, 
Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ. The judgment was delivered by the High Court sitting in Melbourne on 7 March 
1938. Barwick's first submission was rejected. The High Court unanimously held that in enacting section 
209(g), the Commonwealth Parliament had not acted beyond its constitutional power. However, in relation to 
the second submission, the Court was required to determine whether it was a proper exercise of judicial power 
for a court to charge a bankrupt with failing to keep proper books of account under section 217 of the 
Bankruptcy Act. Barwick argued that the section purported to divest the executive of executive power (as 
those words exist in section 61 of the Constitution) and invest a court with a non-judicial function inconsistent 
with its judicial function with respect to the same subject matter. Barwick submitted that it was for the 
executive government to determine whether such a charge would be brought against a particular individual 
and that it was not a function of the judiciary for a judge to be in the position that they are a party to the 
proceeding and also the judge presiding in the proceedings. 
146 The King v Federal Court of Bankruptcy and An or; Ex parte Lowenstein (1937) 59 CLR 556 at 589. See also 
Marr, above n 8, p.29; Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law (1929-1949), above n 143, p.121; Scott Guy, 
'Herbert Vere Evatt: Jurist, Politician, Person- The Paradox' (2009) 21(1) Bond Law Review 65, 97. 
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Lowenstein's perspective (although the dissenting judgments may suggest that this was not the case) 
and it was testament to Barwick's ability as an advocate that he came so close to doing so. 
Another early constitutional case in which Barwick was involved was Colvin v Bradley Brothers Pty Ltd 
{1943). 148 Colvin, the informant, was an inspector under the Factories and Shops Act 1912-1936 
{NSW) ("the FSA"). He initiated a prosecution against Bradley Brothers Pty Ltd, the occupier of a 
factory which employed females in work with machinery, including milling machinery in 
contravention of an order made under the FSA.149 The prosecution was dismissed by the Magistrate 
and Colvin appealed to the High Court.150 Barwick was briefed to appear on behalf of Colvin.151 
Barwick submitted that the award did not produce an inconsistency with the State legislation (the 
FSA) and that it did not evince or evidence an intention to displace State legislation under section 
109 of the Constitution."' Despite Barwick's creative submissions, the High Court unanimously held 
that the order was inconsistent with the award, and therefore by virtue of section 109 of the 
Constitution, it was invalid.153 
Challenges to the Wartime Regulations 
During World War II, the Parliament enacted various regulations to control civilian life. These 
regulations were authorised by statute and were based on the Commonwealth's defence power (s 
51{vi)) of the Constitution. The scope of the defence power was greatly expanded during the war. 
Many citizens objected to various regulations and litigation resulted. In relation to the defence 
power, Barwick stated that: 
It was very important in the interests of personal freedom to confine the executive government 
within those limits. To recognise and express such limits called for much legal expertise and, on 
147 Marr, above n 8, p.29; Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law (1929-1949}, above n 143, p.l21. 
148 68 CLR 151. 
149 An order was made pursuant to section 41 of the Factories and Shops Act 1912-1936 {NSW) prohibiting the 
employment of females on a milling machine. However, an award of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation 
and Arbitration provided that the employment of females on work, which included work on a milling machine, 
was permitted unless such work was declared by a Board of Reference to be unsuitable. There had been no 
such declaration by a Board of Reference. 
150 This case was heard in the High Court at Sydney on 26 November 1943 before Latham CJ, Rich, Starke, 
McTiernan and Williams JJ with judgment delivered on 20 December 1943. 
15! Due to the fact that Gordon Wallace KC was on military duties. 
152 Further, Barwick submitted that the award did not deal with the term 'machinery' but related to 
occupations rather than to machines. That is, the award provided not that females may be employed at milling 
machines but that they may be employed at a particular task. The effect of the alteration to the award, he 
submitted, was to give an extended permission to employ females in the industry, as prior to that provision in 
the award, females were not allowed to be employed generally in the industry. 
153 At 160 (per Latham CJ); at 162 (per Starke J); at 164 (per Williams J). 
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the part of the judiciary, judgment and courage. I had many briefs for citizens to test the validity 
of the regulations. In some instances, clients were successful, in others not. 154 
At the beginning of the war, Barwick was involved in numerous challenges to the wartime 
regulations.155 
Barwick appeared to regard the wartime regulations with contempt. He stated that 'one of the 
things that I devoted myself to quite consciously and quite largely was the maintenance of the 
individual's right as far as possible by attacking these bureaucratically drawn National Security 
regulations'."' According to Marr, he had become a: 
self-made and dedicated free enterprise man. His new beliefs were few but powerfully held: that 
competition produced excellence and rewarded it, and that men and women had a right to the 
rewards of their work. 157 
Mason noted that Barwick 'had his great success in attacking the National Security Regulations 
during the Second World War'158 and Marr stated that Barwick 'attacked the regulations with brilliant 
intensity' .159 Former Supreme Court Justice, John Slattery AO QC, suggested that Barwick's 
'successful challenges to the validity of the National Security Regulations brought him into 
prominence'.160 Barwick noted that these challenges took him 'to the High Court quite a bit'.161 He 
added: 
I appeared in the High Court in notable cases connected with the National Security Regulations, 
and then towards the end of the life of the Labor Government, I entered a period where I was 
getting decisions that the power had gone, that the regulations could no longer be supported' .162 
In challenging these regulations with such vigour, Barwick brought to his work 'an extra degree of 
ingenuity and perseverance, and an ideological passion for a free economy'.'" He channelled his 
energy and effort into mounting arguments that were based on sound reasoning and logic, 
154 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.31. 
155 Ross Barwick recalled with reference to his father that '[d]uring the war years, in particular, he did a lot of 
work in wartime regulations'. See Interview with Ross Barwick (Sydney, 4 October 2006). 
156 National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 15. 
157 Marr, above n 8, p.34. 
1
s
8 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). 
159 Marr, above n 8, p.33. 
160 J.P. Slattery, 'Address: Supreme Court Judges' Dinner' (2007) 81 Australian Law Journal416, 416. 
161 National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 15. 
162 Ibid, 15-16. Barwick also said that 'one of the weaknesses of that Labor administration, I always thought, 
was that they wanted to keep going with this control, and they held it for too long and it went against them 
politically' (at 16). 
163 Sawer, 'Absolutely Free Man', Nation, 4June 1960, p.10. 
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supported by case law. As will be discussed later, the use of emotion can result in a lack of 
objectivity and a loss of composure, although this does not seem to have affected Barwick who was 
able to employ his 'ideological passion' to enhance his submissions. 
Barwick acknowledged that the challenges to these regulations gave him a 'good deal of work in the 
High Court'.'64 Barwick recalled th'at the High Court was always: 
held in a certain amount of terror by the young because it doesn't, as do the other Courts, sit and 
just listen, it actively participates, asks questions, and expresses tentative views, a dialectical 
approach which I enjoyed and from which I profited. 165 
As will be seen, Barwick preferred to engage in dialogue with an appellate court and his style of 
advocacy reflected this. Barwick found appearing before the Privy Council in the special leave 
application in the Bank Natianalisatian Case very uncomfortable initially because the judges did not 
engage in dialogue with him. Barwick's style of advocacy relied on being able to respond to judicial 
questions and tailor his submissions based on judicial comments. He found himself deprived of the 
opportunity to do so when appearing before a less interventionist appellate court. 
Barwick appeared on behalf of Maurice de Mestre in early 1944 in one of many challenges to the 
wartime regulations. This case involved the provisions of regulation 45(1) and (1A) of the National 
Security (Supplementary) Regulations 1942 (Cth).'66 Mr de Mestre, who operated the Railway Hotel 
in Parramatta, was charged with failing to open to the public, and keep every bar open on the 
licensed premises, for the sale of liquor on 3 April1943. In the Court of Petty Sessions, Mr de Mestre 
was convicted. Eventually, the matter was referred to the High Court. 167 The issue was whether the 
regulations were valid as being within the defence power of the Constitution. 
Before the High Court on 28 March 1944, Barwick argued that, although some aspects of the liquor 
trade can be regulated within the defence power, there are some aspects which cannot. He 
164 National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 16. 
165 Ibid. 
166 The Premier of NSW made an Order pursuant to the regulations that required licensees to keep open to the 
public every bar on the licensed premises between 2pm and 6pm. These regulations empowered the Premier 
of a State to make an order requiring a licensee of licensed premises to open, and keep open, to the public 
during specified hours, every bar on the premises. 
167 He obtained an order nisi from the Supreme Court calling upon the sergeant of police, who attended on the 
relevant day, and the Magistrate to show cause why a common law writ of prohibition should not be issued to 
each of them restraining them from proceeding further upon or in respect of the conviction. When the order 
nisi was returnable before the Full Court of the Supreme Court, it was decided that there was an issue in 
relation to the limits inter se of the Constitutional powers ofthe Commonwealth and the State of NSW. As a 
result, the case was referred to the High Court. See Tony Blackshield, 'Inter se questions' in Tony Blackshield, 
Michael Caper & George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia, (2001), Oxford 
University Press, South Melbourne, p.350; Sir Gerard Brennan, 'The Privy Council and the Constitution' in H.P. 
lee & George Winterton (eds), Australian Constitutional Landmarks, (2003), Cambridge University Press, 
Melbourne, 312, 312-319. 
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submitted that the Order was based not only on the assumption that the control of the sale of liquor 
was within the defence power, but also on the assumption that the control of licensed premises and 
the obligation to keep them open, as distinct from the selling of liquor, were also within the power. 
He submitted that regulation 45(1) and (1A) were beyond the powers conferred by the National 
Security Act 1939-1940 (Cth) ("the NSA").168 
Barwick's submissions were rejected by the majority of the High Court (Starke J dissenting) when 
they delivered judgment on 20 April1944. 169 The majority of the High Court held that regulation 
45(1) and (1A) were authorised by section 5{1) of the NSA and were within the defence power of the 
Commonwealth. However, Barwick's submissions provoked a strong dissent by Starke J who found 
that the regulations were not within the defence power and his judgment echoed the essence ofthe 
submissions made by Barwick. 170 
Whilst Barwick's submissions were of only limited persuasiveness, his lack of success in this case may 
have been symptomatic of the Court's broad interpretation of the defence power during wartime 
rather than any weakness or deficiency in Barwick's advocacy. Despite his lack of success in his early 
constitutional law cases, by 1944, Barwick was beginning to establish a reputation as a formidable 
advocate in constitutional cases in the High Court. 
According to Marr, Barwick's first case 'of real constitutional importance'171 was Reid v Sinderberro/12 
in 1944. Sinderberry's case centred on the National Security (Man Power) Regulations which were 
enacted pursuant to the NSA173 to ensure Australia had adequate provision of labour during 
168 Further, Barwick submitted that, even though intoxicating liquor in some respects may have something to 
do with defence, not every limitation, restriction and control that may be exercised in relation to intoxicating 
liquor has some connection with defence and therefore regulation 45{1) and (lA) were too widely expressed. 
Barwick argued that, upon its true construction, sub-regulation (lA) was a power to delegate to the Premier 
aspects which had nothing to do with defence- the limit of the defence power, so far as intoxicating liquor was 
concerned, was to restrict or control its sale so far as that related to defence. 
169 De Mestre v Chisholm (1944) 69 CLR 51, per Latham CJ, Rich, McTiernan and Williams JJ (Starke J dissenting). 
170 Starke J stated (at 62): 'The decisions of the Court in connection with the defence power of the 
Commonwealth are such that I have abandoned the hope of deciding any case upon grounds that are 
intelligible, satisfactory or convincing'. Starke J continued (at 63}: 
So what is the connection ... between the Order and the defence of the Commonwealth? Counsel suggested 
that the purpose of the Order and the defence of the Commonwealth was to make what is called "black 
marketing" unprofitable or else to provide a resting lounge for weary citizens or soldiers, but this is mere 
assumption ... And in this case, I would add, so obviously absurd. But members of the Court came to the aid 
of counsel and suggested that the economic effect of the Order might convenience the public and might 
also, having regard to the business instincts of licensees, have some effect upon the sale and distribution of 
liquor. At best this is a very tenuous connection with defence and, in my opinion, mere conjecture and 
guesswork .... 
The Order, as it seems to me, is one of those irritating orders and restrictions upon freedom of action which 
is arbitrary and capricious, serves no useful purpose, and has no connection whatever with defence. 
171 Marr, above n 8, p.37. 
172 Reid v Sinderberry (1944) 68 CLR 504. 
173 National Security Act 1939-1943 (Cth). 
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wartime.174 In early 1944, William Sinderberry, a salesman at Cash Order Amalgamated ("COA'') 
(later known as Waltons), was ordered to leave his employer and report for work as a factory hand in 
the establishment of the Kellogg (Australia) Pty Ltd factory.175 Sinderberry was being ordered from 
one civilian occupation to another and that was the essence of COA's objections to the regulations. 176 
Sinderberry was charged by the informant, Reid, with contravening regulation 15 by failing to comply 
with a direction made and was fined £1 in the Court of Petty Sessions. COA, on behalf of 
Sinderberry, briefed Barwick to appear in the appeal in the Full Court of the Supreme Court. In a 
unanimous decision, the Court held that regulation 15 was wholly ultra vires. m Reid appealed to the 
High Court and the case commenced on 1 June 1944.178 In his characteristic manner, Barwick 
conceptualised the case on appeal succinctly and concisely as follows: 
The question is whether the Man Power Regulations, having regard to their ambit and their plain 
intent, come within the class of regulations requiring persons to place themselves at the disposal 
of the Commonwealth for securing the public safety or the defence of the Commonwealth."' 
Barwick identified the consequences ofthe High Court reversing the Supreme Court's decision and, 
in so doing, indirectly alluded to the policy implications of finding the regulations to be valid. He 
submitted: 
The employer is bound to employ the person directed, whether he has work for him to do or not, 
and the employee is bound to work for that employer, whether he is solvent or not. The 
regulation is not in substance a provision for marshalling man power into defence channels, but is 
an endeavour to control all employment- to redistribute labour throughout the community- on 
some theory, no doubt, that the community will be made more efficient and this in some way will 
aid the war effort. There is not a sufficiently specific connection to support the regulation.180 
174 Ex parte Sinderberry; Re Reid and Ex parte McGrath; Re Reid (1944) 61(NSW) WN 139. Regulation 13 
provided that employers could not seek to engage, or engage, a person without obtaining a permit from either 
the Director-General of Man Power, from an officer authorised by the Director-General or through a National 
Service Office. Regulation 15 provided that the Director-General may direct any person resident in Australia to 
engage in employment under the direction and control of the employer specified in the direction, or to 
perform work or services (whether for a specified employer or not) specified in the direction. 
175 Sinderberry had been an employee of COA prior to the war and was unfit for military service. 
176 COA believed that such a redirection of staff was wilful and that employees such as Sinderberry could not be 
used to their maximum potential by their new employers. 
177 In the judgment, Jordan CJ stated that: 
Regulations 13 and 15, read according to their natural construction, would, if valid, reduce the population of 
Australia to a state of serfdom more abject than any which obtained in the Middle Ages. No one may 
employ anyone to do anything except by permission of a Government Official. 
Ex parte Sinderberry; Re Reid and Ex parte McGrath; Re Reid (1944) 61(NSW) WN 139 at 141. 
178 
'HIGH COURT BEGINS HEARING OF MANPOWER CASE', The Argus (Melbourne). 2 June 1944, 5. 
179 Reid v Sinderberry (1944) 68 CLR 504 at 506. 
180 Ibid at 507. See also Geoffrey Sawer, Cases on The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, (1948), 
The Law Book Co. of Australasia Pty Ltd, Sydney, p.245. 
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In his submissions, Barwick also employed the use of powerful and emotive language to describe the 
regulations as a form of 'industrial conscription'-'"' 
Ultimately, the High Court unanimously upheld the appeal and found that regulation 15 of the 
National Security (Man Power) Regulations was within the ambit of the defence power under the 
Constitution. Despite his best effort'S, Barwick was yet again unsuccessful.182 
In his judgment, Williams J acknowledged and addressed a key issue raised by Barwick. Barwick 
raised the possibility that if an employee was compelled to work for a private employer, the 
employer might become bankrupt and the employee, despite the preferential provisions of 
bankruptcy legislation, might not be paid.183 The fact that Williams J felt compelled to address this 
submission indicates that it was sufficiently thought-provoking and warranted both a direct response 
and rebuttal. Williams J also noted that 'Mr Barwick was careful to point out the far-reaching 
operation of the regulation' .184 
Although Barwick was unsuccessful in this case, his submissions clearly demonstrate that he 
employed and applied some of the elements of appellate advocacy during the course of his 
submissions. For example, Barwick considered the policy arguments which purportedly justified the 
regulation, and referred to the inequity and injustice of the regulation by suggesting that it was 
'industrial conscription'. He used this term to indicate what he considered to be the disastrous 
consequences of the Court upholding the validity of the regulations. This illustrates the importance 
of language in an advocate's armoury. The phrase 'industrial conscription' is powerful and conveys 
to the Court a sense of injustice. 
It is difficult to gauge whether Barwick's lack of success in this and other cases involving challenges to 
the wartime regulations was attributable to the Court's broad interpretation of the defence power 
181 Reid v Sinderberry (1944) 68 CLR 504 at 507. 
182 Latham CJ and McTiernan J stated: 
A starving and disordered army cannot fight. A starving and disordered civilian population cannot supply or 
support any army. In a war in which all our resources are engaged, the Government which has the 
responsibility of protecting those resources has also the responsibility and should be held to have the power 
of organizing and controlling them. Thus the general control of the man power of the Australian people is a 
subject which falls within the power of the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws with respect to 
defence. 
Reid v Sinderberry (1944) 68 CLR 504 at 512-513; Marr, above n 8, p.38. See also Sawer, Cases on The 
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 180, pp.244-249; Leslie Zines, The High Court and the 
Constitution, (5'h ed), (2008), Reed International Books Australia Pty Ltd, North Ryde, p.304. 
183 Williams J addressed this possibility by stating that: 
But supposing this might happen, it would not be the first bad debt that had ever been contracted, and the 
risk of the loss of payment in this way would be small compared to the risk of the loss of his life by a 
member of the armed forces. 
Reid v Sinderberry (1944) 68 CLR 504 at 520. 
184 Ibid at 521. 
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during wartime or any weakness or deficiency in his advocacy. In any event, Barwick's skills as an 
advocate were developing. 
50 
Chapter 3: Preparation 
"The work of the advocate demands a precise knowledge of the law and a thorough grasp of its 
principles. He or she must be able to recognise quickly which of its principles is relevant to his or her 
case and make use of it to his or her. client's profit." 
Sir Garfield Barwick, 1995185 
Preparation in appellate advocacy has many facets. As a category, it extends beyond merely 
preparing for a case by reviewing the relevant material that comprises an advocate's brief. It 
encompasses other features such as obtaining a thorough knowledge of the law relating to the case 
at hand and the procedure applicable in a court as well as the process of acquiring knowledge about 
the members of the court. This chapter is dedicated to undertaking a critical exploration of the 
elements and ideals of appellate advocacy within the category of preparation. This will provide the 
first part of the framework that will be used to assess Barwick's advocacy in accordance with the 
'three category analysis'. As Professor George Hampel has acknowledged, 'Uludges are constantly 
reporting cases of barristers showing insufficient preparation, legal research, knowledge of basic case 
law, legislation and advocacy skills'.'86 As will be evident from this chapter, preparation is a critical 
element of effective appellate advocacy.'87 
3.1 The Power of Preparation 
The first and elementary rule of advocacy is to be prepared.'88 It has been suggested by a former 
judge of the Federal Court, Ronald Sackville, 189 that '[a]ppellate advocacy, no less than other forms of 
185 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1. 
186 
'Vic: Barristers need more training, says ex-judge', CCH Australia- News Article (2008) 
<http://www.cch.com.au/au/ContactUS/Print.aspx?ID=27848> at 10 October 2008. During his time on the 
High Court, Justice Kirby stated that '(n]owadays, the High Court takes no special delight in exposing brusquely 
the weakness of thinking and preparation that are sometimes evident in the arguments before it' (see Michael 
Kirby, 'Kitto and the High Court of Australia' (1999) 27 Federal Law Review 131, 144). 
187 
" ••. there are basically three things that are vital to successful practice as an advocate- namely, preparation, 
preparation and preparation": 'Newsmakers' (Winter, 2006) 25(2) Uniview Magazine (UWA) 19, p.20. See also 
Glissan, above n 11, p.2. 
188 Justice Riley, 'Advocacy- Preparation is the key' (February/March, 1999) Balance 16, 16; see also 
Nathanson, above n 11; Hyam, above n 31. It has been held that a failure to prepare is quite improper: Putti v 
Simpson (1975) 6 ALR 47 (NT, Muirhead, J). See David Ross, Advocacy, (2"' ed), (2007), Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, p.11; Porter, The Gentle Art of Persuasion, above n 11, p.103. See also Interview with Sir 
Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 2006); Interview with 
Chester Porter QC (Sydney, 2 April 2006). Preparation can take on various forms and includes preparing 
documents or items that may assist the court in understanding the advocate's submissions, such as a 
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advocacy, depends in large measure for its success upon meticulous preparation'.190 The two main 
reasons for this can be found in the inherent nature of appellate advocacy. First, appellate advocacy 
features a multi-member court where judicial questioning can be intense, rigorous and rapid. 
Secondly, appellate advocacy involves the determination of complex legal issues and, therefore, it 
requires of appellate advocates a comprehensive and in-depth knowledge of the law that is relevant 
to the case, including the accompanying case law. 
Preparation in the context of appellate advocacy extends beyond an advocate simply reviewing the 
documents that are relevant to the case- it involves what Hampel describes as 'preparation for 
performance'. 191 In the context ofthe 'three category analysis', performance is analogous to 
presentation. Hampel's expression should also be described as 'preparation for presentation'. The 
preparation undertaken must facilitate the ease and effectiveness of the presentation. 
'Preparation for presentation' results in arguments and submissions that are well-structured as well 
as logical and sequential. Such arguments are easier to follow and are therefore more conducive to 
being accepted by the court. Well-ordered, structured submissions are more likely to follow after 
undertaking a comprehensive preparation. A methodical and systematic approach to preparation 
lays the foundations for a comprehensive preparation. 192 Such preparation requires the advocate to 
invest a significant amount of time.193 
Thinking About the Case 
According to Hayne, one of two basic propositions to remember when preparing for a case is to: 
'Think about the case' .194 
chronology of events related to the present litigation. Such documents or items are useful tools when 
presenting a case to an appellate court. Preparing a chronology of events is one way for the advocate to 
master the facts during the preparation phase and this document also aids and assists an advocate's 
submissions. 
189 Justice Ronald Sackville was a Judge of the Federal Court of Australia from 1994 until 2008. He is currently 
an Acting Judge of Appeal of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of NSW. 
190 Sackville, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 60, 102. Success in this context refers to attaining levels of 
exemplary advocacy rather than success in terms of winning as a result of the judges finding in the advocate's 
favour. 
191 See also Donovan, above n 11, p.14. Glissan describes this as 'performance preparation' (see Glissan, above 
n 11, p.22). 
192 See generally Glissan, above n 11, p.12. 
193 David Pan nick, 'And let that be a lesson to you ... ", The Times, 6 May 2008 
<http:/ /business. ti meson line .co. uk/tol/business/law /article3859034.ece ?print. yesdrand ... > at 26 May 2008. 
194 Hayne, 'Advocacy and Special Leave Applications in the High Court of Australia', above n 11, p.2. 
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Thinking about the case underlies every aspect of preparation. There are various techniques that are 
employed when thinking about the case to aid preparation. For example, a well prepared advocate 
identifies all relevant points in advance, including those against their argument, so they are prepared 
to deal with the latter if they are the subject of questions. Alternatively, as David Jackson195 
suggests, they can confront these points 'up-front'. 196 Jackson states that it is important: 
... to avoid being "caught out" by judicial questions ... if a point occurs to the leader/junior/solicitor 
as potentially material when preparing an argument, there is a reasonable prospect that the same 
point will occur to a member of the court. You need to be able to deal with it if it is raised. 
Sometimes it is better to mention it first in your written or oral argument in order to deal with it in 
your own way, to "head it off at the pass".197 
In some respects, the second advantage may be seen as an attempt to manipulate the members of 
the court rather than persuade, but confronting an issue 'up-front' can be effectively used to address 
an issue that will inevitably be raised by a member of the court in order to avoid criticism at a later 
stage. Any failure to raise the issue with the members of the court at an early stage may cause them 
to infer that it had not occurred to the advocate or the advocate was avoiding this issue. This may 
damage the advocate's credibility in the eyes of the court. 
Arguments before the High Court should place less reliance on previous decisions and greater 
significance on an advocate conveying to the court their view of the relevant principle. Such 
articulation requires constant thought and refinement and will take considerable time. In so doing, 
advocates benefit from discussing these propositions with others according to Hayne.198 Discussing 
concepts and possible submissions with colleagues also allows the advocate to verba lise thoughts 
and refine aspects of the argument. Colleagues may raise an issue the advocate had not considered 
or may demonstrate a difficulty in understanding a proposition. This may be a salutary exercise as 
members of the court may also face the same difficulty in understanding the proposition. 
Some advocates use rehearsal as part of their preparation.'99 This affords the advocate the 
opportunity to practise their presentation skills in addition to becoming more familiar with the 
content of their argument. Rehearsing gives the advocate confidence when delivering submissions 
and allows an advocate to verbalise their thoughts, obtain feedback from colleagues and refine any 
aspects of their argument. As will be discussed later, Barwick rehearsed his arguments in the Bank 
195 David Jackson QC is recognised as one of Australia's best Silks- Australia's Best Lawyers 2009 & Australia's 
Best Lawyers 2008. He was admitted as a barrister in 1964 and appointed a Queen's Counsel in 1976. He 
currently practices from Seven Wentworth, Barristers' Chambers in Sydney. 
196 Jackson, 1Appellate Advocacy', above n 71, 247. 
197 Jackson, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, p.19. 
198 Hayne, 'Advocacy and Special Leave Applications in the High Court of Australia', above n 11, pp.S-6. 
199 Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 7. 
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Nationalisation Case before making submissions to the Privy Council. This allowed him and the team 
of counsel briefed on behalf of the banks to coordinate their strategy and refine their submissions 
accordingly. 
The great American appellate advocate, John W. Davis, suggested that another useful technique to 
adopt in preparation is for advocatl!s arguing an appeal to change places mentally with the judges on 
the bench. He would say to himself, '[i]f you were up there and had a job to do deciding this case 
and wanted to do the best job you could, what would you want to hear from counsel?'200 
During his time as a barrister between 1910 and 1929, Dixon was regarded as an outstanding 
advocate.201 As a junior barrister, one of Dixon's pupils was Robert Menzies.202 Menzies recalled 
Dixon's approach to preparation upon receipt of a constitutional brief. The brief would arrive from 
the instructing solicitor with notes and references to related cases but Dixon would remove all pages 
and put them aside leaving only the statement of facts at the front of the brief. He would say to 
Menzies: 
it's a great mistake to allow yourself to be side-tracked by what may turn out to be judicial errors. 
Our job is to interpret the Constitution, not to interpret other people's interpretation. Let us now 
read the Constitution and interpret it as a comprehensive statute. Let us pay particular attention 
to the basic structure of the Constitution and to every section which may bear upon our problem, 
and see if we can reach a conclusion. When we have reached one, we shall then turn to the 
decided cases. If they support our conclusion, we may take it that we are right. If they don't, we 
must examine them to see whether they can be distinguished from our case successfully. If they 
are indistinguishable, we shall have to decide that our client be advised to attack them as wrongly 
decided, or advise him that our opinion is AB, but the decisions make it clear that the High Court 
will decide against that opinion, and that he should act accordingly.203 
Menzies developed great skills of preparation himself; it was said that '[h]is arguments were based 
on a careful preparation of his cases'. 204 He also became renowned for his successful challenge of 
prior High Court authority in the Engineer's Case.205 
200 Freidman and Lacavora, above n 29, p.209. 
201 See Ayres, above n 50; Kenneth Hayne, 'Oixon, Owen' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper & George Williams 
(eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia, (2001), Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 
pp.218-220. 
202 Later to become Prime Minister of Australia in 1939-1941 and 1949-1966. See Laurence H. Maher, 'Menzies, 
Robert Gordon' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper & George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High 
Court of Australia, (2001), Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, pp.477-479. 
203 Sir Robert Menzies, The Measure of the Years, (1970), Cassell & Company Ltd, London, p.232; Ayres, above n 
50, p.28. 
204 Cameron Hazlehurst, Menzies Observed, (1979), George Allen & Unwin Australia Pty Ltd, Hornsby, p.37. 
205 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (Engineer's Case) (1920) 28 CLR 129. See 
also R. Menzies, Central Power in the Australian Commonwealth, (1967), Cassell Australia Ltd, Melbourne. 
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In the preparation phase, effective appellate advocates are renowned for spending considerable time 
thinking about the case and formulating the key propositions.206 The Victorian advocate, Sir Henry 
Winneke, was renowned for doing this and condensing his case into a few key propositions: 
He would say, "I think I've got to point out to the court that this was wrong", and he'd bring up 
some point he'd uncovered. And it would be a point of some substance; ... He would worry and 
worry about his argument in a case, especially in the High Court or Privy Council, until he could get 
it down to roughly three propositions. 207 
Formulating the key propositions requires a familiarity with the facts, the relevant law and 
procedure. This preparation phase also provides an insight and an indication as to the likely nature 
or course of judicial questioning. Mastering the facts and the law allows the advocate to formulate 
the most effective strategy for persuading the court. The strategy remains in place and is only 
altered when it is imperative to do so. 208 
As will be discussed later, Barwick was renowned for spending an enormous amount oftime on 
formulating his arguments; they would constantly change until they crystallised in his mind shortly 
before a case commenced. 
Identifying Strengths and Weaknesses 
According to Hayne, during the preparation phase, the relative strengths and weaknesses of an 
advocate's case become apparent thereby revealing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
opponent's case.209 Understanding the weaknesses in an advocate's case is important for two 
reasons. First, it ensures that there is adequate planning to deal with them (including in response to 
judicial questions} and secondly, the weaknesses are also likely to reflect the strengths of the 
opponent's case.210 It also allows the advocate to pre-empt submissions from an opponent. Justice 
Heydon of the High Court, has commented on the 'need for effective advocacy to come to grips with 
opposing arguments, [and] not merely to rest in emphatic presentation of one's own primary 
case'. 211 He suggested that it was not sufficient for an advocate to fervently present arguments 
which advance the advocate's case, without also considering the arguments that will be raised by an 
206 This applies irrespective of jurisdiction or the relevant procedure in a particular court, for example, even if 
there is a heavy reliance on written submissions as opposed to oral submissions and so forth. 
207 Robert Coleman, Above Renown: The Biography of Sir Henry Winneke, (1988}, Herald Weekly Times Ltd, 
South Melbourne, Victoria, p.171. 
208 Glissan, above n 11, pp.2, 4; see also Pannick, above n 193. 
209 Hayne, 'Advocacy and Special Leave Applications in the High Court of Australia', above n 11, p.S. 
210 G\issan, above n 11, p.11. 
211 Geoff Undsay, 'Heydon on advocacy' (March, 2003) 23(2) Australian Bar Review 134, 134. 
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opposing advocate- this should be done during the preparation phase. There is a suggestion by a 
barrister, James Glissan, that an advocate should prepare their opponent's case at an early stage in 
the context of their own preparation."' 
An understanding of the weaknesses of an opponent's case was one of the features of the advocacy 
of Tom Hughes who has been described as 'one of the greatest barristers the Australian legal 
profession has produced'.213 A former Judge of the High Court, Michael McHugh214, recalled this 
aspect of his advocacy when reflecting on the occasions where he appeared against Hughes: 
Over the years, I had many cases against him and three with him. Appearing against him was a 
continuing forensic education. Whatever the cause of action and whoever heard it, Tom Hughes 
was always in complete control of his case and well aware of the weaknesses in your case. He 
gave no quarter and asked for none. 215 
A thoroughly prepared advocate will also earn the trust and respect of the court. It is readily 
apparent when an advocate has thoroughly prepared their case (including an awareness of its 
strengths and weaknesses), particularly to an astute bench. It is equally apparent when an advocate 
is under-prepared. The extent of an advocate's preparation is often evident in the delivery of their 
submissions, the nature of their arguments, the advocate's use of analogy or examples and their 
responses to judicial questioning.216 However, as former Commonwealth Solicitor-General, David 
Bennett, observed that '[t]he most important thing in the High Court is how you answer the 
questions you are asked, and that should be a function of preparation'.217 
212 Glissan, above n 11, p.12. 
213 Address by Justice Michael McHugh, 'Tom Hughes AO QC' (Winter 2005) NSW Bar News 66. 
214 Was admitted to the NSW Bar 1961 and appointed a QC in 1973. He was a Judge of the Court of Appeal and 
Supreme Court NSW (1984-1989) and a Judge of the High Court of Australia between 1989 and 2005. He was 
the President of the NSW Bar Association (1981-1983) and President of the Australian Bar Association (1983-
1984). 
215 Address by Justice Michael McHugh, 'Tom Hughes AO QC' above n 214, 67. This was also a feature of the 
advocacy of Murray Gleeson. It was said that 'Gleeson's great talent has been his ability to process ideas so 
that in the nanosecond from conception to utterance they emerge as tight, taut and economic words that are 
able to skewer the weakness of his opponent's case': 'Final Verdict', the (sydney) magazine (Sydney), July 
2008, 54 at 58. In relation to preparation, former Justice Robert Jackson of the US Supreme Court stated that: 
The first step in preparation for all exigencies of argument is to become filled with your case- to know every 
detail of the evidence and findings, to weigh fairly every contention of your adversary, and to review not only 
the rule of law applicable to the specific issue but the body of law in its general field. You never know when 
some collateral or tangential issue will suddenly come up. 
Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 7. 
216 See David Ross, Advocacy, (2005). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.3. In addition, it is important 
for an advocate to have contemplated and appreciated the likely response of a judge to particular lines of 
argument: 'Extra-Judicial Notes', above n 43, 11. 
217 
'Putting words to music in the constitution's case', Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 26 September 
2008,47. 
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The Importance of Preparation to Judicial Questioning 
Judicial questioning will inevitably focus on the various issues that are relevant to the advocate's 
case, including the purpose and justification for each action the advocate has undertaken and for 
each omission made in their presentation, according to David Jackson."' An advocate needs to 
• 
consider this in the preparation phase; otherwise, judicial questioning may expose an advocate who 
advances a submission without having considered the justification for doing so. Ultimately, this may 
damage the advocate's prospects of succeeding with that particular submission (as well as other 
submissions). This may also adversely affect the advocate's credibility, which may have far-reaching 
consequences for the advocate's case generally. Similarly, where the advocate does not have a 
robust justification for any omission, this may adversely affect the advocate's credibility in the event 
that a member of the court considers that the issue should have been raised rather than omitted. 
According to Robert Jackson, 219 the sequence of an argument together with the manner in which it is 
advanced, are important in terms of the comprehension of the argument.220 However, many 
arguments do not go according to plan due to the interjections from members of the court.221 
Despite this, an advocate who has undertaken a thorough preparation is more likely to pursue their 
arguments in the face of rigorous judicial questioning. That is, a well-prepared advocate is in a 
position to incorporate their submissions into their answers to judicial questions. 
The ability to steer proceedings in the direction in which the client's case will be viewed more 
favourably by the court, especially whilst responding to judicial questions, is a particularly useful 
technique. It requires thorough preparation as well as a consideration and conceptualisation of the 
relevant issues."' It also requires flexibility and adaptability. An advocate who has thoroughly 
prepared their case can make appropriate concessions and pursue certain submissions whilst 
abandoning others in an attempt to present their client's case in the most favourable manner. Such 
flexibility is not possible without adequate preparation. 
218 Jackson, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 71, 248. 
219 Robert Haughwout Jackson (February 13, 1892- October 9, 1954) was United States Attorney General 
(1940-1941) and an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court (1941-1954). He was also the chief 
United States prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials. 
220 Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 6. 
221 Robert Jackson, reflecting on his time as an advocate in the US, recalled that he made three arguments in 
every case: 
First came the one that I planned- as I thought, logical, coherent, complete. Second was the one actually 
presented- interrupted, incoherent, disjointed, disappointing. The third was the utterly devastating 
argument that I thought of after going to bed that night. 
Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 9; Hayne, 'Advocacy and Special 
Leave Applications in the High Court of Australia', above n 11, p.2. 
222 
'Extra-Judicial Notes', above n 43, 10. 
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As will be discussed later, one of Barwick's strengths as an advocate was his ability to engage in 
dialogue with the members of the court and respond to judicial questions in a manner that 
incorporated his submissions. In doing so, he was able to steer the proceedings in a direction that 
was favourable to his client (although that did not necessarily translate into success in each and 
every case). He was also able to achieve this by adopting a flexible approach to the presentation of 
his arguments. 
A thorough preparation is considered to equip the advocate with the necessary confidence to 
present a case in the best possible manner- such confidence is crucial when one is attempting to be 
persuasive."' Tom Hughes and David Jackson both agreed that, as an advocate, confidence is gained 
from a thorough and meticulous preparation.'" 
3.2 Knowing the law, knowing the procedure 
Knowledge of the Jaw 
An integral part ofthe preparation phase, in addition to acquiring a detailed knowledge ofthe 
relevant facts of the case, is for an appellate advocate to have thoroughly researched the applicable 
law that is relevant to the issues in the proceedings. According to Ellicott, one of the key elements of 
appellate advocacy is to 'definitely know your brief, [and] know the line of cases that are relevant'. 225 
An appellate advocate who fails to possess a commanding knowledge ofthe relevant law may be 
exposed by judicial questioning, risking loss of credibility and the confidence of the court- both of 
which are extremely difficult to subsequently restore. In circumstances where an appellate advocate 
does not have sufficient knowledge of the relevant law, the individual judges of the court will be 
forced to conduct their own research to ascertain the relevant law. This is a direct result of the 
appellate advocate's failure to provide the court with the assistance that is both required and 
expected.226 Dixon is reported as having said, 'it is a fundamental ethical obligation of every barrister 
223 See Glissan, above n 11, p.9. The English advocate, Henry Cecil, observed that: 'I went to bed very late and 
occasionally had to work right through the night. I learned from experience that, although one might be tired 
during a case, it was vital to know every aspect of it thoroughly': Henry Cecil, Just Within the law, (1975), 
Hutchinson & Co (Publishers) Ltd, London, UK, p.87. 
224 Interview with Hon. Tom Hughes AO QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006) and Interview with David Jackson QC 
(Sydney, 2 August 2006). 
225 Interview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
226 Kirby, 'Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 968-9; See also Interview with Chester Porter QC 
(Sydney, 2 April 2006). 
58 
to have a sound working knowledge of the law'.227 During his time as Chief Justice of the High Court, 
Barwick stated that: 
In our system of administering the law, which I would hope remains, the Bar has the duty of 
aggregating the relevant knowledge of the law and the analysis of the facts for presentation to the 
judge for his consideration. Ahd I would hope that judges would insist on the Bar performing that 
function properly, requiring counsel to come fully prepared to present the case in court, having 
theretofore given such close consideration to the matter as has enabled the identification and 
isolation of the critical points for decision ... and I remain convinced that good advocacy is not 
merely for display in trials but is advantageous both to litigant and judge in the sphere of appellate 
work.228 
Despite this observation being made whilst Chief Justice, it provides an insight into Barwick's 
approach to preparation generally, including the importance of acquiring a detailed knowledge of the 
law. 
In appellate advocacy, the members of the court generally have an excellent grasp of the law and 
may have previously encountered the same or similar legal issues in an earlier case. Therefore, in 
many instances, the appellate advocate needs to acquire a detailed knowledge of the law just to be 
on par with the court on certain issues, let alone to be in a position to respond to difficult and 
penetrating judicial questions. 
During his time as a barrister, Dixon was renowned for his meticulous and thorough preparation, 
including becoming familiar with all the relevant law in the area. On one occasion, Grattan Gunson 
who was being led by Dixon in a particular case brought to Dixon's attention a case from the 1840s 
but Dixon was already aware of it.229 Menzies described Dixon as a 'supreme' appellate advocate 
and stated that: 
One reason for this was that his singular mastery of the law was well known to and greatly 
respected by the judges before whom he appeared. His arguments therefore invariably carried 
great weight; they were not to be lightly brushed aside. 230 
Equally, one of the hallmarks of the appellate advocacy of Sir Isaac lsaacs231 was his 'deep knowledge 
of the law'. This resulted from 'the detailed attention which he gave to the preparation and the 
227 
'Extra-Judicial Notes', above n 43, 9. 
228 Barwick, 'The State of the Australian Judiciary', above n 46, 199. 
229 Grattan Gunson, a Melbourne barrister, was led by Dixon in a particular case in the early part of the 1900s. 
He was attempting to locate a relevant authority which was proving to be difficult. Upon locating a supporting 
authority from the 1840s, Gunson brought it to Dixon's attention only to find that he was already aware of it 
and commented that he always thought that the dissenting judgment was correct. 
See Ayres, above n 50, p.25. Based on written communication from Richard Searby with Philip Ayres, April 
2000. 
230 Menzies, The Measure of the Years, above n 203, p.235. 
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advocacy of cases' .232 Apparently, Isaacs 'would never go into court unless he was fully satisfied that 
his grasp of a brief was perfect, and that he had exhausted every point of law for and against his case 
that was likely to be brought into argument' .233 
Knowledge of procedure 
It is crucial that an appellate advocate also knows the basic procedural rules which govern the 
proceedings in the particular courts in which they appear. An advocate who is unaware of the 
procedural rules of the court may lose the trust and respect of the bench. This may taint their 
submissions. It has been suggested that: 
It is essential for [an appellate advocate] to have a thorough knowledge of the law of evidence and 
procedure ... Much of this knowledge should and will become almost instinctive, but it is, of 
course, necessary to have a thorough working knowledge of even the more unusual points of 
evidence and procedure.234 
In reflecting upon the trends in modern day advocacy, Justice Young of the Supreme Court of NSW 
emphasised the importance of knowing the law and procedure but also of not appearing smug in this 
knowledge: 
... two new styles of advocacy are now becoming more noticeable ... First, there is a confident 
advocate who is so confident that he or she gives the judge the distinct impression that the judge 
is thought to be an ignoramus and quite an inferior lawyer to the advocate ... However, while 
judges consider confidence a virtue, they consider that greater virtues are competence and 
knowledge of law and procedure.235 
Barwick may have suffered from such smugness. He was accused of displaying arrogance in his 
advocacy on occasions, particularly in the Communist Party Case. An overzealous approach to the 
application of the ideal can, in reality, have a negative impact. 
231 Later Justice of the High Court of Australia (1906-1930) and Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia 
(1930-1931). 
232 Gordon, above n 130, p.37. 
233 1bid. 
234 Hyam, above n 31, p.10. 
235 Justice PW Young AO (ed), 'Modern Day Advocacy: An Occasional Series- Part 1' (2006) 80 Australian Law 
Journa/339, 341. 
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3.3 Knowing the court - gauging support 
Knowing the Court 
The composition of the court may affect the prospects of an appellate advocate's arguments and 
therefore ultimately the prospects of their case generally. Appellate advocates need to be aware of: 
'the general predilections, philosophy and attitude of the judges assigned to the case. Pre-
supposition about judicial opinions, based upon result-oriented analysis may be dashed in a 
particular case'.236 
According to Kirby, many appeals are determined by a combination of three factors: legal authority, 
legal principle and legal policy. Different members of the court will have different legal interests and 
distinct approaches to these three factors. 237 As both a former Judge of the High Court and former 
President of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, 238 Kirby's observation is based on many years of 
experience. 
While some members of the court may place considerable importance on legal authority or legal 
principle, others may be more influenced by legal policy. A good advocate's preparation takes into 
account 'the practical necessity of having to prepare an approach to be taken to not one, but many 
judges, who may have differing approaches or emphases'.239 It should be noted at this point that 
Barwick may not have done this as effectively as he might in the Bank Natianalisation Case in his 
choice to target Chief Justice Latham specifically. This will be discussed later. 
A critical part of the preparation phase requires an appellate advocate to locate earlier relevant 
judgments (especially, recent judgments) delivered by the judges assigned to the present case. 240 
This enables the appellate advocate to ascertain, in advance, the previously held views of the judges 
in relation to the issues in the present case. It also indicates the manner in which particular judges 
may decide the current case based on their judgments in previous cases where similar issues have 
arisen. By tailoring their submissions to take into account a judge's previous decisions, an advocate 
is more likely to be persuasive and their submissions are more likely to be accepted. However, it 
should be noted that '[n)ot everything that someone said in the past is necessarily, something 
they're bound by forever'. 241 Whilst not everything that could be said by a judge is capable of being 
236 Kirby, 'Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 967. 
237 Ibid. 
238 Each for approximately 13 years. 
239 Glissan, above n 11, pp.191-192. 
240 Kirby, 'Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 967. See also Interview with Chester Porter QC 
(Sydney, 2 April 2006). 
241 Interview with David Jackson QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). In this interview, David Jackson QC noted that: 
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anticipated, an advocate can be prepared by being familiar with, not only a judge's previous 
decisions, but any extra-curial writings, interviews, articles and so forth that may provide insight into 
the judge's current thinking. 
A necessary ingredient of 'knowing the court' requires an appellate advocate to be aware of the 
nature of their audience. For example, there are crucial differences between an intermediate court 
of appeal and a final appellate court. It has been said that 'argument in the High Court may require 
some differences in technique from argument in other appellate tribunals in Australia' 242 These 
differences relate to the fact that the High Court may be comprised of anywhere between three and 
seven judges whereas an intermediate court of appeal usually comprises three judges and the fact 
that submissions related to policy implications are likely to feature more prominently in final 
appellate courts. A genuine consideration for a final appellate court is that the decision made, with 
all its ramifications, is final and that it cannot be corrected or altered by any other court. There may 
also be other procedural-type differences. Good advocates take these factors into account when 
preparing and advancing their submissions. For example, it has been observed that arguments 
advanced by Robert Menzies were based on a careful preparation and 'presented in a form 
appropriate to the particular tribunal' .243 
According to Hayne, the second of two basic propositions when preparing a case is to: 'Remember 
what court you are in'.244 If a case is to be heard in the High Court, an advocate must show 
awareness, when reading passages from judgments of intermediate courts of appeal or trial judges, 
that the High Court is not bound by such decisions. Similarly, whilst the High Court is not bound by 
decisions in foreign courts, it may consider the manner in which other jurisdictions have dealt with or 
determined a particular issue.245 An advocate must also be prepared for the possibility that one or 
more members of an appellate court may have had occasion, in an earlier case, to consider the same 
you have to be careful though ... The things said in past cases very frequently take their colour from what the 
past case was about and whilst in the main people don't change their mind but what their mind was may not 
be to them what it is to you, particularly, if you are talking about a decision given when the judge was at a 
lower level, because they'll say that was what I said then, now I'm not bound by that. 
242 Harry Gibbs, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11,496. See also H. Selby, G Blank and Dr M Nolan, 
'Introduction' (2007) 9{10) ADR 181 in relation to the importance of an advocate knowing their audience and 
connecting with them. 
243 Hazlehurst, above n 204, p.37. There are other factors which need to be taken into account also, 
particularly in relation to judges who may have common or similar approaches or viewpoints. For example, it 
was suggested that during the time that Chief Justice Gleeson presided over the High Court of Australia (1998-
2008) a block of three judges dominated the court, namely Chief Justice Gleeson, Justice Gum mow and Justice 
Hayne. Therefore, 'what you'll find as a barrister appearing before those judges, is that if the Chief Justice, 
Justice Gumma (sic) and Justice Hayne don't agree with you, almost certainly you've lost the case': ABC, 
'Retiring Chief Justice Murray Gleeson', Law Report, 19 August 2008, 
<http://www.abc.net.au/rn/lawreport/stories/2008/2338639.htm> at 1 September 2008. 
244 Hayne, 'Advocacy and Special Leave Applications in the High Court of Australia', above n 11, p.2. 
245 Ibid, pp.2-3. 
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(or similar) issue confronting them in this case. Consequently, Hayne notes it is possible that one or 
more members of an appellate court will raise an issue which the advocate may not have previously 
considered. 246 Therefore, a well-prepared advocate considers cases and authorities where similar 
issues may have arisen, especially where members of the court were involved as judges or counsel in 
those cases. If an appellate advoca~ is aware that an appellate court has not previously accepted a 
certain line of argument then that court is unlikely to accept a similar line of argument in a later case, 
unless it can be established that it can be distinguished from previous authority. 
Knowing the Judges 
The principle of knowing the court extends to knowing the individual judges who comprise the court. 
This knowledge includes an understanding and awareness of the character and general attitude of 
each individual judge. Whilst this can generally be gleaned from the earlier decisions of particular 
judges as well as prior encounters or experiences with a particular judge, it can also be ascertained 
from extra-curial comments and speeches. Such knowledge will assist the advocate in achieving the 
ultimate objective of persuading the court. According to Sackville: 
Part of the advocate's art is to understand, so far as he or she can, the temperament and judicial 
personality of each member of the court ... Arguments that are received with scepticism or downright 
hostility by one member of the court may be attractive (or even, by that very response, become 
attractive) to another. 247 
This knowledge will also assist in identifying the most appropriate way to respond to judicial 
questions as well as tailor and deliver a submission. It will enhance the persuasive ability of an 
advocate, as: '[t]he understanding an astute advocate acquires of the personality and philosophical 
standpoint of each of the judges constitutes an invaluable aid to presentation'.248 Hughes observed 
that: 
No-one ... will advance very far in the profession of advocacy without acquiring and putting to effective 
use an ability to diagnose the character and discern the motivations of those with whom one has to deal 
on all levels of professional activity- not only clients and witnesses; but judges, jurors and opponents. 249 
One ofthe first things Robert Menzies observed as the pupil of Dixon in 1918 was Dixon's 'close 
knowledge of the forensic qualities and methods of his leading opponents, and of the judicial 
246 Ibid, p.4. 
247 Sackville, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 60, 101. 
248 Ibid, 104. 
249 Hughes, above n 92, p.3. 
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strengths and weaknesses of the judges before whom he appeared' .'50 Dixon used this knowledge to 
his advantage as the following example demonstrates. On one occasion, Dixon appeared before 
Judge Moule in the County Court of Victoria. He knew that Judge Moule, who was an elderly man, 
was a passionate cricket enthusiast. Dixon arranged for his young male witness to describe his first 
sighting of the car that knocked him down in a cricketing context. Rather than the boy saying '20 to 
25 yards away', a distance that could have easily been contested, the boy described the distance as: 
'It was about the length of a cricket pitch, sir'. Upon hearing this, Judge Moule leant forward and, in 
an animated and interested manner, asked the boy where he played cricket, whether he was a 
batsman or a bowler and so forth. Judge Moule concluded that if the boy described the distance as 
the length of a cricket pitch then it must be correct.251 If this anecdote is correct, it illustrates the 
persuasive power of conveying information to a judge in terms that he or she can readily identify 
with based on an understanding of their character or personality. It also highlights the effective 
application of the ideal in reality- in other circumstances, an application of this ideal may not be so 
successful. 
Interchanges between advocates and members of the court provide the advocate with the 
opportunity to learn more about the personality, attitudes and predilections of the judges as well as 
gain an insight into their thinking and approach. According to Sackville: 
Judicial questioning provides an opportunity to ascertain what points are troubling the court, or, 
alternatively, which points appear to be finding favour ... The advocate should be able to respond 
convincingly to questioning, for example by pointing to the differences between the facts of the case 
and those of an authority referred to by the questioner.252 
An appellate advocate who knows an appellate court to such an extent that a rapport has been 
established with it or its individual judges as a result of long association or experience, is more likely 
to have significant persuasive power and the 'danger [to an opposing advocate] of such an opponent 
lies in the close understanding of the predilections and habits of thought of the tribunal' 253 Such 
rapport frequently gives rise to confidence, trust and respect. 
An important aspect of knowing the composition of an appellate court is determining which member 
of the court the advocate should focus their attention. It is not uncommon in appellate advocacy for 
one particular judge to have a more detailed knowledge of the case and the issues at hand than the 
other judges presiding over the case. Some appellate courts intentionally assign one particular judge 
250 Menzies, The Measure of the Years, above n 203, p.235; Ayres, above n 50, p.24. 
251 Ayres, above n 50, p.24. Based on information from Richard Searby, who, according to Ayres, had it direct 
from Dixon. 
252 Sackville, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 60, 104-105. 
253 
'Extra-Judicial Notes', above n 43, 11. 
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the task of obtaining the most detailed knowledge of a case to ease the burden on the other judges. 
A well prepared advocate knows how the court operates and focuses their effort and attention on 
convincing the judge with the most knowledge of the case of the merits of the advocate's 
submissions. This judge may exert considerable influence over the other judges. If, however, that 
particular judge does not appear receptive to the advocate's submissions, according to Kirby, an 
effective advocate will redirect their attention towards the other judges, with a view to 
supplementing their knowledge and persuading them. 254 
When appearing in an unfamiliar court, some advocates, as part of their preparation attend the court 
prior to their case to become familiar with the surroundings and to develop an understanding of the 
personalities of the judges. Dixon engaged in this practice and attended a sitting of the Privy Council 
on more than one occasion prior to his own case to simply 'establish a feel for the men who would 
hear his case'.255 
Appellate advocates who know the court are better placed to anticipate what the judges will want to 
know, in what order and in what manner.256 They are also better prepared to answer questions. 
Justice Peter Young of the NSW Supreme Court lamented the lack of what he described as 'judicial 
targeting'. He stated that: 
The great appellate advocates of the past had the ability to work out quickly which of the appellate 
judges were on side and what were the probable reasons for resistance from the others. They would 
then work on those others or at least some of them to secure a majority result. The judges that were 
worked on were usually those not known to have a "rat trap mind" or who had hobby horses which 
could be ridden in the direction that the advocate desired.257 
254 Kirby, 'Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 968. 
255 Ayres, above n SO, pp.41-42. See also Freidman and Lacavora, above n 29, p.209. Another element of 
'knowing the court' is for an appellate advocate to possess a sound knowledge of the operation of the 
particular court in which they are appearing, including the extra-legal or contextual features of its processes, 
practices and procedures. 
256 Godbold, above n 11, 809 referring to Davis, The Argument of an Appeal, in Advocacy and the King's English, 
216 (G Rossman ed. 1960). 
257 Young, 'Current issues: Appellate advocacy', above n 11, 145. 
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Chapter 4: Presentation 
"I early found that /liked talking to a judge and /liked him to talk to me. It is not given to every judge 
to da that. It is perhaps not given to every barrister to talk ta the judge. But it suited me. And I came 
ta think that the silent judge, the chgp who would not speak to me, was almost anathema. I had to 
devise means of making him talk. I may have succeeded in that. No one has ever had to stretch 
himself much to make me talk, I am afraid, and no one has had to work very hard to find out what the 
tendency of my mind may be, and some that may have disturbed. I am sorry if it has." 
Sir Garfield Barwick, 1981258 
Presentation in appellate advocacy refers to the act and manner of advancing arguments to an 
appellate court and includes the necessary interaction between the members of the court and the 
appellate advocate. It is critical in terms of achieving the ultimate objective of advocacy- persuasion. 
Presentation has been identified as the second category in the elements and ideals of appellate 
advocacy. 
This chapter will analyse the elements of presentation which include: conceptualising the case; using 
the opening and the reply; watching the members of the court; substance rather than elegance; 
flexibility, tact and discretion; explaining policy and principle as well as citing authority with care. 
These comprise the elements and ideals of appellate advocacy that contribute to the effectiveness of 
an appellate advocate's presentation. This analysis will provide the second part of the framework to 
assess Barwick's advocacy in accordance with the 'three category analysis'. As will become evident, 
presentation is a broad category comprising a diverse set of elements and ideals that are vital if the 
advocacy is to be effective. 
4.1 Conceptualise the Case and the Relevance Base 
Conceptual ising the case refers to an advocate's ability to distil, identify and articulate the critical 
issues as well as structure their submissions in a manner that clearly emphasises these issues from 
the outset. Ideally, the submissions advanced in support of the argument should allow these critical 
issues to be properly comprehended and appreciated through the use of sound legal argument and 
justification. The arrangement of the sequence of an advocate's argument as well as any documents 
or authority to which the advocate will refer is extremely important and 'will test the skill of the most 
258 Transcript of Proceedings, Ceremonial Sitting on the occasion of the Retirement of the Chief Justice, The 
Right Honourable Sir Garfield Barwick, P.C., G.C.M.G. at Canberra, Wednesday, 11 February 1981. 
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experienced craftsman' .'59 According to Byers, 'the isolation of the matter [for decision] is a most 
demanding and the most essential of all legal skills. Presenting it clearly, concisely and attractively is 
the summit of oral advocacy'. 260 In Ancient Greece, it was said that an important element of 
persuasiveness was clarity and an objective that was clearly envisaged.261 Advocates need to have 
clear in their mind the direction and purpose of each submission or argument. This ensures that an 
advocate never loses sight of the 'big picture' and that their submissions remain relevant and 'on-
track'. 
The most succinct description of conceptual ising the case is by Gibbs: 
Fundamental to success in appellate advocacy is the ability to perceive the point or points on which the 
resolution of the appeal will depend and to cut a path directly to those points, without meandering to 
explore side issues, however interesting, or worse still, entangling the court in a thicket of irrelevancies 
of fact or law.262 
Ideally, an advocate conveys to the court, as early as possible, the essence of the case so that the 
court is promptly made aware of the relevant issues. By arriving at the essence of the case quickly, 263 
the advocate does not risk losing the attention of the members of the court who have not yet 
formed, or begun to form, conclusions. 
Conceptualising the case allows the appellate court to focus on the relevant issues for determination. 
Irrelevant or unimportant issues only serve to irritate the appellate court and may damage an 
advocate's reputation. Notably, the merits of a case are, for reasons of fairness and justice, 
extremely important to an appellate court.264 As such, part ofthe skill associated with 
conceptualising a case is to weave into any conceptualisation of the case the merits of the case and 
communicate these to the appellate court. 
259 Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 6. 
260 Maurice Byers, 'From the other side of the Bar Table: an advocate's view of the judiciary' (1987) 10 UNSW 
Law Journal 179,180. See also Godbold, above n 11,811. 
261 See generally Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, above n 32. Also, see Thompson, above n 31, 16 who refers to 
five principles fundamental to the "three corners of persuasion", namely: invention (identifying the key 
question that has to be answered); arrangement (the structure of the argument); the style or choice of 
persuasive language; memory (the ability to accurately recall arguments); delivery (the use of voice and body 
language). See also Justice John H Phillips, 'Practical Advocacy: "Crito, we owe a cock to Aesculapius" Socrates' 
(August, 1998) 72(8) Australian Law Journal 586, 586. 
262 Harry Gibbs, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 497-498; Justice James Douglas, 'Oral Advocacy' in Blank & 
Selby (eds), above n 11, p.l81; Priest, above n 62, p.68. See also Interview with Chester Porter QC (Sydney, 
2 April 2006). 
263 Of course, during Barwick's time at the Bar, the volume of cases heard by the High Court was less than it is 
today and therefore the High Court had more time to consider lengthier submissions in cases. See Bennett, 
'Argument before the Court', above n 67, pp.31-32. 
264 Kirby, 'Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 971. 
67 
In the current era of appellate advocacy, there is an emphasis on reducing the length of court 
hearings. As previously discussed, limits are imposed on oral arguments in applications for special 
leave before the High Court and High Court cases generally last no more than one day, with an 
emphasis on written submissions. In this climate, Hampel has suggested that it is important for 
advocates to have the necessary training to ensure that they meet the expectations of the courts for 
'a greater emphasis on focus and efficiency of presentation'.'" That is, advocates will not be able to 
canvass every issue and will need to identify their key points to the court quickly. 266 Kirby, also refers 
to the need for 'efficient presentation'.267 
One of the features of many of the constitutional cases in which Barwick appeared is their 
extraordinary length. For example, the Bank Nationa/isatian Case which ran for 39 days in the High 
Court in 1948 is still the longest running High Court case, closely followed by the Communist Party 
Case in 1950 at 24 days. The presentation in both cases will be considered at length later in this 
thesis, but it is worth noting that it does not appear that 'efficiency of presentation' was achieved. 
However, there were numerous examples in these cases of Barwick efficiently conceptualising the 
case in identifying the relevant issues and simplifying these issues for the benefit of the court. 
Consistent with conceptualising the case, when engaging in oral argument, many commentators 
believe it is imperative for an advocate to 'go at once to the heart of the matter'.268 An advocate 
should, according to Mason, attempt to get to the main thrust of their argument as quickly as 
possible.269 Hughes describes getting to the heart of the case as 'essential' and 'the art of good 
advocacy'. 270 With the imposition of time limits, this assumes greater significance. This principle, 
265 Marcus Priest, 'Advocate makes his point', Australian Financial Review (Sydney), Friday 1 June 2007, 62. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Kirby, 'Appellate Advocacy- New Challenges', above n 11, p.17. See also Kirby, 'The future of appellate 
advocacy', above n 11. 
268 Hayne, 'Advocacy and Special Leave Applications in the High Court of Australia', above n 11, p.8. The 
existence of written submissions means that the judges will expect that the advocate will get to the point of 
the case as quickly as possible at the hearing: see Jackson, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, p.18; Glissan, 
above n 11, p.204. See also Interview with David Jackson QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). 
269 Mason, 'The Role of Counsel and Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 542. See also Judge Joel F. Dubina, 'From 
the Bench: Effective Appellate Advocacy' (Winter, 1994) 20{2) Litigation 3, 4. As Sir Anthony Mason suggested 
'[b]ecause the object of advocacy is to persuade, there is much to be said for getting there as quickly as 
possible. As the Americans say: 'Go straight for the jugular': Mason, 'The Role of Counsel and Appellate 
Advocacy', above n 11, 542. 
270 Interview with Hon. Tom Hughes AO QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). It was said of Dame Roma Mitchell 
(Australia's first female QC and a former judge of the Supreme Court of South Australia). that one of her great 
strengths as an advocate was distilling the issues and relevant principles quickly and accurately as well as her 
ability 'to get to the nub of matters quickly' (see E T Mullighan in "Before The Bench" in Susan Magarey (ed), 
Dame Roma: Glimpses of a Glorious Life, {2002), Axiom Publishing, Adelaide, South Australia, pp.44-45 and 
p.S1). Similarly, it is said of one of Australia's greatest advocates, Robert Ellicott QC, that he has an incredible 
ability to conceptualise the case and structure his submissions around this conceptualisation. It was said that: 
'He has a great instinct for the point of the case, and then sets about shaping it to his vision- in preparation, in 
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important during Barwick's time at the Bar, has achieved renewed importance in the current climate 
in which appellate advocacy is conducted. 
An integral part of getting to the heart of a matter as quickly as possible is, according to Gibbs, the 
'need for brevity and compression' .271 Despite the complexity of matters that come before appellate 
courts, advocates who are able to o\Jtline the main issues relatively quickly without labouring the 
point and without reading long passages from previous authority will benefit from doing so. 
According to John Phillips"', Gleeson, has a favourite saying: 'economical advocacy is, by definition, 
good advocacy'.273 However, it is important that substance is not sacrificed or dealt with in a cursory 
manner merely for the sake of brevity and compression. Hughes suggests that it is important for an 
advocate to 'cultivate the art of brevity and the art of clarity and that requires a lot of work.274 
By all accounts, appellate courts appreciate simplicity; this is also a key feature of conceptualising the 
case. Accordingly, an effective appellate advocate reduces their case to its 'bare essentials, i.e. those 
few core points which will determine the outcome of the case and can be presented in just a few 
minutes' .275 
One of Barwick's strengths as an advocate, as already noted and which will become more apparent, 
was his unique ability to simplify complex concepts and propositions. This added considerable 
weight to their persuasive effect. His advocacy was often characterised by one simple 
conceptualisation or a series of simple propositions. 
To achieve simplicity, focus and discipline are required, the first in terms of concentrating on the 
issues in the case, and the second and third in relation to the arguments advanced. This discipline, to 
a large extent, is gained from devoting considerable time to thinking through the issues in the 
preparation stage and exercising discretion when deciding which arguments to put to a court. 
court, in interlocutory proceedings and at the final hearing. He then sets about selling his vision': Address by 
Justice RV Gyles, 'The Han. RJ Ellicott QC: 50 years at the Bar' (Summer 2000/01) NSW Bar News 39, 41. 
271 Harry Gibbs, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 499. 
272 The Han. John Harber Phillips (1933- 2009) was the Chief Justice of Victoria between 1991 and 2003. 
273 Justice John H Phillips, 'Practical Advocacy: "'Come Sing Vienna Mine"', (December, 1999) 73 {12) Australian 
Law Journal 865, 866. 
274 1nterview with Han. Tom Hughes AO QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). In fact, Tom Hughes QC stated that he 
adopted the following approach to assist him to achieve brevity and clarity: 
I'm not ashamed to admit that in advance of doing a Special leave Application, I will write out in full what I 
want to say. I won't necessarily say it in that form, but it's a great discipline for achieving clarity and 
conciseness, a quality upon which all courts place great stress. 
275 Carroll, n 56, 108. In relation to 'bare essentials', this was yet another great strength of Sir Henry Winneke, 
it was said that: 
He possessed a widely recognised genius for reducing arguments to their essentials; and he was just as widely 
acknowledged for being helpful and scrupulously fair in his dealings with other counsel, witnesses and people 
accused of crimes. 
See Coleman, above n 207, p.168. 
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The main issue is relevance. Gibbs was 'regarded as a top advocate- reasonable, measured, well 
prepared, and possessed of a fine memory and a high sense of relevance'. 276 According to Gibbs, a 
'sense of relevance' is extremely important: 
[G]iven the necessary equipment which any counsel who appears in an appellate court ought to have- a 
requisite knowledge of the law, art ability to marshal facts and a clarity of expression- in my opinion, 
the two qualities most necessary for success in appellate advocacy are a sense of relevance and tact. 277 
Sir John Young, 278 a former pupil of Sir Henry Winneke, observed similarly that Winneke's greatest 
quality was 'relevance' .279 He was known for: 'his flair for quickly sizing up the facts of the case, 
eliminating superfluous material and arguing the main points with clarity and persuasiveness'.280 
Byers was also renowned for identifying the essential issues and not being distracted by irrelevant 
considerations. According to Gibbs, Byers identified: 
the point or points on which the decision will rest and advance[ d) clearly and strongly, but without 
undue repetition, the arguments directed to those points, keeping to the main road and not wandering 
off into side tracks and blind alleys, however attractive they may seem from a distance. 281 
It requires courage to discard irrelevant or unimportant details so as 'to avoid becoming entangled in 
interesting or hotly contested questions which do not go to the result'. 282 According to Kirby, an 
experienced appellate court judge, when judges are confronted with mountains of information and 
voluminous documents: 
a groan can sometimes be heard begging for the return of the days when one of the true skills of the 
advocate was discernment: the decision to cut away irrelevant or insignificant materials unlikely to help 
the decision-maker to come to the desired outcome. 283 
276 Priest, above n 62, pp.67-68. 
277 Harry Gibbs, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 497; Priest, above n 62, p.68. 
278 Sir John Young was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Victoria between 1974 and 1991 and succeeded Sir 
Henry Winneke. 
279 According to Sir John Young: 
He would say, "let's get rid of all this rubbish. What this thing really is about is so-and-so. Now let's 
concentrate on that ... That was his great power, I think- a very incisive mind. He got right down to the 
things that mattered -the brass tacks ... I think he was one of the best advocates we had. 
Coleman, above n 207, pp.152-153. 
28° Coleman, above n 207, p.83. It was said of Peter Hely that '[h]is genius lay in the capacity to reduce 
complexity and disorder to simplicity- to identify the point, to marshal the factual and legal materials bearing 
on it, and to analyse them imaginatively, lucidly, precisely and above all, concisely' (see Justice J D Heydon, 
'Obituary: Peter Graham Hely' (2006) 80 Australian Law Journa/541, 541). 
281 Attorney-General's Dinner in honour of Sir Maurice Byers, 8 February 1984, p.17 referred to in Address by 
Sir Gerard Brennan, 'Inaugural Sir Maurice Byers Lecture- Strength and perils: the Bar at the turn of the 
century' (Summer, 2000/01), NSW Bar News 32, 33. 
282 Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, p.6. 
283 Kirby, 'Appellate Advocacy- New Challenges', above n 11, p.34; Kate Gibbs, 'Be wary of 'electronic 
revolution' Kirby', Lawyers Weekly, 10 March 2006, 4. 
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Irrelevant material has the capacity to irritate the appellate court. Reflecting on the lessons he learnt 
during his time as an associate to Sir William Owen, then a judge of the Supreme Court of NSW, 
Hughes referred to the importance of selectivity and discarding the irrelevant issues. He stated that 
the 'selection of the good and the discarding of the bad points of a case are crucial to success in 
advocacy'. 284 
According to Judge Joel Dubina, discarding irrelevant material results in a discerning approach, where 
only the strongest arguments ofthe case are conveyed.285 It is counter-productive for an advocate to 
present every possible argument available in relation to a particular issue. To advance a weak 
argument when the advocate has at their disposal a strong argument has been described as 'the 
essence of bad advocacy' .286 An advocate who presents every possible argument may cause their 
strongest arguments to be lost amidst a series of weaker arguments, thus lessening the impact and 
effect of the stronger arguments. 287 Also, 'there is nothing to be gained from adopting absolutely 
untenable positions' .288 Advancing untenable arguments: 'also runs a risk of damaging the credibility 
of an advocate's overall case'/89 and may damage the reputation and credibility of the advocate. 
Effective advocacy demands that advocates have (or develop) the ability, during the preparation 
phase, to determine when an argument is weak or a position is untenable. 
An effective advocate will present their strongest argument early. This tactic has been described as 
'following the path of least resistance' .290 An advocate should capitalise on the court being likely to 
be at the height of its attentiveness early and should advance their strongest argument at this point. 
284 Hughes, above n 92, p.20. The full quote appears below. Sir William Owen was later appointed a judge of 
the High Court of Australia (1961 -1972). Tom Hughes stated that: 
He taught me much that otherwise I would not have learned: first and foremost to try to select at the outset 
of a case the significant issues and discard the inessential or unwinnable- two adjectives that really mean the 
same thing. 
The selection of the good and the discarding of the bad points of a case are crucial to success in advocacy. An 
ability to do so can be acquired with practice and by watching one's elders or betters in action. It is, in my 
view, the hallmark of real achievement. 
Hughes, above n 92, p.20. 
285 Dubina, above n 269, 4; Porter, The Gentle Art of Persuasion, above n 11, pp.163-164. 
286 Harry Gibbs, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 498. Chester Porter QC suggests that an advocate should use 
their best arguments first and that '[g]ood advocacy picks out the best one or two arguments or one of three 
arguments and puts those forward': see Interview with Chester Porter QC (Sydney, 2 April 2006). 
287 
'A storm of arguments- good, bad, and indifferent- can convince the judges that there is no merit to the 
case, even if buried in the deluge is a winning nugget' (Laurence H Silberman, 'From the Bench: Plain Talk on 
Appellate Advocacy' (Spring, 1994) 20(3) Litigation 3, 4). 
288 Jackson, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 71, 247. 
289 lain Ross, 'Industrial Advocacy- The Model Advocate', Speaking Notes, 
<http://www.irsv.asn.au/IR_Society_of_Vic.doc> at 12 March 2012, p.19. 
290 Trevor Riley, 'Advocacy: the case strategy' (April, 1999) Balance 16, 16. 
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This will increase the persuasive effect ofthe advocate's argument. It is this theme that is developed 
in the next section in the context of the opening. 
4.2 The Opening 
Mason relates that, in his experience: 
·All too often counsel failed to take advantage of the unique opportunity presented by the opening- to 
make an impact on the minds of the judges before they begin to move forward on their inexorable 
journey to a conclusion. There is no need for a ritual incantation of the history of the litigation. The 
Court is aware of it. Better to begin with a statement of the issues, unless the case lends itself to an 
exhilarating or humorous introduction.291 
The opening provides the advocate with an opportunity to convey to the court the advocate's 
approach as well as their strongest arguments upfront, with the full attention of the members of the 
court.292 According to Stuesser, the advocate should seize this opportunity to create a lasting 
impression in the minds ofthe judges: 
The opening of the case is an occasion of crucial importance and needs to be prepared and presented 
with great care, skill and deliberation; it informs the judge about the case and at the same time points to 
the strengths of the plaintiff's case and the weakness of the defendant's case.293 
Barwick recognised the importance of his opening and seized the opportunity to leave an impression 
on the appellate court. For example, as will be seen, he utilised the opening in the Bank 
Nationa/isation Case to outline and summarise his five broad attacks on the legislation. 
An advocate appearing on behalf of an appellate or plaintiff has a distinct advantage, namely, the 
opportunity to make submissions first. This enables the advocate to dictate the direction of the 
argument. For this reason, there is an advantage in an advocate advancing their main argument as 
early as possible.294 In constitutional law cases, usually the party attacking the validity of the law is 
required to open. However, this practice has been departed from in circumstances where 'it is more 
convenient for those upholding the validity of the law to go first' .295 For example, Barwick appearing 
291 Mason, 'The Role of Counsel and Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 542. 
292 
'The court is freshest, at its most receptive and most interested at the beginning of the advocate's 
argument. The first argument will make the deepest and most long lasting impression': Freidman and 
Lacavora, above n 29, p.211. 
293 Lee Stuesser, An Introduction to Advocacy, (1993), The Law Book Company Ltd, Sydney, p.52. 
294 Jackson, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 71, 250. 
295 Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts, (1967), Melbourne University Press, Carlton, p.43. 
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on behalf of the Commonwealth and seeking to uphold the validity of the Communist Party 
Dissolution Act 1950 (Cth) presented his arguments first in the Communist Party Case.296 
Advocates may squander the opportunity that is afforded to them at the opening of their argument. 
Former Justice of the High Court, Michael McHugh, recalls the type of introductions that caused 
irritation: 
Nothing used to annoy Justice Kirby and myself more than counsel getting up and we were eagerly 
awaiting to hear what the answer was to the appellant's case and the counsel for the respondent would 
say: 'Now I want to take your honours to page 17 of my submissions, footnote 4 it should be 77 rather 
than 74'. 297 
In presenting an opening, discretion and selectivity are important. Kirby suggests that during 
preparation, considerable time and thought should be devoted to the opening words of argument: 
The opening is generally the one moment when the advocate plunges straight into reading a tedious 
extract from legislation or a lengthy citation of authority. The opening [however] is the headline. It is 
the chance to communicate the advocate's basic point of view. It is a moment for selectivity. First 
impressions are often important. The good advocate will therefore give a lot of thought to the opening 
words of argument and to the strategy of explaining the case to the decision-makers.298 
The most effective openings it appears are those which capture the attention of the court by 
encapsulating and summarising the case in a brief yet interesting way, or by utilising a powerful 
metaphor that is particularly apt. A powerful or interesting opening can leave a lasting impression in 
the minds of the members of the court. An example of a memorable opening is attributed to Walter 
Sofronoff QC299 who appeared for the Wik Peoples in the Wik Case.300 This example of skilful rhetoric 
is remembered by two members of the High Court at the time, Justice McHugh and Justice Kirby. 
Kirby recalled that Sofronoff 'did not squander that historic moment'301 and that: 
His submissions commenced, as I recall, with a vivid description of the beauty of the Wik country in the 
northern part of Queensland. On 1 April1915, in that country, he said, the Wik people were going about 
296 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia (High 
Court of Australia, Latham CJ, Dixon, McTiernan, Williams, Webb, Fullagar, Kitto JJ, 14 November 1950 to 
19 December 1950), pp.7, 13-14. 
297 Marcus Priest, 'Eloquence has left the court, your honour', Australian Financial Review (Sydney), Friday 24 
August 2007, 57. 
298 Kirby, 'Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 970. See also Justice James Douglas, 'Oral Advocacy' in 
Blank & Selby (eds), above n 11, p.181. 
299 Currently the Solicitor-General of Queensland. 
300 Wik Peoples v Queensland ("Pastoral Leases case") [1996] HCA 40; (1996) 187 CLR 1; (1996) 141 ALR 129; 
(1996) 71 AUR 173 (23 December 1996). 
301 Justice Michael Kirby, 'Introduction: The Rise (and Fall?) of the Barrister Class' (Speech delivered at the NSW 
Bar Association Rhetoric Series: Rise (and Fall?) of the Barrister Class, Sydney, 20 August 2007), p.6; See also 
Justice James Douglas, 'Oral Advocacy' in Blank & Selby (eds), above n 11, p.181. 
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their daily lives as they and their ancestors had done for aeons. The men were getting their bark boats 
ready to fish because it was a clear day. The women were sitting with the children, teaching them about 
their traditions. Some older children were running off into the bush. At the very same moment, in the 
Land Titles Registry in Brisbane, the representatives of the Mitchelton Pastoral Holding were registering 
a pastoral lease under the Queensland Act. In the old measurements, it laid claim to an area of 535 
square miles, approximately 13S5 square kilometres. 302 
Kirby described it as ' ... a powerful, indeed electric moment'303 and that 'his appeal to seeing the 
picture of the legal problem in that context left an indelible memory on my mind'. 304 
During the opening, reciting a succinct history of the case, summarising the main arguments, 
following those arguments with a careful recitation of significant facts and concluding submissions by 
addressing the relevant law, will afford the advocate the best possible opportunity for an 
'uninterrupted interlude' .'0s Former judges have confirmed that the court is only interested in the 
arguments that will advance the advocate's case and the relevant facts and questions of law which 
are likely to arise.'06 Whilst, the opening of the case should not be used for reciting the entire history 
of the litigation, advocates should not over-estimate the knowledge that the members of the court 
have about their particular case.'07 They may not be as familiar with the relevant issues of the case 
as the advocates would be. 
According to Mason, an advocate should find an 'exhilarating or humorous'308 way to capture the 
attention of the court from the outset if the case is conducive to such an introduction. 309 In Kirby's 
view, an opening that is more likely to grab the attention of the members of the court includes 
302 Kirby, 'Introduction: The Rise (and Fall?) of the Barrister Class', above n 301, pp.6-7; see also Wik Peoples v 
Queensland ("Pastoral Leases case") (1996) 187 CLR 1 at 231; Transcript of Proceedings, Wik Peoples v State of 
Queensland & Ors (High Court of Australia, Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gum mow and 
Kirby JJ, 11 June 1996) (see also (1996] HCATrans 228 (11 June 1996) at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/au/other/HCATrans/1996/228.html?query=Awik accessed on 17 December 2008); see also Priest, 
'Eloquence has left the court, your honour', above n 297, 57. 
303 Priest, 'Eloquence has left the court, your honour', above n 297, 57. 
304 Ibid. 
305 Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 6. 
306 Sackville, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 60, 105. 
307 For this reason, according to Kirby, in their opening, it is imperative that the advocate outline the principal 
facts and the relevant issues in the case to provide the court with a clear picture. This should be undertaken 
despite judicial resistance- that is, in the form of negative comments or questions from members of the court. 
However, once it becomes apparent that all the members of the court have an understanding of the relevant 
facts and issues, the advocate should not persist in the face of continued judicial discouragement as this is 
likely to be counter-productive: see Kirby, 'Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 970-971. 
308 Mason, 'The Role of Counsel and Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 542. 
309 Ibid. In one instance, an advocate that was about to commence their submissions in the face of a hostile 
and aggressive Court of Appeal, responded to an initial barrage by stating: 'Before your honours drop the 
guillotine, let me make just two points .. .'. This caused laughter amongst the judges and bought the advocate 
some valuable time 'to mount a persuasive, well thought out and almost compelling argument': see Justice 
James Douglas, 'Oral Advocacy' in Blank & Selby (eds), above n 11, p.181. 
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references to the particular merits or justice of the case, an interesting issue of legal policy, a clear 
requirement of legal authority310 or some other interesting yet important aspect of the case. David 
Jackson QC, a leading constitutional barrister has a different view: 'I have always found it better to 
eschew the exhilarating or humorous introduction. Witty observations which blossomed in 
chambers tend to wilt in the more acid rain of the courtroom' .'11 
4.3 The Reply 
The reply is also a powerful tool and provides the advocate with the final opportunity to persuade 
the members of the court and leave them with a lasting impression. Generally, the reply is only 
available to the appellant in an appeal. The use of 'the reply to mount a deadly counterattack'"' is 
an art and is difficult to master. However, it can be a very effective tactic. According to Mason: 
effectively the reply is deconstructing the opponent's argument. In reply, you can't just advance the 
argument that you advanced in opening the case ... What you've got to do is hone in on something that 
is being presented by your opponent and destroy that.'" 
Barwick was renowned for his ability to use the reply very effectively and often employed the 
technique of 'trailing his coat', that is, deliberately withholding aspects of his submissions on certain 
issues in his presentation in chief and allowing his opponent to address these issues in their 
submissions then addressing these issues in his reply. 
It is not unusual for an advocate to successfully make their more pertinent points in reply. The 
contents of the submissions will determine what an advocate can achieve in the reply as will the 
nature of the arguments that the advocate has deliberately withheld for use in their reply314 Both 
aspects are discussed in turn. 
As the appellant, the decision whether to reply is heavily influenced by the perceived success of the 
respondent's argument. If the advocate is confident that the court would not accept the 
respondent's arguments or the court has effectively demolished the respondent's arguments, then it 
may be prudent for the advocate to resist exercising their right of reply. By opting not to exercise 
their right of reply, the advocate deprives the court of the opportunity to subject their arguments to 
31
° Kirby, 'Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 970. 
311 Jackson, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 71, 250. See Hughes, above n 92, pp.18-19. See also Ross, Advocacy, 
(2"' ed), above n 188, p.144. 
312 Harry Gibbs, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 499. 
313 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). 
314 Mason, 'The Role of Counsel and Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 543. 
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any further scrutiny and potentially damage the advocate's arguments.315 However, it may not be 
necessary for an advocate to exercise their right of reply in circumstances where they have 
effectively addressed their opponent's strongest arguments at the outset; that is, where the strategy 
of a 'pre-emptive strike' has been adopted.316 
The strategy of withholding part of the argument until the reply is considered to be fraught with risk 
and danger.317 The reply must be a legitimate reply to issues raised by the respondent and cannot be 
used to supplement the appellant's case in chief. If the advocate has failed to raise a particular 
argument in chief (whether it was intentionally withheld or otherwise), and the respondent has not 
raised or referred to this argument in their submissions, the appellant is not permitted to raise this 
argument during the reply. 
The reply is not an occasion to repeat previous submissions advanced by the advocate. Rather, it is 
the opportunity to deal with any issues raised by the respondent during their submissions and to 
identify any flaws or weaknesses in the respondent's argument. Sackville considers an appellant 
fortunate to have the opportunity to do this at the completion of the oral argument,318 to effectively 
have the 'last say'. Just as the opening is a time when the advocate has the undivided attention of 
the members of the court, the reply is a time when the advocate is able to capture the court's 
attention as the oral submissions are coming to an end. 
4.4 Watch the Bench and Judicial Questions 
Watch the Bench 
Since the time of Ancient Greece, it has been acknowledged that effective advocacy requires that an 
advocate have a considerable understanding ofthe persons who constitute the tribunal or bench.319 
That is, an advocate should be aware of the personality, idiosyncrasies"' and predilections of the 
members of the court. This valuable information can be used to tailor both the substance of the 
315 An advocate, who does opt to exercise their right of reply, potentially exposes themselves to a myriad of 
questions as, by this stage, the court has had the benefit of hearing both sides of the argument (see Jackson, 
'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 8). 
316 Glissan, above n 11, p.205. 
317 Mason, 'The Role of Counsel and Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 543; Harry Gibbs, 'Appellate Advocacy', 
above n 11, 499. 
318 Sackville, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 60, 107-108. 
319 Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, above n 32, p.74; Thompson, above n 31, 13; see Eidenmuller, above n 32; see 
also Phillips, above n 263, 586. 
320 Idiosyncrasies of a non-legal nature may also be relevant. For example, Mr Justice Wynn-Parry (a former 
judge of the Chancery Division of the High Court in England) publicly rebuked a barrister for appearing before 
him without wearing a waistcoat: Cecil, above n 224, p.73. 
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advocate's submissions and the manner in which those submissions are presented: 'If you happen to 
know the mental habits of any particular judge, so much the better. To adapt yourself to his [or her] 
methods of reasoning is not artful, it is simply elementary psychology'."' 
An advocate can only understand the individual attributes of the members of the court by 'knowing 
the court' (as discussed in Chapte~ 3), 'watching the bench' during the presentation of their 
submissions and adopting a high level of awareness. Inherent in doing so is the ability to observe 
judge's reactions, including body language and facial expressions, as well as listening carefully to 
their questions and comments. The advocate can then draw inferences about the judicial attitudes 
towards their case generally.322 According to David Jackson '[y]ou've got to keep your eyes on them 
[the judges] all the time' and you should become a 'very good reader of body language'."' Ellicott 
remarked that: 'I know from my own experience that it is very important to keep your eyes on the 
judges and talk to them all. Go along the bench'.324 An advocate should look at the court.325 
The significant forensic advantages available to an advocate from watching the bench provide an 
incentive to minimising time spent reading aloud or referring to written material. According to 
Hayne: '[c]ounsel who puts his or her head down in order to read a prepared speech, or a slab of 
judgment, foregoes any opportunity to engage the Court'.326 An advocate who maintains eye 
contact, engages the members of the court and does not read from prepared submissions is more 
likely to have an attentive and receptive court which will concentrate on their arguments."' Such an 
321 John W Davis, 'The Argument of an Appeal' (1940) 26 American Bar Association Journal895 in Peter J Carre, 
Azike A Ntephe and Helen C Trainor (eds) Appellate Advocacy, (1981), American Bar Association, Chicago, 
p.215. As Robert F. Hanley wrote: 'The advocate must be a psychologist. He must understand human nature, 
and he must know how his listeners think, their habits, desires and emotions' (see Rosenberg and Huberman, 
above n 11, p.xiii). 
322 Kirby, 'Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 971. See also Ross, Advocacy, (2"' ed), above n 188, 
p.9 and Porter, The Gentle Art of Persuasion, above n 11, p.61. 
323 1nterview with David Jackson QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). 
324 1nterview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
325 Ibid. 
326 Hayne, 'Advocacy and Special Leave Applications in the High Court of Australia', above n 11, p.9; Rosenberg 
and Huberman, above n 11, p.46. A well-known American judge, Justice Robert Jackson, has commented that: 
If one's oral argument is simply reading his printed brief aloud, he could as well stay at home ... We like to 
meet the eye of the advocate, and sometimes when one starts reading his argument from a manuscript he 
will be interrupted, to wean him from his essay ... If you have confidence to address the Court only by reading 
to it, you really should not argue there. 
Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 9. 
327 However, some commentators suggest that an advocate write out their argument in full but leave them 
behind so as to avoid reading from it during their oral submissions in court. Some counsel prefer to have with 
them a full text for the 'comfort' and 'security' it provides: Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 11, p.40; See 
also Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 11, p.46. See also Glissan, above n 11, p.7 where it is suggested that 
the danger with written notes is that 'they hold the attention of the advocate and distract from the vital tasks 
of communication and observation'. See also Silberman, above n 287, 59; Nix, Honorable Robert N.C., "The 
View From the Appellate Bench", from Purver, Johnathan M, & Taylor, Lawrence E, Handling Criminal Appeals, 
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advocate is also in a better position to respond to judicial questions."" An advocate's submissions 
are more likely to be accepted, and the arguments more likely to be persuasive, where the advocate 
has maintained the interest of the members of the court. Successful advocacy 'will keep the 
[judges'] minds on the case, and offthe clock'.329 
According to various commentators, the advocates who make the biggest impact and impression on 
the members of the court it seems, are the advocates who are capable of presenting their 
submissions without referring to written materials and who can instead 'engage in a conversation 
with the Bench'.330 It was said of Byers that he' ... epitomised the conversational style of advocacy. 
He invited the court to engage in a dialogue about the issues in the case'.331 Engagement with the 
members of the court, demonstrates that the advocate is familiar with their case and gives the court 
confidence that the advocate will be able to provide assistance to the members of the court in 
attempting to reach a just outcome. 
By closely monitoring the reactions of the members of the court to the submissions that they 
advance, an advocate is able to gauge whether to persist (perhaps gently) with a particular argument 
or issue, or find an alternative method of advancing their argument."' However, it is easier to gauge 
the views of some judges than others despite 'watching' them closely. 
The benefit of watching the bench and judicial questioning is reflected in an anecdote from South 
Australian barrister, Jack Elliott, when he was briefed to appear on behalf of a man who had been 
charged with drink driving for the fourth time as well as failing to stop after an accident and driving 
without due care.333 During the special leave application in the High Court, Elliott commenced by 
attempting to justify the Supreme Court's dismissal of the Crown's original appeal. According to 
Elliott, the following exchange occurred: 
(1980), Bancroft- Whitney Co, San Francisco, pp.397-401 in Peter J Carre, Azike A Ntephe and Helen C Trainor 
(eds) Appellate Advocacy, (1981), American Bar Association, Chicago, p.6; see also Rosenberg and Huberman, 
above n 11, p.46. 
328 Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 11, p.46. 
329 Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 11. 
33
° Kirby, 'Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 972; Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 11, p.45. See 
also Jackson, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 71, 252. Clearly, such a tactic is only able to be utilised if the 
advocate has a general state of awareness, is watching the members of the court and maintaining eye contact. 
331 Address by Sir Anthony Mason 'Opening of Maurice Byers Chambers' (Summer, 2000/01), NSW Bar News 
52. 
332 Kirby, 'Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 971-972. 
333 The magistrate had the power under section 4 of the Offenders Probation Act 1913 (SA) to dismiss the 
complaint even though he believed that the offence had been proven, if the magistrate deemed it expedient to 
do so on grounds such as character, antecedents, age, health etc. The magistrate exercised his power to do so. 
The Crown unsuccessfully appealed to the Supreme Court but was successful in its appeal to the Full Court of 
the Supreme Court. Elliot was instructed to file a special leave application in the High Court. 
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Barwick CJ: I wouldn't worry about that, Mr Elliott, I'd deal with your original argument on the 
magistrate's powers and discretion. 
Elliott: That's pleasing to hear, Your Honour, up till now I've been a voice crying in the wilderness. 
Barwick CJ: You, and the magistrate.334 
. 
During his remaining submissions, Elliott observed the five judges of the High Court 'nodding 
approval to all of our submissions'.335 Shortly after, Chief Justice Barwick said: 'You need say no 
more, Mr Elliott. Special leave to appeal is granted. The appeal will be heard in the May sittings in 
Melbourne'."' Elliott was ultimately successful in the appeal, with only one judge, Justice McTiernan 
dissenting."' 
Judicial Questions 
The general view of various commentators is that judicial questioning provides the advocate with 
invaluable information about the thought processes of each member of the court as well as their 
concerns, reservations and inclinations."" According to John Godbold, 'this opening into the mind of 
the listener is the most valuable piece of information the persuader can get'.339 Insight into, or an 
understanding of, a judge's inclination provides the advocate with an opportunity to adapt and 
modify their submissions and approach, with a view to enhancing the persuasiveness of their 
submissions.340 An advocate should use this opportunity to their advantage.341 That is, ' ... [i]t is 
334 Jack Elliott, Memoirs of a Barrister, (2000), Wakefield Press, Kent Town, South Australia, p.256. 
335 Ibid. 
336 Ibid. 
337 1bid, p.257. Also see Cobiac v Liddy (1969) 119 CLR 257. 
338 Silberman, above n 287, 4; Nathanson, above n 11, pp.4-13. Also, Sir Albert Edward Woodward described his 
approach as a judge as follows: 
... I let counsel know my thought processes as the hearing proceeded. I thought it only fair that they should 
know what they had to deal with. The result tended to produce a dialogue rather than uninterrupted 
speeches by counsel. While most welcomed this, one or two were reluctant to have their oratorical flow cut 
short, so they hardly drew breath, giving me very little opportunity to intervene with an observation or 
question. 
Albert Edward Woodward, One Brief Interval: A Memoir, (2005), Melbourne University Publishing Ltd, Carlton, 
Victoria, p.208. 
339 Godbold, above n 11, 818. This opening into the judicial mind has been referred to as 'windows of 
opportunity' in Glissan, above n 11, p.201. The advocate should ensure that they address what interests the 
court when responding to questions: Pan nick, above n 193. 
340 See Glissan, above n 11, p.201. 
341 Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 11, p.48. The author states: 'Use the judges' reactions, comments and 
questions during the appellant's Counsel's argument to your advantage; they will show what issues the judges 
feel are important or which require further development'. 
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infinitely preferable to have a bench that is prepared to debate the issues with you, than to have a 
bench which listens with a sphinx-like silence' .'42 
However, an advocate should work with judicial questioning and use this opportunity to their 
advantage. This was certainly Barwick's approach. It is far easier to persuade a member of the court 
when they are offering an insight1nto what they are thinking. For this reason, judicial questions 
should be encouraged.343 
Although submissions which are well-presented, well-organised and thorough from the outset tend 
to discourage judicial questions, such questioning is inevitable and advocates should always be 
prepared for it.344 An advocate who has engaged in an extensive preparation will be able to answer 
most judicial questions adequately and their arguments are more likely to survive judicial 
interrogation. Therefore, during preparation: 
the advocate's concentration should lie upon endeavouring to look into the mind of the tribunal, 
to anticipate and work out answers for difficulties and objections, spoken or unspoken, to 
calculate what are likely to be perceived as the strengths and weaknesses of his or her position, to 
judge what arguments are likely to be found to be of intellectual attraction and what are likely to 
be regarded as unimportant or counter-productive, and, always, to think ahead of the court.'45 
Judicial questioning tests the thoroughness of the advocate's preparation: 'nothing tests the skill of 
an advocate or endangers his position more than his answer to questions, and in nothing is 
experience, poise, and a disciplined mind a greater asset' .'46 
342 Perry, above n 68, p.6. 
343 
'Extra-Judicial Notes', above n 43, 12; See also Nathanson, above n 11, pp.4-13; Rosenberg and Huberman, 
above n 11, pp.44-45. Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 12; Rosenberg 
and Huberman, above n 11, pp.44-45. It has been suggested by John W Davis that an advocate should: 
Rejoice when the court asks questions ... If the question does nothing more it gives you assurance that the 
court is not comatose and that you have awakened at least a vestigial interest. Moreover a question affords 
you your only chance to penetrate the mind of the court, unless you are an expert in face reading, and to 
dispel a doubt as soon as it arises. 
John W Davis, 'The Argument of an Appeal', above n 321, p.219. 
344 Chief Justice Denison of the Supreme Court of Colorado explained that: 
A perfect argument would need no interruption and a perfect Judge would never interrupt it; but we are not 
perfect ... It is the function of the Court to decide the case and to decide it properly ... The Judge knows 
where his doubts lie, at which point he wishes to be enlightened; it is he whose mind at last must be made 
up, no one can do it for him, and he must take his own course of thought to accomplish it. Then he must 
sometimes interrupt. 
John W Davis, 'The Argument of an Appeal', above n 321, pp.219-220. 
345 1Extra-Judicial Notes~, above n 43, 12. 
346 Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 12. As Chief Justice of the High 
Court, Barwick made the following statement in relation to judicial questioning: 
The hearing or argument, even at times poor argument, excites the mind of the judge, making it work on the 
facts and upon the law as it is brought forward by the barrister and by the references to authority which he 
gives. Exchange with the Bar, testing, no doubt in a tentative way, the proposition submitted, has its part not 
only in the clarification of the judge's mind but often in the enlargement of counsel's concept of the matter 
80 
However, David Jackson introduces an element of reality and pragmatism about preparing to 
respond to judicial questions by suggesting that an advocate 'will never be able to answer every 
question or every question to the satisfaction of the questioner, and particularly so if you are talking 
about, say, appearing before seven justices in the High Court' .347 Contrast this approach to the 
statement by Gleeson: 
An advocate ought to think out beforehand, what kind of questions the bench are likely to ask, and have 
·an answer prepared for them. It's unforgivable for an advocate to go into a case and be taken by 
surprise about anything.348 
There appears to be a significant difference of opinion about the extent to which appellate advocates 
can ready themselves for the judicial questioning that they will face. Whilst it is unrealistic to expect 
that advocates would be in a position to anticipate all possible questions from the members of the 
court, good advocates would anticipate a core group of questions in any case or a core set of topics 
which may be the subject of questions. This goes some way to reconciling the respective views of 
David Jackson and Gleeson. 
Judicial questioning provides the members of the court with the opportunity to test the substance of 
the advocate's arguments and focus on critical aspects of the advocate's case. The role of judicial 
questioning is best encapsulated by Hayne: 
You cannot expect the Court to remain silent during your argument, whether in a leave application or on 
the hearing of an appeal. The Court will ask questions of counsel which you must always attempt to 
answer as clearly and directly as you may. It is inevitable that some of the questions asked will not assist 
the case you are making. The Court wants to know what consequences follow from adopting particular 
arguments. It is important to understand the limits of the principle which it is said underpin the 
argument. Counsel are paid to advocate a particular client's case. The Court is concerned not only to 
decide a particular case correctly but also to formulate principles properly. It follows that you must be 
prepared for questions that are designed to show whether your argument is faulty. If you can anticipate 
the questions and have an answer in mind, so much the better. Your answer will be more direct. Bear 
in mind, as well, that there are times when questions asked of counsel enable discussion of the matter 
and, on occasions, prompts new lines of submissions. For that essential stimulation of mind in judge and 
counsel alike, I can find no substitute for oral argument, well presented by counsel who are well prepared and 
capable of the exchange of ideas with the bench which is itself capable, not merely of listening, but of 
working in the presence of counsel. 
Barwick, 'The State of the Australian Judiciary', above n 46, 199. 
347 Interview with David Jackson QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). He added that: 
The only way I can think of really is that beforehand you try to work out what you want to say, and as you do, 
you try to put it in paragraphs in your mind or try to write down what you are going to say. At least you know 
where (you are) going then but as you do that, you come to recognise the sort of questions that might be 
asked and as that happens you try to have answers ready for them. 
Also, Jackson, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, p.18-19. 
348 1nterview with Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 14 August 2006). 
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along the bench. A question which you are asked may be intended to provoke an answer that will 
reflect upon a line of questioning by another member of the Court. 349 
Many advocates, particularly inexperienced advocates, dread judicial questioning. This was certainly 
the experience of former advocate and judge, Sir Albert Edward Woodward,350 who stated: 'As a 
young barrister, I lived in fear of being caught out by a question from the Bench that I was unable to 
answer, in circumstances when I should have had an answer ready .. .'.351 If an advocate is unable to 
deal with any relevant questions, 352 it is better to concede this by way of a candid admission rather 
than attempting to respond to the question by hazarding a guess353 
Advocates are often required to deviate from their planned order of submissions to respond to 
judicial questions. However, effective advocates have developed the ability to weave their planned 
arguments into their responses to judicial questions.354 The ability to move between an advocate's 
planned order of submissions whilst simultaneously incorporating their planned arguments into their 
responses to judicial questions is an important skill and demonstrates an intimate understanding of 
their case. This increases the confidence in the advocate and may enhance the advocate's ability to 
persuade the members ofthe court. 
As an advocate, Dixon welcomed judicial questioning and thrived on it. It was said that '[n]ot only 
did he revel in being cross-examined by High Court judges, he knew how to sway them' .355 One of his 
349 Hayne, 'Advocacy and Special Leave Applications in the High Court of Australia', above n 11, p.8. 
35
° Following his career at the Bar, Sir Albert Edward Woodward was appointed to the Commonwealth 
Industrial Court, the Supreme Courts of the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory, and the 
Deputy Presidency ofthe Trade Practices Tribunal: see Woodward, above n 338, p.126. 
351 Woodward, above n 338, p.53. 
352 Another suggested option for an advocate who is confronted with a situation where they are unable 
immediately to deal with an issue raised by a member of the court, is for the advocate to utilise an 
adjournment to devise an appropriate response and ensure they deal with the issue immediately after the 
adjournment: Sackville, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 60, 107. 
353 Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 12; Rosenberg and Huberman, 
above n 11, p.45. 
354 Tom Hughes QC recommends that, when faced with vigorous judicial questioning, an appellate advocate 
'[r]oll with the punches. Don't get upset. Roll with the punches, with the aim of maintaining the integrity of 
your essential argument. Don't get flustered' (see Interview with Han. Tom Hughes AO QC (Sydney, 2 August 
2006); Carroll, above n 56, 109. David Jackson QC agrees that this is important: see Interview with David 
Jackson QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). Geoffrey Sawer, the famous constitutional law academic, described the 
experience of High Court advocacy in the following way: 
because of the Court's inveterate habit of interjecting extensively during argument ... even if counsel come 
prepared with a reasonably well organized plan, they are constantly thrown off it by questions from justices 
and often have great difficulty getting back on the intended track, or indeed remembering the point on the 
track which they had reached before being taken off along some other track preferred by the justices. 
Counsel cannot safely assume that all the justices will have followed the course dictated by interjections, 
much less that the more silent justices will be as familiar with the trend of his argument as the interjectors 
often seem to be. 
Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts, above n 295, p.44. 
355 Ayres, above n 50, p.28. 
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great strengths was his ability to handle judicial questioning and incorporate into his answers his 
well-prepared arguments. The same can be said of Barwick, as will be apparent from his responses 
to questions during the Bank Nationa/isation Case and the Communist Party Case discussed in later 
chapters. 
The former Assistant US Attorney (;eneral and advocate, Hugh B. Cox, was described as 'one of the 
great advocates of his generation in the United States'.356 His ability to deal with judicial questioning 
helped forge his reputation: 
Under questioning by the Court he could move rapidly and easily from an extremely complex 
analysis into some simple parallel to illustrate a point, and then guide himself back, with brilliant 
and masterful insights and without hesitancy, into the main thrust of a conclusion delivered in a 
strong sonorous voice that carried throughout any courtroom in which he spoke. He had a broad 
and scholarly knowledge of the law, a prodigious memory, exacting standards of professional 
performance, a sensitivity to the type of case on which he was engaged and to the Court before 
which it was to be tried. 357 
Similar qualities are also important in the Australian context. 
Advocates, commentators suggest, should answer judicial questions in a direct and accurate manner 
and not seek to evade them,"' delay answering or give vague responses. According to Ellicott, 
'[you're] addressing [the judges] and you're trying to answer their queries and when somebody asks 
a question you deal with it'.359 
However, other approaches to judicial questioning have also been suggested. During his career as a 
distinguished barrister in the UK (and later Privy Counsellor), Cyril Radcliffe360 did not tailor his 
submissions to the court and nor would he respond to questions immediately: 
He did not adapt his method of presentation to the tribunal but by putting forward reasonable 
arguments attempted to persuade. In the House of Lords a Law Lord would frequently interrupt 
356 Robert C. Barnard in The Perfect Advocate: A Memoir of the late Hugh B. Cox, Esquire, (1976), Oxford, 
Christchurch, p.17. 
357 George L. Haskins in The Perfect Advocate: A Memoir of the late Hugh B. Cox, Esquire, (1976), Oxford, 
Christchurch, p.34. 
358 Dubina, above n 269, 4; Nathanson, above n 11, pp.4-13; Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 11, p.45; 
Glissan, above n 11, p.198. 
359 Interview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). Also, see generally Glissan, above n 11, 
p.201 and Ross, Advocacy, (2"' ed), above n 188, p.145. See also Justice James Douglas, 'Oral Advocacy' in 
Blank & Selby (eds), above n 11, pp.186-187. 
360 In 1949, Radcliffe was sworn of the Privy Council, made a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary (law lord) and created a 
life peer as Baron Radcliffe, of Werneth in the County of Lancaster. He also appeared for the banks in the Bank 
Nationalisation Case before the Privy Council alongside Barwick and others. 
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with a question. Radcliffe would not be deflected from his argument by replying to the question 
immediately but would courteously say that he would deal with the point later in his argument. 361 
However, an advocate who greets judicial questions with suspicion or cynicism '[a]ll too often ... bites 
the helping hand'.'" A question may appear hostile on its face, but: 
Questions usually seek to elicit i~formation or to aid in advancing or clarifying the argument. A question 
argumentative in form should not be attributed to hostility, for oftentimes it is put, not to overbear 
counsel, but to help [the judge] sharpen [their] position. Now and then, of course, counsel may be 
caught in a cross-fire of questions between differing Justices, each endeavoring to bring out some point 
favorable to [their] own view of the law. That tests the agility and diplomacy of counsel."' 
Through judicial questioning, an advocate also has an opportunity to clarify any misunderstandings 
that a member of the court may have and advance their case generally364 According to Robert 
Jackson: 
The wise advocate will eagerly embrace the opportunity to put at rest any misconception or doubt 
which, if the judge waited to raise it in the conference room, counsel would have no chance and perhaps 
no one present would have the information to answer. 365 
It cannot be assumed that a question from a member of the court indicates their final view in 
relation to an issue or the views of any other members of the court.366 There may be many other 
reasons for the question, for example, to alert the advocate to a flaw in their submissions or an 
aspect of the advocate's case that has been previously overlooked. A probing or searching question 
from a member of the court may not necessarily indicate disagreement; it may simply reflect the 
judge's attempt to comprehend the argument or the consequences of accepting a particular 
argument.367 David Jackson observed that: 'The members of appellate courts do not always look at 
361 Edmund Heward, The Great and the Good: A Life of Lord Radcliffe, (1994), Barry Rose Law Publishers Ltd, 
Chichester, UK, pp.21-22. 
362 Freidman and Lacavora, above n 29, p.210; Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 11, pp.44-45. 
363 Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 11. See also Nathanson, above n 
11, pp.4-13. 
364 1ain Ross, above n 289, p.15; Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 11, pp.44-45. 
365 Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 12. 
366 According to former Chief Justice Gleeson: 
you've got to understand where the numbers are likely to lie on the bench. The ones who are doing the most 
talking are not necessarily the ones who are in the majority. Sometimes the ones who do the most talking are 
commonly in a minority and it would be a bad error to be misled by what they're saying into thinking that 
what they're saying is representative of the way the bench as a whole is thinking. 
Interview with Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 14 August 2006}. 
367 Sackville, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 60, 101; Nathanson, above n 11, pp.4-13. 
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cases in the same way. Intellectual processes and approaches differ, and that may be reflected in 
questions asked by the court during the appeal' .368 
In an appellate court, it is not uncommon for a particular judge to play a more dominant role in 
intervening during an advocate's submissions and posing questions. In such a case, it is important 
that the advocate's responses to such questions are directed to all members of the court. Focusing 
one's attention on one member of the court may give a misleading impression as to the manner in 
which the argument is affecting the entire court.369 Former Solicitor-General, David Bennett QC,370 
recalled from the Scientology Cose371: 
in the Scientology case when I was at the bar, Justice [Lionel] Murphy asked me questions which 
involved an attack on Christianity. Although his questions were intended to support the argument I was 
putting, I had to be careful not to adopt too much of what he was putting to me, for fear of antagonising 
the three active Christians on the court. 372 
Ellicott indicated that he often employed overstatement for the purposes of gaining an insight into 
the minds of the judges and 'as a means of drawing out the bench ... overstatement ... often ... works 
to bring a point of view out and you know where the mind is going'.373 
Some appellate judges, commentators suggest, ask 'straw man' questions- that is, questions by 
judges who have already made up their mind on a particular issue in a way that conflicts with the 
position adopted by the advocate. The advocate 'must not allow himself to be lured into wasting 
valuable time jousting the straw man'.'74 There are also occasions where judicial questions may be 
368 Jackson, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, p.18-19; see also Justice James Douglas, 'Oral Advocacy' in Blank 
& Selby (eds), above n 11, p.187. 
369 
'Extra-Judicial Notes', above n 43, 12. 
370 Dr Bennett was the Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, appointed for a five-year term in 
August 1998 and for a second five-year term in August 2003. In August 2008, Dr Bennett returned to private 
practice. He was called to the NSW Bar in 1967 and was appointed as a Queen's Counsel in 1979 and practiced 
in the areas of appellate law generally, constitutional law, administrative law, revenue law, trade practices and 
competition law, among others. He served as president of the New South Wales Bar Association from 
November 1995 to November 1997 and President of the Australian Bar Association from November 1995 to 
February 1997. 
371 Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-Rolf Tax (Vic) {"Scientology case") [1983] HCA 40; {1983) 154 
CLR 120 (27 October 1983). 
372 
'Putting words to music in the constitution's case', above n 217, 47. 
373 Interview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). Further, Ellicott indicated: 
You mustn't overstate to the point of not being able to defend the proposition, ... advocacy is an expression 
of confidence about your case and sometimes overstatement does draw the bench I've found. It might draw 
an acid comment or it might say "that's ridiculous" or "how can that be" but in the process you know where 
the point of no return is in relation to the proposition and you can get back to it, so it's a process of going 
forward and coming back, it's a bit like fencing or something like that. 
374 Freidman and Lacavora, above n 29, p.211. 
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asked with an ulterior motive in mind, for example, for the purposes of convincing the other judges 
on the appellate court. This has been referred to as 'judicial advocacy'.'" 
4.5 Focus on the Substanc.e, Elegance is a Bonus 
One ofthe fundamental elements and ideals of appellate advocacy in presentation is the substance 
of an advocate's submissions. For the purposes of this analysis, substance refers to the content of an 
advocate's submissions whereas elegance refers to the style or manner in which an advocate's 
submissions are delivered. Whilst elegance is an important skill or technique to develop, an 
advocate's primary focus should be on substance. In the words of Justice James Douglas"' of the 
Supreme Court of Queensland, 'most judges appreciate effective use of language, simple and clear 
expression with a real focus on the substance of the argument'.377 
The adversarial system places a heavy burden on the advocates to deliver to the court competing 
arguments which the judges in an appellate court context can test through judicial questioning and 
consider carefully before making their determination. The administration of justice in the adversarial 
system therefore relies heavily on advocates upholding their ethical obligations to the court in terms 
of frankness and candour as well as achieving a minimum standard of competence. A fundamental 
aspect of achieving the requisite level of competence, commentators suggest, is advancing 
arguments which are reasonably available, yet strong and persuasive. 
The primary focus should be on the facts of the case and any relevant law or authority that may be 
applicable. If the submissions are presented with style or elegance, this will further assist the 
advocate's cause.378 Substance also refers to the imperative, as Hayne has stated, for an advocate's 
submissions to be 'intellectually rigorous' since the reasons given by the judges in any decision 
should be 'intellectually rigorous'. 379 
375 See Mason, 'The Role of Counsel and Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 542-543 and Glissan, above n 11, 
p.202 See generally Ross, Advocacy, (2"' ed), above n 188, p.145 and Justice James Douglas, 'Oral Advocacy' in 
Blank & Selby (eds), above n 11, p.187. It has been suggested by Friedman and Lacavora that: 
[E)very question is not necessarily what it seems. Some appellate judges question counsel to persuade their 
colleagues on the bench. Such questions are really directed through, not to counsel, and it is through the 
content of the judge's question, not the answer, that the interrogating judge intends to assist his slower-
witted confreres to see the point of the case. The attorney must be "tuned in" to the question and its real 
purpose. 
Freidman and Lacavora, above n 29, p.210. In relation to questions which are posed for an ulterior motive, 
Glissan compares these to a 'Trojan horse': see Glissan, above n 11, p.202. 
376 Justice James S Douglas has been a Judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland since 2003. 
377 Justice James Douglas, 'Oral Advocacy' in Blank & Selby (eds), above n 11, p.183. 
378 Kirby, 'Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 972. 
379 Hayne, 'Advocacy and Special Leave Applications in the High Court of Australia', above n 11, p.4. 
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Effective appellate advocacy requires a delicate balance between submissions that are concise yet 
comprehensive and thorough. The greatest temptation, it is said, is to belabour points, engage in 
repetition or deliver long-winded submissions; this temptation should be avoided. 380 This is linked to 
the notion of selectivity, 381 namely, the process of identifying the strongest arguments available, the 
result of which will comprise the substance of an advocate's case. It is generally considered counter-
productive to present every argument available or every argument that has been developed or 
conjured up. An advocate should be discerning about which arguments they choose to present so as 
to ensure that the better and stronger arguments are not 'deprived of impact by being presented in 
the middle of a tangle of confused and aberrant argumentation'.382 According to Sackville, 
arguments which are unlikely to succeed ' ... are like the thirteenth chime of the clock; not only wrong 
in themselves but casting doubt on all that has come before'.383 
Selectivity is also relevant in terms of an advocate gaining credibility and respect in the eyes of the 
court. For example, the advocate's credibility may depend on whether they have, in previous cases, 
abandoned arguments that did not prove to be worth pursuing. 384 
Such views presuppose that the strongest arguments available in any particular case are readily 
identifiable and can distinguish themselves from weaker arguments. Whilst this may be the position 
ideally, there will be occasions where such arguments are not readily identifiable due to the 
complexity of the law or the novelty of the issues involved in the case. There may also be 
circumstances where an appellate advocate has been briefed to argue a case and only weak 
arguments are available. In terms of selectivity, generally, Barwick's approach relied on using his 
'ground up' approach to identify the arguments available and he then presented the strongest of 
those arguments. 
Consistent with the focus on the substance of submissions, one effective technique employed is 
described as 'priming' or 'chaining'. 385 This involves advancing a series of overlapping propositions in 
380 An advocate should avoid being' ... prolix and undiscriminating, [that is) including a dozen or more 
arguments, trivial and serious, in the hope that the court will assume the presence of fire from clouds of 
billowing smoke': Coffin, Honorable Frank M. "Preparing for Argument" from The Ways of a Judge, (1980), 
Houghton Mifflin, Boston, pp.100-107 in Peter J Carre, Azike A Ntephe and Helen C Trainor (eds) Appellate 
Advocacy, {1981), American Bar Association, Chicago, p.55. 
381 See Trevor Riley, 'Advocacy: Organise the Address' (February, 2002) Balance 13, 13; see also Coffin, 
"Preparing for Argument'1, above n 380, p.SS. 
382 
'Extra-Judicial Notes', above n 43, 11. 
383 Sackville, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 60, 105. Barrister, James Glissan QC, believes that an advocate 
should begin with the arguments that they are most confident will succeed: see Glissan, above n 11, p.200. 
These are also likely to serve as the advocate's strongest arguments. 
384 
'Extra-Judicial Notes', above n 43, 11. See also Interview with David Jackson QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006) 
where he suggests that if you have a reputation for conveying every possible argument then you will lose 
credibility as an advocate. 
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a chain such that the acceptance of one proposition leads inevitably to the next.386 The objective is 
for the judges to accept each proposition and move to the next proposition. For this approach to be 
effective, it is critical to commence with a series of linked premises that a court is likely to accept and 
lead the court to agree with 'the more controversial premise- the critical request'.'87 This 
technique, it is said, requires considerable practice and experience in building logical links between 
the premise and the conclusion in each proposition. It also requires significant preparation and the 
careful use of language. 388 
Whilst the substance of an advocate's arguments is important, if these arguments can be presented 
with style, elegance or flair then this, it is said, will further assist the advocate's cause by making the 
arguments more appealing and, ultimately, more persuasive. It is said that ' ... style is the accurate 
expression of clear thought which should be achieved by the use of simple and harmonious 
words'.''' Robert Menzies was renowned for presenting his argument, 'so far as he was allowed to 
do so, in its most attractive way'.390 As will be apparent from the analysis of Barwick's presentation 
in the Bank Nationalisation Case and Communist Party Case, Barwick had a unique and engaging style 
characterised by the ability to deploy simple yet effective language. 
The manner in which arguments are presented allows the advocate to inject their own personality 
into their submissions. This will indirectly assist the advocate's persuasive ability: 'We must never 
forget the spark of creativity, that inexplicable capacity of some people to sculpt their 
communication into breathtaking forms'."' However, an advocate who presents their case with 
style or elegance but lacks substance will quickly be exposed by judicial questioning and, ultimately, 
may fail to persuade the judges. 
385 Stanchi, above n 25, 415. 
386 Ibid. In fact, the most effective argument chains are those that do not necessarily connect together. 
387 1bid, 417, 423. It has been suggested that an advocate 'must show the audience the path to follow, moving 
step by step, revealing the argument and the story, but leaving them to fill in the punch line. We persuade by 
letting them persuade themselves'. When this technique is employed, it is often commenced with a 
proposition that is uncontroversial and likely to be accepted and move on from there. See also Selby, Blank 
and Nolan, above n 242, 182. 
388 Ibid, 421-422. Byers was a master of this approach. It is said that he would occasionally advance an 
argument which had five logical steps and would outline the first four steps and then embark on another part 
of his submissions, only to be interrupted by the judge saying: 'But, Sir Maurice, if you make those four 
propositions that you have just made, shouldn't this fifth proposition logically follow?' Sir Maurice's standard 
response was said to be: 'Oh, your honour, I didn't wish to fly too close to the sun!' Byers' response appears 
ironical, suggesting that he did not have the audacity to assert acceptance of the fifth proposition although the 
judge had detected that this would naturally follow. The judge, it is said, would often support the propositions 
that Byers had advanced and the ultimate conclusion: see Justice James Douglas, 'Oral Advocacy' in Blank & 
Selby (eds), above n 11, p.184. 
389 b Hyam, a ave n 31, p.7. 
390 Hazlehurst, above n 204, p.42. 
391 Selby, Blank and Nolan, above n 242, 182. 
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Byers was an advocate renowned for his style. Former Attorney-General, Gareth Evans remarked of 
him that '[t]he counter point to brevity, that which sets it off ... is style and that's a quality that 
Maurice has in abundance' .392 
• 
4.6 Flexibility, Discretion and Tact 
Flexibility 
Flexibility, discretion and tact are closely associated- they also represent key elements and ideals 
within presentation. 
Ellicott identified the following approach to advocacy which incorporates some of the key elements 
of appellate advocacy, namely, flexibility, tact and discretion: 
formulate your, what I call a glide path, that is to say, those propositions that you are going to espouse 
in getting into the case recognising that in top appellate courts like the High Court, the argument is 
never going to go the way you think it will. [l]t's more likely than not you are going to be diverted by 
other points of view and therefore you've got to be ready for that and if you are not ready for that, 
you're not a good appellate advocate. You've got to know the danger points, that is to say, the points of 
no return where you have to stand your ground and if you depart from those well you're over the edge, 
or if you misjudge where you must stand your ground, you can either be put in a dangerous position or 
alternatively you seem to be arguing needlessly when you could put a lesser proposition so that's very 
important. Also courage and speaking with authority[;] they're all important to a successful advocate. 393 
Flexibility requires mental agility and that an advocate be 'nimble on their feet'- that is, the ability to 
adapt submissions following comments or reactions from the judges, depart from the planned order 
of submissions, answer judicial questions and respond to an opponent's submissions or tactics. 394 In 
doing so, it requires discretion and tact, to guard against anything that may prejudice or adversely 
influence the case. According to Ellicott, 'flexibility is ... the essence [of] good advocacy at the 
appellate level' .395 Former Chief Justice of the Federal Court, Michael Black, stated that: 'You have to 
be able to parry as an advocate -I am using a fencing term now. It is not like you march across the 
field with a musket, you have to be absolutely flexible. That performance is so exciting'. 396 
392 Sir Gerard Brennan referring to a remark by Gareth Evans. See Address by Sir Gerard Brennan, above n 281, 
33. 
393 Interview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
394 Nathanson, above n 11, pp.4-13; Glissan, above n 11, p.203.; Porter, The Gentle Art of Persuasion, above n 
11, p.lOl. 
395 Interview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
396 
'20 Questions: Michael Black', The AFR Magazine (Sydney), November 2009, 20 at 20. 
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The task confronting an advocate, according to Gibbs, 'is to formulate the argument that is most 
likely to persuade the court to take the course that he [or she] wishes it to follow and to present that 
argument as clearly and forcibly (and, preferably, as succinctly) as possible' .397 When, for example, it 
appears that the judges are not favouring particular arguments, flexibility is required. That is, it may 
be necessary to discard or alter par;ticular arguments.398 
An illustration ofthe dangers of an inflexible approach arises in an anecdote recounted by Robert 
Menzies who appeared as junior to John Latham399 in an appeal before the High Court in the 1920s. 
Dixon appeared against them for the appellant. According to Menzies, Latham's weakness as an 
advocate was that 'his manner and method seemed cold and pedantic'400 and his 'argument had to 
be presented to the judge or judges in an inevitable and ordered sequence, with a sort of unspoken 
suggestion that the listener was being instructed, even on the most elementary principles' .401 Dixon, 
Menzies believed, knew of Latham's inflexible approach and sought to exploit it. According to 
Menzies, Dixon's tactical sense was 'impeccable'.402 
According to Menzies, Dixon opened and destroyed Latham's weaker arguments. In response to a 
query from Chief Justice Knox as to whether he was going to address the other arguments, Dixon 
laughed and said: 'Well, Your Honours, those points, which are somewhat obscure to me, should 
really be explained by my learned opponent, so that we'll be able to consider them !'403 Latham 
'began to explain them with pedantic care, explaining some propositions of law which were really 
elementary, just as if the judges needed instruction'.404 Menzies recalled that the judges' questions 
became more and more hostile and penetrating as they 'were searching for answers to our winning 
points'.405 Latham found himself in a tough battle with the court and ultimately the appeal was 
lost.406 
397 Harry Gibbs, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 497. 
398 Ibid; Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 11, p.46. 
399 Referred to earlier as Chief Justice Latham as he became the Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia from 
1935 to 1952. 
400 Menzies, The Measure of the Years, above n 203, p.235. Latham was also described as 'an able lawyer, well 
grounded in the law, extremely hard working and thorough in the preparation of his cases' who 'was much 
concerned with the logical structure of his arguments, and somewhat prolix as an advocate': see Zelman 
Cowen, Sir John Latham And Other Papers, (1965), Oxford University Press, London, p.31. 
401 Menzies, The Measure of the Years, above n 203, p.236. 
402 1bid. 
403 Ibid. Dixon opened his argument by demolishing the weakest grounds which Latham and Menzies had 
successfully relied upon in the Supreme Court and then destroyed the second weakest ground. Dixon sat down 
and Chief Justice Knox asked him whether he was 'going to deal with the other points in the case'. 
404 1bid. 
405 Ibid. 
406 Ibid, pp.235-236. 
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As discussed in an earlier section, an advocate must watch the reactions or signals that are coming 
from the judges and use these to gauge the likely prospect of success of their submissions. The 
dynamics of appellate advocacy, it is said, inevitably require the rapid exercise of judgment while also 
demonstrating good judgment and discretion.407 Arguments that an advocate believes are likely to 
persuade the court during the preparation of their case may receive a mixed or even hostile 
reception from the judges. Mason has observed that: 
The able appellate counsel, alive to the possibility that he may need to adjust his case in light of the 
Court's reaction to his argument, preserves some degree of flexibility in the expression of his 
submissions, knowing that what attracts one judge may repel another.408 
Mason has described flexibility as a ' ... virtuous quality, so long as it is subordinated to a principled 
approach and a structured argument'.409 That is, an effective advocate will formulate a series of 
structured arguments to form the basis of their submissions and yet be flexible and willing to depart 
from these submissions as required. 
Whilst some advocates adopt an approach of complete flexibility (that is, without a structured 
argument) so as to take advantage of any opportunity or opening that arises, the danger with doing 
so is that the advocate risks being unable to convey to the judges a set of coherent arguments while 
responding to judicial questioning. An advocate's inability to adhere to a principled approach within 
the structure of a meticulously and thoroughly prepared submission, according to Mason, often 
causes an advocate to lose momentum when confronted with rigorous judicial interrogation.410 
Without structured and well-prepared submissions, the judges will be required to analyse and 
consider the advocate's random responses and extract the advocate's essential arguments from 
these responses. 
Responding to judicial questions and addressing judicial comments requires that the advocate depart 
from their planned order of submissions and demonstrate flexibility (also referred to as 
adaptability)411 as well as patience at all times.412 It may also necessitate that an advocate adapt, 
modify, tailor or refine their submissions. The flexibility required in such circumstances has been 
described in American literature as 'controlled flexibility', that is: 
407 Ross, Advocacy, above n 216, p.4. 
408 Mason, 'The Role of Counsel and Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 541. 
409 Ibid. 
410 Ibid. 
411 According to Tom Hughes AO QC, 'adaptability is necessary': see Hughes, above n 92, p.13. 
412 An advocate who adheres to a strict "game plan" in the face of unforeseen developments is unlikely to 
communicate effectively: Freidman and Lacavora, above n 29, p.211. 
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a relaxed resilience allowing one to respond to a judge's question, coupled with an internal gyro 
compass enabling one to return gracefully to a charted course. Mastery of the pair of talents- yielding 
to the sometimes centrifugal force of a judge's query and returning as soon as possible to one's own 
centripetal course- is more critical than ever in an era of truncated arguments.413 
Sackville has suggested that if the.advocate has adequately prepared their submissions then they will 
have a clear view of the direction of their argument and their responses to any questions should not 
disrupt the structure of their argument.414 As will be seen later, Barwick's presentation in the Bank 
Nationa/isation Case was characterised by his ability to move effortlessly between his planned 
submissions and his responses to judicial questions whereas, in the Communist Party Case, Barwick 
seemed almost to resent judicial questions and did not use his answers as effectively to convey his 
submissions. 
Ellicott has suggested that the ability to tailor submissions according to comments from the bench 
together with possessing the flexibility and discretion to discard a particular argument is 'so much 
part of a good advocate's armoury' .415 This is echoed by Chester Porter QC416 who believes that 'the 
secret of persuasive advocacy is to understand how your tribunal is thinking, and to adjust your 
arguments accordingly'.417 If, Porter suggests, an advocate is able to steer the judge in a direction 
that gives the impression that the judge devised an argument independently, this may greatly assist 
in persuading the judge:' ... the most convincing arguments are those which the judge thinks he or 
she has thought of without the assistance of counsel' 418 According to Mason, Maurice Byers, 
subscribed to this view: 'Maurice was not without artifice. He knew that all judges are vain, some 
more so than others, and that sometimes it is good advocacy to let the judge think that he has 
discovered the answer himself' .419 
413 Honourable Frank N. Coffin, extract from "A Term of Court" from The Ways of a Judge (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1980), pp.129-135, in Peter J Carre, Azike A Ntephe and Helen C Trainor (eds) Appellate Advocacy, 
(1981), American Bar Association, Chicago, p.224. 
414 Sackville, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 60, 106-107; Justice James Douglas, 'Oral Advocacy' in Blank & Selby 
(eds), above n 11, p.186. 
415 Interview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
416 Chester Porter QC was called to the Bar on 12 March 1948 and retired on 30 June 2000 after more than 52 
years at the Bar. 
417 Chester Porter, Walking on Water: A Life in the Law, (2003), Random House Australia, Sydney, pp.10-11. 
418 Sackville, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 60, 106. According to the Greek Grammarin Appollodorus, the 
primary goal of advocacy is 'to persuade the Judge and lead his mind to the conclusions desired by the 
speaker'. It has been suggested that for an advocate to succeed in the art of persuasion, the Judge or other 
decision-maker must be influenced to want to give the desired decision: Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 
11, p.xiii. Justice Young of the Supreme Court of NSW stated that: 'In the highest courts, some of the most 
brilliant advocates so cast their submissions that the judge would be convinced that the judge himself had 
thought of the point himself though it had been put in his mind by skilled advocacy' (Young, 'Current issues: 
Appellate advocacy', above n 11, 144-145). 
419 Address by Sir Anthony Mason 'Opening of Maurice Byers Chambers', above n 333. Mason's comments 
need to be examined in their context. They were made at the time that he opened Maurice Byers Chambers-
92 
These comments correspond to the saying by Aristotle that: 'The fool tells me his reasons. The wise 
man persuades me with my own'.42° Flexibility involves a delicate balance.421 In an effort to respond 
to the concerns of the judges, however, an advocate should not alter their submissions so as to 
discard the fundamental tenets of their submissions. This may damage an advocate's credibility and 
reputation, perhaps even irretriev9bly. To determine whether an advocate should alter their 
submissions requires weighing up the benefits to be gained against the extent to which the 
submissions go to the very heart of the advocate's case. According to Sackville, if an advocate is 
unable to adapt their submissions to: 
... the concerns, express or implicit, of the judges, an important persuasive element in the argument may 
be missing. Yet this must be balanced against the need to maintain consistency. If flexibility involves 
abandoning the underpinnings of the argument, it will be achieved at too high a price. Again, 
preparation is critical. The more fully submissions have been thought through, the better able is counsel 
to explore convincingly the consequences for other cases and circumstances of accepting the argument, 
a matter in which most appellate courts display particular interest.422 
However, it has been suggested by Hughes that an advocate should 'never be afraid to make a 
concession when your commonsense and sense of reality tell you to do so. Make a concession and 
work around it. You have to adjust your argument to the realities of the case' .423 
As Mason has suggested, there are circumstances where one judge may be receptive to a particular 
submission, whereas it may not attract another judge.424 This requires flexibility and readiness to 
adopt an alternative approach. An example offered by Kirby in relation to international law material 
has broader application: 
... advocates contemplating the use of international law material do well to keep in mind the 'rule' of 
advocacy commending knowledge of the court and of the judges deciding the case. In a multi-member 
court, including judges who may hold differing views on such topics, discernment is demanded. The 
advocate must at once secure the agreement of the judge who is interested in, and influenced by, such 
named in honour of Sir Maurice. The comments were made in a eulogising setting and may suggest some 
exaggeration. Nevertheless, they represent and reflect a key aspect of an advocate's power of presentation. In 
saying that, Tom Hughes AO QC also agrees with this view but describes it as follows: 
a capacity to put a point in understated terms, so that it has a chance of maturing in the mind of the person 
to whom it is addressed rather more as his own idea than as that of the originator. One should cultivate an 
ability to implant a seed of thought, believing its germination (partly at least to the decision-maker, by whom 
an idea will be more firmly held, and perhaps better expressed, if he thinks that it is his own). 
See Hughes, above n 92, pp.12-13. 
420 As quoted in Thompson, above n 31, 13. 
421 Jackson, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 71, 251. 
422 Sackville, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 60, 106. 
423 Interview with Hon. Tom Hughes AO QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). 
424 Mason, 'The Role of Counsel and Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 541; Justice James Douglas, 'Oral 
Advocacy' in Blank & Selby (eds), above n 11, p.183. 
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sources whilst avoiding irritation to the judge who is antagonistic to such materials, regarding them as 
an invitation to legal heresy. 425 
However, the fact that one particular judge may feel a certain way about an issue, is not necessarily 
reflective of the views of the remaining judges.426 Other members of the court, Jackson has 
suggested, may be a little perturbed that one of their fellow judges is occupying significant time with 
frequent interruptions while the other judges may wish to move on to other issues.427 Bennett 
recalled that Justices Gum mow and Heydon asked the most difficult, piercing questions but that: 
I used to spend most of my time on my feet answering some equally difficult questions from Kirby 
because he was usually against what I was putting ... There is an interesting question about how 
you handle that. There is the cynical view, which says that, if you respond by getting stuck into 
him, you will get all the others on side, because they are all against him. The more correct view is 
that you should treat the question respectfully and answer it properly, so that in effect you are 
giving the majority the answer to his propositions. 428 
Implicitly, Bennett is suggesting that flexibility, discretion and tact are required to deal with a judge 
who is playing a dominant role in questioning while also not alienating or irritating the remaining 
judges. Another example is in the Bank Nationa/isation Case, where Chief Justice Latham was very 
active in his questioning of Barwick yet ultimately, Latham's views represented the minority in the 
case. An assessment of Barwick's performance in the context of flexibility, discretion and tact is 
undertaken in later chapters. 
It is important for an advocate to recognise when it is not possible to convince the non-receptive 
judge. Such a situation requires the use of tact and discretion to make a quick assessment of 
whether there is any prospect of convincing the particular judge/s of the merits of the argument or 
whether to concede on that particular issue. Such a concession may become necessary to avoid 
persisting with an argument and risk either losing the support of the other judges or frustrating 
them. Justice Sydney Robins, a former Ontario Court of Appeal judge, described it this way: 
Counsel should allow some sensitivity to the view oft he Court. Where the Court has indicated, or 
has made it abundantly clear from its comments and questions that it is not interested in a 
particular point or that it has the point, or that it does not agree with the point, I see little benefit 
in counsel pursuing the argument on that point. If you have firmly put forth everything that you 
425 Kirby, 'Appellate Advocacy- New Challenges', above n 11, p.36. As an example, former Justice Kirby 
referred to the views of McHugh J in AI-Kateb v Godwin (2004]119 CLR 562 at 589, [63] who declared as 
'heretical' Kirby's opinion that the Australian Constitution should now be read in the context of international 
law. 
426 See Elliott, above n 334, pp.96-97. See also Interview with Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of the High Court of 
Australia (Sydney, 14 August 2006]. 
427 Jackson, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 71, 251-252. 
428 
'Putting words to music in the constitution's case', above n 217,47. 
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can and the judges understand the point, then let it go at that. Do not carry on to the extent of 
tedious repetition and persistence. 429 
Discretion and Tact 
Tact and discretion, as noted, are inextricably linked to flexibility and need to be employed during 
the presentation of submissions.430 
In the context of advocacy, tact has been described as 'an intuitive perception of the right thing to do 
or say and an adroitness in dealing with persons and circumstances'.431 Tact needs to be exercised 
throughout an advocate's submissions, whether advancing arguments or responding to judicial 
questions. Dixon described advocacy as 'tact in action' 432 Hughes alluded to this in suggesting that, 
as an advocate, '[y]ou've got to get the feel of the court and adjust yourself to their inclinations 
avoiding confrontation' .433 The concept of discretion is also encapsulated by Hughes, for whom an 
important element of good appellate advocacy is 'to throw out the rubbish, don't flog dead horses ... 
that requires judgment' 434 
Effective appellate advocacy requires that an advocate keep the judges' attention on the main issues 
and their principal arguments, whilst not losing the confidence of the court. The use of tact and 
discretion is critical. According to Gibbs: 'Fixing the critical matters in the mind of the judges without 
losing the sympathy of the court in the process sometimes requires steering a narrow and perilous 
course'. 435 The peril is to lose the sympathy or support of the court. 
Whilst tact and discretion are important in advocacy generally, particular circumstances require that 
both be deployed more than in others. For example, a judicial suggestion may be made which clearly 
contradicts the views of the other judges but may assist the advocate's case. In this situation, the 
advocate will be required to make a quick decision to either accept or reject the suggestion. By 
accepting the suggestion, that particular judge may be swayed at the same time risking alienating the 
other judges.436 A similar situation may arise where a judicial suggestion may be detrimental to the 
advocate's case if accepted; that is, circumstances where '[t]he cup of salvation may in truth be the 
429 Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 11, p.44. 
430 Harry Gibbs, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 498. 
431 Hughes, above n 92. 
432 
'Extra-Judicial Notes', above n 43, 11. See also 'The Art of Advocacy', provided by Tom Hughes on 2 August 
2006, p.8; Justice James Douglas, 'Oral Advocacy' in Blank & Selby (eds), above n 11, p.186. 
433 1nterview with Han. Tom Hughes AO QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). 
4341bid. 
435 Harry Gibbs, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11,498. 
436 Ibid. 
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poisoned chalice' .437 In either situation, the advocate is required to exercise considerable tact, 
diplomacy and discretion when addressing the appellate court to reject such judicial suggestions. 
Another example is when faced with a hostile or unexpected intervention. This requires, Sackville 
suggests, discretion and the ability to think quickly to respond convincingly and, by doing so, gain an 
advantage from the confidence it it~stils in the eyes of the appellate court.438 
It is important for an advocate to gauge the extent to which the judges know the law relevant to the 
particular case as this will determine the extent to which it will be necessary for the advocate to 
outline the relevant law.439 This requires tact and discretion as a failure to assess this correctly may 
lead either to offending the judges or losing their collective attention or alternatively, failing to assist 
the judges with regard to the relevant law. 
In some instances, a lack of tact can be rescued by quick wit (discussed in the following chapter). 
This is illustrated in the following example. Cliff Papayanni440 was appearing in the High Court on a 
special leave application: 
Papayanni: Your Honours, this is an application for Special Leave from a criminal trial in New 
South Wales. In New South Wales in criminal trials the onus of proof is on the 
Crown and it is to the standard beyond reasonable doubt. 
Chief Justice: Really, Mr Papayanni, you don't have to lecture us on basic legal principles as 
though we were school children. You can assume we know that. 
Papayanni: Your Honour, that was the mistake I made in the court below. 
This evoked laughter from the judges.441 Whether or not it made a difference is unknown. We know 
at least that Mr Papayanni was successful in his application for special leave. 
4.7 Explain Policy and Principle 
In appellate advocacy, the ramifications of an appellate court accepting a particular argument are 
important and need to be considered before such an argument is advanced. This is particularly 
relevant to cases before the High Court. David Jackson, observed that: 'Policy considerations ... play 
437 Jackson, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 71, 251. 
438 Sackville, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 60, 104. 
439 It has been suggested that the advocate should structure their argument to assist the court to reach a 
conclusion and not lecture it: see Glissan, above n 11, p.203. It has also been said that it would be a mistake for 
an advocate' ... to proceed on the basis that the judges will know as much about the case as the barristers': 
Justice James Douglas, 'Oral Advocacy' in Blank & Selby (eds), above n 11, p.183. 
440 Barrister admitted to the NSW Bar in 1960 and Public Defender 1975-1981. 
441 Glissan, above n 11, pp.203-204. 
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a part in argument, a matter which should not be forgotten' .442 Therefore, if an argument is 
persuasive and based on solid legal grounds but would result in undesirable public policy 
consequences if it were to succeed, the argument is unlikely to be accepted by an appellate court. 
Such implications will strongly impact upon the persuasiveness of certain arguments. As the 
renowned US trial lawyer, F. Lee 8ailey observed: 'A trial result affects only the parties to the trial, 
but an appellate result affects everyone in the jurisdiction of that appellate court' .443 
Kirby suggests that the advocate should give considerable thought to the principle and policy behind 
the relevant law which arises in the case,444 whether legislation, the common law or a combination of 
both. In appellate cases, an advocate will often be propounding the adoption of a new or different 
interpretation of legislation and/or the extension or rejection of the common law. To do so 
effectively, the rationale for the relevant law must be understood and identified- although the 
emphasis on the purpose of the legislation is a more recent development, it was still relevant during 
Barwick's time at the Bar. Understanding the rationale for the relevant law during preparation, may 
allow the advocate to address the various concerns and possible reluctance of the judges to accept 
the advocate's arguments. 
The consequences of accepting submissions made by an advocate are an important consideration for 
the judges of an appellate court. Mason stated that courts' ... are always anxious to discover the 
consequences which will follow from acceptance of a proposition of law'.445 The consequences of 
the decision will inevitably be the subject of judicial enquiry.446 Accordingly, an advocate should 
expect judicial questioning in relation to consequences as the judges attempt to ascertain the 
implications of making a particular decision. Where an advocate has turned their mind to the 
relevant consequences and is prepared to address these, it is likely to assist the court and, ultimately, 
will increase the persuasiveness of the advocate's submissions. 
442 Jackson, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, p.6; see also Glissan, above n 11, p.l91. See also Interview with 
David Jackson QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). 
443 Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 11, p.xiii. 
444 Kirby, 'Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 974. 
445 Mason, The Role of Counsel and Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 539. Former Chief Justice Gleeson 
suggests that it is very important for advocates to keep in their minds: 'what are the implications of deciding in 
a particular way for similar problems or for coherence in the law generally, [and] if we develop the law in this 
particular way how will that cut across legal principle in other directions': Interview with Murray Gleeson, Chief 
Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 14 August 2006). 
446 Jackson, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 71, 246; Jackson, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, p.6. David 
Jackson QC noted that: 
Members of the Court tend to look to the effect of their decisions over a broader area than that covered by 
the immediate case, and it is important, in preparing an appeal in the High Court, to think of the implications 
of acceptance, and rejection, of the argument (and of the other side's argument on the same issue) because 
that topic will almost certainly be the subject of enquiry from the Court. 
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However, identifying the policy implications requires considerable thought and imagination. Gleeson 
stated that: 
imagination is also a quality that is still important in advocates, particularly when you are appearing in 
the High Court because, members of the High Court are always very cautious about the consequences 
for future cases, of what the'fsay in this case. So if an advocate can recognise those consequences and 
present an argument that deals with them, that kind of argument is likely to get a good reception. 447 
It has been acknowledged that policy considerations now feature more significantly in the High 
Court's judgments.448 This is evidenced by the many judgments that make specific reference to the 
policy implications of a decision''' In certain cases, the policy implications may be the determining 
factor in a judicial decision. Bennett, stated that, in considering policy, picking the right analogies 'is 
a very important part of appellate advocacy'. 450 He elaborated: '[o]ne has to pick attractive analogies 
for one's cause ... When one is before a court like the High Court, which is concerned about the big 
picture, it is an important part of persuasion'.451 In later chapters, there are numerous examples of 
Barwick selecting an appropriate and persuasive analogy in the analysis of his presentation in the 
Bank Natiana/isation Case and the Communist Party Case. 
Submissions made with reference to policy ramifications also serve to build the advocate's 
credibility. 
4.8 Cite Authority with Care 
Appellate advocacy requires advocates to refer to previous legal authority for the purpose of 
substantiating their arguments, whether it is by direct reference or analogy, or for the purposes of 
distinguishing their arguments from existing legal authority. However, this should be done 
selectively. 
Citing authority with care also serves a greater purpose of the administration of justice generally, 
particularly in an adversarial system. The adversarial system relies on advocates advancing 
arguments to the court for its consideration and determination. These arguments are, by necessity, 
supported by the decisions in previous cases. The administration of justice in a common law system 
447 Interview with Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 14 August 2006). 
448 Mason, 'The Role of Counsel and Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 541. 
449 See Anthony Mason, 'Policy considerations' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Caper & George Williams (eds), The 
Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia, (2001), Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, pp.S35-
536. 
450 
'Putting words to music in the constitution's case', above n 217, 47. 
451 Ibid. 
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places considerable emphasis on the doctrine of precedent. Advocates play a large part in bringing 
the previous decisions of courts to the attention of an appellate court. 
An advocate who presents an analysis of, and refers to, relevant authorities during their submissions 
will, it is clear, provide the court with valuable assistance. In a US context, it is said that this may 
have a significant persuasive effect.452 There is every reason for it to have a similarly persuasive 
effect in Australia. However, citing copious amounts of authority without the requisite discipline 
may result in the advocate losing the collective interest of the court and, ultimately, may reduce the 
advocate's persuasive ability. If an advocate's argument requires the close examination of a series of 
authorities, they will need to take the court through these one at a time and explain their relevance 
or their distinguishing characteristics.453 
Previous decisions should not be utilised as' ... a substitute for argument','54 but 'should only be used 
to support, refute or explain a particular proposition' .455 The purpose of citing legal authority is not 
to supplement an advocate's arguments or to fill critical gaps in their reasoning. Rather, according to 
Mason, previous authorities' ... should be used to authenticate, refute or explain the proposition 
under debate, and they should not be used as biblical texts or as utterances from the oracle at 
Delphi' .456 In isolation, passages from previous authorities will not be inherently persuasive: merely 
highlighting the relevant passages is not sufficient. 
According to Hayne, an advocate should draw the court's attention to any previous decision to be 
relied upon, explain its relevance, indicate the various principles or passages relied upon for present 
purposes and indicate the location of any relevant passages before referring to the case at length.457 
David Jackson also believes that it is important to emphasise any particular point in a passage to 
which the advocate wishes to refer.458 Whilst this is a basic element of appellate advocacy rather 
452 Godbold, above n 11, 818. 
453 Justice James Douglas, 'Oral Advocacy' in Blank & Selby (eds), above n 11, p.181. Justice James Douglas, 
'Oral Advocacy' in Blank & Selby (eds), above n 11, p.188. 
454 Mason, 'The Role of Counsel and Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 539. 
455 lain Ross, above n 289, p.lO; see also Glissan, above n 11, p.201; see Ross, Advocacy, (2'' ed), above n 188, 
p.146. According to David Jackson QC, '(y]ou won't get away with that [citing legal authority in place of legal 
argument] these days, they did more in the High Court in Barwick's day. But these days they say "well, we can 
read", "we read that, why does it matter", "we read that, what do you get from it'": Interview with David 
Jackson QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). 
456 Mason, 'The Role of Counsel and Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 539. 
457 Hayne, 'Advocacy and Special Leave Applications in the High Court of Australia', above n 11, p.4. 
458 Jackson, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 71, 251. See also Interview with David Jackson QC (Sydney, 2 August 
2006) where he states that an advocate should: 
pick the best bits and then you say there are a number of other cases to the same effect or adopt this. These 
days you say you can see them referred to paragraphs such and such of our written submissions, but in 
Barwick's day I think people did spend longer going to the passages and they did refer to the cases rather in 
more detail than they would now. 
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than an ideal of appellate advocacy, the more skilfully that authority is cited and woven into an 
advocate's submissions the more likely it is to approach the ideal. For example, Kirby believes that 
the court will be greatly assisted if the advocate is able to quickly, and with precision, summarise the 
relevant facts of the case, outline the decision and then recite any significant passages from the 
case.459 
The approach advocated by Kirby will capture the attention of the court more than merely reading 
out passages from previous cases. This is particularly important in modern times where an 
enormous body of case law now exists. Hayne states that: 
I would say that the reading of slabs from any decided cases is seldom helpful in any argument in the 
Court. We are all literate. We will all read the references you give us. Tell us therefore what you say 
the case decides and show us where we find that in the case. 460 
An advocate may rely on a number of previous decisions when presenting their case and therefore 
the onus is on the advocate to ensure that the principles distilled from the previous decisions are 
applicable.461 It is important to understand the context of any decisions or judgments that may be 
relied upon and, according to Hayne: 
... in the end you must be able to answer the most innocent of questions from the bench, "What is the 
principle that you say applies?" That will require your formulation of the principle in a way that can find 
accurate and sufficient support in what has gone before in the Court or, if what you propound is new, 
can be shown to be a logical development from what has gone before. 462 
Jackson also advises against reading to the court long passages from authorities, evidence or 
submissions. This is likely to lose the collective attention of the members of the court as well as their 
individual concentration. It is also tedious and it may irritate the judges.463 Also, reciting long 
passages prevents the advocate from watching the bench -the perils of which have been discussed 
earlier. 
See also Interview with Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 14 August 
2006) where former Chief Justice Gleeson stated that: 
One great difference in the style of advocacy now as compared with Barwick's day is that modern advocates 
practically never get the opportunity to read out lengthy slabs from cases. The court wouldn't let them ... so 
advocates nowadays have to be much more selective in their citation of authority or, more accurate, in their 
quotation from authority. 
459 Kirby, 'Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 972-973. The practice of simply reciting one case after 
another and adding explanations as to why each case is or is not relevant to the current proceedings has been 
described by Robert Jackson as a 'dismal and fruitless use of time': Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States 
Supreme Court', above n 11, 7. 
460 Hayne, 'Advocacy and Special Leave Applications in the High Court of Australia', above n 11, p.3. 
461 Ibid, p.4. 
462 Ibid. 
463 Sackville, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 60, 106. 
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Another aspect of citing authority with care is exercising caution when attempting to apply previous 
decisions to the facts of the current case by analogy. It is important to consider the application of 
the previous decision to the present facts thoroughly before employing this technique. Failing to do 
so may either harm or destroy the advocate's argument, or assist the opponent's case, if an 
inconsistency or point of differen~ation is undetected. In the context of appellate advocacy, it has 
been said that '[o]ne of the oldest and yet most sophisticated device is the analogy, applying the 
principle being urged on the court to some similar situation where the result would be 
devastating' .464 Most appellate arguments using reported decisions are arguments by analogy.465 
Citing authority with care also extends to the quality of the authorities.'66 Relying upon a series of 
precedents that are inappropriate or irrelevant will damage the advocate's credibility and tarnish 
their reputation. Relying on a dissenting opinion may do likewise, unless it is supported by later 
authority, or is necessary (for example, to demonstrate a relevant policy consideration) or useful in 
some other respect. In addition, relying upon a dissenting opinion may associate the advocate's 
argument with a dissenting opinion in another case: 'By identifying [the advocate's] contention with 
a recent dissent, [it] may close some minds to the rest of [the] argument' .467 
Another element of citing authority with care is to ensure that quotations from previous judgments 
are not quoted out of their proper context, or given a strained interpretation for the purposes of 
gaining an advantage. This may harm an advocate's credibility and may result in losing the 
confidence of the judges. It 'is hard to retrieve the confidence forfeited by seeking such an 
advantage'.468 Also, judges at appellate level are often very familiar with legal authorities and are 
likely to become aware of, or detect if, a passage is taken outside of its proper context. 
For credibility reasons, it is better for an advocate to address an adverse precedent openly and 
attempt to reduce its impact by explaining its limitations or distinguishing characteristics rather than 
deliberately avoiding acknowledging its existence.469 That is: 
464 Coffin, "Preparing for Argument", above n 380, p.56. 
465 Malcolm L. Edwards, "Selection and Study of the Record" extract from "Briefs on the Merits" in Peter J 
Carre, Azike A Ntephe and Helen C Trainor (eds) Appellate Advocacy, {1981), American Bar Association, 
Chicago, p.146. 
466 For example, Robert Jackson believes that referring to weaker precedents after stronger precedents will 
only serve to identify the weaknesses of the advocate's argument. Robert Jackson has suggested that' ... if the 
first decision cited does not support it, I conclude the lawyer has a blunderbuss mind and rely on him no 
further': Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 7. 
467 Ibid, 8. 
468 Ibid; Nix, "The View From the Appellate Bench", above n 327, pp.397-401. 
469 It has been said by Robert Nix that: 
The presentation of arguments should include positions regarding any known adverse precedents. Evasion of 
such precedents by omission is doomed to quick defeat. If opposing counsel fails to use such precedent, 
court personnel inevitably notes the omission without the benefit of counsel's distinctions or persuasions of 
inapplicability. 
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If there is adverse authority, do not ignore it. You have an ethical obligation to reveal authority which is 
adverse to your position. Your opponent will inevitably discover the adverse authority; if you ignore it 
now, you will have to deal with it later on your opponent's terms. The worst of all possible worlds is to 
have the appellate court discover the adverse authority on its own. In these circumstances, you may 
never have an opportunity to argue against the authority and the court will feel your research is 
• 
inadequate or your ethics questionable.470 
Honorable Robert N.C. Nix, "The View From the Appellate Bench", from Purver & Taylor, above n 327, pp.397-
401, p.G. 
470 Edwards, "Selection and Study of the Record", above n 465, p.146. 
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Chapter 5: Personation 
"Sir Garfield Barwick, one of the greatest appellate advocates of his age, often used to attribute his 
success to his power of recall. A gift of that kind is of course particularly useful in enabling counsel to 
answer a question from the bench. with confidence and accuracy, and an apt answer to a question on 
a crucial matter not infrequently swings the opinion of the judge in favour of counsel's argument. 
However, given the necessary equipment which any counsel who appears in an appellate court ought 
to have -a requisite knowledge of the law, an ability to marshal facts and a clarity of expression -in 
my opinion, the two qualities most necessary for success in appellate advocacy are a sense of 
relevance and tact". 
Sir Harry Gibbs, 1986"71 
The third category of the elements and ideals of appellate advocacy is personation. This expression, 
coined by the author, describes the personal properties, characteristics or attributes that an 
individual advocate practising exemplary appellate advocacy may possess, and which aid the 
persuasiveness of their submissions. This discussion will provide the third part of the framework 
which will be used to assess Barwick's advocacy in accordance with the 'three category analysis'. The 
elements of personation include: courage; honesty, respect and candour; emotion; and what the 
author calls 'the extras', namely, voice, words, wit presence and memory. 
5.1 Courage 
Court work has been described as 'civilised warfare' .472 As an advocate, it is crucial to be tenacious 
and not to 'relinquish a central position without a fight'. 473 This requires courage. Being courageous 
does not imply aggressiveness- effective advocates can be courageous yet remain civil and 
courteous.474 Advocates who demonstrate courage will command respect from the judges provided 
their position is reasonable and justified. However, if an advocate maintains a position against 
unanimous disapproval, then respect for the advocate is likely to dissipate and the judges are likely 
to become irritated and frustrated. 
471 Harry Gibbs, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11,497. 
472 Ross, Advocacy, above n 216, p.3. 
473 Ibid. 
474 1bid. 
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When presenting submissions, advocates will often confront judicial discouragement and 
antagonism. In particular situations, it is important for advocates to persist with their submissions 
whereas in some circumstances, it may not be wise or prudent to proceed.475 Where an advocate 
chooses to continue with their submissions in the face of judicial discouragement and antagonism, 
strength, courage and resolve are required (as well as tact and discretion, as discussed in Chapter 4). 
Constant interruptions from the members of the court are recognised as potentially distracting and 
frustrating for an advocate. It is at this point that an advocate's courage may start to wane. 
However, effective appellate advocates will 'endure such interruption with good grace and be as 
helpful as possible' .476 An effective advocate will draw on their reserves of courage to address any 
judicial concerns, satisfy any request for information and continue with their submissions. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, it is imperative that an advocate be ready to respond to judicial questions 
although this may require them to depart from their order of submissions.477 This scenario may 
require an advocate to demonstrate considerable courage if a question is not capable of being 
answered at that time, for example, in circumstances where, it may not assist the advocate's case. 
Where it is important to continue with their planned order of submissions at the time, the advocate 
will need to indicate to the court that they will return to this question at a later time. 
As discussed, an advocate may face strong judicial interrogation in the course of their submissions. 
In circumstances where the advocate is encountering considerable opposition from one particular 
judge and believes that this judge is not capable of being persuaded, the advocate may choose to 
acknowledge courteously to that particular judge that they understand their view, and then continue 
with their submissions. Such a response and the ability to persist requires courage. In Kirby's view, 
this response may find favour with, and attract the attention of, the other judges who are annoyed at 
the judge's approach.478 Indeed, it may result in the remaining judges becoming sympathetic to the 
advocate's arguments. However, most judges are ' ... quite immune to the wiles of the judicial 
advocate'.'" and will often not pay too much attention to a judge who interrogates an advocate and 
nor are they likely to place any significance upon the interventions. 
Robert Jackson suggests that an advocate should not be discouraged in the event that they face 
opposition from the judges, as '[m]ost memorable professional achievements were in the face of 
475 Kirby, 'Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 974; Glissan, above n 11, p.9, suggests that persistence 
is essential but it must be distinguished from doggedness and that repetition does not equate to persistence. 
476 Martin Keith, 'Advocacy: The Public Face of Practice' (May, 1998) 20(4) Bulletin (Law Society of South 
Australia) 24, 25. 
477 Kirby, 'Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 973-974. 
478 Ibid, 974. 
479 Mason, 'The Role of Counsel and Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 543. 
104 
opposition, abuse, even ridicule'.400 However, whilst courage is important, it can be 
counter-productive if it results in the failure to detect the key signals and signs from the court which 
would ordinarily require the advocate to be flexible and adapt their submissions. This is an 
important balancing exercise. 
Determination, an attribute closely aligned with courage, enhances the persuasive effect of an 
advocate's submissions, it is said, as it demonstrates that an advocate believes wholeheartedly in 
their submissions: 
[A] good advocate is always determined. You should not retreat from your questioning or submissions if 
you consider they are worthy ... If you perceive lack of response you should not retreat from your 
position or be deterred from your original objectives.'" 
However, there is a fine line between an advocate exhibiting determination and an advocate 
displaying stubbornness. 
An advocate may find it difficult to stay determined and maintain their composure in certain 
situations, particularly when faced with a barrage of questions from the judges. When the members 
of the court appear to be unresponsive, it is important that an advocate does not become 
'confrontational or combative'.402 Confrontational behaviour is likely to receive an unfavourable 
response from the judges. Determination' ... is a real test of character [whereas] [p]ersonal traits 
such as anger, frustration, confusion or distress should not seep into your presentation' .403 Hughes 
suggests that '[r]udeness is a "no no" and if you have to take a stand you can do so within the limits 
of courtesy' .404 
As will be apparent in later chapters, Barwick was well known for being a tough and courageous 
advocate. However, in certain circumstances, this trait became a disadvantage when it interfered 
with his ability to register the reactions of the appellate court. 
McHugh has suggested that courage is the answer to the decline in eloquence and colourful 
advocacy at the Bar: 'What it [advocacy] requires more than anything is courage; courage to stand up 
to judges and tell them that you are going to put your client's case ... Done firmly and well mannered, 
that is what counts' ... s McHugh laments the lack of eloquence and style in arguments which he 
attributes to the disinclination of advocates to assert themselves when faced with judicial opposition. 
480 Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 15. 
481 Keith, above n 476, 25. 
482 Ibid. 
483 Ibid. 
484 Interview with Hon. Tom Hughes AO QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). 
485 Priest, 'Eloquence has left the court, your honour', above n 297, 57. 
105 
In his view, if advocates demonstrated more courage, an increase in the standard of advocacy would 
follow. Perhaps the trend in modern advocacy, due to the pressures on time when presenting 
submissions in many jurisdictions does not easily lend itself to demonstrating such courage and 
disagreeing with members of the court. Also, the increased reliance on written submissions and the 
decrease in oral advocacy may be. responsible for this decline as there are fewer opportunities to 
develop and improve the skills associated with oral advocacy. 
5.2 Honesty, Respect and Candour 
Honesty 
An important element of appellate advocacy is that an advocate demonstrates honesty or candour at 
all times. This, among other things, will maintain the respect of the members of the court and will 
increase the persuasive effect of the advocate's arguments. It was said of Robert Menzies that 'he 
was one who appreciated the strength which candour always lends to an argument' .486 
It is also important to recognise that advocates, as officers of the court, have an overriding obligation 
and duty to be honest with the court under all circumstances.487 Should an advocate knowingly fail 
to refer to a relevant fact, authority or legislative provision or be dishonest in any way, this is likely to 
damage the advocate's credibility. An advocate must be able to convey their submissions in a 
manner that is most favourable to their client but within the confines of honesty and accuracy. An 
advocate ' ... who is inaccurate or less than candid interferes with the objective of persuasion' .488 
According to David Jackson, a court is likely to be 'more attuned or favourable to the person who has 
been able to' go to the heart of the case and, at the same time, accurately state their case.489 
During his time as a High Court Judge, Kirby stated that the advocate's most priceless possession is 
their reputation; being honest contributes greatly to maintaining and enhancing it.490 An advocate's 
reputation is indicative oftheir credibility.491 
486 Hazlehurst, above n 204, p.37. 
487 For example, practice as a barrister in NSW is subject to the NSW Barristers' Rules (section 81, Legal 
Profession Act 2004 (NSW)). The Advocacy Rules are contained in Rules 6-72. Rules 21-31 specifically refer to 
"Frankness in court". The Advocacy Rules also apply to legal practitioners when acting as advocates as the 
Advocacy Rules are incorporated into the Revised Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 1995. The Revised 
Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 1995 were made by the Council of the Law Society of New South 
Wales, pursuant to its power under section 57B of the Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW), on 24 August, 1995. 
These Rules, are deemed, by virtue of Schedule 9 clause 24 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) to have 
been made under the 2004 Act. 
488 Godbold, above n 11, 816. 
489 Interview with David Jackson QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). 
49
° Kirby, 'Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 973; Ross, Advocacy, (2"' ed), above n 188, p.146. 
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While it is difficult to identify examples where advocates have been unsuccessful due to their lack of 
honesty or candour, the opinions of former appellate court judges suggest that a lack of honesty and 
candour does tarnish an advocate's reputation and credibility and this has an indirect impact on their 
submissions: 'the absence of candour can prove to be an Achilles heel'. 492 
An effective advocate will formulate their submissions in a manner that is favourable to their client 
but an advocate ' ... should not sacrifice accuracy of expression on the altar of expediency, for 
rejection of counsel's version of the issues may entail rejection of the argument' .493 In advancing 
submissions favourable to their client, an advocate must ensure that their submissions are accurate 
and do not misrepresent the position. There is a fine line between passionate and forceful advocacy 
as opposed to over-zealous and potentially damaging advocacy. Professional sincerity ensures that 
the advocate earn the respect and confidence of the court. The 'most persuasive quality in the 
advocate is professional sincerity' .494 Advocates can still present their submissions with vigour and 
'partisan zeal',495 so as to afford their client the best possible chance of succeeding, while 
demonstrating professional sincerity. An advocate should '[p]ersuade through sincerity, plausibility 
and simplicity'.496 
Honesty is appreciated and respected by the courts. In addition, the court may also offer the 
advocate assistance in this regard.497 During his time as Chief Justice of the High Court, Gibbs noted 
that: 
Nothing can be more destructive to an argument than for a court which has viewed it with favour to 
discover, when opposing counsel comes to address, or when the court retires to consider the matter, 
that counsel who was putting the argument has failed to refer to some fact, statutory provision or 
decision that seems to present an insuperable obstacle to the acceptance of his argument. On the other 
hand, nothing is more effective than to direct the court's attention to what seems to be one's 
opponent's strong point and to reveal its hidden weakness before the opponent can fortify his position. 
491 In relation to credibility it has been suggested that: 
... credibility, [is] the earned respect of the court for the advocate's candor [sic] in presenting the whole of his 
case, defects and all. The first time such an advocate comes to a court's attention, he establishes his 
credibility; thereafter, his reputation precedes him into the courtroom and constitutes an unspoken but 
palpable advocacy. 
Coffin, "A Term of Court", above n 413, p.226. 
492 Harry Gibbs, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 498. Also, Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 11, in the 
Preface by The Honourable Charles Leonard Dubin, Chief Justice of Ontario, p.47. See also Ross, Advocacy, (2"' 
ed), above n 188, p.4. One example where misstating evidence may have contributed to an advocate losing 
credibility can be found in Gale v Gale (1952) 86 CLR 378. See Elliott, above n 334, pp.118-119. 
493 Mason, 'The Role of Counsel and Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 541. 
494 Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 15. 
495 Ibid. 
496 Stuesser, above n 293, p.4. 
497 Kirby, 'Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 973. 
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It is pleasing that ethical requirements and pragmatism coincide in this respect and that virtue can be its 
own reward.498 
As Gibbs suggested, bringing a persuasive yet contradictory precedent to the attention of the court 
provides the advocate with the opportunity to transform a seemingly destructive authority, which 
may initially appear to hamper the advocate's cause, into a forensic advantage. The advocate can 
address the earlier authority at length and either attempt to identify the weaknesses of the authority 
or distinguish it from the present case. Overall, this serves to demonstrate the advocate's honesty as 
well as their extensive preparation. As David Jackson says 'honesty is a useful thing as a tool of 
advocacy'.499 
An advocate should also identify any weaknesses in their case. According to Robert Jackson, these 
weaknesses should be dealt with as early as practicable, as '[t]o delay meeting these issues is 
improvident; to attempt evasion of them is fata1'.'00 By choosing to avoid the weaknesses, the court 
may infer that the advocate perceives these to be fatal to their case. It may also lead to a perception 
that the advocate has not thoroughly prepared their case and, has either not identified the 
weaknesses or has simply not turned their mind to such weaknesses. An advocate, Gibbs notes, can 
also refer to their opponent's strong point as an indirect means of identifying its weaknesses.'01 This 
approach, in addition to enhancing the advocate's credibility, is likely to increase the persuasive 
effect of the advocate's arguments. 
Weaknesses are likely to become the subject of judicial questioning in any event. An advocate who 
identifies the weaknesses early in their case or their opponent's case then seeks to address and 
negate them, engages in what has been described as a 'pre-emptive strike' in an advocacy context.'02 
This technique has the ability to effectively negate and then neutralise both an advocate's weakest 
arguments and their opponent's strongest arguments. The ability to identify weaknesses in their 
case or their opponent's case also requires the advocate to undertake an extensive preparation. 
498 Harry Gibbs, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 498-499. 
499 Interview with David Jackson QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). 
500 Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 5. Also, Pan nick, above n 193. 
501 Harry Gibbs, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 498-499; Glissan, above n 11, p.205. 
502 This is also referred to as "going for the jugular"- that is: 
It is not pleasant to concentrate on the weakest part of one's case, but when the advocate knows what it is, 
acknowledges the appearance or actuality of weakness, and then, with as much forcefulness as the issue 
permits, shows the appearance to be misleading or the weakness to be counter-balanced by other strengths, 
it becomes known as one who goes for the jugular- the advocate's highest accolade. 
Coffin, "A Term of Court", above n 494, p.226; Justice James Douglas, 'Oral Advocacy' in Blank & Selby (eds), 
above n 11, p.186. 
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Respect and Candour 
Ellicott suggests that one of the key elements of appellate advocacy is 'looking at the court, not 
fiercely but with humility'.503 An essential element of appellate advocacy is respect. Advocates show 
respect to the court by demonstrating, among other things, courtesy and patience. An advocate 
should present their submissions i~ a respectful way504 and without arrogance. Effective appellate 
advocates deal with judicial questioning and comments generally in a polite and courteous manner. 
Whilst it is acknowledged that it can be challenging to remain courteous and patient when an 
advocate is faced with constant and relentless questioning, failing to do so will result in showing 
disrespect to the court which will be counter-productive when the ultimate aim is to persuade. 
Anecdotal evidence and writings by former judges indicates that disrespect can harm an advocate's 
reputation and credibility and ultimately, their prospects in the case.505 
Whilst it is important for an advocate to be respectful, advocates must also show self-respect and 
not belittle or demean themselves, nor compliment or praise any of the judges.506 Robert Jackson 
advises: 'Be respectful, of course, but also be self-respectful, and neither disparage yourself nor 
flatter the Justices. We think well enough of ourselves already' .507 An advocate should not appear to 
grovel 508 An advocate who grovels will do themselves and their case a disservice; they may lose 
503 Interview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
504 For example: 
Remind yourself that the members of the appellate court, as well as yourself and the other counsel, are 
furthering the cause of justice and the administration of justice ... Never talk down to the court; it is 
inappropriate and it is definitely not helpful to your client's case. 
Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 11, in the Preface by The Honourable Charles Leonard Dubin, Chief Justice 
of Ontario, p.11; Ross, Advocacy, (2"' ed), above n 188, p.9. 
505 The importance of respect and the dangers from failing to display respect are apparent from this next 
example. In the UK, solicitor-advocate Mark Clough QC received a rebuke from a judge in the Sony v HM 
Revenue & Customs case (see Sony Computer Entertainment Europe Limited v Commissioners for Her Majesty's 
Revenue And Customs [2006] EWCA Civ 772 (at http://www.bailii.org/cgi-
bin/markup.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2006/772.html&query=sony&method=boolean)). When Clough 
suggested that a judge had 'deliberately misinterpreted' part of a previous decision, the presiding judge Lord 
Justice Chadwick, took offence and remarked that: 'Fearless advocacy is one thing; intemperate advocacy is 
another'. Chadwick U then proceeded to criticise Mr Clough's skeleton argument for Sony as being of 
'inordinate length ... [and a] frequent and unnecessary resort to hyperbole'. Sony's counsel was the subject of 
a public rebuke and the advocate's style of advocacy would have ensured that he had not endeared himself to 
the judge in either this case or future cases (see Kirby, 'In-temper advocacy', above n 88, 26 at p.26. See also 
Ben Moshinsky, 'Chadwick U condemns Addleshaw Goddard QC' (2006) http://www.thelawyer.com/cgi-
bin/item.cgi?id=120635&d=122&h=24&f=46 at 10 December 2008). 
506 Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 4. 
507 See Robert H. Jackson, 'Advocacy Before the Supreme Court: Suggestions for Effective Case Presentations' 
(1951) 37 American Bar Association Journa/801, 802 as referred to in Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 11, in 
the Preface by The Honourable Charles Leonard Dubin, Chief Justice of Ontario, p.11. 
508 Jackson, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 71, 252. See also Interview with David Jackson QC (Sydney, 2 August 
2006); Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 11, in the Preface by The Honourable Charles Leonard Dubin, Chief 
Justice of Ontario, p.11 where the authors referred to a statement by former Justice of the US Supreme Court, 
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credibility and in doing so may affect the likelihood of a judge accepting their arguments, as well as 
damaging the advocate's reputation and credibility. 
Effective appellate advocates develop their own style of advocacy; nevertheless, this should include 
honesty, respect and candour at all times. The '[p]ersonal styles of advocates vary, but the 
competent advocate has developed a presentation which adds to the perception of their 
reliability' .'09 Effective appellate advocates are 'concerned, thoughtful, responsive, polite and at all 
times aware of the duty owed to the client and as an officer of the Court' 510 This can be a difficult 
and delicate balance to achieve. These elements of personation are critical to an advocate's 
reputation and credibility, while ultimately adding weight to the persuasiveness of their submissions 
as well as playing a crucial role in presentation. 
5.3 Emotion 
An advocate must not fear using their emotions to assist their client's case. s11 Ellicott suggests that 
an advocate should not 'be afraid to be emotional ... in an appropriate way. It goes with 
advocacy' .'12 The use of emotion by an advocate demonstrates to the court the advocate's passion 
and belief in their arguments. 51' This can lend weight to the persuasiveness of the advocate's 
arguments. 
Although it can be beneficial to incorporate emotion into an advocate's submissions, too much 
emotion can also be detrimental to the advocate's cause if it results in a loss of objectivity. 
Objectivity is an enormous asset for an advocate and a 'calm and detached appreciation of the 
strengths and weaknesses of an advocate's own case is essential to the ability to present that case to 
its best advantage'.'14 Porter remarked that 'to be a good advocate it is necessary to remain 
Justice lewis D. Brandeis, where he succinctly stated (lewis D. Brandeis, 1912, quoted in Alfred lief (ed), The 
Brandeis Guide to the Modern World, (1941), little, Brown and Company, Boston, p.166}: "If we desire respect 
for the law, we must first make the law respectable". According to the authors: 
If you realize the truth of these words, you will be assisted in forming your attitude towards the court and 
your opponent. You will not enter into personal disputes with your opponent and you will find the entire 
process easier, less nerve-racking, and more satisfying. You will argue with courtesy and respect but not with 
subservience. You will be prepared to face the court and hold your position in the face of questions and 
challenges by the judges. 
509 Keith, above n 476, 24. 
sto Ibid. 
511 Ross, Advocacy, above n 216, p.2; Ross, Advocacy, (2"' ed), above n 188, p.7. It has been suggested that, to 
be appealing, the argument should have both logical and emotional appeal: Nathanson, above n 11, pp.i-iii. 
512 Interview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
513 Although it is acknowledged that emotion is more likely to play a role in trial advocacy as opposed to 
appellate advocacy. 
sl4 'Extra-Judicial Notes', above n 43, 11. 
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detached' .51s By demonstrating that the advocate is able to present their client's case in an objective 
and balanced manner, the advocate will gain the trust and respect of the court. This will assist in 
attempting to persuade the court. 
An effective advocate will therefore need to strike a balance between being passionate and 
convincing and at the same time not being too emotionally involved: 
If you allow yourself to become too emotionally involved in the cause of your client, too enmeshed in 
the client's troubles, too caught up in the sense of grievance the client is experiencing, the danger will 
be that you are no longer able to provide objective counsel to your client. 516 
It is said that there is a direct relationship between objectivity and effectiveness. A former president 
of the American College of Trial Lawyers, Joseph A Ball, commented: 'The more I become involved 
emotionally in my client's cause the less I am able to (do) for him'.517 
It is essential that an advocate identify the issues in a case, drawing on their common sense and 
experience whilst adopting, according to Godbold, a 'dispassionate and detached mind'. 518 
Advocates achieve a sense of perspective if they are capable of remaining objective and distant from 
the case that they are presenting. 51' This allows the advocate to view their case critically and on its 
merits, and make an honest and objective assessment of the prospects of success of their client's 
case, as well as identify the strengths and weaknesses of the case. 
In Godbold's view, when an advocate becomes too emotional, they may not provide the court with 
as much guidance and assistance as it requires520 In this case, the advocate may stumble at the first 
hurdle of advocacy, namely, to inform. The members of the court will be persuaded by a meritorious 
case which is grounded upon sound legal principles and they are not likely to make decisions 
capriciously or in an arbitrary manner. For this reason, arguments which degenerate into pleas of 
emotion are not likely to find favour with a member of the court. Despite the view that emotion can 
assist, it is generally acknowledged that the court will be willing to consider arguments involving the 
merits of the case based on accurate and relevant legal principles rather than emotion.521 
Sls Porter, Walking on Water: A Life in the Law, above n 417, p.8. 
516 Trevor Riley, 'Advocacy: Objective Counsel' {April, 2001) Balance 17, 17. 
517 Ibid, 18. 
518 Godbold, above n 11, 809. Ted Laurie QC recalls receiving advice not to become emotionally engaged in a 
client's case from the then Chief Justice of the High Court, Sir John Latham, at a cocktail party in 1946: PeterS 
Cook, Red Barrister A Biography of Ted Laurie QC, (1994), LaTrobe University Press, Bundoora, Victoria, p.148. 
519 lain Ross, above n 289, p.16. 
520 Godbold, above n 11, 808. 
521 
'Extra-Judicial Notes', above n 43, 12. 
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In an interview in 2009, Chief Justice French alluded to the dangers of an advocate becoming too 
emotionally involved in a case: 
There are some advocates who have a strong belief in the justice of the case in which they appear 
because it reflects their personal values. That of itself is not necessarily a bad thing although it can be an 
impediment to critical judgment. But there is a small subset of such advocates who seem to think it is 
enough to be on the side of the angels and that rigorous consideration of the law is a black letter 
approach, which somehow pollutes the moral purity of their case. They are seldom of much help to 
anyone.522 
This statement should be borne in mind during the analysis of Barwick's performance in the Bank 
Nationa/isation Case where his advocacy was said by some to be enhanced by virtue of the fact that 
his arguments reflected his personal values about the freedom of the individual. This should be 
compared to his presentation in the Communist Party Case where his arguments seemed to accord 
with his beliefs (although there is some conjecture in relation to this) yet were not as effective. 
Notwithstanding these reservations, in certain cases, the use of emotion may increase the 
persuasiveness of the submissions. Discretion is required to determine when it may be appropriate 
to utilise emotion. In some instances, in Sackville's view, it will be more effective to focus entirely on 
the principles that arise from legal arguments rather than on the particular facts of the case523 or the 
converse may apply. Poor judgment in this regard can have an adverse effect on the advocate's 
submissions. 
At the very least, it will assist an advocate if they are able to empathise with, and feel compassion 
for, their client. This allows an advocate to be an effective and convincing mouthpiece for the client. 
However, an effective advocate ought to always remain in control of their emotions and exercise 
discipline so as not to allow their client's plight to influence their submissions in an adverse manner: 
the sadness or injustice of the circumstances of your client and the impact those matters have upon you 
as an advocate must be kept in proper check. Your most important function is to provide your client 
with an objective, unemotional and professional source of advice ... 524 
Whilst emotion is more likely to affect someone acting for an individual rather than a corporation or 
government entity, it can play a part in constitutional cases, especially where important issues of 
policy are at stake. 
An effective advocate should avoid losing control or exhibiting other emotions which will be 
detrimental to their case.525 Porter states that as an advocate 'you must never lose your temper'.526 
522 Kate Gibbs, 'Chief Justice scrutinises personality and justice', above n 11, 1. 
523 Sackville, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 60, 104. 
524 Riley, 'Advocacy: Objective Counsel', above n 518, 18. See also Glissan, above n 11, p.7. 
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Any loss of control will result in the loss of respect and confidence, thus causing damage to the 
advocate's credibility and reputation. The advocate also risks offending the members of the court or 
causing anger and irritation which may irreparably damage the advocate's case.527 Advocates who 
engage in '[s]elf-indulgent displays of sarcasm, anger or indignation ... which are often at the client's 
expense, are unprofessional and unforgivable' 528 There is nothing to be gained by advocates 
displaying these types of emotions whereas there is everything to lose. Generally, it is when 
subjected to judicial questioning that advocates are more susceptible to losing control of their 
emotions. However, effective appellate advocates maintain their composure even in the face of 
relentless judicial questioning as any displays of 'anger or irritation are indulgences that an advocate 
can ill afford' 529 
One of the underlying messages about the use of emotion in advocacy is that an advocate should not 
argue a case for any purpose other than to persuade the members of the court. Arguing a case for 
some other purpose is likely to distract from the task at hand. An advocate should note that '[t]he 
case that is argued to please a client, impress a following in the audience, or attract notice from the 
press, will not often make a favorable [sic] impression on the bench. An argument is not a 
spectacle'.530 Barwick made reference to this specifically in his recollection of the opening day ofthe 
Bank Nationalisation Cose where he addressed the High Court before an overflowing courtroom. He 
highlighted the importance of not being distracted by the overwhelming interest such that it altered 
the manner in which he presented his client's arguments."' 
525 See Elliott, above n 334, p.328. 
526 Interview with Chester Porter QC {Sydney, 2 April 2006). See also Porter, Walking on Water: A Life in the 
Law, above n 417, p.306 where Chester Porter QC stated that when he was young he had to watch his temper 
in court. He stated that as he grew older he 'learned the golden rule that an advocate may appear to be angry, 
but one's temper must never be lost. One must always be in full control'. 
527 It has been suggested that: 
While the argument must be argumentative, it cannot be strident. The audience, appellate judges, will be 
offended by an unrestrained appeal to emotion. Yet, your argument must in a restrained way appeal to the 
feelings and values of the appellate court judges. 
Edwards, "Selection and Study of the Record", above n 465, p.143. Also, it has been stated that '[t]he appellate 
lawyer's function is primarily intellectual. Too much emotionalism can be counterproductive, in bad taste, and 
downright offensive': Freidman and Lacavora, above n 29, p.208. 
528 
'Extra-Judicial Notes', above n 43, 11. 
529 lain Ross, above n 289, p.15. It has been suggested that: 'Ill-temper or petulance, arrogance or ignorance or 
self-indulgence on the part of a judge will be met by calm, courteous but unyielding insistence by the barrister 
that such judicial conduct be rectified' (Address by Sir Gerard Brennan, above n 281, 38). See also Glissan, 
above n 11, p.7 and Porter, The Gentle Art of Persuasion, above n 11, pp.65, 208. 
530 Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 10. 
531 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.66. 
113 
5.4 The Extras: Voice, Words, Wit, Presence and Memory 
There are a number of 'extras' to an advocate's presentation which are also relevant and which may 
increase the persuasive effect of the advocate's submissions: voice, words, wit, presence and 
memory. They are all relevant to effective appellate advocacy (although many, being innate, may 
only be improved to a limited extent by practice and/or experience). 
Voice 
An advocate's voice is the means through which they deliver their arguments. Speaking in a manner 
that is easy to listen to facilitates the court following the advocate's arguments."' According to 
Glissan, a 'clear, distinct and interesting voice is more than an asset to an advocate: it is essential'.533 
The manner in which the advocate uses their voice is as important as tone or inflection. This requires 
constant monitoring by the advocate: 
If your voice is low, it burdens the hearing, and parts of what you say may be missed. On the other 
hand, no judge likes to be shouted at as if he were an ox. I know of nothing you can do except to bear 
the difficulty in mind, watch the bench, and adapt your delivery to avoid causing apparent strain.534 
It is important that an advocate demonstrate, through the projection of their voice, a courteous and 
respectful demeanour at all times.535 A failure to do this and the advocate may find that members of 
the court are less receptive to their submissions: an ' ... improper tone is a self-created 
impediment'."' For example, it is possible for an advocate to patronise the members of the court 
532 See Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 11, in the Preface by The Honourable Charles Leonard Dubin, Chief 
Justice of Ontario, p.46 where it was said that an advocate should '[s]peak so that the judges can hear you, 
clearly and at a speed with which they can comfortably keep pace'. 
533 Glissan, above n 11, p.S. 
534 Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 10. Jack Elliott stated, in relation 
to voice, that: 
It is necessary to be heard. You need to speak loudly and clearly. If you consciously raise the volume of your 
voice when you first go into court it will soon become second nature to you. What you say has to be 
absorbed and understood, so you must not gabble or rush your words. The thing is to speak in an unhurried 
and measured tempo. 
Elliott, above n 334, p.311. It has been suggested that the 'loud braying monotone may be understood, but it 
loses the attention of the judge ... very quickly': Glissan, above n 11, p.8; see also Porter, The Gentle Art of 
Persuasion, above n 11, p.113. 
535 That is, do not use a tone that is 'combative or belligerent': Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 11, in the 
Preface by The Honourable Charles Leonard Dubin, Chief Justice of Ontario, p.47. Also, P. Young, 'Current 
issues' (2008) 82 Australian Law Journa/149, 149. 
536 Godbold, above n 11, 817. 
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through the tone of their voice.537 Altering tone at key stages and varying voice 'volume or 
modulation for emphasis and effect ... are all acceptable tools of efficient advocacy' .538 
One of the most common and difficult flaws to correct is an advocate's propensity to rush when they 
speak."' Clearly, an advocate who speaks too quickly will not make it easy for the court to 
understand or comprehend their submissions and this is likely to hamper an advocate's ability to 
persuade: 'speed of delivery is ... an important consideration'.540 
An advocate's voice may also attract adverse attention. For example, commenting on the advocacy 
of Sir John Kerr,541 Woodward described his voice as his only weakness: 'His only disadvantage as a 
barrister and public speaker was a high-pitched and rather nasal delivery'.542 The following 
description of the voice of Dr Herbert Vere Evatt,543 one of the leaders at the NSW Bar in the 1920s, 
suggests that his voice may have also been a weakness: 
Evatt was an unattractive speaker. His weak-bodied, high-pitched voice had a broad, nasally cadence. 
He retained an unmodulated delivery, seemingly the wilful cultivation of rural, 'labor' roots ... A lack of 
natural projection complemented flat, dry oratory, his scholarly monotone rarely pitched to a verbal 
distinction that was likely to induce rhythmic captivation between orator and audience. 544 
Of, Winneke, in contrast: 
It was said by some that his 'Oxford' accent became more pronounced when he was on his feet in 
court ... He was very much the actor- a real performer. His voice took on a different tone once he 
was 'on the set'. 545 
537 In relation to tone, it has been suggested that: 
While not wishing to encourage emotionalism in oral argument, I must stress that the persuasive appellate 
advocate should communicate in bearing, tone of voice, and general attitude a strong feeling of the innate 
justice of the cause. 
Freidman and Lacavora, above n 29, p.211. It has also been suggested that tone should be used ' ... to convey a 
feeling of the justice of your client's case and a little restrained righteous indignation can help in that regard': 
Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 11, in the Preface by The Honourable Charles Leonard Dubin, Chief Justice 
of Ontario, p.46. 
538 Glissan, above n 11, p.8. 
539 Keith, above n 476, 25; Ross, Advocacy, (2"' ed), above n 188, p.8. 
540 Glissan, above n 11, p.8. Also, it has been suggested that '[y]ou must be attentive to the audience to ensure 
that you are going slowly enough to drive your point home and yet not so slowly as to be tedious': Glissan, 
above n 11, p.8. See also Porter, The Gentle Art of Persuasion, above n 11, pp.114-115. 
541 Later to become Chief Justice ofthe Supreme Court of NSW (1972-74) and Governor-General (1974-77). 
542 Woodward, above n 338, p.87. 
543 Commonly referred to as "Doc Evatt" or "Doc" and referred to as such in later parts of this thesis. He was a 
Justice of the High Court of Australia (1930-40); Attorney-General and Minister for External Affairs (1941-49); 
Leader of the Australian Labor Party (1951-60); Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of NSW (1960-62). See 
generally Peter Crockett, Evatt: A Life, (1993), Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Victoria. 
544 Crockett, above n 543, pp.10-11. 
545 Coleman, above n 207, p.174. 
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Despite their respective voices, both Kerr and Evatt had successful careers at the Bar; while voice 
may be considered an ideal for the purposes of exemplary appellate advocacy it is not a necessity or 
a significant matter in reality. In relation to Barwick, Mason described Barwick's voice as 'strong and 
it had a timbre to it' and that he 'made good use of inflection' but that it wasn't 'an attractive voice' 
or 'a rich voice'.546 Porter descrii;led it as 'a most interesting voice with lively inflection'.547 Ellicott 
stated that Barwick talked quietly but that 'his voice was not necessarily part of his armoury whereas 
it is with a lot of people. It wasn't a booming voice or it wasn't necessarily crisp'. 548 This is discussed 
in detail in the next chapter. 
Language 
It has been suggested by Ross that the language employed by an advocate is more important than 
the level of the advocate's voice.549 Effective appellate advocates present their submissions clearly 
and articulately. As discussed earlier, it is a distinct advantage to be able to explain complicated 
arguments in a simple, clear and concise manner without being superficial.550 This requires the 
advocate to utilise appropriate language to suit the context. According to David Jackson, the choice 
of language 'does involve thinking about it beforehand' -that is, during the preparation stage- and 
'some people are quicker in response to others'.551 
Words are the tools that an advocate employs to persuade the members of the court. 55' An 
advocate should use words that are appropriate and ensure that the words employed do not result 
in any ambiguity. 
546 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006}. 
547 Interview with Chester Porter QC (Sydney, 2 April 2006). 
548 1nterview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
549 Ross, Advocacy, above n 216, p.3. See also Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 11, in the Preface by The 
Honourable Charles Leonard Dubin, Chief Justice of Ontario, p.46. It is suggested that advocates should learn 
the 'weight and edge' of words: Hyam, above n 31, p.7. 
550 Ross, Advocacy, above n 216, p.3; Glissan, above n 11, p.204; Porter, The Gentle Art of Persuasion, above n 
11, pp.154-155. 
551 Interview with David Jackson QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). 
552 According to Melissa Perry QC: 
It is trite to say of our profession that words are our tools of trade. The most effective oral advocates who I 
have had the pleasure to watch and to learn from are those who have had a wide vocabulary, and mastery of 
the meaning of words. 
Perry, above n 68, p.S. Further, it has been suggested by Tom Hughes QC that: 
An advocate must aspire to be a master of his native tongue; and in this connexion it is useful to store up a 
variety of pungent or colourful expressions which can be deployed (but only with discrimination and not too 
often) on suitable occasions. How often has one thought of an appropriate retort only after the occasion 
which calls for it has passed? To avoid the discomfiture of a delayed reaction, keep some verbal stock on a 
mental shelf, ready for instant use. 
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The advocate's ability to persuade is greatly influenced by the tools at the advocate's disposal. The 
power of language should not be underestimated in this context. It has been suggested that: 
... the essential tools of the advocate remain the same wherever the advocate practices. In the end, the 
advocate has only two tools- the English language and the thought that that language is intended to 
convey. The art of the advocate lies in the way in which he or she uses those tools. 553 
Winneke was renowned for his 'mastery of the language' .554 When Len Flanagan QC, a former Crown 
Counsel for Victoria, first met Winneke in 1963 he found that: 
Wit 
... what impressed me most at that first meeting was the economy of his language. He didn't waste a lot 
of time with peripheral material; he went directly to the point. He could be very colourful when he 
wanted to, and very quick in answering questions. 555 
Being quick-witted is a useful skill for an advocate to possess. The use of humour selectively and 
appropriately can have great effect556 Hughes believes that 'a bit of humour goes so long as it's not 
misplaced' .557 An advocate must be cautious however, in the manner in which they use their wit.558 
Hughes, above n 92, pp.17-18; Glissan, above n 11, p.8. 
553 Hayne, 'Advocacy and Special Leave Applications in the High Court of Australia', above n 11, p.9. It has also 
been suggested that an advocate should be fastidious in their choice of language to ensure that they express 
exactly what they mean: Hyam, above n 31, p.151. 
554 Coleman, above n 207, p.x. 
555 Ibid. The renowned barrister Albert Edward Woodward was critical of the language used by former Prime 
Minister of Australia, Bob Hawke, during his time as a union advocate: 
The only fault I found with him as an advocate was his frequent and distracting use of extreme language to 
make a point. For example, his opponents' arguments were often described as not merely wrong, but 
'grotesque' or 'repulsive'. This, combined with his frequent use of other colourful exaggerations, detracted 
from the quality of his argument 
Woodward, above n 338, p.85. Hawke, nevertheless, was highly successful. 
556 Ross, Advocacy, above n 216, p.3. It has been suggested that, to avoid bitterness, wit and humour can be 
used to make a point rather than invective and experience is a useful guide as to when the use of wit and 
humour is appropriate. It is also suggested that an advocate should employ genuine humour and avoid 
flippancy: Hyam, above n 31, p.36. Former Chief Justice Murray Gleeson stated that the use of humour is 'a 
question of taste really, provided its well aimed its fine but it's easily overdone': Interview with Murray 
Gleeson, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 14 August 2006). 
557 1nterview with Hon. Tom Hughes AO QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). Throughout his time at the Bar, Sir Owen 
Dixon was known to burst into laughter during the weakest points of his opponent's arguments. On one 
occasion, Edmund Herring complained to Justice Lowe that Dixon was laughing at his argument. Justice Lowe 
cautioned 'I will have you know, Mr Dixon, that laughter is no argument in my court'. Dixon replied, still 
laughing, 'I know, Your Honour, that's the trouble!': Communication from James Merralls to Phillip Ayres in 
Ayres, above n 50, p.26. 
558 One commentator has suggested that because humour is a very dangerous weapon, it should be avoided 
other than in exceptional circumstances: Pannick, above n 193. Another reason why humour should be used 
cautiously is that it can be misunderstood by clients and can create the 'unfortunate perception that people 
aren't taking the matter as seriously as they should': ABC, 'Retiring Chief Justice Murray Gleeson', above n 243. 
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Robert Jackson noted an example of wit by a British barrister that is likely to have offended the 
judge: 
The Judge said: "I have been listening to you now for four hours and I am bound to say I am none the 
wiser." 
• 559 The barrister replied: "Oh, I know that, my Lord, but I had hoped you would be better informed." 
Whilst the barrister's retort was witty, it failed to address the judge's fundamental concern. The 
retort was also likely to have been considered offensive compounding the judge's frustration and 
irritation. 
Wit should not be employed in a manner that offends the court. In one further situation related by 
Jackson: 
[T]he judge said: There is nothing to your proposition- just nothing to it. 
The [advocate] said: Your Honor {sic), I have worked on this case for six weeks and you have not heard 
of it twenty minutes. Now, Judge, you are a lot smarter man than I am, but there is not that much 
difference between us.560 
Although this retort by the advocate may have been witty, it failed to address the judge's comments. 
Humour is a two-edged sword in the context of appellate advocacy- used effectively, it can be a 
potential persuasive weapon. However, used inappropriately, it may damage an advocate's case. 
Presence 
Effective appellate advocates generally possess what can be described as a 'presence'. According to 
Ross, presence, in this context, generally stems from confidence.561 A confident advocate is more 
likely to capture the attention of the court and is also more engaging. Confidence is also linked to 
preparation. An advocate 'must endeavour to take centre stage in the courtroom. If properly 
prepared, [the advocate] will assume the authority needed to fulfil [their] duty'.562 
559 Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 11. 
s6C Ibid. Please note that all future references to "Honor" rather than "Honour" is due to the spelling in the 
quotation and will not be succeeded by '{sic)'. 
561 Ross, Advocacy, above n 216, p.3. It was said of Gordon Samuels, that [h]is commanding presence, high 
intelligence, beautiful voice and forensic skills quickly won him an enormous practice': Michael Kirby, 
'Obituaries: Hon Gordon Samuels AC, 0/0 QC' (2008) 82 Australian Law Journa/285. Gordon Samuels was an 
eminent barrister, a Judge of the Supreme Court of NSW, a Court of Appeal Judge and later the Governor of 
NSW. 
562 Keith, above n 476, 24. 
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An advocate who has undertaken a meticulous and thorough preparation will derive confidence from 
the knowledge that they are thoroughly prepared.563 That is, at least in the ideal, there is no judicial 
question that can be asked to which they cannot respond and there is no submission that could be 
advanced by the opposition that they have not considered. An advocate can also develop confidence 
from both practice and experience' There' ... is a sharp learning curve that results from feeling 
foolish, bewildered or upset by your presentation' .564 Presence may also derive from other factors 
such as competence and eloquence. 
According to David Jackson, the secret to presence is as follows: 
I think you have to carry yourself in a sense, you're the leader and you've got your troops, you've got to 
know what you're doing. If you know what you're doing, you're in charge and you don't let yourself be 
flustered by juniors who are saying "say this, say that". Keep the puppies quiet. 565 
Presence does not equate to height. Some of the greatest advocates in Australia were short 
(including Barwick and Byers). 
Memory 
As already mentioned, an advocate with a good memory has a distinct advantage or, as David 
Jackson suggests, 'it's a help"66 A good memory often allows an advocate to respond to a question 
from the court with confidence and precision. It is not unusual for the opinions of judges to be 
swayed by an advocate providing an appropriate answer to a question on a critical issue.567 A good 
memory provides the advocate with an abundance of information which is easily and instantly 
accessible as required. Dixon was renowned as an advocate for, among other things, his: 
phenomenal memory of reported cases ... [He] ... never had any problem, when responding to 
unexpected arguments of opposing counsel, in citing, extempore, cases he had not previously 
considered in relation to the matter at hand.'68 
Although it is not desirable for an advocate to memorise their submissions as it often results in 
inflexibility coupled with a stiff and uneasy demeanour, 569 the other extreme is also not desirable: 
563 See generally Glissan, above n 11, p.9. 
564 Keith, above n 476, 24. 
565 Interview with David Jackson QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). 
566 Ibid. 
567 Harry Gibbs, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 497. 
568 Communication from James Merralls to Phillip Ayres in Ayres, above n 50, p.26. 
569 It has been suggested that memorising your argument will result in your argument lacking 'spontaneity and 
life, and will not be effective': Rosenberg and Huberman, above n 11, in the Preface by The Honourable Charles 
Leonard Dubin, Chief Justice of Ontario, p.46. 
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'[e]qually objectionable is ... an unorganized, rambling discourse, relying on the inspiration of the 
moment'.570 This calls for a balance between an advocate employing their memory to remember key 
aspects of their submissions whilst also relying on pre-prepared notes to ensure that their 
submissions follow a logical structure. This is likely to lead to more coherent and organised 
submissions while at the same time allowing engagement with the members of the court, by being 
able to recall key aspects of their submissions in response to judicial questions. 
The manner in which an advocate delivers their submissions must accord with their abilities and 
disposition. 57' An advocate must deliver their submissions in a manner which seems natural. Some 
advocates will need to rely on more comprehensive written notes than others. There are very few 
advocates who have the rare ability, in terms of their memory and composure, to argue a case 
without reference to any written notes. 572 
An example of an extremely successful barrister who possessed a number of 'the extras' was Robert 
Menzies. He had 'a commanding appearance, a strong and clear voice, logical almost to a fault, a 
master of lucid expression and obviously well prepared in every way'.573 
One of the themes that emerges from this chapter is that, notwithstanding the widely accepted 
elements and ideals identified, an effective appellate advocate will develop their own style based on 
their own ability, including their own strengths and weaknesses, and which individually incorporates 
the relevant elements and ideals. As an advocate, one 'should be able to analyse those personal 
strengths which make you persuasive or credible and develop a style amenable to your own 
needs'.574 
570 Jackson, 'Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court', above n 11, 9. 
571 1bid. 
572 Ibid. For example, David Jackson QC stated that: 
I endeavour to have for each case, a note of what I want to say in short paragraphs. It is not possible to stick 
with it all the time because you have the judges asking you questions, but I find it useful to have as an aide 
memo ire of what you want to say, what you are going to refer to, all this sort of thing. Other people have 
different views on this, but that is the way I do it. Writing it out also puts you in a situation where you have 
thought through the implications of what you're saying. 
See Interview with David Jackson QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). 
573 Hazlehurst, above n 204, p.41. 
574 Keith, above n 476, 25. 
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Chapter 6: Barwick's Approach to Preparation, Presentation 
and Personation 
'The period of argument in court is an opportunity for the meeting of minds in the search for truth in 
relation to the matter in hand. It must reflect, in the quality of its use, the degree of devotion and skill 
that has been applied to the preparation of the argument, to the identification of the significant, to 
the elimination of the irrelevant and to the avoidance of barren repetition". 
Sir Garfield Barwick, 1964575 
The exploration of the elements of preparation, presentation and personation in the context of 
appellate advocacy which was undertaken in the previous three chapters, was directed towards 
establishing a framework to enable an assessment of Barwick's ability to achieve these ideals. The 
purpose is to subject conclusions about the ideals of appellate advocacy to an examination of the 
reality by exploring the performance of an advocate, Barwick, who had the reputation as being one 
of the greatest appellate advocates. The emphasis in Chapters 7, 8 and 9 will be Barwick's advocacy 
in the Bank Nationalisatian Case and the Communist Party Case. 
Before undertaking this analysis, Barwick's approach to preparation, presentation and personation 
generally needs to be considered in terms of the ideals of appellate advocacy within each of these 
categories. This chapter analyses Barwick's own observations, the observations of his 
contemporaries and others who knew him as well as commentary available in relation to Barwick's 
advocacy. The chapter also provides an introduction to enable a more detailed examination of the 
ideals in the context of a discussion of specific constitutional law cases in the following three 
chapters. 
6.1 Barwick's Approach to Preparation 
As suggested by Sackville, success in appellate advocacy depends largely on a meticulous 
preparation. However, success in this context refers to attaining levels of exemplary advocacy rather 
than success in terms of winning. Undoubtedly, a thorough preparation was instrumental to 
Barwick's success as an advocate. Chester Porter who worked with Barwick on preparing an address 
575 Transcript of Proceedings in the High Court of Australia at Sydney on Friday 1" May 1964 on the occasion of 
the Swearing In of Sir Garfield Barwick as Chief Justice of Australia, p.10. 
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to the Legislative Assembly on industrial relations legislation, described Barwick's preparation in that 
instance as 'meticulous'.576 
Barwick's 'Ground Up' Appraa_ch 
A key aspect of Barwick's preparation was what will be described, for the purposes of this thesis, as 
his 'ground up' approach. This is based on Barwick's description of his approach to preparation. He 
would, he writes, 'always work from the ground up'.577 His approach was to commence his 
preparation by examining the fundamental principle of law that was at the centre of a particular 
case. This involved referring to the original sources of the law. He would immerse himself in the 
case and work his way to the point where he understood the present state of the law and then 
developed his arguments accordingly. Barwick outlined his approach in his autobiography as follows: 
... in working on a case I would always work from the ground up. I would examine closely the relevant 
accepted wisdom of the day but not take it for gospel; I would verify it from original sources. In this 
way, in later days, I often found a principle which was misunderstood in its current application, or one 
that had been forgotten or overlooked. Following this course, I sometimes achieved results that in 
themselves appeared novel but which were simply built on the fundamentals of the law. 578 
Self-evaluation, often relying on subsequent events or developments and the benefit of hindsight, 
needs to be critically examined and independently verified, however, Barwick's description has been 
corroborated by a number of different sources. Porter reflected on his time as a junior counsel when 
he had numerous conferences with Barwick and confirmed Barwick's 'ground up' approach. He 
stated that Barwick: 
... went to the fundamental text of a statute or the fundamental principles of common law and he drew 
his own inferences ... regardless of any authority beneath that of the House of Lords or the High Court. 
And the interesting thing is that he was right most of the time ... [H]e was a man who went straight to 
basic principles and hardly cited a single authority."' 
Ellicott also confirmed Barwick's 'ground up' approach: 'I remember that he would say well of course 
such and such a case [referring to authorities] and he'd go back to the 19'h century and develop it 
through. He had it all there at his fingertips because it was kept in his mind'.580 
576 Interview with Chester Porter QC {Sydney, 2 April 2006). 
577 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.19. 
578 Ibid. 
579 Interview with Chester Porter QC {Sydney, 2 April 2006). 
580 Interview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
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In response to a question about section 92 of the Constitution 581 and whether Barwick would trace 
the case law back to the early decisions on the section, Barwick's son, Ross, stated: 
Oh certainly it was a brick building exercise. Always. Always a brick building exercise. Indeed if I've 
learnt anything from him in the law, he'd always say, "start at the beginning, what does the statute say, 
what do the cases say", .... "Loek at the law and the facts will look after themselves". 582 
Barwick's 'ground up' approach to preparation provided him with a great opportunity to develop a 
larger and more diverse practice which, together with his success, helped him earn a reputation as a 
leading advocate: 
From here on [the late 1930s] my practice steadily broadened and I was regularly briefed in all 
the jurisdictions of the court. Cases which produced an unexpected result, particularly by the 
application of the law, tended to increase my practice. I began to build a reputation as a lawyer 
as well as an advocate. An ability to deploy the principles of the law in a practical way was 
appreciated. I became a leading junior. Often I was given a junior to assist me in the more 
complicated cases. 583 
Many of the 'unexpected results' Barwick referred to were obtained by employing his 'ground up' 
approach, which often resulted in the discovery of a principle of law which had been applied and 
relied upon without ever being questioned or disputed as to its foundation or origins. This approach 
would, on occasions, result in Barwick challenging the application of a principle of law and thereby 
seeking to overturn previously established principles. Barwick's challenges to the wartime 
regulations were an example.'84 His approach contributed to his growing reputation as an advocate. 
He had a demonstrated ability to grasp legal concepts quickly and comprehend them in such a way 
that he could apply them to factual scenarios with relative ease.'85 
Barwick's preparation and his 'ground up' approach also aided other aspects of his advocacy. It 
provided him with confidence in his presentation and enhanced his presentation generally. In this 
581 This is significant because Barwick appeared in numerous cases involving s 92, including the Airlines Case 
and the Bank Nationalisation Case. 
582 Interview with Ross Barwick (Sydney, 4 October 2006). 
583 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.30. 
584 Discussed earlier, for example, De Mestre v Chisholm (1944) 69 CLR 51, Reid v Sinderberry (1944) 68 CLR 504, 
Ex parte Sinderberry; Re Reid and Ex parte McGrath; Re Reid (1944) 61(NSW) WN 139. 
585 In fact, Barwick maintained his 'ground up' approach even during his time as Chief Justice of the High Court. 
Barwick recalled a case (Viro v R [1978] HCA 9; (1978) 141 CLR 88 (11 April1978)) that was argued before the 
High Court during his time as Chief Justice concerning whether a drunk man could form criminal intent in 
circumstances where previously the Privy Council had found that he could and the High Court had found 
otherwise. Barwick indicated that the case turned largely on how a particular expression was read in one of 
the cases and that it was 'a case where if you had that to argue you'd have to go and have a close look at the 
root of the whole thing and see that it had been misunderstood, that the emphasis had been misplaced, you 
see'. See Molomby & Donohoe, above n 19, 14. 
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way, his approach was geared towards 'preparation for performance' as described by Hampel in a 
previous chapter, and referred to for the purposes of this thesis, as 'preparation for presentation'. 
Ellicott's description of Barwick's approach to preparation adds weight to the suggestion that 
Barwick's approach was governed by the 'preparation for presentation' concept: 
His preparation would have been to find the most attractive way in which to present his 
argument consistent with winning the case. I think he would have considered whether he could 
put it shortly, sit down, get the other side up facing a strong argument that he'd put and then 
deal with them in reply in a more lengthy way coming back to the significance of the points he'd 
made.586 
Barwick's 'ground up' approach was also relevant to his preparation in the context of trial 
advocacy. s87 However, his emphasis on relevance was an important part of his 'preparation for 
presentation' and presentation generally, as will be seen in later chapters. Barwick had the ability to 
identify the relevant law and issues quickly and discard irrelevant or immaterial information. 
Barwick's 'ground up' approach also assisted him with judicial questioning. By effectively tracing the 
origins of the relevant law, Barwick became very familiar with the current legal issues in dispute as 
well as the history of these issues. As a result, he was in an ideal position to answer any judicial 
questions with respect to those issues. This is also apparent when analysing Barwick's advocacy 
using the transcript of his presentation in the Bank Nationalisation Case and Communist Party Case 
as will become evident. 
Barwick's ability to respond skilfully to judicial questions was supported by Ellicott: 
I can only recall in the Privy Council and in the High Court in Keighery's that he would always 
throw up a simple and plausible solution to the question. He was not one for backtracking. In 
other words, his thought processes as uttered represented a mind that had gone through the 
problems. 588 
586 Interview with Han. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
587 Barwick described his approach to preparing for a case as follows: 
I tried to get to the bottom of the facts of the case. The first thing to know is what facts you've got available, what 
facts you expect to prove. Then you next go through how you are going to prove them. But you must see the 
relevance of those facts to the legal cause of action that you are asked to present and succeed. That's why I 
emphasised a while ago the idea of relevance, you've got to pick up the relevant facts and material relevant to a 
cause of action, the proposition which is the backbone of the case. 
Molomby & Donohoe, above n 19, 10. 
588 Interview with Han. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). The reference to Keighery's case is a 
reference to W P Keighery Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1957] HCA 2; {1957) 100 CLR 66 {19 
December 1957). 
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Ellicott agreed that this ability to respond to judicial questions suggested that Barwick had 
anticipated the nature ofthe questions as a result of his comprehensive preparation.'" 
The importance that Barwick attributed to preparation is evident from an instance that he recounted 
where he was briefed at short notice to act on behalf of a defendant in a jury trial in the Supreme 
Court of NSW. Upon being asked to take over this brief, Barwick recalled that 'unabashed by the 
brevity of the time for detailed preparation, I agreed to do so' .'90 This statement illustrates that he 
understood and appreciated both the value and importance of a detailed preparation. However, it 
also demonstrates the reality associated with preparation in practice: often a detailed or 
comprehensive preparation is simply not possible. While this may not be problematic in some cases, 
in others it may impact upon an advocate's performance and, ultimately, the result ofthe case. The 
complexity of the case will also be relevant. 
A discussion with Mitchell prior to his death also reveals the importance that Barwick attributed to 
preparation. At one point, Mitchell suggested to Barwick that he should practice more in the High 
Court. Barwick responded that he had as much as he could do in the Supreme Court and that it was 
'hard work'. Mitchell replied that he was used to hard work, to which Barwick agreed, adding 'but it 
takes a lot of preparation'.'91 
Subsequently, Barwick's High Court practice grew significantly and Barwick recalled: 'I remember an 
occasion when I appeared in every case in the list for the sittings except one, a situation which placed 
a considerable strain on my capacity to prepare myself adequately for each case' .592 Whilst 
recognising the importance that Barwick assigned to a comprehensive and detailed preparation, this 
also indicates his concern that it was becoming increasingly difficult to undertake such a preparation 
in the circumstances. It is possible that there were occasions where Barwick did not prepare 
adequately owing to the rapidly expanding nature of his practice. Barwick reported that Justice 
Starke of the High Court believed that he did too much and therefore did not have sufficient time for 
preparation: Barwick recalled that '[i]n order to get through the work, I always tried to be brief. 593 
It has been suggested by Porter that 'on one occasion [Barwick] was actually reading his brief while 
the other side was arguing before the High Court' .'94 This is consistent with Barwick's recollection of 
589 Interview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
590 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.23. 
591 National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 17. 
592 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.33. See National Library 
of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 17-18. In his interview with J.D.B. Miller, 
Barwick stated that on this occasion he had every case in the list except for one and that this amounted to 17 
cases. Barwick recalled that Chief Justice Latham would refer to it as the "Barwick Session" (at 18). 
593 National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 17. 
594 Interview with Chester Porter QC (Sydney, 2 April 2006). 
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the time where he had every case in the High Court except for one, conceding that 'you can't prepare 
them all, so I developed the capacity of listening to my opponent and working on the next case'.595 
The difficulties Barwick encountered in undertaking a comprehensive preparation were attributable 
to his rapidly growing practice rather than any belief that such a preparation was not necessary. This 
also reflects the reality of appellate advocacy in practice. Barwick had the advantage of a prodigious 
memory and the ability to absorb information quickly which assisted him greatly when faced with a 
small 'window of opportunity' to prepare a case. Ellicott emphasised the importance Barwick 
attributed to preparation together with his ability to absorb detail quickly: 
my experience of him would be that he had a strong view that you had to know your brief and, 
unless you did, you hadn't passed the first test in advocacy. It's the basis of his advocacy, but 
because he could command a knowledge of it fairly quickly he could move from one case to 
anotherfairly easily, work heavily and my recollection is of a person moving from one case to 
another. 596 
These anecdotes and recollections reflect the reality that the demands of running a busy practice 
often impacted on the time Barwick could dedicate to such a preparation. Barwick developed the 
ability to undertake as comprehensive preparation as possible in the minimum time available and to 
the extent necessary, based on the complexity of the particular case. It follows that there may have 
been some instances where Barwick did not adequately prepare some cases. This also leaves open 
the possibility that some of Barwick's unsuccessful results may have been the product of a lack of 
preparation, although no single explanation can be given. 
595 National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 18. Barwick suggested 
that he developed this ability whilst at school: 'The only place where I could do my homework for quite a while 
was in the room where they [his parents and relatives] played cards, and so I was able to absolutely isolate 
myself, today you could let off guns around me, and if I wanted to do something it wouldn't make any 
difference' (at 18). According to Mason, Barwick had: 
... this power of concentration. One ofthe stories he used to tell was that in his early days when he was a boy 
-I've forgotten what his father use to do- but his father used to have a lot of people in the house and 
Barwick would be working in the same room as a school boy. These men would be there talking and I imagine 
drinking, maybe they were card players or something like that, and he had to learn to concentrate with this 
noise going on around him. 
In an interview in 1989, Barwick identified concentration as one of the qualities that can be improved: 
The would-be advocate can improve his powers of concentration. He can get himself into the situation where 
the world disappears and he has just something in the focus of his mind or sight. I'm sure you can improve 
your powers of concentration ... 
I think you can improve your concentration by concentrating and learning to concentrate in the midst of 
music or something that's making a noise or if it's somebody talking you can get yourself to the point of view I 
think by exercising what powers of concentration you have. You can isolate or insulate yourself and thus I 
think you can improve your capacity in that respect. 
Molomby & Donohoe, above n 19, 9. 
596 Interview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
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As previously discussed, effective appellate advocates spend a considerable amount of time thinking 
about the case and formulating the key propositions. This requires a familiarity with the facts, the 
relevant law and procedure. This accords with Mason's recollection of Barwick's preparation. 
Mason was Barwick's junior in many High Court cases597 and had ample opportunity to observe 
Barwick's method of preparation:• 
... my abiding recollection of [Barwick] was that he was always thinking about the case and he had 
a livewire mind ... you find him refining these propositions constantly. You began to wonder 
whether they were ever going to find static form, because he was always thinking of slight 
improvements. 598 
A direct result of this approach, together with completing a thorough and 'ground up' preparation, 
was that Barwick was able to formulate often creative or novel arguments. As Gleeson noted, based 
on comments he recalled: 
The other great capacity [Barwick] had, according to everything I heard in the profession, was 
that he was a very imaginative advocate. He could think up points that would never have 
occurred to anybody else. And he was the sort of advocate who was always thinking ahead. He 
was always two steps ahead of everybody else.599 
Another aspect of preparation in appellate advocacy arises from the need, as Justice Heydon put it, 
to come to grips with the opposing arguments.600 Barwick adhered to this principle. His approach 
included examining his opponent's arguments. Mason made the following observation: 
... two central features in his preparation of the argument of the case [included] the amount of 
time that he actually devoted to formulating the submissions and propositions he was going to 
put in the case. In other words, it was essential to come up with propositions that you could 
defend, that you were confident that you could defend, rather than propositions that had some 
flaw or hole in them because a valid point made against your propositions early on was extremely 
597 Mason was referred to as Barwick's 'favourite junior counsel' in Kristen Walker, 'Mason, Anthony Frank' in 
Tony Blackshield, Michael Caper & George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia, 
(2001), Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, p.459. It has been difficult to ascertain the origins of this 
comment or any reported cases where Mason was Barwick's junior (except for Nelunga/oo Pty Limited v 
Commonwealth (No.4) (1953) 88 CLR 529). When Mason was asked about the origins of this comment he 
stated: 'It is likely that this remark was made during Barwick's early years on the High Court when he was 
reflecting back on his advocacy experience' (Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High 
Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 2006)). 
598 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). 
599 Interview with Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 14 August 2006). 
600 Lindsay, above n 211, 134. 
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detrimental to the argument. And the other point was what was the opposing case? How was 
the opposing case going to be presented?601 
In addition, Barwick's preparation would also result in him looking 'to see how the case could be put 
differently from a legal aspect, a legal point of view, using some other legal principle than the one 
that you are favouring in your apj&roach'.602 
Barwick's Wark Ethic 
Another factor which assisted Barwick's preparation was his appetite and capacity for hard work. 
This allowed Barwick to acquire as well as master the application of the elements of appellate 
advocacy. This is particularly apparent in his comprehensive preparation which often incorporated 
his 'ground up' approach. Barwick's work ethic can be attributed both to his parents and his 
upbringing.603 
Mason recounted: 
My impression of Barwick ... , as an advocate, was that Barwick was really prepared to do it all 
himself. He expected the junior to work and to discuss things with him and to provide ideas, but 
his history I think in the law had been that he did his own work anyhow.604 
According to Mason, one quality that distinguished Barwick from other advocates was his stamina: 
One quality I should mention ... [was] stamina! Physical and mental stamina. That was ama2ing. 
How he could remain alert and on the ball for so long after a busy day in the High Court, a 
demanding day in the High Court- he'd come back to chambers, conduct conferences and he'd 
always be on the ball. He had this ability to switch his mind from one topic to another. Underline 
stamina, because I've often thought in the law that you encounter various people with a high 
level of intelligence, what really marks out the individual who is very successful, outstandingly 
successful from the others, generally you'll find its stamina. He or she's got the physical and 
intellectual strength. 60s 
601 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). 
602 Molomby & Donohoe, above n 19, 10. 
603 According to Tom Hughes, Barwick's: 'many outstanding qualities were the product of his upbringing; 
they reflected and exemplified a concentration by his parents and by him on the value of hard work and 
self-reliance as the means of attaining goals in circumstances not always auspicious' (S. E. K. Hulme et al, 
'High Court Centenary: Reminiscences and reflections' (2003) 77 Australian Law Journa/653, 666). 
604 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). 
605 Ibid. 
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These comments support the proposition that one can learn and acquire the elements of appellate 
advocacy yet to achieve excellence requires attributes, such as stamina, which cannot necessarily be 
developed, acquired or controlled. 
Ross Barwick confirmed that his father would be in court most days until4.30pm, attend conferences 
for a couple of hours, go home, h~ve dinner and socialise with the family then adjourn to the study 
until the early hours ofthe morning.606 Also, on Sundays, junior barristers or solicitors would attend 
conferences at Barwick's house.607 
According to Barwick, an 'advocate has got to be a hard worker ... You've got to be prepared to 
devote yourselfto the particular task you've got in hand, this case'.608 This: 
means you've got nothing else to do with your mind but to do the client's case and to work at it in 
the sense that it doesn't matter whether it takes you until midnight or later to master its facts 
and the relevant law.609 
Barwick's knowledge of the law and relevant procedure 
Another important element in preparation is knowing the law and the relevant procedure. According 
to Porter, this was critical to Barwick's success as an advocate: 
I think if you wanted the secret of his advocacy in the High Court he had a tremendous knowledge 
of the law generally. What I would call a knowledge of basic legal principles, particularly basic 
constitutional principles, but he wasn't one of these people who went before the High Court and 
just aimlessly read long decisions to them in great length. He was a person who went before 
them and he would have the principle of the case and he would always be back to the 
fundamental words of the statute and then he would have an almost unanswerable logic derived 
from the principle or the statute as the case may be. 610 
606 Interview with Ross Barwick {Sydney, 4 October 2006). Ross Barwick also commented about his father's 
physical energy and the fact that he could 'get by with comparatively little sleep'. He would sleep for 3-4 hours 
every night and, in later years, he would cat nap for 10-15 minutes but 'always he had this driving energy'. 
According to Ross Barwick: 
What marked the man was this confluence of physical energy and intellect. They were brought together. I 
mean you'd find a University Professor who has the intellect and some athlete who's got the energy, you 
know. He was all in one package. It was an extraordinary thing to observe, and of course none of us could 
keep up with him in that sense. 
607 Ibid. Ross Barwick even recalls a story where Barwick took an urgent phone call from a solicitor late at night 
whilst he was at a function. The solicitor had something on the next day and needed Barwick's assistance. 
Barwick met the solicitor at his chambers and had a look at the issue. Barwick then identified the point and 
said to the solicitor: "This is the point here, yes we can deal with that tomorrow. It won't take very long. Can I 
go back to my party now?" (see Interview with Ross Barwick (Sydney, 4 October 2006)). 
608 Molomby & Donohoe, above n 19, 10. 
609 Ibid. 
610 Interview with Chester Porter QC (Sydney, 2 April 2006). 
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This is also consistent with Barwick's 'ground up' approach. 
While every lawyer and advocate is expected to 'know the law', knowledge ofthe law refers here to 
the acquisition of a comprehensive knowledge of the applicable law in the proceedings before the 
appellate court, including all relevant case law and legislation pertaining to that area. 
Barwick himself recognised the importance of knowing the law. In an interview in 1989, he was 
asked to identify the most important things for a barrister beginning at the Bar to get a grasp of. He 
identified knowing the law: 
I assume that I have learned my law -I mean that I have learned my law. I have learned the 
principles of it and I've got it clear in my mind and I understand it. That is a prerequisite pre-
eminently of the advocate, he has to feel himself quite secure in his own knowledge of the 
relevant law, whatever the nature of the case that he has to handle. 
If he hasn't got it from recollection, he must acquire it by study, as it were, ad hoc for the purpose 
of the case. 611 
Barwick acknowledged that, as an advocate, one must acquire a detailed knowledge of the law and 
the relevant legal principles: 
The work of the advocate demands a precise knowledge of the law and a thorough grasp of its 
principles. He must be able to recognise quickly which of its principles is relevant to his case and 
make use of it to his client's profit. Several of my cases illustrate both these points and 
emphasise the place of the advocate in the protection of the citizen. 612 
Ellicott stated that '[y]ou can assume that preparation, both of law and fact, would have been well 
and truly part of his armoury'.613 
Barwick also focused on knowing a court's procedure during his preparation. As time went on, this 
was aided significantly by his experience in appearing in different courts and different jurisdictions as 
well as his experience in appearing regularly in the High Court. Porter suggested that Barwick 'knew 
High Court procedure backwards' .614 Ross Barwick suggested that his father 'was always ready by 
virtue of his circumstances to move around anywhere and everywhere. There was no court which he 
wouldn't appear in,.15 According to former Supreme Court Justice, John Slattery, Barwick was 'a 
most persuasive counsel who appeared in all Courts and all jurisdictions from Courts of Petty 
611 Molomby & Donohoe, above n 19, 9. 
612 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.34. 
613 Interview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
614 Interview with Chester Porter QC (Sydney, 2 April 2006). 
615 Interview with Ross Barwick (Sydney, 4 October 2006). 
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Sessions (now Local Courts) to the Privy Council'. 616 However, in reality, appearing in many 
jurisdictions would have made it more difficult to become familiar with the rules pertaining to each 
particular court. 
This experience instilled Barwick with confidence, and this confidence was evident in his advocacy. 
According to Mason, Barwick had 'great confidence' and 'he really believed that he knew more about 
the law and had a power of analysis that was superior to anyone else so he had that confidence. A 
lot of advocates don't have that degree of confidence'.'" 
While Mason confirmed that Barwick was a confident advocate, he also indirectly alluded to a 
possible weakness with Barwick's advocacy: Barwick's belief that he knew more about the law than 
anyone else. The danger with this may be over-confidence, complacency, and even arrogance. 
Barwick has been criticised for arrogance in the Communist Party Case, as will be discussed in 
Chapter 9.618 
The suggestion that Barwick's advocacy was affected by occasional arrogance is also supported by 
some of those who knew him during his time at the Bar. Mason conceded that Barwick's confidence 
'probably did border on arrogance' but, in terms of his advocacy, Mason saw it as 'an exhibition of his 
confidence, his tenacity and his courage'.619 Porter echoed these comments by recalling a case 
where Barwick appeared before a Magistrate who at one point told Barwick to have 'a little more 
respect for the court'. According to Porter, this inferred that Barwick was 'a very arrogant man' but, 
Porter added, 'so far as Barwick was concerned he had a lot to be arrogant about'.620 
616 Slattery, above n 160, 416. 
617 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia {Sydney, 21 February 
2006). 
618 Ayres, above n 50, pp.220-222. See also Owen Dixon, Diary, 14-15 December 1950, Owen Dixon, Personal 
Papers. Chief Justice Latham, while still in office, once told Barwick that his argument in the Communist Party 
Case was the worst he had heard from him. At the time of writing his autobiography, Barwick indicated that he 
did not disagree: 'I have no reason to question his judgment' (Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's 
Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.48). 
619 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). 
620 Interview with Chester Porter QC {Sydney, 2 April 2006). For example, Chester Porter indicated that: 
Someone would say to him "well what about this authority, isn't this against it", "yes we'll challenge that in 
the High Court", Barwick would say and he'd probably be right, that's the fascinating thing about it, "we'll 
change that in the High Court" he would say about it. 
Also, Chester Porter QC described Barwick as 'an arrogant man in inferior courts and then in his attitude 
towards inferior courts'. 
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Ellicott described Barwick as 'a punchy sort of person, very confident, strong ego'.621 Ellicott 
conceded that Barwick did have a level of 'intellectual arrogance' stemming from an 'assurance of 
mind that he was right'. 622 
The reality, reflected in these comments, is that an extensive preparation or knowledge of the law 
and procedure (or extensive experience) may lead to over-confidence and the danger is of an 
appearance of lack of respect for the court. 
Barwick's knowledge of the court 
Knowing the court is another important element in preparation in appellate advocacy. Barwick 
certainly embodied this. In the early stages of his career, Barwick realised that 'advocacy called for 
charm and cunning as well as a grasp of the law'.623 The importance that Barwick attributed to 
'knowing the court' is encapsulated in his statement that '[t]he important thing in life is to know the 
judge' .624 Evatt was of the view that judges were swayed only by sound argument whereas Barwick 
'exercised the arts of persuasion'.625 
Barwick was conscious that he needed to tailor his submissions to particular judges of the High Court 
as this would greatly enhance the persuasive effect of his submissions. As discussed earlier, in the 
late 1930s, a senior member of the Bar told him that the High Court judges thought that his 
submissions were often too brief. Barwick stated that '[a] apparently I had to learn to elaborate my 
propositions and perhaps sometimes to repeat them, maybe in different form and tailored to catch 
the eye of a particular judge.626 Implicitly, Barwick was acknowledging (albeit the choice of the word 
'apparently' suggests perhaps reluctantly or sceptically) the importance of knowing the judges, 
watching them to gauge their individual reactions and flexibility in tailoring his submissions to the 
respective judges. Barwick's ability to recall this advice so many years later also suggests that he 
learnt this at an early stage. 
Barwick's knowledge of the individual judges and the court generally derived from his comprehensive 
preparation and his 'ground up' approach to appellate advocacy. Ross Barwick recalled an instance 
where his father was in the billiard room at home and had laid out 25-30 volumes of the 
621 Interview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). Ellicott also noted that Barwick was 
'extremely compassionate' and referred to the 'well-known story about his going into bankruptcy to protect his 
brother, and that's a pretty significant event, that took a bit of courage there too'. 
622 Ibid. 
623 Marr, above n 8, p.19. 
624 Ibid. 
625 Ibid. 
626 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, pp.32-33. 
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Commonwealth Law Reports on the billiard table. Ross Barwick was a law student at the time and 
recounted as follows: 
He said to me ... "I'll show you something about Dixon" and he went through these decisions to 
demonstrate how Dixon had been inconsistent and he knew them all backwards. He said "I'll 
show you what Dixon said here~, "just have a look at that passage" and then he'd go to another 
passage, "this is only a year apart or something you know". The most extraordinary 
demonstration of what I thought was an almost mathematical analysis of these decisions."' 
This is indicative of the level of analysis that Barwick would undertake for the purposes of tracing the 
reasoning of particular judges in previous cases. It also explains how Barwick became so familiar 
with the decisions of particular judges. He approached this exercise in an almost scientific manner. 
As Ross Barwick suggested, this allowed his father, for example, to lead Dixon along a particular line 
of authorities and then submit: 'of course your Honour has always taken this view, perhaps your 
Honour might have a look at this one' .628 
This anecdote also reveals the potential gulf between exemplary advocacy and advocacy in practice. 
Knowledge of the previous decisions of judges is an important part of achieving exemplary advocacy 
but it is only effective in practice if judges are consistent in their approach to similar issues. 
A further illustration of Barwick's knowledge of the judges of the High Court in the 1930s and 1940s 
can be seen from the following response by Barwick when asked to make a few comments about 
some of the eminent judges of the High Court before whom he appeared or with whom he 
associated: 
Fullagar had a very perceptive mind and, if he intervened, it was usually a pretty pungent sort of 
intervention. He was very pleasant to appear before, as Dixon was. Latham ... was quite 
different. He tended to be talkative and tried to do everything by syllogistic logic; but he ran the 
Court very well, and I liked him very much and thought he was a really fair-minded man. Sir 
Hayden Starke didn't like indirection and tended to dominate the scene by keeping you to the 
points he thought were central. Consequently, you had to learn a particular skill to let him know 
you would be able to deal with this point, but in your own time. It wasn't always easy. But he 
was very much his own man and first-class. 
Sir George Rich had a very good pen and a good sense of humour. His judgments were beautifully 
composed. That court was a nice court in which to work, once you had them talking to you. 629 
Porter acknowledged that Barwick 'personally knew all the High Court judges well and he personally 
knew the judges of the Full Court which later became the Court of Appeal' ."30 
627 Interview with Ross Barwick (Sydney, 4 October 2006). 
628 Ibid. 
629 Bailey, above n 19, 1309. 
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Mason confirmed Barwick's knowledge of the personality of the judges: 'he knew what they were 
like'.631 For example, Barwick thought that Justice Starke 'was a black and white person' and 'that 
Starke didn't like an argument where the argument was disturbing his sort of vision of what was 
black and what was white' .632 Ellicott agreed and he said that 'it was quite clear that [Barwick] 
studied the bench, whether it was•Williams or Dixon or the like'.633 
Ross Barwick suggested that his father's knowledge of the judges on the Supreme Court or High 
Court derived 'partly [from] his own insight with people. He did not socialise a lot with them in order 
to know them well' 634 While exemplary advocacy requires knowledge of both the law and the 
judges, knowledge of the judges can occur through reading their previous decisions, and general 
insight, as well as through other means, such as social situations. 
Barwick himself acknowledged his knowledge of the individual members of the High Court in an 
interview in 1977: 'I have known this Court because I practised in it from a very early time in my 
professional days, I knew its personalities, I [was] quite close to them'.635 
The importance that Barwick ascribed to knowing the court, and the particular judges, is illustrated 
by the following anecdote from Barwick's early years at the Bar. 636 When Barwick was a junior at the 
Bar, he received a brief to appear with Evatt leading. At one stage, Barwick strongly suggested to 
Evatt to make a particular submission based on a previous decision by one of the judges before 
whom they were to appear. Evatt dismissed this suggestion. In Court, the judge referred Evatt to 
that particular case and asked inquisitively as to why he was not formulating an argument based on 
this case. Evatt then turned to Barwick and said in a loud voice: 'It's a great pity you couldn't find 
630 Interview with Chester Porter QC (Sydney, 2 April 2006). Tom Hughes QC had appeared as junior counsel 
with Barwick in the 1950s. According to Hughes, Barwick had no reticence about imparting to his juniors his 
personal views about judges before whom he appeared: see Hulme, above n 603, 664-665. Hughes recalls on 
one occasion, when working with Barwick in October 1955 in his London apartment overlooking the Thames on 
the special leave application in Antill Ranger & Co. Pty Ltd v Commission for Motor Transport (1955) 93 CLR 83; 
Commissioner for Motor Transport v Antill Ranger & Co. Pty Ltd [1956] AC 527, Sir Frank Kitto's name came up 
in conversation. Tom Hughes recalls Barwick speaking dismissively of him, describing his role in the Bank 
Nationa/isation Case as that of an "equity draughtsman". This was confirmed by Tom Hughes QC in his 
interview with the author: see Interview with Hon. Tom Hughes AO QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). In fact, 
Chester Porter QC suggested that Barwick could be spiteful. For example, he described Gordon Wallace as 
'overrated' at a Bar Association Dinner: see Interview with Chester Porter QC (Sydney, 2 April 2006). 
631 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006}. 
632 Ibid. See also Molomby & Donohoe, above n 19, 12. 
633 Interview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
634 Interview with Ross Barwick (Sydney, 4 October 2006). Barwick recommended that young barristers should 
not 'lose the opportunity of meeting the judge socially if he can': Molomby & Donohoe, above n 19, 15. 
635 National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 108. 
636 It also adds to the interesting background surrounding both the Bank Nationafisation Case and the 
Communist Party Case. 
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these books for me!' Barwick recalled being infuriated and acknowledged that he was short-
tempered when he retorted that: 'You can go to buggery' and then walked out of the court. 
According to Barwick, Evatt never forgot this.637 The reaction of the judge to this incident is 
unknown. 
Many observations can be made as· a result of this incident. It illustrates the differences between the 
advocacy of Evatt and Barwick and the relative importance they ascribed to knowing the members of 
the Court and tailoring submissions accordingly. It also reveals Barwick's failure to control his 
emotions and show respect- key elements in the category of personation. This incident also reveals 
the difference between exemplary advocacy or the ideals of advocacy which requires calmness, 
flexibility and respect, and advocacy in practice. 
An example of where Barwick's submissions benefited from his knowledge of the court, and the 
particular judges, is found in an anecdote of an appearance by Barwick in the Privy Council. Barwick 
appeared for a young woman who had lent a married man a substantial sum of money after they 
formed a friendship and he signed promissory notes in her favour. Upon his death, the man's Will 
provided that all his personal effects were left to his widow and the equity in his house to the young 
woman whom he appointed his executrix. The High Court allowed an appeal from his widow under 
the Testator Family Maintenance Act entitling her to his entire estate and ordering the young woman 
to pay all the legal costs of the proceedings.638 The Privy Council found in favour of Barwick's client 
by allowing the appeal and the High Court's orders were set aside.639 Barwick deliberately referred 
to a controversial passage from the High Court's judgment which appeared to suggest that the 
relationship between the married man and the young woman disentitled her to be repaid the 
debt.640 Barwick revealed later, in his autobiography, that he was also aware that one of the Lords 
had a mistress and therefore this case would be significant for this particular Lord.641 
637 National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 26. According to Marr, 
in response to the comment from the bench as to why Evatt was not formulating an argument based on this 
previous case, Evatt stated, 'I am afraid my junior did not draw it to my attention' and then Barwick retorted 
'Go to buggery' and left the court. Marr, above n 8, p.19. In any event, the general substance of this anecdote 
was also confirmed by Murray Gleeson: Interview with Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of the High Court of 
Australia (Sydney, 14 August 2006). 
638 Ellis v Leeder (1951] HCA 44; (1951) 82 CLR 645 (3 August 1951); Interview with Murray Gleeson, Chief 
Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 14 August 2006). 
639 Leeder v Ellis (1952) 86 CLR 64 (8 October 1952); Interview with Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of the High 
Court of Australia (Sydney 14 August 2006); Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & 
Recollections, above n 1, p.60. Barwick indicated to the Privy Council that there was no specific allegation of 
adultery at the hearing and nor was the validity of the promissory notes challenged. 
640 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, pp.58-60; Interview with 
Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 14 August 2006). 
641 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, pp.58-60. Apparently, the 
Law Lord about whose personal affairs Barwick knew said "What a prig" in reference to Justice Dixon: Interview 
with Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 14 August 2006). At one point during 
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6.2 Barwick's Approach to Presentation 
According to Barwick, one thing he learnt as a barrister was how to present what he wanted to say as 
attractively as he could.642 
Barwick's Ability to Conceptua/ise the Case 
There is, it appears, universal acknowledgment that one of Barwick's greatest strengths was his 
ability to conceptualise a case in simple terms, including the simplicity with which he conveyed often 
complex propositions. This ability greatly contributed to his establishing a reputation as one of the 
leading appellate advocates. Porter believes that 'the real key to his success as an advocate, [was]l 
would say ... the ability to reduce complication to simplicity and argue as though there was no 
possible other interpretation except his'. 643 
At the Bar, Barwick practised and adopted the technique of advancing succinct and relevant 
arguments and conceptualising a case in simple terms. This, however, did not always result in 
simplicity. Mason observed that: 
I always thought that he had the idea that you had to be able to express every relevant thought 
within the framework of one sentence, and that rather explains why he has all these rather long, 
involved sentences. 644 
According to Slattery: 
He possessed the great ability to present succinct submissions in Court in a pleasant 
conversational style which seemed to appeal to judges. He was never verbose in his 
presentations to the Court. He always came quickly to his main points and when he was satisfied 
the Court had understood his submissions he resumed his seat. 645 
the appeal, one of the Lords asked Barwick whether adultery had been an issue. Barwick responded that it had 
not. Further, Barwick was asked whether there was any evidence of adultery and Barwick responded with 
words to the effect that 'the cynical could say so because the lady went to the man's house almost every 
weekend over a period of years'. The Lord then stated that such a matter had to be charged as well as proved 
and added: 'By the way, is it the law that if I lend my mistress £100 I can never recover it'. Barwick responded 
that he had no doubt that it was not the law but 'the contrary would appear from what I read in the High 
Court's judgment'. 
642 National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 37. 
643 Interview with Chester Porter QC (Sydney, 2 April 2006). 
644 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). 
645 Slattery, above n 160, 416. 
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Slattery's description of Barwick as possessing a 'pleasant conversational style' is supported by the 
comments of many of the appellate judges at the time and his contemporaries. Slattery's comment 
is also supported by the analysis of Barwick's argument in the Bank Nationa/isation Case and, to a 
lesser extent, the Communist Party Case. It appears that while a 'pleasant conversational style' was 
Barwick's prevailing style, there were occasions where his submissions and his dialogue with 
appellate judges were clouded by bouts of arrogance (this is discussed later in the context of both 
constitutional cases). 
Barwick's style in conceptualising a case was the direct result of his early influences at the Bar. In his 
early years at the Bar, Barwick was briefed to appear with George Flannery KC. Flannery has been 
described as 'the master of succinct argument at the Sydney Bar'.646 According to Marr, Flannery was 
renowned for only arguing points that he believed he could win and as a result, the courts were 
always attentive to his submissions knowing that he would not waste their time with irrelevant 
arguments. In a critical appeal, Flannery was known to have addressed the High Court for only 10 
minutes and won comfortably. As an advocate, Barwick did not consciously imitate or attempt to 
replicate Flannery's restraint but 'his style of succinct argument influenced the young barrister' .647 It 
is said that Flannery was one of the very few advocates whom Barwick admired.648 
During his time at the Bar, Barwick developed the ability to conceptualise a case quickly and 
effortlessly. This was a useful skill which also assisted him in advancing submissions which were 
simple, logical and easy to follow- a key element and ideal of appellate advocacy. Many of Barwick's 
fellow barristers working on his floor were impressed by: 
... the man's exceptional forensic cunning- he saw to the heart of problems at a glance, upended 
them, shook them, broke them down to first principles to answer the only question that aroused 
his lawyer's curiosity: how do I win?649 
The references to 'forensic cunning' and 'how do I win' may however also suggest that Barwick's 
primary focus was on success in any given case. While success is clearly the ultimate objective for 
every advocate, appellate advocacy needs to be undertaken within the parameters of the ethical 
obligations owed by barristers to the court. However, within these parameters, there is scope to 
employ strategy and tactical measures to assist an advocate in their attempts to persuade an 
appellate court. Ultimately, the adversarial system and the administration of justice rely on a contest 
of competing arguments with each side seeking to persuade the decision-makers. Therefore, to seek 
646 Marr, above n 8, p.18. 
647 Ibid. 
648 Ibid. 
649 Ibid, p.30. 
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to identify the crux of the problem quickly and employ it in submissions with the aim of persuading 
the appellate court and 'winning' is an obvious and inevitable by-product of the adversarial system. 
However, as discussed earlier, attaining levels of exemplary advocacy does not necessarily equate to 
success in terms of the judges finding in the advocate's favour for a variety of reasons. 
Hughes also recalled Barwick's ability to get to the heart of a case and distil it down to its core as well 
as his approach to preparation.650 He stated that: 
[Barwick] developed and applied to the practice of the forensic art qualities of pellucid thought in 
both the formulation and expression of argument; he had a highly developed ability to discard 
irrelevancies and get to the heart of a case. As one of the very few present members of the Bar 
who worked as his junior I can testify to aspects of his conduct which made an abiding impression 
on me. He would write out in his own hand the main propositions upon which his argument was 
to depend. He believed that writing down the essential points was a necessary discipline. This 
was long before the days of compulsory written outlines. 651 
Porter suggested that 'one of the reasons why a court liked Barwick was that he would come to the 
point quickly and he wouldn't waste time ... and when you get to the High Court, what they want is 
quality, they don't like their time being wasted' ."52 Kirby has suggested that '[d]irectness in an 
advocate is a great strength' ."53 
Gleeson also confirmed that Barwick had the reputation of being able to simplify matters- an 
important aspect of conceptualising the case: 'Some people would accuse him on an occasion of over 
simplification but he had a great capacity to go to the heart of an issue and ... reduce the issue to its 
essentials' 654 
Gleeson's comment supports the overwhelming view that Barwick had an impressive ability to 
identify the heart of an issue and convey that to a court, but it also identifies a potential weakness in 
his advocacy- the problem of over-simplification. On occasions, Barwick could over-simplify certain 
issues in an effort to strip them of their complexity, yet, by doing so, he may not have accurately 
conveyed the totality of the issue at stake. This weakness also reflects on his experience during his 
early years at the Bar where his submissions were often considered 'too brief' as discussed in 
650 Interview with Han. Tom Hughes AO QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). 
651 Thomas Hughes, 'The Rt Han Sir Garfield Barwick AK GCMG' (Speech delivered at the Memorial Service, 
Sydney, 11 September 1997) provided by Tom Hughes on 2 August 2006. 
652 Interview with Chester Porter QC (Sydney, 2 April 2006). 
653 Justice Michael Kirby, 'Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy II' (Speech delivered for the Australian Advocacy 
Institute- Appellate Skills Workshop, Sydney, 5 May 1995) 
<www.lawfoundation.net.au/ljf/app/&id=34361BA229D337A8CA2571A8007E39B5> at 10 June 2009. 
654 1nterview with Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 14 August 2006). 
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Chapter 2. In his autobiography, Barwick acknowledged that 'I had a habit of condensing my 
submissions'.655 
Marr described Barwick's advocacy in the following way: 
'Mr Barwick! You are simplifying the position' came the frequent cry from the bench. It was the 
cry, more often than not, of a judge in confusion, sensing a flaw in Barwick's argument but 
attracted to it nevertheless. Barwick loved to steal a win, to draw the court from a reasonable 
beginning by strange, usually imperceptible steps to an apparently unavoidable conclusion. It 
was considered unwise to give judgment in Barwick's favour without first sleeping on it. •s• 
Simplicity and brevity were clearly Barwick's strong point. However, these can easily be transformed 
into a weakness. 
The description of Barwick's advocacy by Marr seems to suggest that Barwick employed almost 
hypnotic charm to mesmerise judges with his advocacy and that he managed to steer, or lure, the 
judge to adopt a conclusion that Barwick wanted the judge to reach. Gleeson recalled: 
According to what I heard when I first came to the Bar, there were some judges who were very 
cautious about Barwick because they thought that he might over simplify issues in a way that 
they didn't have the capacity themselves to recognise and deal with at the time. I am not talking 
about the High Court in that regard.'" 
Gleeson also alluded to the belief of some judges (not High Court judges) that Barwick had a 
tendency to over-simplify issues and propositions to make them attractive or persuasive to them 
personally. Such judges would exercise caution and take time to consider them in more detail at a 
later stage rather than ruling on issues immediately.658 
Ross Barwick agreed that his father had the ability to advance a proposition that 'would be mounted 
in a simple and compelling form and then elaborated upon according to the facts of the case'. 659 A 
demonstration of Barwick's ability to reduce complex propositions into simple ones is evident from a 
story recounted by Hughes. In 1954, Hughes was briefed as junior counsel to Bruce Macfarlan QC to 
655 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, pp.32-33. 
656 Marr, above n 8, p.37. 
657 Interview with Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia {Sydney, 14 August 2006). 
658 Ellicott described Barwick as follows: 
Barwick was the greatest advocate I saw. He was simple, straight forward, emotive where necessary and able 
to charm judges. In fact, some of the judges used to say, 'Don't give an ex-tempore judgement, because you 
need to get off the bench to see things in the clear light of day'. I think that is how Barwick was- immensely 
convincing. I saw him in all courts, right up to the Privy Council. 
Address by Justice RV Gyles, above n 272, 43. 
659 Interview with Ross Barwick (Sydney, 4 October 2006). 
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appear for Antill Ranger Pty Limited660, an interstate transport operator, to recover moneys paid as 
road tax under State legislation that was declared invalid by the Privy Council in Hughes & Vale Pty 
Limited v NSW.661 The High Court unanimously held that the State could not bar such a claim under 
section 92 of the Constitution. Barwick appeared on behalf of Edmund T. Lennon Proprietary Limited 
in a case heard at the same time.••; The High Court's decision was the subject of a special leave 
application to the Privy Council. Hughes was briefed as junior to Barwick alongside Robert 
Gatehouse663 of the English Bar. Hughes recollects being present in Barwick's chambers when 
Barwick formulated, in what he describes as barely legible handwriting, the cardinal proposition 
upon which the case turned. Hughes states that its 'stark simplicity was alluring' .664 The proposition 
was as follows: 
The State is unable to remove all legal remedy for conduct by itself and its officials which by 
virtue of the Commonwealth Constitution it may not authorize or justify. That submission may be 
a narrow statement of a wider proposition that the State may not under any guise validate its 
own legislative acts which are beyond its competence or validate administrative acts done in 
pursuance of such invalid legislation 66s 
The Privy Council granted special leave but dismissed the appeal in 1956.666 The essence of the 
decision echoed the proposition Barwick had formulated and conveyed to the others in his 
chambers."'' 
Porter suggested that, for Barwick: 
the law was perfectly clear and simple and it was a simple matter where he had a new problem of 
devising the answer to that problem from the established principles or from the text of the statute itself. 
He was very much one for coming back to the text rather than dredging up every possible decision that 
had ever been made on the text."'' 
660 Anti// Ranger & Co. Pty Ltd v Commission for Motor Transport {1955) 93 CLR 83 (HC); Commissioner for 
Motor Transport v Antill Ranger & Co. Pty Ltd [1956] AC 527. 
661 (1954) 93 CLR 1. 
662 Edmund T. Lennon Proprietary Limited v State of New South Wales & Drs {1957) 97 CLR 667. 
663 Later a judge of the Queen's Bench Division. 
664 Hulme, above n 603, 662-663. 
665 Ibid. 
666 94 CLR 177. 
667 Hulme, above n 603, 663. 
668 Interview with Chester Porter QC (Sydney, 2 April 2006). 
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David Jackson believed that a 'lot of things [Barwick] did on the bench I think mirrored the way in 
which he had been an advocate and I don't mean that in any bad sense'."69 when discussing the 
validity of legislation, Barwick would say that the point to start at is: 'What does the statute say?' ."70 
Ellicott indicated that '[o]ne of his gifts ... was to be able to reduce [a] proposition to an example. 
can recall him doing it and again il's quite a gift, not everybody can do it' ."71 There is evidence of 
Barwick doing this in both the Bank Nationa/isation Case and the Communist Party Case. 
Barwick's ability to transform the most complex and difficult concepts and issues into very basic 
propositions was the key to his success. As Marr stated: 'This power to simplify and illuminate was 
Barwick's greatest tool of persuasion. He was the master of it, of the perfect exercise of insight, 
ingenuity and unobtrusive eloquence'."12 
Barwick's use of the Opening and the Reply 
Barwick often used his opening to outline his conceptualisation of the case. According to Mason, 
Barwick would seek to identify and conceptualise the main issue in the case and formulate it in a way 
that was favourable to his client: 
There isn't any doubt that in terms of the opening he'd be concentrating on what the crucial issue 
in the case is. And he would be putting everything in a context which would be designed to 
ensure thatthe outcome- the answer to that issue- would be favourable to his client673 
Gleeson suggested that Barwick was able to balance the desire to present his client's case in the 
most favourable light with the notion of justice to ensure that he retained the confidence of the 
court: 
Barwick must also have had, from everything I've heard, ... a very keen sense of justice. In other 
words, he must have known how to present a case in its best light. And you can only present a 
case in its best light if you understand where the merits of the case lie. After all, what you are 
ultimately trying to do is persuade the court that the outcome for which you are contending is 
fair. That's an elementary proposition. If an advocate loses sight of that, you can be as clever as 
you like but you are not likely to make much of an impression on the bench.614 
669 Interview with David Jackson QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). 
670 Ibid. 
671 Interview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
672 Marr, above n 8, p.37. 
673 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). According to Mason, Barwick was' a notable exponent of the art ... Not infrequently the telling part of 
his argument was presented in reply': Mason, 'The Role of Counsel and Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 543. 
674 Interview with Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 14 August 2006). 
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In reply, Barwick 'had a very clear idea of what was permissible'.'" According to Mason, Barwick 
would: 
... be on his feet when he was the respondent and an opponent was going beyond the bounds in 
reply. And he'd be saying "that's not permissible", "that's outside the scope of reply", and 
objecting to what his opponent was saying. Sometimes the Court would say "oh well, look it's 
really new matter and we'll give you the opportunity to reply" but very often they'd say "no, it is 
outside the scope". 676 
When Barwick was the respondent, he would seek to limit his opponent's reply, yet when he 
appeared for an appellant he would seek to push the boundaries in his reply, often by advancing 
submissions that appeared tenuously based on arguments in chief or by introducing material that 
had not been alluded to in his argument in chief- often referred to as 'trailing your coat'. 
According to Porter, Barwick was renowned for 'trailing his coat': 
... "trailing his coat" means that he gave a very brief opening as counsel for the appellant and 
then brought forward his major arguments in reply, and the other poor bugger didn't have a 
chance to answer them. A tactic I don't think would be permitted today. But he got away with it, 
and the story goes that on one occasion he "trailed his coat" and then viewing the opponent's 
arguments, spent his time reading his brief for the first time677 
If Porter's anecdote is correct, it suggests that Barwick did not engage in a comprehensive 
preparation at all times. Apparently, after 'trailing his coat', Barwick would come 'in strongly in 
reply'. 678 Hughes recalls that this 'was a favourite tactic' employed by Barwick.679 Ellicott agreed, 
and suggested that Barwick would 'put the clever point, trail the old coat as Chester says, let the 
opposition get up and then lambast them in reply, and use the reply as the basis upon which to come 
in and wrap up the case'.680 Hughes also recalled that: 'Barwick was great in reply. He would 
perhaps treat a point fairly lightly in chief so that it was there and in play, but put the real emphasis 
of his argument as regards that point in his reply'. 681 Ellicott acknowledged that Barwick adopted this 
675 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). 
676 Ibid. 
677 1nterview with Chester Porter QC (Sydney, 2 April 2006). 
678 Ibid. 
679 Interview with Han. Tom Hughes AD QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). David Jackson suggested that even now 
when one advocate attempts to introduce new material after the other side has had their turn, the comment 
likely to be heard is that "you are trying to do a Barwick reply": see Interview with David Jackson QC (Sydney, 
2 August 2006). 
680 Interview with Han. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
681 Interview with Han. Tom Hughes AO QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). According to Gibbs, Barwick was 
accustomed to using 'the reply to mount a deadly counterattack' with great advantage: Harry Gibbs, 'Appellate 
Advocacy', above n 11, 499. 
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tactic but that it was not something that everyone could do.682 Barwick also employed a technique of 
'concentrating in [his] reply on pointing out the submissions to which the other side has not 
replied'. 683 
Barwick acknowledged that the use of the reply requires judgment; it 'has great risks because your 
court may have formed its view before you reply on the thing you want to reply on'.684 Barwick 
stated that: 
it's a technique that's got to be very selectively used. I did use it selectively. But where the case 
clearly -I could put my point of view without trenching on the defence, the opposition to my 
point of view, then I could leave the reply to the opposing point of view to a reply which is its 
proper function and that gives the impression very often that you divided the case up and kept 
the best back, but it can be very effective because you can then deal with a thing that your 
opponent has said and which, as a rule, he can't touch any more. 685 
However, as is evident from Barwick's approach to preparation and presentation, including in reply, 
he was a strategist. As Ellicott indicated: 
He was a tactician- much more of a tactician than your average barrister because most barristers 
I think just say well what are the points I want to put and get up and put them and sit down and 
do a short reply. Get on with the next case. You don't see too many tacticians around. 686 
There are two ways of approaching Barwick's tactics in 'trailing his coat'. As Ellicott suggested, 
Barwick was a tactician and used this in his advocacy, particularly when he was in a position to do so 
in the context of advancing a reply. The alternative approach is to regard 'trailing your coat' as 
unethical or, at the very least, outside the spirit of appellate advocacy, as it seeks to gain an 
advantage over an opponent in circumstances where they are unable to respond further. The 
tension between these perspectives has not been resolved. 
Porter suggested that 'trailing your coat' would not be permitted today. It is probably more relevant 
to ask whether it is in fact possible. The answer is probably not. This is largely due to the fact that, 
with the introduction of the requirement to submit a written outline of arguments and/or written 
submissions in all appellate courts in Australia, all arguments are effectively foreshadowed in written 
form before the oral advocacy commences. As a result, it is easier to identify which arguments are 
682 Interview with Han. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
683 Interview with Han. Tom Hughes AO QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). 
684 Molomby & Donohoe, above n 19, 15. 
685 Ibid. See the example of Barwick's use of the reply in Bank of New South Wales v Laing as discussed in 
Molomby & Donohoe, above n 19, 15. See Laing v Bank of New South Wales (1952), 69 WN (H. Ct. NSW) 318 
and Bank of New South Wales v Laing [1954] AC 135. 
686 Interview with Han. Tom Hughes AO QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). 
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being sought to be introduced for the first time in reply. Therefore, Barwick's ability to employ the 
tactic of 'trailing your coat' would be significantly curtailed in modern day appellate advocacy such 
that any advantage that he derived from this tactic (which is difficult to measure) would no longer 
exist. It does not, in any case, appear to have damaged his reputation. 
Barwick's Engagement with the Bench 
In his advocacy generally, Barwick employed few notes and preferred dialogue between counsel and 
Bench (a practice he continued as a judge). According to Barwick: 
From my point of view as a practising counsel, the important thing was to have [the judges] 
talking to you so that you had the benefit of what they were thinking, what angles of the matter 
were attractive to them. The hardest judge to work with is a fellow who never says a word. 687 
Barwick thrived on the dialogue between himself and the members of the Bench. This, as he 
remarked, provided him with an insight into the minds of the judges; it allowed him to tailor his 
submissions and clarify any misconceptions. Consequently, he did not like to appear before those 
judges who did not engage in dialogue with him as will be apparent in the examination of Barwick's 
early advocacy in the Bank Nationalisation Case before the Privy Council. Barwick made the 
following revealing comment about Chief Justice Dixon: 'He was difficult to argue before because he 
didn't often enter into any exchange with you'.688 
In Porter's words: 'If you can use the boxing analogy, [Barwick] was very quick on his feet ... and he 
was very adroit at taking the judicial comment and moulding it his way' .689 Porter added that 
Barwick 'could think up a very quick answer and a very good answer just immediately'.690 Ellicott 
agreed and suggested that it was Barwick's 'quickness of mind, his command of the brief, his agility 
of words' which allowed him to deal with judicial questions effectively.691 
Mason stated that Barwick 'had the rare capacity, founded on a mastery of his case, to take 
advantage of the hostile question by using it as a vehicle for the further elaboration of his 
argument'.692 He suggested that Barwick: 
more than anyone else made ground off questions that were asked -even questions that were 
designed to be hostile questions. A lot of counsel will tell you that they welcome questions from 
687 Bailey, above n 19, 1309. 
688 Ibid. 
689 Interview with Chester Porter QC (Sydney, 2 April 2006). 
690 Ibid. 
691 Interview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
692 Mason, The Role of Counsel and Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 542. 
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the bench. Now, in some cases I don't think that's an entirely accurate statement. But in his case 
it was a very accurate statement. He enjoyed dealing with questions and he regarded them as 
vehicles which would enable him to make a point effectively. 693 
Gleeson agreed with this: 
Barwick's great ability- this was widely known in the profession ... was to engage the bench in 
discussion with him. Most other advocates in Barwick's time used to just address the court. They 
didn't welcome interruption. They were often not very good at handling interruption. Barwick, 
on the other hand, consciously set out to engage the bench in dialogue ... But Barwick's style of 
advocacy welcomed, and as I say encouraged, dialogue.694 
Barwick's Substance aver Elegance 
As discussed previously, a key element and ideal of appellate advocacy is focusing on the substantive 
aspects of an advocate's submissions although there are also benefits associated with delivering the 
submissions in an elegant manner. Barwick's emphasis was on the substance of his submissions, 
including his comprehensive preparation and 'ground up' approach; it appears that he did not 
generally avail himself of the benefits associated with delivering his submissions in an elegant 
manner. Mason believed that '[t]here was nothing elegant about' Barwick.69s Gleeson agreed: 'From 
what I heard about him, I doubt that he was an elegant advocate. I think in certain circumstances he 
might even have been a fairly truculent advocate' .696 
Contrast the views of Mason and Gleeson with those of Byers. When Byers came to the Bar in 1944, 
he reca lied that: 
... Barwick was every junior's first choice. He was, I think, a better lawyer than Sir Frank Kitto ... 
But the difference was marginal and Barwick was incomparably the more spectacular and 
attractive advocate ... At this stage, his vanity was kept within normal bounds and his 
conversation was both instructive and interesting. 697 
693 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). 
694 Interview with Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 14 August 2006). 
69
s Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). According to Sir Anthony Mason, Alan Taylor, Douglas Menzies and Robert Menzies were advocates 
who displayed great elegance. 
696 Interview with Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 14 August 2006). 
697 Byers, 'Obituary: the Right Hon Sir Garfield Barwick AK, GCMG, QC', above n 120, 723. 
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This does not necessarily suggest that Barwick was an elegant advocate. However, the reference to 
Barwick's vanity, infers that at some later stage, it exceeded 'normal' bounds. This is discussed 
further in the section on 'Personation'. 
Barwick's Flexibility, Discretion and Tact 
Barwick's approach of employing few notes and engaging in dialogue with the bench was, according 
to Mason, also designed to ensure that Barwick remained flexible. Mason stated: 
I am inclined to think that was part of another strategy and that was you wanted to keep your 
mind as flexible as possible. You wanted to see how the argument went after you started to 
present it, and therefore you didn't want to get yourself tied to a rigid presentation'" 
This allowed Barwick to engage the bench effectively in discourse and respond to judicial questions 
while also noting the comments and observing the reactions of the judges. He was then able to tailor 
his submissions. Mason suggested that this: 
... was also a key to his advocacy ... He had an extremely flexible mind and if he saw that the case 
was sort of moving one way, he'd be prepared to depart from a proposition and to amend a 
proposition to take advantage of some new thought or some new situation that had developed. 
He wasn't like a General on the Western front in the Second World War sticking to a plan of 
attack, and sort of trench line warfare. With him it certainly wasn't trench line warfare.699 
Flexibility, discretion and tact, as we have seen, are key elements and ideals of appellate advocacy. 
Barwick's approach to judicial dialogue assisted him greatly in remaining flexible. According to 
some,700 it is this flexibility, together with his failure to respond to judicial comments that evaded him 
during his presentation in the Communist Party Case (discussed in Chapter 9). 
698 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). 
699 Ibid. According to Barwick, during the years that Chief Justices Latham and Dixon respectively presided over 
the High Court, any advocate appearing before the High Court would have become accustomed to engaging in 
a dialogue with the Bench and would have benefited from it. Whilst Dixon personally did not like engaging in 
dialogue with advocates, many of the other judges on the High Court did. However, Barwick noted that not all 
Australian advocates enjoyed such interrogation: 
I remember when later presiding over the High Court, [one] counsel protesting when asked a question, and 
saying that he preferred to present his argument without interruption. To my mind, dialogue rather than 
speeches heard in silence is to be preferred. For one thing, such exchanges are more likely to promote sound 
judgment. At any rate, during the Banks case I answered many questions and I think by answering them, 
made my argument clearer to my listeners. 
Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.77. 
700 Ayres, above n 50, pp.220-222. See also Owen Dixon, Diary, 14-15 December 1950, Owen Dixon, Personal 
Papers. See also n 620. 
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Barwick was acutely aware of the important role that discretion played in ensuring he was focusing 
on the relevant issues and discarding the irrelevant ones. As an advocate, 'Barwick always stressed 
the importance of distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant facts and considerations and the 
need to isolate the essential issues in a legal problem'.701 While being relevant to discretion, 
relevance is also closely associated with conceptualising the case as a key element of effective 
appellate advocacy. 
In an interview in 1983, Barwick was asked what the most important skills of a trial lawyer are. In 
response, he stated: 
I thought about this ... and came up with the answer that it was to see quickly what was relevant 
and what was not and to be able to apply it. That goes not only for the major issues, but also 
right through the whole court process, including cross-examination. It means being able to 
perceive the relevance of what's said or done related quickly to the issues and either bring it out 
or push it aside. You must have speed, I suppose good cerebration, and, as well as I can phrase it, 
quick perception of relevance. 702 
The skills Barwick identified are equally applicable to appellate advocacy and represent key elements 
and ideals of appellate advocacy. In a follow up question as to whether these skills can be obtained 
from books, Barwick responded: 'Oh no. You need practice at it and need to have the courage to 
discard irrelevance'.'" 
When asked about the temptation to include everything, Barwick responded: 'Yes ... being prepared 
to throw overboard all the things that look to be advantageous but are irrelevant and may obscure 
the real issues. Matters that do no more than lengthen proceedings are in the long run really minus 
quantities'.704 
Mason stated that Barwick would 'recognise that a proposition was untenable, or I think more 
importantly in terms of High Court advocacy, he had the ability to realise when a proposition ought 
to be discarded'.705 Whilst Mason suggested that this ability was 'intuitive' he added: 'no doubt 
intuition is partly borne of experience and if you have appeared before a Court, you know the 
reaction of judges, you can tell that a proposition isn't going to go down'.706 
701 Bailey, above n 19, 1305; George Winterton, 'Barwick the Judge' (1997) 41(10) Quadrant 25, 25. 
702 Bailey, above n 19, 1305. 
703 Ibid. 
704 Ibid. In an interview during his time as Chief Justice, Barwick stated that an 'advocate must be able to 
abandon a point that has been answered rather than flog a dead horse': 'Barwick', above n 47, 10. 
705 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). 
706 Ibid. 
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As an advocate, Barwick understood the combined importance of watching the bench, remaining 
flexible, using his discretion to discard irrelevant arguments and tact. The following anecdote 
demonstrates Barwick's ability to employ these particular elements and ideals of appellate advocacy 
in practice. Barwick (with Jack Smyth as his junior) was briefed to appear on behalf of a publican who 
was charged with refusing to sup!Jiy, on demand, beer at the regulation price. A government 
inspector who attended the premises and was initially told there was no beer, located some in the 
cellar, paid for a bottle, then left.707 It had been suggested by Smyth that technically the government 
inspector did not fail to get his beer in light of the fact that he obtained it in the cellar. Barwick did 
not seriously consider this point and submitted a range of complex legal arguments to the Full 
Court.708 However, he recalled watching the bench closely and noticing that there was not a positive 
response to these arguments. As a result, Smyth whispered: 'Why don't you try the other point?' 
Barwick agreed and submitted that, on the facts, the accused had not failed to provide the beer. In 
response, Barwick recalled that Justice Rogers then said to me: 'Why did you keep your best point to 
the last? That's not like you'. Consequently, the publican was acquitted by a majority due to this 
'other point'. Barwick stated that it: ' ... shows that sometimes in litigation it is not wise to abandon 
any point'. 709 
This example demonstrates, from an advocate's perspective, the importance of watching the bench 
to gauge the reactions to their submissions and flexibility in adapting their submissions as required. 
This example also illustrates the reason that advocates should be selective in the arguments they 
advance and must gauge the reaction of the judges to determine whether to resort to alternative or 
'back-up-type' arguments. 
The comment by Justice Rogers also suggests that Barwick had a reputation for submitting his best 
points first. When answering a question as to how he achieved his great success in the law, Barwick 
referred to this anecdote in the context of advancing a 'doubtful one'- that is to say, a possible but 
not necessarily strong argument. In so doing, Barwick indirectly refers to his various strengths as an 
advocate. These correspond with the elements and ideals of appellate advocacy; namely, 
conceptualising the case, relevance, flexibility, tact and discretion as well as courage. Barwick stated: 
Well, I can work hard, and I've had good health, but I have had a quick sight and could see the 
point quickly, well ahead of many of my fellows, and that's an advantage. And I think a degree of 
courage, not to worry about the irrelevant and to concentrate on the essentials. After all, most 
707 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, pp.44-45. 
708 Which comprised Jordan CJ, Rogers and Street JJ. 
709 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, pp.44-45. 
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things have only one or two points that are worth pushing. Sometimes you have to press a 
doubtful one-"0 
In terms of discretion and judgment, Barwick suggested that you could 'improve your judgment by 
learning by your mistakes and not make the same mistake twice but you must have some native 
capacity of judgment' .711 
Mason confirmed that Barwick did on occasion succeed with arguments 'which were dubious' and 
stated: 
Now, I don't know that I'd say he ever put an argument to a Court knowing it was a wrong 
argument, I t,hink the arguments he'd be putting are arguments that he always regarded as 
arguable. But the thing about him was that arguments that might not have been arguable in the 
hands of another Counsel were arguable in his hands. 712 
The anecdote above also demonstrates the different perspectives associated with a particular 
argument- whilst Barwick considered the successful argument to be a weaker argument, Justice 
Rogers thought that it was his strongest argument. It also illustrates that an advocate's discretion to 
discard irrelevant arguments is to some extent a subjective matter. 
The anecdote also supports Mason's view of Barwick, namely, that he did not regard Barwick as.a 
tactful man. Mason suggested that '[w]hen you're the best and you consider yourself to be the best, 
tact isn't a very important quality'.713 Mason implies that it was Barwick's arrogance that resulted in 
tact becoming less important. This is also relevant to the analysis of Barwick's performance in the 
Communist Party Case (discussed later). Barwick's arrogance may have, on occasions, impacted his 
ability to exhibit other elements of appellate advocacy, and achieve the ideals of appellate advocacy. 
Barwick's Approach to Citing Authority 
Barwick was always concerned with ensuring that he cited authority with care and identifying 
relevant authorities was an important part of his preparation. Mason recalled that: 
710 Bailey, above n 19, 1313 
711 Molomby & Donohoe, above n 19, 10. 
712 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). In fact, Sir Anthony Mason recalled a comment from a case in which he appeared, namely, Television 
Corporation Ltd v Commonwealth [1963] HCA 30; {1963) 109 CLR 59 (28 August 1963). At one stage, Sir John 
Kerr was advancing an argument and John Holmes QC said to Sir Anthony Mason, referring to the argument, 
that 'this is a Barwick argument but the problem is it's not being presented by Barwick'. Sir Anthony Mason 
recalled: 'And I think he was right. I don't recall the details of the argument but it had all the ring of a Barwick 
argument, but it wasn't being presented with that confidence and skill that Barwick would have presented the 
argument himself'. 
713 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). 
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He was very good ... in distinguishing authorities in the course of argument, very good indeed, 
and that was an important point in the preparation of the case. You need to look at the 
authorities that the other side would be relying on and you need to be able to distinguish them, 
put them in their appropriate context. I remember one experience I had with him very early on, 
this was in Nelungaloo, this was an interlocutory application in Nelungaloo if I remember 
. 
rightly. 714 
Mason recalled that, after the Privy Council had handed down its decision in Nelungaloo v Pty Ltd v 
The Commonwealth (1950),715 another action was started and the question arose whether this other 
action could continue in light of the Privy Council's decision and the question was whether it was 
going to be removed into the High Court.716 Mason stated: 
Now, I remember during the course of the preparation of the case, I drew his attention to 
something that Dixon had said in an earlier case. It had something in it that was favourable to us 
but it also had something in it that wasn't as favourable. His attitude, I can remember him saying 
to me on that occasion "well young fellow, this is an authority that's got spots on it. You never 
cite an authority that's got spots on it". In other words, what he was saying was, unless the thing 
really is clearly in your favour, forget about it.717 
Mason added that: 
And of course, see, don't forget we were dealing with a judgment, I'd drawn his attention to a 
judgment of Dixon's, and of course he was still on the court and therefore he was aware of 
Dixon's antagonism and antagonism in relation to the issues in this case. Therefore, it was more 
likely to do us damage than to be of advantage to us.718 
Barwick always believed that he would be able to persuade the judges of the High Court to depart 
from precedent in appropriate circumstances provided that he advanced compelling arguments. 
That is, they were not 'slaves to precedent' .719 His 'ground up' approach often provided him with the 
necessary compelling arguments to do so. 
714 Ibid. 
715 Nelungaloo Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1950) 81 CLR 144 (27 July 1950). 
716 See Nelungaloo Pty Ltd v Commonwealth {No 4.) {1953) 88 CLR 529 (8 December 1953). 
717 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). 
718 Ibid. 
719 Anthony Mason, 'The Appointment and Removal of Judges' 
<www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/education-monographs-1/monograph1/fbmason.htm/> at 10 June 
2009. 
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6.3 Barwick's Approach to Personation 
Barwick's Courage 
In the previous chapter, the importance of courage in advocacy was considered. Barwick was 
courageous as an advocate and stood up to judges on countless occasions. Mason described Barwick 
as 'tough, courageous and tenacious'.720 Ellicott described Barwick as 'fearless' in life and claimed 
that this came through in his advocacy. He said that Barwick was associated with 'excellence ... 
courage and conviction'.721 Barwick often engaged in fiery exchanges with judges in an attempt to 
convince them of the merits of his submissions. According to Marr, as an advocate, Barwick was: 
most effective in attack and his growing ascendancy over New South Wales judges was in no 
small part due to the terrifying fights he was willing to have with the bench when his tactics 
demanded it. The courts, too, were coming to respect the man.722 
Marr's statement raises a tension that exists with exhibiting courage. Courage is respected and 
admired only if it is used appropriately. Therefore, an advocate who maintains their position or 
stance on an issue in circumstances where it would be illogical to do so or in the face of considerable 
judicial discouragement is more likely to be viewed as obstinate, obnoxious or arrogant. This may 
also lead to the advocate becoming discourteous and disrespectful- or perceived as such- in certain 
instances. Marr's statement implies that Barwick's battles with the bench were ferocious which, 
Marr suggests, led to the courts respecting Barwick. However, these 'terrifying fights' may have also 
resulted in a negative impression of Barwick. 
Marr's statement refers to Barwick's ferocious fights with the bench when his 'tactics demanded it'. 
This appears to suggest Barwick's unwillingness to retreat or compromise on certain issues or 
submissions that he considered central to his case. This is integral to effective appellate advocacy; 
the 'terrifying fights' that Barwick engaged in may have been justified. The question left unanswered 
is whether in these 'fights' Barwick demonstrated the necessary courtesy and respect. This is 
examined in more detail in the context of the Bank Nationalisation Case and the Communist Party 
Case. 
According to Mason, Barwick remained respectful to the judiciary despite being 'forceful' in his 
views. However, he believed that one of Barwick's weaknesses as an advocate was that, as a person 
who is naturally combative, he did not 'display particular sensitivity to comments coming from the 
720 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). 
721 Interview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
722 Marr, above n 8, p.30. 
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bench'.723 Mason suggested that there was 'an element in his mind -I'm a winner. There's an 
argument- I'm going to win the argument' .724 
Porter also believed that one of Barwick's weaknesses was arrogance and that it was possible that, as 
Dixon suggested in the Communist Party Case, Barwick 'would be so tied up with his own argument 
that he wasn't prepared to take a tip from the bench' .725 Hughes agreed that Barwick was arrogant 
but suggested that 'he had a lot to be arrogant about' .726 However, he also believed that another of 
Barwick's weaknesses was his 'unduly harsh judgment of others at times' .727 
Ross Barwick suggested that there were moments in his father's advocacy where, after 'having taken 
command [he] could sort of go over the top a bit and he could be very ... acerbic'.728 This will be 
explored in the context of the Bank Nationa/isation Case and Communist Party Case. He also 
suggested that if his father 'was inclined to be a little arrogant, it was not because he was 
uninformed, it was really superiority of intellect.729 
In contrast, Ellicott did not describe Barwick as arrogant. Instead, he stated that Barwick had an 
'assurance of mind that he was right'. 730 He suggested that Barwick 'was very convinced he was right 
... [l]f he had a firm view that the propositions he was putting were right, he, you know, that's it'.731 
He described Barwick as 'a strong personality who [spoke] with authority'732 and was a 'commander 
of people'. 733 
The prevailing view of Barwick was that he was self-assured and confident which on occasions may 
have led him to being perceived as arrogant. His self-assuredness and confidence underscored his 
courage- a key element and ideal of appellate advocacy. However, in reality, if such courage was 
723 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). 
724 Ibid. 
725 Interview with Chester Porter QC (Sydney, 2 April 2006). Chester Porter QC suggested that 'if Barwick ever 
had a disaster, I have no doubt he did have disasters in courts, over-confidence would have been a contributing 
factor'. 
726 Interview with Hon. Tom Hughes AO QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). 
727 Ibid. 
728 1nterview with Ross Barwick (Sydney, 4 October 2006). For example, in a particular case where Justice 
Rogers of the Supreme Court was presiding, His Honour suggested just before the luncheon adjournment that 
the parties use the adjournment to attempt to resolve the case. His Honour said to the parties "so gentleman 
perhaps during the adjournment you might like to reflect". Barwick said "well, your Honour it would be for my 
friend to reflect. In my case, I shine". 
729 Interview with Ross Barwick (Sydney, 4 October 2006). 
730 Interview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
731 1bid. 
732 Ibid. 
733 Ibid. 
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infected by bouts of arrogance or discourtesy then excellence in his advocacy may have been 
compromised. 
Honesty, respect and candour in Barwick's Advocacy 
• 
Honesty, respect and candour are all regarded as important elements and ideals of appellate 
advocacy in the context of personation. In common with most advocates, Barwick believed that it 
was important to be honest with the court, particularly in circumstances where an advocate was 
attempting to persuade the court to depart from established precedent. Barwick suggested that: 
The first thing you must have is complete frankness. You tell them what you are going to do, and 
be frank that you're going to ask them to overrule it, depart from it, and you're going to give 
them reasons why they should, not that they're going to remake the law but they are going to 
expose the fault that's already been made. 734 
Barwick also knew the value of showing respect and due deference to a judge by, for instance, 
allowing a judge to believe that he or she had discovered a relevant point or reference, that is, he 
understood the importance of occasionally pandering to the judge. For example, Barwick learnt from 
George Flannery of one Supreme Court judge who prided himself on being able to read quickly. 
According to Barwick, if Flannery: 
wanted to educate that judge and read him a certain passage in a case he would not read him 
that passage. He would read a page or two beforehand and he'd read slowly and the judge would 
suddenly find the passage and the judge would say: "Oh, Mr Flannery, you need this passage" and 
of course he had found it for himself. Vanity is not unknown amongst judges. 
If Flannery had read the relevant passage directly to him there would possibly have been a certain 
antipathy whereas if the judge found it for himself it became acceptable -I saw George do that, 
I've done that, read the wrong page sometimes. That is only illustrative of the infinite variety of 
reactions that you are likely to arouse or induce in the appellate judge."' 
Whilst Barwick understood the need to be respectful to the court, this example reveals the manner 
in which respect can be used as technique to aid persuasion. This technique may, however, be 
viewed in a cynical way. Whilst respect is a key element and ideal of appellate advocacy, in reality, it 
734 Molomby & Donohoe, above n 19, 14. 
735 Ibid, 12. However, Barwick suggested that it was often important to guard against circumstances where a 
member of the bench understands a proposition too soon: 
Well, if you've got on the bench a very acute mind that can start and deal with your proposition before you've 
put it which he could do and he could predispose his companions long before you got there. That depends on 
the line up. I wouldn't give, in some cases, Dixon a chance to get a head of me like that, because he was a 
powerful man with his colleagues. 
Molomby & Donohoe, above n 19, 15. 
153 
can be employed in a manner whereby an advocate seeks to derive an advantage. The quest to 
persuade judges can lead advocates even to the point where they attempt to manipulate the judges 
under the guise of showing respect. 
Barwick was competitive and motivated by the desire to win. Mason described him as a 'very 
argumentative character' and 'a combative character' .736 Ross Barwick described his father as 'highly 
competitive' .737 He utilised his comprehension of the complexities and intricacies of the law to 
explore the various avenues of victory. According to Marr, this pursuit of victory made Barwick 'one 
ofthe great brawlers of Phillip Street'.738 Once again, Marr's comment implies that Barwick was a 
'fighter' who had many arguments and suggests that Barwick did at times verge on a lack of respect 
and courtesy. 
Barwick noted the importance of attempting to control the judicial dialogue without being 
discourteous and disrespectful. In reference to Dixon, he stated: 
I'd watch very carefully in chief that I gave him no chance to cut in on it, if I could, and suggest 
some line that I wasn't putting, as he sometimes did. That's not easy because you can't be rude 
and the task of diverting attention away is not easy. 739 
However, there were occasions where Barwick lost his composure and was disrespectful to the court. 
He recalled an occasion where a judge said something to him and Barwick recounted that 'before I 
could clip my tongue I said something that 1 oughtn't have said'. 740 
Based on the views of commentators and advocates, honesty, respect and candour are regarded as 
key elements and ideals of appellate advocacy. In reality, honesty and candour are easier to achieve 
as they coincide with an advocate's ethical obligations, whereas respect can be compromised in the 
'heat of battle' or whilst attempting to demonstrate courage- another key element and ideal of 
appellate advocacy. 
Barwick's Use of Emotion 
As discussed earlier, emotion can be powerful in aid of persuasion if employed effectively but also 
has the capacity to cloud objectivity. Barwick considered himself to understand the importance of 
not getting emotionally involved in a case. He stated: 'I think that's [a) mistake that counsel wants to 
736 1nterview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). 
"' Interview with Ross Barwick (Sydney, 4 October 2006). 
738 Marr, above n 8, p.30. 
739 Molomby & Donohoe, above n 19, 15. 
740 National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 31. 
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avoid, to get emotionally involved at all in a case. That's not always easy'.741 He referred to Leeder v 
Ellis (discussed earlier) as an example where he 'was angry about what I thought was an injustice' .742 
Consequently, he 'appeared before the Privy Council for no fee to put it right'.743 
Generally, it has been difficult to identify evidence of Barwick's use of emotion in appellate advocacy. 
His voice, however, was thought to oe capable of conveying emotion, as suggested by Ellicott. 744 
Whilst an examination of the transcript in the Bank Nationalisation Case and the Communist Party 
Case does assist in identifying Barwick's approach in practice, there are a few instances where it 
appears emotions have played a part in Barwick's advocacy. However, in the examples referred to 
below, one reveals an instance where Barwick lost his temper in the courtroom and the other where 
he caused his opponent to become angry to his advantage. Previously, reference was made to the 
disagreement between Evatt and Barwick where Evatt had dismissed Barwick's suggestion to 
advance a submission based on a particular decision and then suggested that Barwick had not 
brought it to his attention. In response, Barwick told Evatt to 'go to buggery' and left the court.745 
Whilst this anecdote reveals Evatt's failure to be honest with the court, it also illustrates Barwick's 
occasional inability to control his temper in court. 
Barwick also used emotion to his advantage in his advocacy, as illustrated, in the following anecdote. 
Whether this tactic was appropriate remains questionable. Byers recalled an instance where he 
observed Barwick's advocacy in a trial relating to a minor libel action. He observed: 
It was a very minor libel but one which had obviously aroused the passions of those involved. A 
notoriously short-tempered silk with his nondescript junior were for the plaintiff and Barwick and 
his junior represented the defendant. [Barwick] so badgered the short-tempered silk with sotto 
voce remarks and objections of one sort and another that the short-tempered silk completely lost 
control of himself and of his case. He was non-suited as a result. I doubt that this behaviour 
would be tolerated today, but the rules then were different and advocacy was more ruthless. 746 
Although Barwick's tactics were questionable, it appears that his opponent was susceptible to these 
tactics and Barwick was seeking to take advantage of this fact. It may be inappropriate for an 
advocate to treat another advocate in this manner; however, it may also reflect the fact that 
advocacy in those days was conducted in a more robust environment and such behaviour was 
tolerated. Often, acceptable standards and practices reflect the context and times in which they 
741 Molomby & Donohoe, above n 19, 13. 
742 1bid. Discussed earlier in this chapter. 
743 Ibid. 
744 1nterview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
745 Marr, above n 8, p.19. This anecdote was also repeated and confirmed by former Chief Justice Murray 
Gleeson: Interview with Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 14 August 2006). 
746 Byers, 'Obituary: the Right Hon Sir Garfield Barwick AK, GCMG, QC', above n 120, 723. 
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occur. As we have seen, Byers stated that he doubted whether Barwick's behaviour would be 
tolerated today; Barwick's badgering would be likely to attract the attention of a judge who would 
instruct the advocate to cease, as together with any futile objections, such behaviour is likely to be 
considered disrespectful. 
Nevertheless, the tactics employed by Barwick demonstrate his competitive nature and his ability to 
take advantage of his opponent's weaknesses. His tactics caused the opposing advocate to lose 
control and ultimately lose the case. This anecdote also serves as a reminder of the importance of an 
advocate controlling their emotions. It appears that Barwick employed a similar tactic of badgering 
in the Bank Nationa/isation Case (discussed in the next chapter). 
Emotion is a key element and ideal of appellate advocacy although may not be as relevant in 
circumstances where an advocate is appearing in a constitutional case. In saying this, particular 
constitutional cases may be more conducive to the use of emotion (because the fate of individuals is 
more at stake); for example, a native title matter or immigration matter. However, in reality, 
emotion can also be a disadvantage if it causes an advocate to lose control of their temper, lose their 
objectivity or their ability to rationally present their submissions. 
Barwick and 'The Extras' 
The other aspects of an advocate's presentation that may increase the persuasive effect of their 
submissions are 'the extras', namely, voice, words, wit, presence and memory. However, it is 
acknowledged that many of these cannot simply be acquired. 
Mason suggested that Barwick's voice 'was strong and it had a timbre to it' and he 'made good use of 
inflection and so forth' but that it wasn't 'an attractive voice' or 'a rich voice' .747 Porter described it 
as 'a most interesting voice with lively inflection, you would never go to sleep during his address, you 
would never be bored by it'.'48 He suggested that Barwick could make areas of law often considered 
uninteresting 'sound fascinating and he had a most attractive voice, he put sentences together very 
well and the occasional touch of wit, he was always bright and alert' .'49 
747 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia {Sydney, 21 February 
2006). 
748 Interview with Chester Porter QC (Sydney, 2 April 2006). 
749 Ibid. Chester Porter QC also described his voice in the following way: 'It was a voice, I would suppose you 
would say a rather witty, ingenious, and voice of pure enjoyable reason -that's how I would describe the 
voice'. 
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Ellicott described Barwick's voice in the following way: 
I recall him as talking quietly and not bombastically in the court, sufficiently to be heard and to 
get his message across, ... [H]e didn't have the voice of a well-tuned actor but he obviously could 
act in the sense of every barrister who is worth his chips can act, but his voice was not necessarily 
part of his armoury whereas it io with a lot of people. It wasn't a booming voice or it wasn't 
necessarily crisp, but the tongue could be an acid tongue, it could certainly be emotional. 750 
Ellicott's comments echo Ross Barwick's earlier comments that Barwick was capable of employing 
language that could be critical and biting. In addition, Ellicott's comments also suggest that Barwick's 
voice could become emotional at times: Barwick himself suggested that becoming emotionally 
involved in a case should be avoided, although provided that an advocate does not get too 
emotionally involved,751 employing emotional language appropriately can add weight to the 
persuasive effect of submissions. As we have seen, Ross Barwick stated that his father 'could be very 
sort of acid and acerbic'.752 
According to Ellicott, Barwick had the ability to 'coin a phrase' and: 
in the course of preparation he would have used his mind to get the best way to express the 
matter. I think he gave a lot of thought to his advocacy, as distinct from just mastering the 
subject, and how he would formulate it and express it."' 
Ellicott referred to Barwick's use of language by suggesting: 'I'm sure he thought of the phrases that 
he might use which might give colour to the case, a sort of expression of merit and whatever, I'm 
sure he did that'.754 He also stated that Barwick 'had a good command of the English language'.755 
Ellicott suggests that Barwick's choice of language did not necessarily occur spontaneously and that 
Barwick spent considerable time during the preparation stage on the manner in which he would 
express his submissions. 
Mason stated that Barwick 'was very good with language' and had 'a great understanding of the 
nuances ofwords'.756 Porter suggested that it was 'the elegance of his language' that made 
Barwick's submissions interesting.757 Hughes agreed that Barwick had a 'great vocabulary'.758 
Barwick's use of language was also assisted by the fact that he was 'a very quick man'.759 
750 Interview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
751 Molomby & Donohoe, above n 19, 13. 
752 Interview with Ross Barwick (Sydney, 4 October 2006). 
753 Interview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
754 Ibid. 
755 Ibid. 
756 1nterview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia {Sydney, 21 February 
2006). 
757 1nterview with Chester Porter QC (Sydney, 2 April 2006). 
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In an interview in 1989, Barwick suggested that one of the essential qualities of an advocate was 
quick witted ness which he described as follows: 'the wit which can recognise the relevance of what 
you've just heard, how it relates to the task you have in hand, its relevance to the issue to be 
determined in the trial or the appeal' .760 Perhaps unsurprisingly, essential qualities as outlined by 
Barwick himself reflect many of the-strengths attributed to Barwick as an advocate. These are the 
qualities he worked hard to develop or enhance in his own advocacy. 
Porter, who attended numerous conferences with Barwick, referred to Barwick's wit observing that 
as 'an advocate in court he was never dull- sometimes he was very witty'.761 
Porter recalls Barwick's wit during an occasion in 1954 where Barwick appeared on behalf of Doyle 
Mallett at the Royal Commission into the liquor laws conducted by Justice Victor Maxwell. Barwick 
stated: 'You might well think that the only resemblance between this Commission and a court of 
justice began and ended with the furniture in the courtroom in which the Commissioner sat' .762 This 
also demonstrated his acid and acerbic tongue, and may also be perceived as exhibiting a lack of 
respect for the Royal Commission. It also suggests that Barwick may have reached a stage in his 
career where his over-confidence as an advocate affected his judgment in terms of demonstrating 
respect. By contrast, and consistent with this observation, Mason did not regard Barwick as a witty 
person -he 'was much more given to using sarcasm as a weapon' .763 Hughes recalled that Barwick 
usually employed 'a sense of irony ... he was a master of irony' and he also employed 'a bit of 
sarcasm'.764 
Mason described Barwick's presence as having 'a dynamism about him' which stemmed from his 
confidence, and his charisma.765 Porter recalled that Barwick 'had a presence when I knew him ... 
[H]is enormous prestige went with him and his entry into a court room you know ... I mean a court 
was honoured to have him appear before them, even the High Court' .766 Hughes also agreed that 
Barwick had a presence and stated that '(t]here are intangible qualities not easy to enumerate which 
758 1nterview with Hon. Tom Hughes AO QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). 
759 Interview with David Jackson QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). 
760 Molomby & Donohoe, above n 19, 9. 
761 Porter, Walking on Water: A Life in the Law, above n 417, p.llS. See Interview with Chester Porter QC 
(Sydney, 2 April 2006). 
762 Sir Anthony Mason, 'Supreme Court of New South Wales: Opening of law terms judges' dinner' (2008) 82 
Australian Law Journa/839, 842. See also Interview with Chester Porter QC (Sydney, 2 April 2006). 
763 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). According to Mason, Alan Taylor made very effective use of his wit and Barwick 'really wasn't able to 
match him in that respect'. 
764 1nterview with Hon. Tom Hughes AO QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). 
765 1nterview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). 
766 Interview with Chester Porter QC {Sydney, 2 April 2006). 
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make for that quality called presence but he had it'.767 It is not easy to identify the features that 
contribute to presence. However, commentators appear to agree that an advocate with a presence 
has a sense of confidence, gravitas and polite assertiveness that accompany their submissions and 
which can aid their persuasiveness. 
Ellicott recalled that he observed Barwick's presence on many occasions and that '(t]here are some 
people who can enter a room and command it and lots of small men can do that- he was one of 
them' .768 As this suggests, Barwick's presence did not derive from his physical stature but rather the 
confidence he exuded which was built on a thorough preparation as well as the sheer energy and 
dynamism which many say he possessed. Over time, his presence also increased as a result of his 
growing reputation. 
One of the keys to Barwick's success was that he possessed an extraordinary memory. Mason 
described his memory as 'prodigious' .769 Gibbs said that 'his power to recall detail and then to speak 
of it with simplicity represented his greatest skills as an advocate' .770 Porter recalled that Barwick 
'had a good memory for fundamental principles ... [H]e had a pretty good memory of case law ... a 
very good memory of events that he was describing .... [and] a ready memory for every important 
constitutional case in Australia'.771 Hughes described Barwick's memory as 'elephantine'."' 
A good memory is a valuable asset and an important attribute for an appellate advocate. It allows 
the advocate to speak freely and to engage the bench in such a manner that allows easier adaptation 
ofthe advocate's submissions in response to judicial reactions or judicial body language. 
Ellicott described Barwick as 'a person who could master subjects, he had a massive memory and had 
great recall of events and incidents and conversations which I suspect helped him a great deal in 
767 Interview with Hon. Tom Hughes AD QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). 
768 1nterview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). Barwick placed considerable importance on 
appearance which also contributed to his presence. In response to a question about court dress, Barwick 
stated: 'I think nothing looks so poor as the advocate showing a sagging pair of trousers and a coloured shirt 
with a gown hanging on some part of his shoulders': see Bailey, above n 19, 1312. 
769 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). 
770 Harry Gibbs, 'Appellate Advocacy', above n 11, 497. See also Kirby, 'Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy', above 
n 11,965. 
771 Interview with Chester Porter QC (Sydney, 2 April 2006). 
772 Interview with Hon. Tom Hughes AD QC (Sydney, 2 August 2006). David Jackson QC did note that, during 
Barwick's years as an advocate, 'there were a lot fewer cases in those days so it was easier to remember the 
major ones and I just don't think there is quite that ability these days': Interview with David Jackson QC 
(Sydney, 2 August 2006). 
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cross-examination'.773 He also suggested that Barwick would employ his memory to great effect in 
the following way: 
... he would take much more interest in what the bench was saying than the average barrister. 
wouldn't say he'd go away and dwell on it, but he'd remember it and it would be part of his 
armoury in dealing with that particular judge whether he was a lord of appeal or whether he was 
a High Court judge or some other judge. 774 
773 Interview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). Robert Ellicott QC recalls an instance where 
he was appearing in the Privy Council with Barwick in 1958. The previous day, Barwick had argued Newton v 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation {1958) 98 CLR 1 {7 July 1958). Ellicott recalled: 
It wasn't a complex case, on the other hand he had to master it. I probably spent in all an hour and a half late 
one afternoon, the day before the case, in his flat in StJames in London in discussion of the case. I picked him 
up the next morning at his flat and we walked over to the Privy Council. He was obviously on top of the case. 
It was about whether a grazier had retained an interest in a grazing property because he remained a partner I 
think, that was the situation, and if he did retain an interest and even though he'd given it to his children it 
was deemed to be part of his estate. Anyhow, it was a well travelled part of the law and he was obviously 
completely in charge of it. 
Further, Ellicott recalled: 
Just as an instance, it's perhaps an unusual example, but on the way to the Privy Council I think he must have 
named every flower by species between StJames and the Privy Council. He'd walk through StJames Park and 
he said "Bobby look at that", or "look at that", or whatever, you know, tell me the name, to me it was 
remarkable. 
774 Interview with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC {Sydney, 8 August 2006). 
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Chapter 7: Barwick and the Bank Nationalisation Case in 
the High Court 
"Many of the cases which arrive in this Court for decision, most for ultimate decision, have their 
complexities, to which the very fact of judicial differences of opinion at earlier points of their history, 
bear witness. Thus, much painstaking effort is required to ensure that no false assumptions are 
made, that the facts understood aright [sic1 that no relevant circumstance or argument or legal 
principle is overlooked. This casts on the Bench a great responsibility which it accepts and which it 
performs, but that does not lessen, indeed rather it heightens, the imperative need on the part of the 
legal profession for most assiduous preparation of cases, and for great refinement and precision of 
argument. Just as the judge must work out of court during and after a hearing, so must the practising 
man work before and during the presentation of a case". 
Sir Garfield Barwick, 1964775 
"This was of course, a great case. The idea of a Government being unable to do these things is 
foreign to most people, the use of 92 for this purpose was strange, and we had quite a few decisions 
that would have favoured what the Government was doing." 
Sir Garfield Barwick, 1977776 
The exploration of the elements and ideals of appellate advocacy in terms of preparation, 
presentation and personation in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, has established a framework to enable an 
assessment of Barwick's advocacy in accordance with the 'three category analysis'. In the last 
chapter, an assessment of Barwick's advocacy against the ideals of appellate advocacy in terms of 
preparation, presentation and personation generally was undertaken. The emphasis in this chapter 
will be on Barwick's advocacy in relation to these three categories in the context of one of the most 
significant constitutional law cases, namely, the Bank Nationalisation Case. 
This analysis draws upon observations and commentary relevant to Barwick, and also 
involves an examination of primary material available with respect to this case, including the 
transcript of Barwick's argument. 
775 Transcript of Proceedings in the High Court of Australia at Sydney on Friday 1" May 1964 on the occasion of 
the Swearing In of Sir Garfield Barwick as Chief Justice of Australia, p.10. 
776 National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 21. 
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7.1 Preparation for the Bank Nationalisation Case 
The Bank Nationa/isation Case is one of the most significant constitutional cases heard in the High 
Court and remains the longest running constitutional law case in Australia's history. It represents 
'one ofthe greatest political and legal battles in Australia's history'.777 It has also been suggested 
that the 'attempt to nationalize the private trading banks was probably the most controversial move 
by any Australian government in the history ofthe Commonwealth'."" 
Barwick was briefed to appear on behalf of the banks in the Bank Nationalisation Case. To 
understand and appreciate the significance of this case, it is important to understand the events that 
led to this case coming before the High Court. The historical context also reveals Barwick's early 
involvement and provides the necessary context to allow an in-depth examination of Barwick's 
advocacy in this case. 
Background to the Bank Nationalisation Case 
On 13 August 1947, the High Court delivered its judgment in the Melbourne Corporation Case.779 By 
majority, the High Court780 held that section 48 of the Banking Act 1945 (Cth) which, in effect, 
prohibited a bank from conducting any banking business for a State or for any authority of a State, 
including a local governing authority except at the will of the Commonwealth Treasurer, was invalid 
because it discriminated against the States (Latham CJ, Dixon and Williams JJ) or that it violated an 
essential function of the States (Rich, Starke and Williams JJ).781 
The question of whether the federal parliament had the power to nationalise the banking industry 
was not in issue in the Melbourne Corporation Case. However, one can extrapolate from the 
777 Wickrema Weerasooria, "The Bank Nationalisation Case- 50th anniversary" (November/December 1999) 
15(5) Australian Banking & Finance Law Bulletin 78, 78. 
778 A L May, Battle for the Banks, (1968), Sydney University Press, Sydney, p.vii. 
779 Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31 which is known as the Melbourne Corporation 
Case as well as the State Banking Case. 
780 Latham CJ, Rich, Starke, Dixon, and Williams JJ (McTiernan J dissenting). 
781 As such, the majority found that State immunity from federal discrimination or violation of essential 
activities was implied by the constitutional guarantee of the federal system and its effect was to restrict 
Commonwealth legislative powers, including the banking power. The result was that States, governmental 
authorities and municipalities could bank wherever they chose to do so. See Sawer, Cases on The Constitution 
of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 180, pp.S15-525; Geoffrey Sawer, Cases on The Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, (3'' ed), (1964), The Law Book Co of Australia Pty Ltd, Sydney, pp.15-23; Brian 
Galligan, The Politics of the High Court: A Study of the Judicial Branch of Government in Australia, (1987), 
University of Queensland Press, Queensland, p.167; Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts, above n 295, 
p.135; Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law {1929-1949), above n 143, pp.211-212; May, above n 778, 
p.10; Cowen, Sir John Latham And Other Papers, above n 400, p.39; Michael Caper, Encounters with the 
Australian Constitution, (1987), CCH Australia Ltd, North Ryde, pp.175-176; R. F. Holder, BankofNewSouth 
Wales: A History, (1970), Angus and Robertson, Sydney, pp.883-884. 
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reasoning of the respective judges that Rich, Starke and Williams JJ had adopted a position that 
would probably preclude bank nationalisation; if the States had a sovereign right to use the facilities 
of private banks, then by implication, the Commonwealth could not abolish the private banks. 
However, Latham CJ and Dixon J left the particular question open while McTiernan J's reasoning 
could easily be extended to allow bank nationalisation.782 The Labor government sought to take 
advantage of the unique opportunity the Melbourne Corporation Case presented to give effect to its 
policy of nationalising key industries783 
Barwick appeared for the City of Melbourne in this case. Barwick became well acquainted with the 
case law relating to the banking power ins Sl(xiii) of the Constitution as well as the law with respect 
to the intergovernmental immunities implied by the federal system. His knowledge of the banking 
power, combined with his knowledge of section 92, which was gained primarily from the Airlines 
Case784 was later deployed in the Bank Nationa/isation Case. The Melbourne Corporation Case 
represented an important victory for Barwick and ideal preparation for his next challenge in the Bank 
Notionalisatian Case.785 
782 For example, at 84, per Dixon J; at 85-96, per McTiernan J. See also Galligan, above n 781, p.169. There was 
some suggestion that in this decision the High Court brought back a modified version of the doctrine of implied 
immunity that was ruled not to apply in the Engineer's Case (Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide 
Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 29). 
783 G Blainey and G Hutton, Gold and Paper (1858-1982), A History of the National Bank of Australasia Ltd, 
1983, pp.229-230. Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.57; 
Peter Johnston, 'The Bank Nationalisation Cases: The Defeat of Labor's Most Controversial Economic Initiative' 
in H.P. Lee & George Winterton (eds), Australian Constitutional Landmarks, (2003), Cambridge University Press, 
Melbourne, 85, 89; L.F.Crisp, Ben Chifley: A Political Biography, (1961), Longmans, Green & Co. Limited, Sydney, 
pp.326-327; May, above n 778, p.12; lan Hancock, John Gorton: He Did It His Way, (2002), Hodder Headline 
Australia Pty Ltd, Sydney, p.49; Holder, above n 781, p.816. It has been suggested that, the nationalisation of 
the banks, was motivated, at least in part, by the fact that the government had been unsuccessful in the 
Melbourne Corporation Case. Despite this decision, the government believed, incorrectly as it turned out, that 
its power with respect to banking would support a law prohibiting private banking: Crispin Hull, The High Court 
of Australia: Celebrating the Centenary 1903-2003, (2003), Lawbook Co., Sydney, p.25; Weerasooria, above n 
777,78-79. 
784 Australian National Airways Pty Limited v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29. This case arose following the 
Chifley government's attempt to nationalise interstate and territorial airlines and to establish an airline owned 
by the Commonwealth government. The High Court held that the trade and commerce power under s 51(i) of 
the Constitution authorised the Commonwealth to operate an airline but the legislation was invalid under 
section 92 to the extent that it attempted to confer on the Australian National Airways Commission a 
monopoly in respect of airline services between states and to create the offences ins 49. At 31; 62-64, 69 (per 
Latham CJ); 71-72 (per Rich J); 79 (per Starke J); 83-85 (per Dixon J); 102-103 (per Williams J). More detailed 
discussion of this case can be found in Chapter 7. 
785 On 14 August 1947, Prime Minister Chifley discussed the legal aspects of nationalising the banks with Evatt. 
On Saturday 16 August 1947, after Cabinet had discussed all other matters, Chifley asked Evatt to outline and 
explain the judgments in the Melbourne Corporation Case. Chifley summed up by saying that 'the Government 
could either swallow the decision and await an attack by the private banks on the vital sections of the 1945 
Acts, or they could remove the challengers by nationalising the banks': Crisp, Ben Chifley: A Political Biography, 
above n 783, p.327; 'Bank Decision Community: Millions Involved', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 18 
August 1947, 1; 'Govt. Plan To Nationalise Banks: To Cost £100 Million', The Canberra Times (Canberra), 18 
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On 14 August 1947, following a Cabinet meeting,786 Prime Minister Chifley announced that the 
government would nationalise the private trading banks.787 Essentially, the proposed legislation788 to 
nationalise the banks would eliminate eight trading banks that were incorporated in Australia and 
confiscate the Australian business of three UK banks and three other foreign banks. Effectively, the 
Commonwealth Bank and a few S~te banks would monopolise the banking industry. Under the 
proposed legislation,789 the Commonwealth Bank would be empowered to acquire the shares of 
every Australian banking company at a price to be fixed by a special Federal Court of Claims or 
agreed upon privately, as well as purchase the Australian assets of all other banks. The 20,000 
employees of the nationalised banks had the option of remaining employed with the Commonwealth 
Bank on a similar salary and on similar conditions.790 
It has been said that the announcement 'incited the fiercest political controversy since the 
conscription referendum of 1917'791 and laid the foundation for the Bank Natianalisatian Case,'92 one 
August 1947, 1; 'Judgments Flow To Canberra', The Canberra Times (Canberra), 14 August 1947, 1; 'Judgments 
Flow To Canberra', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 14 August 1947, 1. 
786 During the brief Cabinet meeting, Chifley recommended nationalisation and each Minister agreed with 
Chifley. When Chifley subsequently presented the bank nationalisation legislation, it was endorsed by caucus 
within 20 minutes. See Crisp, Ben Chifley: A Political Biography, above n 783, p.327; Kylie Tennant, Famous 
Australians- Evatt: Politics and Justice, (1970), Angus & Robertson Publishers, Sydney, p.217; 'Bank Decision 
Community: Millions Involved', above n 786; 'Govt. Plan To Nationalise Banks: To Cost £100 Million', above n 
786; 'Judgments Flow To Canberra', The Canberra Times (Canberra), 14 August 1947, 1; 'Judgments Flow To 
Canberra', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 14 August 1947, 1. 
787 On the same day, Prime Minister Chifley issued a 42-word press statement which suggested that his 
government would nationalise the private trading banks. See Crisp, Ben Chifley: A Political Biography, above n 
783, pp.325-328, 331; May, above n 778, pp.ll-12. See also Hull, above n 783, p.25; Weerasooria, above n 
777, 78-79; May, above n 778, pp.ll, 13-14; Holder, above n 781, p.884; 'Socialised Banking', The Mercury 
(Hobart), 18 August 1947, 3; 'Public Demands For Referendum', Cairns Post (Cairns), 29 October 1947, 1; 
Galligan, above n 781, p.170; Johnston, above n 783, 89-103. 
788 Evatt, the Attorney General in the Chifley government, had the primary responsibility for advising the 
government on the constitutional prospects of the legislation. He recognised that the constitutional validity 
would depend on the High Court's approach to section 92 of the Constitution which had already prevented the 
nationalisation of the airlines and whether it would be extended to prevent the nationalisation of the private 
banks. See Tennant, Famous Australians- Evatt: Politics and Justice, above n 786, p.217; Crisp, Ben Chifley: A 
Political Biography, above n 783, p.329; May, above n 778, p.65; L. Zines, 'Mr Justice Evatt and the 
Constitution' (1969) 3 Federal Law Review 153, 175-186. 
789 See Blainey and Hutton, above n 783, pp.229-230. Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & 
Recollections, above n 1, p.57; Johnston, above n 783, 89; Crisp, Ben Chifley: A Political Biography, above n 783, 
pp.327-330; May, above n 778, pp.ll-12; Galligan, above n 781, p.169; Holder, above n 781, p.885; Sawer, 
Australian Federal Politics and Law (1929-1949), above n 143, p.197. 
790 Banking Bii/1947(Cth). See also Blainey and Hutton, above n 783, pp.230-231; Johnston, above n 783, 89; 
Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law (1929-1949}, above n 143, pp.194-195; Crisp, Ben Chifley: A Political 
Biography, above n 783, pp.328-330. 
791 Blainey and Hutton, above n 783, p.230. Mr McConnan, Chairman of the Associated Banks, indicated that 
the banks would fight the policy of nationalisation to the end. The majority of staff of the National Bank, as 
well as the staff from the other banks, quickly mobilised and launched a campaign against nationalisation 
which included cheering an informal speech by McConnan in Melbourne on 26 August and sending a telegram 
of protest to Prime Minister Chifley. The General Managers of the Australian banks met in Melbourne and 
decided to oppose nationalisation. See also Crisp, Ben Chifley: A Political Biography, above n 783, pp.328-332; 
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of the most significant constitutional cases in Australia's history.793 Opponents of the Labor Party 
suggested that bank nationalisation was a tactic of socialist dictatorship and it caused outrage 
amongst business leaders.794 The banking industry, including both banks and their staff, mobilised 
and used their resources to oppose nationalisation through many protests and public meetings as 
well as a concerted publicity campaign.795 
Upon the announcement by Chifley of the government's intention to nationalise the banking system, 
a group of barristers was assembled. Barwick was briefed by Sir Norman Cowper796 of Allen Allen & 
Hemsley, on behalf of the Bank of NSW, and was told by that firm that he was to be the leader of the 
Australian barristers.797 The banks immediately retained Barwick as a result of his successful 
arguments in the Airlines Case and the Melbourne Corporation Case.798 Barwick was also one of the 
leading appellate advocates and constitutional law barristers at the time. This assessment is 
supported by Gleeson who stated that, 'Barwick got the brief- the brief to lead the Australian team 
for the Banks in the Bank case- because Barwick was regarded in the profession as the best advocate 
in Australia at the time' .799 
May, above n 778, pp.12-14; Tennant, Famous Australians- Evatt: Politics and Justice, above n 786, p.217; 
Holder, above n 781, pp.884-885). 
792 Bank of New South Wales & Ors v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 (High Court), affirmed (1949) 79 CLR 497 
(Privy Council). 
793 Weerasooria, above n 777, 78. It is also the longest running case in the High Court's history at 39 days. 
794 Galligan, above n 781, pp.169-172; May, above n 778, pp.14-15. Menzies, the opposition leader of the 
newly formed Liberal Party, positioned the party to be the advocate of establishment values and traditional 
Australian liberal democracy and as such opposed bank nationalisation. Menzies labelled bank nationalisation 
as 'the most far-reaching, revolutionary, unwarranted and un-Australian measure introduced in the history of 
the parliament' and a 'tremendous step towards the servile state'. See Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and 
Law (1929-1949}, above n 143, p.197; Johnston, above n 783, 89; Menzies, Central Power in the Australian 
Commonwealth, above n 205, p.145; 'Driving On With The Bank Bill', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 13 
November 1947, 2; 'Socialisation The Issue', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 26 August 1947, 2; 'Socialist 
Threat In Bank Bill', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 29 October 1947, 1. 
795 See 'BANK DECISIONS COMMUNITY: Millions Involved', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 16 August 
1947, 1; 'Bank Managers To Fight Plans For Nationalisation', The Canberra Times (Canberra), 23 August 1947, 4. 
See also Weerasooria, above n 777, 78; May, above n 778, pp.15-46; Holder, above n 781, p.886. 
796 Sir Norman Cowper was admitted as a solicitor of the Supreme Court of NSW on 6 June 1923. He practised 
as a solicitor for more than 50 years with Allen Allen & Hemsley where he was a partner from 1935 and senior 
partner from 1951 until he retired in 1975. See Alfred James, 'Sir Norman Cowper' (2000) 86(1) Journal of the 
Royal Australian Historical Society 74, 77, 81); Valerie Lawson, The Aliens Affair, (1995), Pan Macmillan 
Australia, Sydney, p.59. 
797 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.62; Holder, above n 781, 
p.886. The author undertook various searches with the assistance of Allen Arthur Robinson (formerly Allen 
Allen & Hemsley) of its archives in relation to the Bank of NSW and its retainer in the Bank Nationalisation 
Case. However, due to the passage of time, very few records were in existence. The only material in existence 
relating to the Bank of NSW were advices in matters unrelated to the Bank Nationalisation Case. 
798 Galligan, above n 781, p.173; 'Banks Muster Legal Forces', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), Tuesday 19 
August 1947, 1. 
799 Interview with Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 14 August 2006). The 
suggestion that Barwick made his name in the Bank Nationalisation Case has been raised elsewhere, for 
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As Marr stated, this brief was very suited to Barwick: 
It demanded a man who could handle litigation that was huge, complex and dry. Yet at stake were 
principles to which he felt a passionate attachment. He fought best when he believed in what he 
was fighting for. It gave his attack extra cunning and stamina. Few great advocates have the 
opportunity to devote themselves for any length of time to a cause for which they feel the 
commitment Barwick felt for the banks and their struggle with Chifley.800 
Marr's suggestion that Barwick 'fought best when he believed in what he was fighting for' will be 
examined later in this chapter, particularly when examining the transcript ofthe argument. 
The team led by Barwick801 included Alan Taylor Kc'02 (who reportedly admired Barwick's blunt 
aggression),803 Kitto KC,804 Dr Coppel KC,805 Adam,806 and Smith807 Kitto reportedly 'masterminded 
some of the most important strategies in that campaign'.808 
The fact that the banks retained so many counsel even before the legislation was passed by 
Parliament was testament to the importance of the looming legal challenge. It also allowed Barwick, 
as well as the other counsel, to commence their preparations early for the inevitable High Court 
challenge. This additional time would have been useful in the context of the complex and difficult 
legal issues that were anticipated. 
On 15 October 1947, the Banking Bill was introduced into Federal Parliament. Chifley delivered the 
Second Reading Speech outlining the case for the policy and provided an outline of the provisions of 
the Bill. He stated that the Bill aimed 'to empower the Commonwealth Bank to take over the 
example, in May, above n 778, p.79. It has been suggested that, at the time of the Bank Nationalisation Case, 
'Barwick's name was only then being made'. See also National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir 
Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 15. 
800 Marr, above n 8, p.58. It has been suggested that Barwick's background 'inclined him philosophically to the 
banks' cause': Johnston, above n 783,93. 
801 Graham Fricke, Judges of the High Court, (1986), Century Hutchinson Australia Pty Ltd, Melbourne, p.168; 
Martha Rutledge, 'Taylor, Alan Russell' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Caper & George Williams (eds), The Oxford 
Companion to the High Court of Australia, (2001), Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, p.662. 
802 In 1943, at the age of 41, Taylor was appointed senior counsel. Taylor made his first High Court appearance 
in 1934; and between 1934 and 1943 he averaged two appearances a year. After this, he began to appear 
before the High Court three or four times a year. In 1947, he made ten appearances in the High Court. Later Sir 
Alan Taylor was appointed a judge of the High Court of Australia. 
803 Also, it was said that Taylor shared Barwick's distaste for the single mannered approach of the Melbourne 
Bar: 'They scratch every hair on the dog's back except the one that matters' (Marr, above n 8, p.234). 
804 Later Justice Frank Kitto, a judge of the High Court of Australia from 1950 to 1970. See Kirby, 'Kitto and the 
High Court of Australia', above n 186. 
805 Or Elias Godfrey Cop pel KC was a Victorian barrister who later served as an Acting Judge of the Supreme 
Court of Victoria after being appointed in 1950. He also achieved a Doctor of Laws. 
806 Alistair Adam was a Victorian barrister who later served as a Judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria. 
807 Thomas Weetman Smith was a Victorian barrister who later served as a Judge of the Supreme Court of 
Victoria. He replaced Justice Wilfred Fullaghar who was appointed to the High Court in 1950. 
808 Fricke, above n 801, Melbourne, p.171. 
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banking business at present conducted in Australia by private banks' .809 The introduction of the Bill 
provoked considerable debate in parliament.810 
After days of impassioned debate, Chifley ensured the passage of the Bill through parliament on 26 
November 1947 and the Banking Act 1947 (Cth) ("the Act") was granted Royal Assent the following 
day. It came into effect upon being given Royal Assent -106 days after the High Court's decision in 
the Melbourne Corporation Case was delivered.811 
The legislation allowed the Treasurer, by notice in the Gazette, to vest the shares in the private banks 
in the Commonwealth Bank and to authorise the compulsory acquisition of all the assets and 
liabilities as well as the management of the private banks. It also allowed the Commonwealth 
Treasurer to prohibit the conduct of banking business in Australia by any private bank.812 The 
legislation has been described as 'the most controversial in the history of federal legislation ... [it] 
convulsed the political life of the country in the State as well as the federal sphere' .813 
Preliminary litigation in the Bank Nationalisation Case 
Kitto recommended that an injunction be obtained from the High Court before the Bill received Royal 
Assent to prevent the government from implementing the Act. Barwick supported the injunction and 
steps were taken to prepare the injunction application. However, the application to the High Court 
became unnecessary as a result of negotiations between the parties whereby the government 
provided an undertaking that it would not implement the Act until its validity was determined. In 
any event, it was agreed that the banks would persist with their application for an injunction to 
809 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 15 October 1947, 748, 796-798, (Ben 
Chifley, Prime Minister); May, above n 778, p.68; Holder, above n 781, p.885; Blainey and Hutton, above n 783, 
pp.230-231. 
810 
'BANKING BILL BEFORE HOUSE', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 16 October 1947, 1; 'BITTER FIGHT 
BEGINS IN PARLIAMENT ON BANKING BILL', The Canberra Times (Canberra), 16 October 1947, 1; 'BANK 
ACQUISITION PLAN REVEALED', The Argus (Melbourne), 16 October 1947, 1; May, above n 778, pp.65-67, 68-
69, 75; Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law (1929-1949), above n 143, pp.196-197; Crisp, Ben Chif/ey: A 
Political Biography, above n 783, p.329; Marr, above n 8, p.59; Holder, above n 781, pp.885-886; Galligan, 
above n 781, p.172; Blainey and Hutton, above n 783, pp.230-231; Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's 
Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.64; May, above n 778, p.59; 'States' Case Against Banking Bill', The 
Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 26 November 1947, 3. 
811 
'BANK BILL NOW LAW', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 28 November 1947, 1;'ROYAL ASSENT TO 
BANKING NATIONALISATION', The Canberra Times (Canberra), 28 November 1947, 1; May, above n 778, p.76; 
Galligan, above n 781, p.173; Weerasooria, above n 777, 78-79; Hancock, above n 783, p.49; Holder, above n 
781, p.886. 
812 See section 46, Banking Act 1947 (Cth). Some of the key provisions of the Act are summarised in Appendix B. 
813 Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law {1929-1949), above n 143, p.187. 
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ensure that no aspect of the Act could be implemented.814 Once the Act received Royal Assent, the 
banks filed the necessary writs instituting legal proceedings in the High Court as had been agreed 
with the Commonwealth.815 
On 15 December 1947, Dixon J granted an interlocutory injunction restraining the government from 
further action until the Act's constitutional validity could be determined by the High Court.816 
As preparations for the legal challenge to the Act before the High Court continued in earnest, the 
banking industry marshalled its resources to campaign against the Commonwealth.817 The Barwick 
team 'embarked on a campaign that had the precision of military strategy' .818 
The large team of lawyers that had assembled to act on behalf of the various banks split into 
committees to examine various parts of the Constitution which they were to rely upon in challenging 
the validity of the Act. Barwick was the chairman of the committee which examined section 92 of 
814 
'Government Restrained from Implementing', The Canberra Times (Canberra), 16 December 1947; 
'Injunction By Court In Banking Case', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 16 December 1947, 1; 'Trading 
Banks And States Get Injunction Until Final Court Judgment', The Sydney Morning Herald {Sydney), 16 
December 1947, 7; May, above n 778, pp.77-78; Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & 
Recollections, above n 1, p.62; Galligan, above n 781, p.173; Marr, above n 8, p.62; Johnston, above n 783, 92; 
Holder, above n 781, p.886. 
815 On 28 November 1947, the banks sought the injunction from the High Court to prevent the legislation from 
coming into effect until its constitutional validity could be determined by the High Court. See 'Banks And Two 
States To Stop Immediate Nationalisation Of Banks', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 29 November 1947, 
1; May, above n 778, pp.77-78; Galligan, above n 781, p.173; Weerasooria, above n 777, 78-79. 
816 Following this, the writs were to be referred to the Full Bench of the High Court on 15 January 1948 
provided that the affidavits of both parties were satisfactory. On 15 January 1948, Dixon J heard arguments on 
the affidavits and announced that the hearing would commence before the Full Court in Melbourne on 9 
February 1948. On 17 January 1948, for reasons unknown, the Commonwealth filed a Notice of Motion 
seeking an early hearing beginning on 19 January 1948. This application was refused by the Full Bench. See 
'Bank Case In High Court On February 9', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 16 January 1948, 2; 'FULL HIGH 
COURT TO HEAR BANK CASE ON FEB. 9', The Canberra Times (Canberra), 16 January 1948, 4; 'HEARING OF 
BANK ACT CHALLENGE', The Argus (Melbourne), 16 January 1948, 4; May, above n 778, pp.77-79; Galligan, 
above n 781, p.173; Weerasooria, above n 777, 78-79; Holder, above n 781, p.887. 
817 According to the banking industry, the nationalisation of banks would affect 20,000 bank staff and eliminate 
eight Australian private banks, three English banks and three other foreign banks. Customers of all the banks 
received material regarding the consequences of nationalisation and bank staff delivered leaflets into letter 
boxes across the country. The banking industry also organised a comprehensive media campaign which 
involved advertising in the print media and on radio. It has been suggested that '[t]he banking industry was 
determined not only to defeat the proposed legislation but the Government that was behind it': Weerasooria, 
above n 777, 79. 
818 Fricke, above n 801, p.170. In the course of the preparations, in a different case, a pea-merchant sought to 
challenge the constitutional validity ofTasmanian legislation with respect to section 92 of the Constitution. 
Taylor had been briefed to defend the Tasmanian legislation but decided not to appear as it might have been 
detrimental to the overall strategy in the Bank Nationalisation Case; in that the issues on which the Barwick 
team was so diligently working might be prematurely resolved in this other case and secondly, because Taylor 
would be arguing in support of the Tasmanian legislation: see Fricke, above n 801, p.170; Marr, above n 8, p.61. 
The Field Peas Case was the shorthand title for the following case: Clements and Marshall Pty Ltd v Field Peas 
Marketing Board (Tas) (1947) 76 CLR 401 (Williams J); Field Peas Marketing Board (Tas) v Clement and Marshall 
Pty Ltd {1948) 76 CLR 414 (Latham CJ, Starke, Dixon and McTiernan JJ). 
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the Constitution.819 Barwick 'more than any other counsel saw the potential for a major assault 
founded on s.92'.820 It has been suggested that Barwick's treatment of section 92 involved defining 
'freedom according to precedent' .821 
The case before the High Court was listed to commence in Melbourne at the beginning of February 
1948. Prior to the case, there was a fortnight of conferences between counsel and solicitors in 
Melbourne. During these conferences, there was discussion about the 'Transport Cases' and the 
'Marketing Cases'822 and their effect on the argument to be put in the Bank Nationa/isation Case.823 
Barwick however, thought 'these decisions irrelevant to the result of the present case and had 
reasons for not attacking them'.824 In many respects, as will be seen later, Barwick's assessment was 
correct although, for example, Latham CJ's judgment states that to find that the Act was invalid 
based on section 92 would result in the need to overrule a number of the 'Transport Cases' and 
'Marketing Cases' .825 
For the purposes of these conferences, the banks with English headquarters sent out to Australia, 
Kenneth Diplock, 826 then a leading junior at the English Bar and Emrys Lloyd, a partner in Farrers, a 
819 Marr, above n 8, p.GO. 
820 Johnston, above n 783, 93. 
821 Gary Rumble, Sir Garfield Barwick's Approach to the Constitution (Doctoral thesis, Australian National 
University, August 1983), p.7; Johnston, above n 783, 93. 
822 The Transport Cases, which were heard in the 1930's, allowed the States to restrict interstate trucking, and 
in some instances, ban interstate trucking completely, in order to protect their railways from competition. The 
High Court allowed such restrictions and/or bans. They included: Willard v Rawson (1933) 48 CLR 316; R v 
Vizzord; Ex parte Hill (1933) 50 CLR 30; 0 Gilpin Ltd v Commissioner for Road Transport & Tramways {NSW} 
(1935) 52 CLR 189; Riverina Transport Pty Ltd v Victoria (1937) 57 CLR 327. One of the earliest "Marketing 
Cases" was New South Wales v Commonwealth (1915) 20 CLR 54, also known as the Wheat Case. In this case, 
the High Court unanimously held that NSW legislation passed during the war which authorised the compulsory 
acquisition of wheat by the government, subject to compensation, did not contravene section 92. See also the 
cases involving Mr James, including James v South Australia (1927) 40 CLR 1, James v Commonwealth (1928) 41 
CLR 442, James v Cowan (1930) 43 CLR 386, James v Cowan [1932] AC 542; (1932) 47 CLR 386, James v 
Commonwealth (1935) 52 CLR 570 and James v Commonwealth (1936) 55 CLR 1. Other "Marketing Cases" 
included: Peanut Board v Rockhampton Harbour Board (1933) 48 CLR 266, Milk Board {NSW) v Metropolitan 
Cream Pty Ltd (1939) 62 CLR 116. Generally, the "Marketing Cases" concerned statutory marketing schemes 
for primary produce. See Sawer, Cases on The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, (3'' ed). above n 
781, p.168; Michael Co per, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, (1983}, Butterworths 
Pty Ltd, North Ryde, p.13; Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, (51h ed). above n 182, pp.142-144 and 
p.187; P.E. Nygh, 'The Concept of Freedom in Interstate Trade' (1967) 5 University of Queensland Law Journal 
317, 335; Coper, Encounters with the Australian Constitution, above n 781, p.267. 
823 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, pp.64-65. 
824 Ibid, p.65. 
825 Bank of New South Wales & Ors v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 239, per Latham CJ. 
826 Kenneth Diplock became a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary in 1968 and was elevated as a life peer with the title 
Baron Diplock, of Wansford in the County of Huntingdonshire to the House of Lords. 
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firm of solicitors from London. At these conferences, the English lawyers offered their views in terms 
of how the case might be conducted.827 
Whilst the banks had assembled a formidable legal team led by Barwick, the Commonwealth was to 
be represented by Evatt, the Attorney-General, who had left the bench of the High Court to enter 
Commonwealth Parliament in 1946.828 Farquharson, the chief legal officer of the Bank of New South 
Wales, commented at one point that '[i]t was becoming evident that the banks had not been astray 
in their choice of counsel'. 829 
Section 92 and the existing authorities 
Section 92 of the Constitution provides: 
On the imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce, and intercourse among the 
States, whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free. 
The judicial approaches to section 92 have, in the past, stemmed largely from the judicial response to 
the fundamental question: 
does the freedom of which s 92 speaks take its meaning from the philosophy of individualism and 
liberalism or from the economic theory of free trade or (to use a more modern and more 
embracing concept} a common market?830 
The early case law reflected confusion about which approach applied to the interpretation of section 
92831 Most of the decisions with respect to section 92 until the 1940s generally fell into two 
categories: challenges to the regulation of state transport (the 'Transport Cases') or challenges to 
statutory marketing schemes for primary produce (the 'Marketing Cases'). 
Barwick, on behalf of the banks, had to demonstrate that section 92 of the Constitution guaranteed 
the freedom of each individual bank to trade across State borders and that the Act impinged on this 
827 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.65. 
828 Caper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, p.92; Hull, above n 783, 
p.26; Caper, Encounters with the Australian Constitution, above n 781, p.273. 
829 Fricke, above n 801, p.170. 
830 Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, (5'' ed), above n 182, p.139. Also, Nygh, above n 822, 333. 
831 Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, (5th ed), above n 182, pp.139-147. The cases involving section 92 
between the late 1920s and until the early 1940s 'concerned either statutory marketing schemes for primary 
produce or the regulation of transport which had the aim of preventing newly developed road transport from 
bankrupting the State railways': Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, (5th ed), above n 182, p.142. In the 
19'' century, the major premise of 'laissez fa ire' economics was the freedom of the individual. Any 
interference with an individual's freedom had to be justified on the ground of social necessity, that is, to 
prevent interference with the rights of others. However, the language adopted in section 92 suggested that 
the freedom referred to was the economic doctrine of free trade, that is, the freedom to move goods or 
persons from one State another. 
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constitutional freedom. The difficulty was attempting to reconcile the myriad of cases relating to 
section 92. 
Barwick commenced preparing in his characteristic meticulous manner. As we have seen, he 
attributed considerable importance to preparation and in this case, due to its size and complexity, a 
comprehensive and thorough preparation was crucial. From the time he was briefed and for the 
remainder of 1947, Barwick recalled that he did 'preparatory work for the presentation of argument 
on behalf of the banks' .832 
Essentially, there were to be five broad grounds of attack upon the Act: 
1. It falls under no head of legislative power. That is, it is not; 
a. a law on the subject of banking within section Sl(xiii) of the Constitution; 
b. within section Sl(xx) (corporations power) of the Constitution; 
c. acquisition on just terms for a purpose of Commonwealth power and is not within 
section Sl(xxxi) of the Constitution; and 
d. within section Sl(xxxix) (incidental matters) ofthe Constitution. 
2. The acquisition provisions, the management provisions and the prohibition provisions are 
contrary to section 92 of the Constitution. 
3. In so far as otherwise the acquisition might be justified, it is bad because it is not on just 
terms. 
4. It invades the constitutional integrity of the States. 
5. It is inconsistent with the Financial Agreement and section 105A of the Constitution.833 
However, amongst these grounds, Barwick believed that section 92 was likely to be the main basis 
for the contention that the Act was completely invalid. Numerous cases involving section 92 had 
come before the High Court since Federation and Barwick acknowledged that, during the course of 
the section 92 decisions, the judges had 'expressed themselves in various ways'.834 According to 
Barwick, Dixon J 'was the consistent supporter of the application of s 92, though as a rule he was in 
the minority'.835 This is interesting in light of Barwick's 'billiard table' exercise (coined by the author 
referring to Ross Barwick's anecdote recounted earlier) which suggested that Dixon was not 
832 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.63. 
833 Ibid, p.66. See also Marr, above n 8, p.64; Johnston, above n 783, 92. 
834 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.63. 
835 Ibid. For example Willard v Rawson (1933) 48 CLR 316; R v Vizzard; Ex parte Hill (1933) 50 CLR 30; 0 Gilpin 
Ltd v Commissioner for Road Transport & Tramways (NSW) (1935) 52 CLR 189; Hartley v Walsh (1937) 57 CLR 
372. 
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consistent when analysing similar legal issues in different cases. Further, in light of the unsettled law 
on section 92, Johnston has suggested that 'Barwick perceived this tactically [and realised] that the 
inherent contradictions in the earlier cases opened the way for developing the individual right 
theory'.836 According to Caper, the Bank Nationalisation Case represented 'the great watershed in 
the struggle between the individual right theory of s 92 and the abstract theory of free trade in the 
According to Marr, it was the Privy Council decision in James v Cowan (1932)838 which held promise 
for Barwick in the Bank Nationalisotion Case as it suggested that section 92 was not only 
guaranteeing free trade across the States' borders but also free enterprise generally.839 James was 
one of many cases that held promise for Barwick: starting from W & A McArthur v Queensland 
(1920)840, and including Peanut Board v Rockhampton Harbour Board (1933)841, Milk Board (NSW) v 
Metropolitan Cream Pty Ltd (1939)842, Grotwick v Johnson (1945)843 and the Airlines Cose.844 
836 Johnston, above n 783, 98. 
837 Co per, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, p.92. 
838 47 CLR 386. The events that led to James v Cowan commenced with the South Australian Dried Fruits Board 
compulsorily acquiring Mr James' 1927 crop to achieve the purposes of its marketing scheme. As a result, 
almost all of Mr James' dried fruits were seized between March and August 1927 and he commenced an action 
in the High Court. In James v Cowan (1930) 43 CLR 386, the High Court held (Isaacs J dissenting) that the 
compulsory acquisition did not infringe section 92. However, on appeal, the Privy Council reversed the decision 
in James v Cowan (1932) 47 CLR 386. See Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, (51h ed), above n 182, 
pp.142-146; Sawer, Cases on The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 180, pp.141-146; 
Sawer, Cases on The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, (3'' ed), above n 781, pp.158-162, 171-
172. See also Caper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, p.34; Sawer, 
Australian Federalism in the Courts, above n 295, p.181. 
839 Marr, above n 8, p.61. 
84{) 28 CLR 530. This case involved a Queensland Act which provided for the fixing of the maximum price at 
which goods could be sold in Queensland. A majority of the High Court held (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Starke, Rich and 
Higgins JJ with Gavan Duffy J dissenting) that the Queensland Act was invalid as it contravened section 92 to 
the extent that it applied to interstate trade. See Sawer, Cases on The Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, (3"' ed), above n 781, p.169; Co per, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, 
above n 822, pp.19-20; Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, (51h ed), above n 182, pp.141-143; see also 
Nygh, above n 822, 336; Caper, Encounters with the Australian Constitution, above n 781, p.268; Sawer, 
Australian Federalism in the Courts, above n 295, p.179. 
841 48 CLR 266. This case arose after Queensland established a Peanut Board to compulsorily acquire all 
peanuts in Queensland and to take over marketing the peanuts. Growers were reimbursed from the proceeds 
of sale, peanuts had to be delivered to the Board and dealings other than with the Board were prohibited. By 
majority (Gavan Duffy CJ, Rich, Starke, Dixon and McTiernan JJ with Evatt J dissenting), the High Court held that 
the marketing scheme contravened section 92. See generally Caper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the 
Australian Constitution, above n 822, p.41; Sawer, Cases on The Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, above n 180, pp.146-151; Coper, Encounters with the Australian Constitution, above n 781, pp.270-
271; Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts, above n 295, p.181; Geoffrey Sawer, 'The Privy Council, The 
High Court and Section 92' (1947) 1 Res Judicatae 155, 155; Brennan, 'The Privy Council and the Constitution', 
above n 167, 321; Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law (1929-1949), above n 143, pp.66-67. 
842 62 CLR 116 ("the Milk Board Case"). In 1939, a majority (Latham CJ, Rich, Evatt and McTiernan JJ, Starke J 
dissenting) of the High Court decided that the milk marketing scheme did not infringe section 92 mainly due to 
its social purposes. See below n 850 for further details. 
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Barwick's Preparation of Argument 
Barwick's knowledge ofthe individual judges and his ability to tailor his submissions accordingly were 
considered earlier. Barwick applie~ this key element and ideal of appellate advocacy on numerous 
occasions to great effect. He was, in particular, acutely aware of the importance of understanding 
each individual judge's approach to the application of section 92 of the Constitution as this would be 
a key factor in determining whether the banks' arguments would succeed. Barwick was personally 
familiar with the series of section 92 cases: 'I had myself conducted or been engaged in some of 
these cases and of necessity was familiar with all of them and consequently with the attitudes of the 
individual judges towards the operation of s 92' .845 
According to Barwick, the High Court had 'never adopted the correct attitude to the application of 
s 92' and he had formed his own view of how the section ought to be applied. 846 From a strategic 
perspective, Barwick contemplated whether he should attempt to convince the High Court that they 
should adopt his personal view as to how the section should be applied. This was a critical decision. 
Barwick acknowledged his quandary and the fact that, as an appellate advocate, he was required to 
make a forensic decision: '[t]he problem in point of advocacy was whether an attempt should be 
made to have that view accepted by the High Court' .847 
Barwick summarised the decided cases in relation to section 92 as follows: 
843 70 CLR 1. Dulcie Johnson, a young woman, who travelled by rail from South Australia to Western Australia to 
visit her fiance without a permit was charged with an offence under the National Security Act 1939-1943 (Cth) 
as a result of contravening paragraph 3 of the Restriction of Interstate Passenger Transport Order made 
pursuant to the National Security {Land Transport) Regulations which was in turn made pursuant to the 
National Security Act 1939-1943 (Cth). The Commonwealth prosecuted the charge before a Magistrate in Perth 
who dismissed the complaint and the Commonwealth appealed to the High Court. In a unanimous decision 
(Latham CJ, Rich, Starke, Dixon and McTiernan JJ ), the High Court held that paragraph 3(a) of the Restriction of 
Interstate Passenger Transport Order made pursuant to the National Security {Land Transport) Regulations was 
a direct interference with the freedom of intercourse among the States conferred by section 92 of the 
Constitution, and was therefore invalid. Barwick also recounted Evatt's belief that Barwick had arranged for 
Johnson to travel to Western Australia which Barwick denied (see National Library of Australia, Miller, 
Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 19). See generally Co per, Freedom of Interstate Trade under 
the Australian Constitution, above n 822, pp.89-90; Coper, Encounters with the Australian Constitution, above n 
781, pp.257-258; Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law (1929-1949), above n 143, p.179; Marr, above n 8, 
p.48; Sawer, Cases on The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 180, pp.208-217; Geoffrey 
Sawer, Cases On The Constitution Of The Commonwealth Of Australia, (2"' ed), (1957), The Law Book Co of 
Australia Pty Ltd, Sydney, pp.168-175; PH Lane, A Digest of Australian Constitutional Cases, (51h ed), (1996), The 
Law Book Company Limited, North Ryde, pp.348-349. 
844 Australian National Airways Pty Limited v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29. See above n 784. 
845 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.63. 
846 Ibid. 
847 Ibid. 
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The judges had variously decided cases involving the application of the section, sometimes on the 
basis of the subject-matter of the legislation, sometimes on the parliamentary motivation in its 
passage, and sometimes on the nature of the legislation, that is, whether it was regulatory or 
prohibitive. There was a general tendency to seek to define what the section required trade etc to 
be free from rather than to consider what a prescription of absolute freedom required. 848 
. 
Barwick adopted his customary 'ground up' approach to ensure that he was familiar with the history 
of the decided cases on section 92. During his preparation, he considered the appropriate strategy 
to employ. He 'did not think the argument in the High Court was one in which [he] should attempt to 
secure from the judges acceptance of so radical a change from what had already been decided'. He 
thought that it 'would be wise to accept the propriety of what had been decided by them and be 
content to rely on the absolute nature of the prohibition imposed by the banking legislation'.849 
Therefore, Barwick made the critical decision to opt for an approach which fell within the ambit of 
the existing decisions; he would argue that the Act imposed an absolute prohibition and went 
beyond mere regulation. This was an application ofthe test that Latham CJ had outlined in the Milk 
Board Case850 and which he also applied in his judgment in the Airlines Case. 
848 Ibid. 
849 Ibid, pp.63-65. Barwick regarded the Banking Act as creating a government monopoly by virtue of its 
absolute prohibition of private banking. In contrast, for example, the legislation at the centre of the 'Transport 
Cases' provided for a regulatory system of licensing of private transport operations supported by a prohibition 
of unlicensed operations. In Barwick's view, the legislation in those cases attempted to effect a regime of 
regulation as opposed to complete prohibition. Therefore, Latham CJ's support for these cases might have 
been reconciled with the acceptance of the proposition that a complete prohibition of interstate ban king, as 
opposed to its regulation, was invalid. As a result, Barwick's argument in attacking the validity of the Banking 
Act did not need to interfere with the existing 'Transport Cases' and 'Marketing Cases' whilst also not explicitly 
conceding that these decisions were correct. This carefully considered approach was formulated by Barwick 
following his comprehensive preparation. 
850 62 CLR 116. In 1939, a majority (Latham CJ, Rich, Evatt and McTiernan JJ (Starke J dissenting)) of the High 
Court decided that the milk marketing scheme did not infringe section 92 mainly due to its social purposes. 
The milk marketing scheme had two purposes, social and commercial. The social purpose related to ensuring 
the quality and purity of the milk, the regularity of its supply and a reasonable price. The commercial purpose 
was to guarantee producers a reasonable and stable price for their product. The Milk Act 1931-1936 (NSW) 
gave the Milk Board comprehensive control over the distribution of milk in Sydney and Newcastle. The 
defendant was selling in Sydney cream purchased in Victoria and transported to Sydney without the Board's 
consent. The Board succeeded in obtaining an injunction to restrain the defendant from doing so. All judges 
agreed that the defendant was engaged in interstate trade and the issue was whether the milk marketing 
scheme was consistent with section 92. Relevantly, Latham CJ relied on James v Cowan (1932) [1932] AC 542; 
47 CLR 386 to conclude that the milk marketing scheme was not 'directed against' interstate trade and its 'real 
object' was not to interfere with interstate trade (at 132-133). Latham CJ (at 127) outlined a test which he also 
applied in the Airlines Case: 
One proposition which I regard as established is that simple legislative prohibition (Federal or State), as 
distinct from regulation, of interstate trade and commerce is invalid. Further, a law which is 'directed 
against interstate trade and commerce' is invalid. Such a law does not regulate such trade, it merely 
prevents it. But a law prescribing rules as to the manner in which trade (including transport) is to be 
conducted is not a mere prohibition and may be valid in its application to interstate trade notwithstanding s 
92. 
See Coper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, pp.83-85, 90; Zines, The 
High Court and the Constitution, (s'h ed), above n 182, pp.146-147; 150-152; Sawer, Australian Federal Politics 
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Barwick assessed his prospects of convincing each individual judge of the merits of his case on behalf 
of the banks and, by doing so, demonstrated the importance of knowing the Court. He recalled that: 
I made my own assessment of the likely attitudes of the various judges to nationalising the banks. 
I considered that Rich, Starke, Dixon, Williams and Fullagar JJ [sic] would be disposed to find 
invalidity on one or more grounds and that my task would be to aid them towards such a 
conclusion. Latham CJ I thought would be disposed to support the legislation, and if he did so, 
McTiernan J would follow him. It was therefore important that we convince Latham. 851 
In Barwick's view, the extent of the operation of the Act was critical and needed to be understood. 
He stated that: 
My argument before the High Court reflected my knowledge of its members and my estimate of 
their likely reaction to the legislation. Thus, some things could be taken for granted. But it was 
critically important that the full operation of the legislation should be appreciated; consequently I 
spent a deal of time expounding this. The legislation raised many questions about legislative 
power and acquisition of property, as well as the operation of s 92. The argument on these topics 
was distributed among the counsel for the bank.852 
Barwick's view that Latham CJ was the least likely to find the legislation invalid were, it appears, 
based on Latham CJ's approach to section 92 in the Milk Board Case in which he outlined a test which 
he also applied in Gratwick v Johnson (1945)853 and the Airlines Case. According to Latham CJ, 
prohibition of interstate trade and commerce was invalid whereas mere regulation was permissible 
under section 92. Despite Barwick's belief that the remaining judges would agree with this 
argument, one explanation for his desire to convince Latham CJ specifically could lie in Latham's 
ability to influence the other judges. Barwick may also have been motivated by a desire to unify the 
Court in its approach to section 92 -perhaps more aligned with his own view of section 92. The 
decision to target Latham CJ was nevertheless curious in many respects, particularly given Barwick's 
assessment of the position of the other four judges. 
From an appellate advocacy perspective, the risk of attempting to convince one judge in particular is 
that the advocate may neglect the others, thus risk alienating them and possibly failing to convince 
and Law (1929-1949}, above n 143, pp.121-122. See also Sawer, Cases on The Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, above n 180, pp.198-208, 217-234; Caper, Encounters with the Australian 
Constitution, above n 781, p.272; Sawer, Cases on The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, (3'' ed), 
above n 781, pp.180-194; Nygh, above n 822, 340. 
851 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.64. Note that the 
reference to Fullagar J is incorrect as he was not appointed to the High Court until1950 and therefore the 
author suspects that this should be a reference to Webb J instead. This may also raise questions in terms of the 
accuracy of this statement generally. 
852 Ibid. 
853 70 CLR 1. 
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them as anticipated. However, Barwick did suggest854 that the .other judges would be disposed to 
finding invalidity on one or more grounds and his task was to assist them to reach that conclusion. 
This indicates that he would not focus his submissions on Latham CJ exclusively but would dedicate 
sufficient time to assisting the other judges reach the conclusion that he anticipated they would 
reach. The manner in which Barwiok achieved this will be examined later in this chapter. 
Barwick acknowledged that he would have 'to think out a new approach entirely to [s]ection 92, and 
I did' .855 He requested that the banks' solicitors engage Richard Eggleston856 to assist him in 
developing his argument on section 92. Barwick did not simply rely on his own ability but sought 
assistance which is consistent with effective appellate advocacy in terms of undertaking a 
comprehensive preparation. By contrast, in the Communist Party Case, it does not appear that 
Barwick sought any assistance with preparation which may have been attributable to the short 
preparation time or other factors. According to Barwick, he wanted to prepare a proposition on 
section 92 which was consistent with what Latham CJ had previously decided in the Milk Board Case, 
Gratwick v Johnson and the Airlines Case such that Latham CJ would have difficulty rejecting such a 
proposition.857 As a result, Barwick with Eggleston devised a specific proposition which they believed 
Latham CJ could not dispute. The proposition was as follows: 
On the decided cases as they stand, at least the proposition is correct that s 92 is infringed 
whenever an individual or a corporation is engaged in inter-State trade, commerce or intercourse 
and, either by direct prohibition, or by acquisition with the object, purpose or motive of effecting 
such a prohibition, the carrying on of such business by him or it is forbidden. It is the individual's 
freedom to move from place to place and to conduct his business across State lines that is 
858 protected or guaranteed by s 92 ... 
Barwick believed that he would have 'little difficulty in being able to convince the court that banking 
is part of trade etc and that interstate banking, although dealing with the transmission of intangibles, 
854 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.64. 
855 National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 21. 
856 Sir Richard Moulton Eggleston was a Victorian barrister who later served as a judge of the Commonwealth 
Industrial Court and the Supreme Court of the ACT. Barwick stated that 'Dick has a first class mind, he hasn't 
had, perhaps, all his desserts, and he and I worked out this theory and documented it' (see National Library of 
Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 21). 
857 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.64; Barry Virtue, 
'Barwick has his say on Murphy' (1995) 30(6) Australian Lawyer 17, 23. Under the Banking Act, all private 
banking was prohibited except in the event that the Commonwealth Treasurer allowed it. In Gratwick v 
Johnson (1945) and in the Airlines Case, Latham CJ had subscribed to a distinction between absolute 
prohibition and regulation. Latham CJ had accepted the invalidating operation of section 92 in each of the 
above cases. 
858 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.64. See also Bank of 
New South Wales & Ors v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 231, per Latham CJ. 
176 
is part ofthat interstate trade etc which had the protection of s 92'.859 Whilst Barwick's suggestion 
proved to be correct for the majority, the dissenting judges (Latham CJ and McTiernan J) did not 
reach this conclusion.860 They held that banking was not itself 'trade and commerce' which was 
characterised by the sale and transportation of goods or the movement of people across a State 
border.861 It is in this manner that ~atham CJ addressed the proposition formulated by Barwick and 
Eggleston.862 Barwick had failed to convince latham CJ and McTiernan J of even such a preliminary 
matter for the purposes of his argument.863 latham CJ held that the Act did not infringe section 92, 
but not for the reasons that Barwick had anticipated. Did Barwick spend so much time focusing on 
his fundamental proposition to latham CJ on the broader section 92 issue that he failed to spend 
sufficient time satisfying latham CJ of the fundamentals, including the preliminary question whether 
'banking' could be characterised as 'trade and commerce'? In the analysis of Barwick's presentation, 
it will be evident that Barwick dedicated considerable time to the issue of 'banking', including 
numerous references to US and Canadian authorities, which, it turned out, latham CJ did not find of 
any great assistance.864 
Barwick anticipated latham CJ's conclusion, but failed to convince him and failed to anticipate his 
reasons. However, whilst his preparation was consistent with, and applied, the elements of effective 
appellate advocacy, it is once again a reminder that even exemplary advocacy does not necessarily 
result in a successful outcome in any particular case with a particular judge. Barwick managed to 
convince four of the remaining six judges, however, his inability to convince the two others may 
859 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.64. 
860 Bank of New South Wales & Drs v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 284-290 (Rich and Williams JJ), 305-
309 (Starke J), 380-383 (Dixon J). See generally Caper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian 
Constitution, above n 822, pp.92-93; Lane, A Digest of Australian Constitutional Cases, (5th ed), above n 843, 
p.344; Geoffrey Sawer, 'Bank of NSW v Commonwealth' (1949) 22 Australian Law Journal213, 215. 
861 At 233-235 (Latham CJ), 398 (McTiernan CJ). See generally Co per, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the 
Australian Constitution, above n 822, pp.92-93; Sawer, 'Bank of NSW v Commonwealth', above n 860, 215. 
862 Bank of New South Wales & Drs v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 231, per Latham CJ. 
863 Whilst the majority of the Court accepted Barwick's submission on the appropriate interpretation of section 
92 of the Constitution, Latham CJ and McTiernan J did not. Based on the Court's reasoning, Latham CJ seems 
to be the least consistent with his approach to section 92- in the Airlines Case he held that the legislation 
nationalising the airlines was unconstitutional whilst in this case he held that the legislation nationalising the 
banks was constitutional. This inconsistency appears to result from his characterisation approach. Effectively, 
Latham CJ was able to find that the Banking Act 1947 (Cth) was not 'directed against' interstate trade because 
of his view that banking itself was not trade and commerce (at 233-237, 240). McTiernan J agreed entirely with 
Latham CJ's reasons (at 297-398). See Galligan, above n 781, p.176. In fact, upon his retirement, Chief Justice 
Latham stated that 'when I die, Section 92 will be found written on my heart'. This reflected the frequency 
with which this section of the Constitution occupied his attention during his years on the High Court: see 
Cowen, Sir John Latham And Other Papers, above n 400, p.48 (see also Zelman Cowen, 'Latham, John Greig' in 
Tony Blackshield, Michael Co per & George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia, 
(2001), Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, p.421). See generally Caper, Freedom of Interstate Trade 
under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, p.94. 
864 Bank of New South Wales & Drs v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 233-235, per Latham CJ. 
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reflect the fact that the judges' views were unmoveable, or may be attributable to the quality of the 
presentation of the case. This will be examined in the next few sections. Whichever it was, the result 
also serves to emphasise the differences between exemplary advocacy and advocacy in practice. 
Overall, Barwick's assessment of the likely attitudes ofthe individual judges to the bank 
nationalisation legislation was accurate as evidenced by the Court's decision. A majority, namely, 
Rich, Starke, Dixon and Williams JJ, found the Act unconstitutional on one or more grounds, whilst 
Latham CJ and McTiernan J found that the Act was valid. 
7.2 Presentation and Personation in Chief in the Bank Nationalisation Case 
In February 1948, the scene was set for the eagerly anticipated hearing in the Bank Nationa/isation 
Case. After the considerable preparation undertaken by Barwick from August 1947, he was ready for 
the case to commence. The Act, as we have seen, had attracted considerable controversy and the 
case had generated unprecedented interest. 
The constitutional challenge brought by the banks, in relation to the validity of the Act, commenced 
before the Full Bench of the High Court on 9 February 1948.865 The banks were also joined by the 
three non-Labor State governments, namely Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia. The 
case would become the longest running case in the history of the High Court and would span 39 
days.866 
The case comprised five actions which were brought against the Commonwealth, its Treasurer, the 
Commonwealth Bank and its Governor867 Barwick led the submissions as the leading counsel for the 
plaintiffs. The decision that Evatt868 should lead the case on behalf of the Commonwealth aroused 
considerable controversy for two main reasons. First, he had been a member of the High Court 
865 Latham CJ, Rich, Starke, Dixon, McTiernan and Williams JJ. Webb J was absent as he was the President of the 
International War Crimes Tribunal in Tokyo at the time (see 'Judges of the High Court', Sydney Morning Herald 
(Sydney), 12 August 1948, 1. 
866 Blainey and Hutton, above n 783, p.232; Weerasooria, above n 777, 79; Hull, above n 783, p.26; Ayres, 
above n 50, p.186; Michael Caper, 'The Seven Habits of a Highly Effective High Court' (Paper given at the UNSW 
Constitutional Law Conference, Parliament House, Sydney, 21 February 2003), p.6; Holder, above n 781, p.887. 
867 See Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia 
{High Court of Australia, Latham 0, Rich, Starke, Dixon, McTiernan, Williams JJ, 9 February 1948 to 15 April 
1948), pp 1-3; Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.66. A full list 
of Counsel who appeared can be found in Appendix C. 
868 In light of the fact that the case was being heard in Melbourne and would be lengthy, Dr Evatt, who was 
leading for the Commonwealth, arranged accommodation for himself and his wife at The Windsor Hotel. He 
ordered management to bring to their room a grand piano for his wife to play (see Ayres, above n 50, pp.187-
188). 
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between 1930 and 1940. Secondly, he was the Attorney-General at the time in the Chifley Labor 
government and as such, he was responsible for drafting the Act.869 
This was by far Barwick's biggest case to date. The atmosphere in the courtroom was tense- there 
was ill feeling between the opposing barristers as well as amongst members of the Court.870 
Barwick's advocacy was characteris~d by his unique style and his application of the elements and 
ideals of appellate advocacy. This, it is suggested, contributed greatly to the persuasiveness of his 
submissions in this case. 
In terms of his style, a number of key aspects were critical to his advocacy in this case. Barwick 
outlined his approach for the court in clear terms initially and then periodically referred the court to 
the outline of his submissions. As he moved between his two broad areas of attack and moved 
between his arguments within each broad area, he indicated to the Court where each argument fit in 
the overall context of his general submissions. He also indicated when he was leaving one particular 
argument or submission to progress to the next. This added to, and allowed the Court to follow, the 
logical structure of his submissions. At the start of each sitting day when he resumed making his 
submissions, Barwick summarised the proposition that he was advancing the previous sitting day 
effectively to 'set the scene' again for the benefit of the Court. His advocacy was characterised by his 
ability to utilise answers to judicial questions as a means of conveying his arguments and his 
submissions, and he appeared to move effortlessly between his submissions and answering judicial 
questions. He also employed the use of examples and analogy to great effect to support his 
arguments or to respond to judicial questions. He often used different arguments to support the 
same proposition. 
7.3 Barwick's Opening 
Barwick recalled that, on the opening day, the Court was crowded with Melbourne society as well as 
journalists. However, Barwick was focused on adhering to legal argument and claimed to avoid being 
distracted by the occasion. His focus was on persuading the members of the Court: 
869 Priest and Williams, above n 77, p.53; Ayres, above n 50, pp.187-188. 
87
° For example, McTiernan and Starke JJ were not talking to each other. See Ayres, above n 50, pp.187-188. 
Interestingly, it has been reported that Dixon J apparently disliked Barwick: see Peter Young, 'Melbourne 
Gentleman of the 30s: Owen Dixon- Book Review' in 'High Court Centenary: Sir Owen Dixon' (2003) 77 
Australian Law Journal682, 685. On the first day of the proceedings, after the appearances were announced, 
Evatt objected to Starke and Williams JJ hearing the case due to their interests in the various banks both in 
terms of Starke J's wife holding some shares in the National Australia Bank and the fact that they each held 
accounts with various banks. However, Latham CJ did not support the objection and said that both judges 
were entitled to hear the case, and ruled that these circumstances would not affect a fair and impartial trial: 
see Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above 
n 867, pp.l-7; Marr, above n 8, p.64; Priest and Williams, above n 77, p.53. 
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I was ... determined to keep the argument to legal principle and to ignore the political overtones. 
There was to be no more than a dry legal debate. So I am afraid I disappointed my audience. I 
opened the case in a matter-of-fact way: no rhetoric of any kind, no generalities or throwaway 
lines. The dull approach was, I am sure, disappointing, and it was not long before I lost my 
audience. 871 
Barwick recalled that the presence of journalists suggested that they were waiting for a specific 
quote or statement that they could use for a headline. The journalists present were anticipating 
controversy but were disappointed. One reporter wrote that Barwick had 'made the case sound like 
a minor contest between citizens'.872 Barwick had achieved his objective. In reference to the 
reporter, Barwick stated: 'He little thought how congratulatory I took his description to be'.873 
One of the underlying messages about the use of emotion in advocacy is that an advocate should not 
argue a case with any other purpose in mind than to persuade the members of the court. Apart from 
being contrary to ethical standards, arguing a case with any other purpose in mind is likely to distract 
the advocate from the task at hand. Barwick made reference to this principle specifically in his 
recollection of the opening day of the Bank Nationa/isation Case. He highlighted the importance of 
not being distracted by the overwhelming interest such that it altered the manner in which he 
presented his client's arguments. 
Barwick utilised the opening of the case to outline and summarise the five main arguments on behalf 
of the plaintiffs. These were the five broad grounds of attack outlined earlier in this chapter874 He 
then outlined the manner in which the five broad lines of attack had been allocated amongst the 
871 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.66. 
872 Ibid. See also Virtue, above n 857, 24. 
873 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.66. 
874 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, pp.10-11. In this way, Barwick conceptualised the plaintiffs' case into five general issues: 
The first attack is that the Act is not authorised by any of the Heads of power, by none of the paragraphs of 
section 51 of the Constitution. Probably the four that we envisage are most concerned are paragraphs 13, 
20, 31 and 39. [The relevant powers are: banking, corporations power, the acquisition of property power and 
the incidental power] . 
... in particular it is not a law on the subject of banking at all, and that it could not be said to be a law on any 
of the other three subjects that I indicated by reference to section 51 . 
... The second broad line of attack is that in three radical provisions of it the Act is obnoxious to section 92 of 
the Constitution, and there are three broad sections of the Act -I do not mean this in the sense of 
paragraphs, but of divisions of its operation -that we say are obnoxious to section 92. In the first place, its 
acquisition provisions; secondly, its management provisions- that is to say those provisions which provide 
for management of the banks; and, thirdly, its prohibition provisions. 
The third broad line of attack, in some part covered by the first but not wholly, is that insofar as the Act is 
justified under paragraph 31- that is, the acquisition of property- it does not provide just terms. 
The fourth broad attack is that the Act is an invasion of the constitutional integrity of the States.[The fifth 
broad-line of attack is that] ... the Act is inconsistent with Section lOSA of the Constitution and the financial 
agreements made thereunder. 
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plaintiffs' counsel.875 Barwick indicated that he would make submissions with respect to the 
plaintiffs' arguments in relation to the first two issues: 'it has fallen to myself to present the 
argument on the first attack, that is insofar as it affects paragraph 13 [the banking power] and 
Section 92'.876 The focus in this chapter is therefore on Barwick's advocacy regarding the banking 
power and section 92. 
As Barwick was unable to convince a majority877 of the Court that the legislation was not a law with 
respect to banking (s 51 (xiii)) but was able to convince a majority878 that the acquisition provisions, 
the management provisions and the prohibition provisions were contrary to section 92, this case 
provides a useful contrast between his successful attack and unsuccessful attack. It is an opportunity 
to assess the effectiveness of his advocacy in terms of presentation and personation. 
By a 4-2 majority, the High Court declared that most of the Act was invalid. Rich, Starke, Dixon and 
Williams JJ formed the majority whilst Latham CJ and McTiernan J comprised the minority.879 Rich 
and Williams JJ held that the Act was unconstitutional on every ground that they addressed. They 
did not find it necessary to determine whether it violated the constitutional integrity of the States. 
Latham CJ and McTiernan J found that the Act was valid on every ground except that it infringed 
section Sl(xxxi) in that it amounted to an acquisition of property that was not on 'just terms' in some 
parts. Dixon and Starke JJ agreed with Latham CJ and McTiernan J in relation to all issues except the 
extent of the infringement of just terms and the critical question of section 92. Essentially, Dixon and 
Starke JJ held that large parts of the Act were invalid on the basis that they violated the principle of 
acquisition on 'just terms' but that this was not irreparable, by amendment of the legislation. As a 
result, the decisive issue in relation to the invalidity of the Act was the majority's (namely Dixon, 
Starke, Rich and Williams JJ) ruling on section 92.880 Importantly, all members ofthe majority held 
875 Dr Coppel would deal with section 51(xxxi) whilst counsel for the plaintiffs in the second action (Kitto, Taylor 
and Dean) would deal with grounds 1-3 to the extent they would deem it necessary as well as grounds 4 and 5, 
whilst counsel representing the States in the third, fourth and fifth actions would deal with grounds 4 and 5 
only: see Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 867, p.ll. 
876 1bid; Marr, above n 8, p.64. 
877 Only Rich and Williams JJ agreed with Barwick. 
878 Rich, Starke, Dixon and Williams JJ formed the majority in relation to this issue. 
879 The decision has been criticised. For example, in Justice Ronald Sackville, 'Continuity and Judicial Creativity-
Some Observations', (1997)20(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal145, 165. See also Lane, A Digest 
of Australian Constitutional Cases, (5'' ed), above n 843, p.344. In Michael Kirby, 'Sir Edward McTiernan: A 
Centenary Reflection' (1991) 20 Federal Law Review 165, 178, former Justice Kirby described McTiernan J's 
decisions as 'the least ''pro laissez fa ire" in cases under s 92 of the constitution'. Latham CJ convened a 
conference of all judges in the High Court library to discuss the case and distributed a 57-page memorandum 
outlining the issues which indicated his own preferences and possible counter arguments: see Clem Lloyd, 'Not 
Peace But A Sword!- The High Court Under J.G. Latham' (1987-1988) 11 Adelaide Law Review 175, 187. 
880 Johnston, above n 783, 95; Galligan, above n 781, p.174. See also Hull, above n 783, pp.26-27; see also 
Ayres, above n 50, pp.189-190. 
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that section 46 of the Act contravened section 92 of the Constitution and that the section was not 
severable. 
Barwick indicated to the Court that the most appropriate course was that he 'should first, as it were, 
open the Act- take the Court through the Act and show its precise operation and the inter-
relationship of its parts'.881 That is; it would be necessary for him to outline each individual section of 
the Act. 
Ordinarily, such an approach may be viewed by advocates and commentators alike (as discussed in 
section 4.1) as a failure to effectively conceptualise the case or demonstrate a lack of discretion and 
selectivity. It could cause irritation and frustration amongst the judges. However, according to 
Johnston: 
Barwick ... spent considerable time subjecting the particulars of the legislation to microscopic 
examination. He carefully explained the details including what might happen to employees' 
pension funds, which division of the Commonwealth Bank might purchase the banks' shares, and 
how interstate transmission of bank funds could be affected. These were analysed in a way that 
was calculated to arouse the justices' condemnation of the Act's intrusiveness into the affairs of 
those bastions of private enterprise, the banks. Barwick's subtle dissection of its provisions also 
underscored the uncertainty affecting persons subject to the Act, including the banks' customers, 
shareholders and traders. 882 
As Johnston suggests, this gave Barwick an opportunity to employ language skilfully to effectively 
provide a 'running commentary' on the various provisions of the legislation and attempt to influence 
the judges from the outset. Barwick used a combination of sarcasm, exaggeration and humour to 
great effect and, at one point, he addressed the fact that the legislation applied to Australian assets 
that were situated, or deemed by law to be situated, in Australia.'" Barwick suggested that the 
legislation could only apply to Australian assets in Australia as such legislation would not be 
applicable if it was not referable to Australian subject matter. He submitted:· 'I say it would be 
outside power simply to authorise a distinct business to [be] set-up by the Commonwealth Bank in 
paraguay (sic) having nothing whatever to do with Australia' .884 
881 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, p.12. 'If I might go through the Act, I think it will be convenient to deal with it relevant section by relevant 
section, to see its operation': Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Drs v The 
Commonwealth of Australia, above n 867, p.15. 
882 Johnston, above n 783, 94. 
883 Section 5. 
884 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, pp.21/22. 
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7.4 Barwick's Submissions on Characterisation 
Barwick conceptualised in succinct terms the characterisation test that he believed should be applied 
to determine whether the Act fell within a relevant power of the Constitution, namely: 
The real test is as to whether or, not the Act is within power, in pith and substance and direct 
operation, as distinct from consequential or remote operation of the purpose and so-called object, 
whether "object" used in the loose sense is irrelevant. It is a question of deterining (sic) what is 
the substantive operation of the law. Therefore, it is necessary to examine and scrutinise what in 
fact it authorises and does. 885 
Barwick argued that the legislation attempted to enlist the support of a head of Commonwealth 
power simply by mentioning some aspect ofthe subject matter although it was not in 'pith and in 
substance' a law with respect to that subject matter.886 He referred to sections 22887 and 24888 to 
further emphasise that the head of power under section Sl(xiii) of the Constitution related to 
'banking' and not banks per se 889 
In his reply, Barwick referred again to the test that he had propounded, namely, the 'true nature and 
character' test versus the 'touch and concern' test advocated by Evatt890 He employed Evatt's 
terminology in a slightly humorous way to indicate that the law is not a law with respect to banking, 
even based on Evatt's test: 
The first step is to keep clearly in mind the policy behind a valid law and the question of what you 
consider when you come to consider the true nature and character. This is related very closely to 
the submission of the Attorney-General that the right test for determining the validity of 
Commonwealth legislation is mere relevance- does it touch or concern? At one stage, it did not 
have a tangible touch. I suppose that is an extremely light touch; and it is asserted by the 
Attorney-General that that is different from the true nature and substance test which the Privy 
Council has laid down. He says that it is a different test because he proceeds to deny that the true 
nature and substance is the right test. 891 
885 Ibid, p.lS. 
886 Ibid, p.66. 
887 Barwick stated that section 22, which granted a power to the Treasurer to select any one bank for the 
purposes of being taken over by the Commonwealth Bank, was not necessarily supported by the banking 
power in section Sl(xiii) of the Constitution: see Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and 
Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 867, p.53A. 
888 Barwick referred to section 24 which provided the Commonwealth Bank with the power to require the 
vesting in the Commonwealth Bank of any foreign assets. He suggested that such a provision was not relevant 
to banking or banking in Australia. 
889 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, p.58. 
890 Ibid, pp.1984-1985. 
891 Ibid, p.1980. 
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He took the opportunity to provide the Court with some examples of his argument which would 
increase the persuasive effect of his submission. These examples were intended to highlight the 
inadequacy and width of the test proposed by Evatt and point to Barwick's alternative: 
On this touch and concern test, this would be a good law about banking- that all cheques and 
drafts and all insurance policies 1md proposals should be printed on paper manufactured by the 
Tasmanian Newsprint Pty Limited. That would touch and concern banking and insurance and it 
would be a good law on the touch and concern test. It would be impossible on that test to deny 
that that is a good law. I suppose, if you harked back to another part of the argument, you would 
say that was merely selecting what instruments may be used in banking. That cannot be so, and 
why not so?- only because you must look to the substance of it and determine what is the 
substance and the true nature of the law. 
What of a law that only members of some particular organisation should be entitled to get interest 
on deposits? You could only resolve that as not being a law with respect to banking by looking at 
its true nature, finding out whether there was anything germane to the topic892 
Barwick foreshadowed the increase in the scope of Commonwealth power that would result if such a 
test were adopted, thereby referring the Court to the policy implications associated with accepting 
his opponent's argument. In this way, he also sought to demonstrate that the test he proposed was 
the appropriate test to employ to determine the validity of legislation under the Constitution with 
respect to a particular subject matter. 
Barwick continued his submissions with respect to the test that should be adopted in relation to this 
legislation."" Following a series of questions from Latham CJ aimed at testing Barwick's submission, 
Barwick took the opportunity to reaffirm his main proposition. This was a common tactic he 
employed- that is, repeating his submissions under different guises, with the intention of reinforcing 
his submission without appearing to be repetitious.894 
Considerable time in reply was devoted to the relevant test to determine whether the legislation was 
within the subject matter of the Commonwealth's powers. Barwick relied heavily on Huddart 
Parke?" for the proposition he was propounding. In doing so, he cited authority with care in the 
following submission: 
892 1bid, pp.1984-1985. 
893 Ibid, pp.1988-1989. 
894 Whilst doing so, Barwick suggested that to the extent that the US case of Hammer v Dagenhart contradicted 
the true nature and character of the law test, it cannot be applied. In his view, the decision relied upon by the 
defendants was not appropriate in the context of the Australian Constitution and therefore this case: see 
Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, p.1992. 
895 Huddart Parker Ltd v Commonwealth (1931) 44 CLR 492. 
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The two principal judgments in it both bear the strongest trace of the view I am putting, 
particularly the judgment of Mr Justice Evatt. There is evidence of these two ideas, (1) that you 
take the true nature and character of the law notwithstanding earlier passages to the contrary, 
and (2), that there may be criteria adopted which will put the law outside Commonwealth subject 
matter.896 
Barwick referred to Evatt's comment as a Justice of the High Court in Huddart Parker that '[y]ou must 
look at the true nature and character of the law'. 897 The reference had the benefit of demonstrating 
the inconsistency between Evatt's 'objective' approach as a judge and his 'subjective' approach in his 
role as the defendants' counsel in the present case. Barwick used this technique regularly 
throughout the case to illustrate the inconsistencies in Evatt's approach, seeking indirectly to 
discredit Evatt's arguments, suggesting that, independently, he did not agree with his own 
arguments in the present case. Barwick thus increased the persuasive effect of his own arguments. 
This was a carefully contrived and, it turned out, effective strategy. 
Barwick then took further steps to discredit Evatt's argument in relation to the Huddart Parker case 
by suggesting that Evatt's 'mere relevance test' was not consistent with decisions from the Privy 
Council or with other decisions of the High Court.898 
Barwick devoted a considerable amount oftime in his submissions to outlining what he believed was 
the correct test to apply to the issue of characterisation and discrediting Evatt's submissions on this 
issue. He seemed to belabour the point and his submissions became repetitious. It is evident that 
Latham CJ became frustrated with Barwick's repetition: 'I think you have made your point on it, Mr 
Barwick. I think you have expressed it ... .'899 Barwick reacted to the clear signal from Latham CJ 
and, rather than risking the ire of the Court, used tact and discretion, and moved to another 
submission. 
In his judgment, Latham CJ acknowledged that the phrase 'pith and substance' was frequently used 
by previous authorities, yet he did not believe that it solved any difficulties.900 However, he also 
896 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, pp.1998-1999. 
897 1bid, pp.2000-2004. 
898 Ibid, pp.2004-2005. 
899 Ibid, p.2006. 
900 His view was that: 
when a question arises as to the validity of legislation it is the duty of the Court to determine what is the 
actual operation of the law in question in creating, changing, regulating or abolishing rights, duties, powers or 
privileges, and then to consider whether that which the enactment does falls in substance within the relevant 
authorized subject matter, or whether it touches it only incidentally, or whether it is really an endeavour, by 
purporting to use one power, to make a law upon a subject which is beyond power. 
Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 187, per Latham CJ. 
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added that there would be 'grave difficulties'901 in accepting the Commonwealth's position that a law 
which 'touches and concerns' an authorised subject matter is valid unless it contravenes some 
express prohibition in the Constitution. Latham CJ outlined his characterisation test: 
In determining the validity of a law it is in the first place obviously necessary to construe the law 
and to determine its operation and effect (that is, to decide what the Act actually does), and in the 
second place to determine the relation of that which the Act does to a subject matter in respect of 
which it is contended that the relevant Parliament has power to make laws. A power to make laws 
with respect to a subject matter is a power to make laws which in reality and substance are laws 
upon the subject matter. It is not enough that a law should refer to the subject matter or apply to 
the subject matter ... 902 
This test is not dissimilar to the characterisation test proposed by Barwick and contains traces of 
Barwick's conceptualisation. Latham CJ also indirectly agreed with Barwick's submission that 'you do 
not get subject matter by merely mentioning the subject matter'. 
Rich and Williams JJ accepted Barwick's formulation, based on the authorities, that you are to look at 
the true nature and character of the legislation, that is, 'the pith and substance of the legislation'. 903 
Starke J also agreed.'04 Dixon J and McTiernan J did not specifically address this issue. Therefore, 
Barwick's conceptualisation of the relevant characterisation test seemed to find favour with several 
members of the Court.'05 
Approximately half way through day two of the proceedings, Barwick had concluded his outline of 
the Act. At this point, an issue arose in relation to the reading and tendering of various affidavits. 
Barwick insisted that the Commonwealth should read their affidavits immediately after the plaintiffs 
had read theirs and not during the course of the Commonwealth's submissions as the 
Commonwealth had requested. Presumably, Barwick sought to have the affidavits read at this 
juncture for the purposes of disconnecting the Commonwealth's evidence from its submissions and 
being able to address the relevant issues raised in the Commonwealth's evidence in his submissions 
in chief. 
901 Ibid at 183, per Latham CJ. 
902 Ibid at 186, per Latham CJ. 
903 Ibid at 254, per Rich and Williams JJ. 
904 Ibid at 304 and 311, per Starke J. 
905 As an aside, after dealing with this issue and before outlining the questions they proposed to deal with, Rich 
and Williams JJ commented that the 'cases have been argued at great length and with great care on behalf of 
the plaintiffs and of the defendants'. Whilst the use of the word 'care' suggests that both Rich and Williams JJ 
thought the submissions were well formulated and deeply considered, the reference to the 'length' of the 
submissions may suggest that, in their view, the submissions were unnecessarily lengthy. 
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Barwick's knowledge of both practice and procedure in the High Court and in trials generally, 
together with his courage and his tact are illustrated in the following exchange related to the reading 
of affidavits: 
Starke J: 
Barwick: 
Starke J: 
Barwick: 
Starke J: 
Barwick: 
Starke J: 
Barwick: 
I suppose, strictly speaking, you are not entitled to these documents of the 
Attorney-Genehl's yet. They should be read in his case. If you are leading 
evidence, as on a trial, your business is to put your case. 
This is a trial, Your Honor, in which I have a right of opening, which I exercise. 
In a trial you put in all your evidence, but you do not put in the defendant's 
evidence. 
I do not argue the merits until I have heard all the evidence. 
You do not read all the evidence put in for the Crown. When the 
Attorney-General opens his argument and reads his affidavit, then you would 
object. That is the time to determine it, really. 
With great respect, is not this the situation: this being a trial, before one argues 
questions as to what should be done, the evidence must be closed. To close the 
evidence I should read my affidavits and then the Crown read their affidavits, and 
on the conclusion of the evidence I should then argue on the case. 
He might move to non-suit you. 
He might. However, that is the time to do it, when the evidence is closed, and my 
proposal is, with respect, that the evidence should be concluded before the 
argument finally proceeds. As a matter of convenience, I think it will ultimately 
prove to be the most convenient course. 906 
Barwick succeeded in his quest to have all affidavits read at the same time.907 Interestingly, in this 
exchange, Barwick used Starke J's analogy in relation to 'trial' and made it work in his favour. 
906 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, p.87. 
907 Latham CJ ruled as follows: 
There are some advantages and some objections in either of the courses proposed. We think that on the 
whole the more satisfactory course, at least at this stage, is that counsel shall be allowed to read all the 
evidence subject to objection. When objection is raised it will be for the Court to determine as to whether it 
will then rule upon it or regard the objection as involving matters of substance and so not determinable at 
that stage. 
After hearing what has been said, we determine that all the evidence may be read. It is all admitted subject 
to objection ... 
Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, p.92. 
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It was a small but important victory for Barwick, one that illustrated his knowledge of practice and 
procedure as well as his ability to deal effectively with judicial questions, particularly in the face of 
early resistance. 
7.5 Barwick's First Attack- What is Banking? 
After the process of reading the affidavits was completed, Barwick commenced his principal 
submissions. He used a combination of humour and mild sarcasm to break the monotony following 
the long and tedious reading of the affidavits and to capture the attention of the judges from the 
outset prior to commencing his principal submissions. Barwick stated: 
After reading the affidavits it is almost a pleasant reaction to come back to more mundane 
matters of the actual legal characteristics and the transactions with which we have to deal and 
with which this Act is really concerned 908 
Barwick then outlined the relevance of the affidavits to his two grounds of attack, section Sl(xiii) and 
section 92.909 He suggested that the affidavits did not seem to have 'much bearing' on the first 
matter but were relevant to the second matter, namely, the arguments with respect to section 92. 
According to Barwick, they demonstrated that the plaintiffs' business involved 'trade and commerce' 
and highlighted that a banker's business involved the movement of funds across State lines.910 At 
this point, it became apparent why Barwick had fought so hard to have the defendants' affidavits 
read immediately after the plaintiffs' affidavits- it allowed him to make direct comparisons between 
the parties' respective evidence in relation to his section 92 argument. By doing so, Barwick 
attempted to damage the defendants' defence of the validity of the legislation with respect to 
908 Ibid, p.120. 
909 Barwick started by outlining conceptualised versions of his two main arguments that formed the basis of his 
submissions: 
After all, so far as the arguments I want to present are concerned there are two principal matters. The first is 
a question of power; that is to say: Is there a subject matter under Section 51 of the Constitution upon which 
this is in reality and in substance legislation'? 
The second principal matter is: Whether there is any prohibition in the Constitution against such law- if it 
proves to be a law on the subject matter- and the only relevant section there is Section 92. That is so as far 
as I am concerned; others will deal with other sections. 
Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, p.120. 
910 Ibid, pp.120-121. However, Barwick suggested that the only use of the defendants' affidavits was to confirm 
that the fundamental characteristic of the banker's business was, in relation to the interstate element, to effect 
the movement of something tangible or intangible from one place to another. He noted that the defendants 
referred to this as the movement of 'credit' or 'bank credit' whilst the plaintiffs referred to it this as the 
movement of 'funds'. 
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section 92 from the outset. Marr suggested that Barwick opened the third day 'with a 
characteristically daring attempt to knock the Commonwealth right out of the ring' .911 
Barwick proceeded to deal with the validity of the various sections of the Act and suggested that 
there was an obvious legislative purpose or motive. He was careful, particularly in the face of judicial 
questioning from Starke J, to ensure that the Court understood that his argument was not that the 
particular bank nationalisation scheme was invalid but that various parts of the Act were invalid.'" 
From a tactical perspective, this was a carefully considered strategy and approach. If Barwick were 
unsuccessful in showing that the entire scheme underpinning the Act was invalid, then the entire Act 
would be declared valid. However, the benefit of his approach was that, if he were successful with 
respect to particular sections of the Act but unsuccessful in relation to others, he would have at least 
made significant inroads into the validity of the Act. The valid provisions could not be implemented 
but nor could they be severed as they were in some way dependent or reliant upon the provisions of 
the Act which were held to be invalid.'" 
Barwick outlined his strategy and approach carefully and clearly. This allowed the Court to 
understand the manner in which he would challenge the validity of the various provisions of the Act. 
His strategy provides strong evidence that he had considered the issues in this case at considerable 
length. He outlined his approach as follows: 
The way I wanted to argue it was to take [the sections] separately in the first place as a series of 
separate and quite independent schemes in operation, test each one of them for pith and 
substance as to what it was, and show that each fail, sometimes for one reason and sometimes 
for different reasons ... 914 
Barwick submitted that the word 'banking' in section Sl(xiii) of the Constitution restricted the 
banking power to the 'incorporation of banks' and excluded the idea of incorporating and 
empowering banks to do something. This was consistent with his fundamental 'ground up' 
approach. 
Essentially, Barwick sought to illustrate that the empowering of a bank to buy a share in a bank is not 
a law with respect to banking. Barwick submitted that 'banking' for the purposes of section Sl(xiii) 
'authorises laws which really and substantially bear upon transactions or operations characteristic of 
9
u Marr, above n 8, p.65. 
912 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, p.123. 
913 Barwick's approach can be encapsulated by adopting a war analogy. Barwick believed that it was far better 
to try to put numerous holes in the hull of the ship with smaller missiles, as some are bound to strike the hull of 
the ship causing it to sink eventually, rather than have one shot at the ship with a larger missile. 
914 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, p.124. 
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banker and customer'.915 To further emphasise the point that 'banking' involved transactions which 
gave rise to the relationship of banker and customer, Barwick reminded the Court that in the 
Melbourne Corporation Case one year earlier, all present members of the Court had 'used the 
expression that banking was the business of a banker'916 and he emphasised that the head of power 
was not 'business of banking' but 'banking'. Barwick then sought to establish that the expression 
'business of banking' was to be understood in terms of the carrying out of the operation of banking 
and the performing of transactions. He proceeded to quote passages from each of their judgments 
to demonstrate this and suggested that he did not intend to quarrel with this expression."" He 
sought, in this way, to unite the judges on the meaning of this expression from the outset. 
This technique was shrewd. It reminded all judges of the manner in which they had interpreted the 
expression 'banking' in a case involving similar issues only one year earlier, and appealed to their 
desire to maintain consistency and to achieve fairness and justice. It was also a subtle way of citing 
authority with care. 
Barwick employed various examples to illustrate the scope of the banking power. He submitted that 
the term 'banking' meant that 'there has been an impact upon the characteristic operation of the 
bank and the customer. lfthat is absent, then of course it is not a law with respect to banking'."'" 
Barwick submitted that a central bank, such as the Commonwealth Bank, may engage in banking in 
certain instances, such as where it regulates the lending policy of the banks as this affects the 
relationship of a banker and its customer. Further, he submitted that although the purpose or policy 
related to central banking, this did not necessarily make the subject matter central banking as the 
subject matter was actually banking."'' 
Barwick did not simply read aloud passages from previous cases but indicated to the Court the 
relevance of each case for present purposes. He was also selective and utilised the case law for the 
purposes of substantiating his submissions, not as a substitute for argument. Barwick would refer to 
the central proposition that he sought to establish, namely, the meaning of 'banking' and then the 
various cases which supported his proposition: 
915 Ibid, p.131. 
916 Ibid, pp.131, 135. 
917 1bid, pp.135-136. Barwick noted that each judge in the Melbourne Corporation Case had suggested that the 
"business of banking" involved 'the idea ofthe carrying out, the operation of banking, doing transactions'. 
918 Ibid, p.l33. 
'"Barwick submitted that another example is where a central bank controls interest rates. This regulated how 
much interest a banker may charge a customer and therefore this is classified as banking despite the fact that 
the policy or purpose relates to central banking: see Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales 
and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 867, p.132. 
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Wherever you find in the reports any reference to banking you always find it as reference to a 
transaction or an operation or a business in the sense of the carrying out of transactions. There 
are a number of cases in our own reports where you find some reference and I will give them to 
the Court at this point. 
First of all, there is Tennant and the Union Bank (1894 Appeal Cases, 46). In Walsh and Johnson 
(37 CLR at p.81), one finds Mr. Justice Isaacs saying it is the "operations of banking". 
In the case of the Attorney General for Canada against the Attorney General for the Province of 
Quebec (1947 Appeal Cases, pp. 41 and 42), you have a confirmation of Tennant's case and the 
use of the same language. His Honor Mr. Justice Dixon in Stenhouse and Coleman {69 CLR at 471) 
speaks of "transactions~~ in relation to banking ... 
The Privy Council- as were the Courts below- were satisfied it was deposits in certain banks that 
were the real subject matter of the law. At p.44 this is what the Privy Council says- and this is 
the crux of the case in my opinion: 
"Their lordships cannot but think .... essentially part of the business of banking". 
It was because there was this characteristic of banking present that a law with respect to 
unclaimed moneys passed out of the area of civil rights and was 'banking'. 920 
Barwick's strategy of citing various passages from the Melbourne Corporation Case also illustrated his 
familiarity with the attitudes of the judges to issues that also arose in the present case. He was able 
to adapt and respond quickly to the enquiries of the various judges. In Marr's words: 
He could play on the idiosyncrasies of the court like the conductor of an orchestra. He would 
humour Latham, talk to Rich with patient understanding, and turn the feud between Starke and 
McTiernan to advantage. It was all skilful, unobtrusive and charming. As McTiernan put a 
question, Starke would cut rudely across him with one of his own. Barwick would defer to Starke, 
and then come back to McTiernan's query with a careful show of attention. 921 
At one point, there was a rapid exchange between Latham CJ and Barwick over whether the power of 
a bank to buy shares fell within the definition of banking: 
Latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
920 Ibid, pp.134-135. 
In other words, the power to buy shares, is the power of which a bank is to have 
assets of various kinds to be able to lend money. Is not that within your own 
definition of banking? 
No, of course the power to do it would come under "The Incorporation of Banks". 
921 Marr, above n 8, p.GS. 
Latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
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It may come under that as well. Do not think that I am making an assertion. I am 
asking you if such a provision has not a bearing on the banking business in relation 
to customers. 
One would have to make some reference to what test you would have to use in 
determining the proximity of the bearing. Otherwise, you would have defined in 
pith and substance that that was what it was for. The consequential result of 
relationship would not do. And of course a bank could engage as a tourist agent, 
and it might develop that side too much. It may ultimately effect (sic) some 
relationship. 922 
It appears that Barwick maintained his composure throughout this exchange. Following this 
exchange, there is a reference by Latham CJ to section 12 of the Act which allows the 
Commonwealth Bank to purchase shares in private banks. Barwick responded to Latham CJ's 
questioning by offering two contrasting examples. This appeared to have been an effective response 
since Latham CJ made no further enquiries on this issue. This demonstrates the importance of an 
advocate responding to judicial questioning patiently and courteously. It also demonstrates 
Barwick's ability to be both flexible and tactful. Despite the rigorous questioning of Barwick, in his 
judgment, Latham CJ agreed that the acquisition of a share in a bank by any person (whether a bank 
or not) is not itself a banking operation nor is the purchase by any person (whether a bank or not) of 
assets from a bank923 This example also demonstrates that judicial comments or questions may not 
necessarily indicate a judge's final position on an issue. 
In responding to judicial questions, Barwick utilised the opportunity to reiterate his main proposition 
that 'banking' referred to banking operations. He adeptly wove his main proposition into his 
response to judicial questions at every possible opportunity. The exchange between Barwick and 
Starke J on the meaning of 'banks' and 'banking' demonstrates Barwick's technique in operation: 
Barwick: 
Starke J: 
Barwick: 
Starke J: 
I submit there is no support in that judgment for the notion that "State banking" 
means State banks and that it is correct to read back and say, "Therefore, 
'banking' means 'banks'. That is what Your Honor is asking me, whether I would 
agree to that way of reading it. 
It does mean banking. 
Yes, the banking operations. 
The word "banking" has the same meaning all through. 
922 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, p.141-142. 
923 Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 195. 
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Barwick: Quite true, Your Honor. It means "operations" throughout the whole. 924 
Barwick had the ability to employ an example which was both appropriate and persuasive. He 
frequently used hypothetical factual scenarios not involving banking to demonstrate his point. These 
analogies were intended to be inherently persuasive: 
. 
It is said that a law which authorises one corporation to acquire the business of another 
corporation is a law with respect to banking. If I paraphrased it for the moment to see its full 
extent, I would say, "Let us assume a law that authorises Myer's to acquire the business of Buckley 
& Nunn's". Could you say that was a law with respect to merchandising? 
I suppose one would almost immediately say, "No". It is true that the change in the relationship 
will have some bearing upon merchandising, but the law is a law so far as the subject matter goes, 
in my submission, about companies, or even about particular companies. 
So here when you apply the test I suggest of what banking is, calling attention to the activity of 
banking, then the power to acquire either a share or the business of the other corporation could 
scarcely be described as a law on the subject of the activity which the particular business carried 
on. 
Of course, if it were otherwise one could not say where you would go because a law which 
authorised the Commonwealth Bank to take over a pawnbroking business would immediately be 
said to be either a law about banking or a law about pawnbroking. In very truth, it would be 
neither. It would not be a law about the activity carried on by either party.925 
Barwick's novel and, to an extent, light-hearted reference to pawnbrokers illustrates his point that a 
law with respect to banking does not encompass the ability to nationalise the banks.926 Indirectly, he 
also alluded to the consequences or policy implications of accepting a contrary approach and used 
forceful language to emphasise this: he stated 'one could not say where you would go'. 
At times, Barwick faced rigorous judicial questioning. Generally, he dealt with such questioning in a 
courageous, yet not obstinate manner. He also appeared to maintain his control at all times. Faced 
with a barrage of judicial questions on a particular issue, such as his approach to the interpretation of 
'banking', he did not alter his position nor did he wilt under pressure. One such example is the 
following exchange between Starke J and Barwick: 
924 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, p.lSO. Shortly thereafter, in response to a question by Dixon J, Barwick once again reaffirmed his 
submission on the interpretation of 'banking' by stating '[a] II those things you can see substantially bear upon 
this characteristic of bank and customer relationship': see Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South 
Wales and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 867, p.152. 
925 1bid, p.l57. 
926 See generally Marr, above n 8, p.65. 
Starke J: 
Barwick: 
Starke J: 
Barwick: 
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It is not very relevant to the Constitution, but when the Bank of England was 
nationalised would you not have called that a law relating to banking? 
No, I would not, with respect. 
It is not relevant to this matter but would you not call that a Jaw with respect to, 
or in relation to, banking? 
No, with respect I would not, Your Honor.927 
Barwick was not afraid to correct a judge if he felt his argument had been misunderstood or 
summarised incorrectly. This shows considerable courage but requires tact. An example is where 
Latham CJ attempted to encapsulate Barwick's argument: 
Latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
Your argument appears to reduce the power to make Jaws in respect of banking to 
a power to deal with banking transactions between a bank and a customer. It 
assumes the continued existence of banks; it excludes, so far as this is power to 
legislate on banking, any power to deal with the constitution (sic) or the powers or 
management of any bank- all of that is outside the conception of banking. Does 
that clearly state your argument? 
No, I think Your Honor states it too widely.'" 
At this point, Latham CJ was foreshadowing his ultimate approach to the banking power which 
consisted of a broad interpretation as opposed to Barwick's narrow interpretation. This is discussed 
further below. However, it may indicate that Barwick was not watching the bench and listening 
carefully to Latham CJ's comments in which he was foreshadowing his likely approach. If Barwick 
had detected this, he may have been able to alter his submissions accordingly to address Latham CJ's 
concerns (although it may not have altered Latham CJ's view). This highlights the difference between 
exemplary appellate advocacy and appellate advocacy in practice where it is not always possible for 
an appellate advocate to follow the signals that are being sent from the bench which, with the 
benefit of hindsight, may be obvious. Of course, it remains possible that Barwick did detect this and 
chose not to alter his submissions due to the fundamental nature of this submission or his inflexibility 
Barwick used the width of section 12 of the Act, which allowed the Commonwealth Bank to purchase 
shares in private banks, to illustrate that the law was not a law with respect to the activity of 
banking. It is yet again another restatement of Barwick's main argument.''' During submissions, 
927 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, p.157. 
928 Ibid, p.158. 
929 1bid, p.l65. Barwick stated: 
The point I was making in relation to Section 12 was that when you add the width of operation to the 
particular subject matter- that is to say, the power to acquire a share- the submission is that one is not left 
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Barwick stated that there was no significance to be attached to the fact that it was the 
Commonwealth Bank that was the bank which could purchase the shares of the private banks and to 
which control was to be given or whose business it was sought to be expanded.930 He illustrated this 
proposition by stating that, for example, providing a bank with the power to conduct a hire purchase 
business or a pawnbroking business-could not be classified as banking and therefore merely granting 
the power to a bank to purchase shares did not suggest that it was a law with respect to banking.931 
As much as it is important for an advocate to respond to judicial questioning, an advocate must also 
be conscious that a particular answer to a judicial question may have implications and ramifications 
for the advocate's submissions generally. Therefore, it is important to answer a judicial question 
both honestly and accurately whilst not attempting to evade it. However, it is also important to 
answer cautiously so as to avert danger. McTiernan J inquired as to the validity of a law reducing the 
number of banks from 50 to 10. Barwick was not willing to answer such a hypothetical question and 
he skilfully dealt with it in the following way, knowing that an answer based on pure speculation may 
be damaging to his case. At the same time, he simultaneously reiterated his key proposition: 
McTiernan J: What about the law prescribing the reduction of the number of banks from, say, 
Barwick: 
50 to 10? 
That is a question which I should not have thought could at any time be answered 
in the abstract, because one would have to see whether it was in its nature 
substantially a banking law.'" 
Barwick demonstrated courage when faced with rigorous questioning from Latham CJ who clearly 
disagreed with Barwick in relation to his proposition that the expansion of banking business was not 
a law on the subject of banking.'" Barwick maintained his narrow interpretation of the term 
'banking'. Such a narrow interpretation attracted the attention of the members ofthe High Court. 
Despite considerable judicial pressure, Barwick did not waver. It has been said that '[c]ourage and 
determination are wonderful qualities in advocates' .'34 As Marr states, Barwick 'drew some sharp 
responses from the bench ... but turned them without flinching._.35 
in doubt that the substance of the law is not a law with respect to the activity of banking. Its width 
contributes to that conclusion. 
930 Ibid, p.165. In addition, Barwick indicated that it is only the trading division of the Commonwealth Bank 
which is relevant for the purposes of the Act. 
931 Ibid, p.166. 
932 Ibid, p.169. 
933 1bid, pp.170-171. 
934 Justice Michael Kirby, 'Ten Rules of Appellate Advocacy II', above n 654. 
935 Marr, above n 8, p.GS. 
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Specifically referring to section 46 of the Act, which prohibited the carrying on of banking business by 
private banks, Barwick submitted that on any interpretation of the provision the banking transactions 
cease to be consensual and therefore fall outside of the banking power."' Dixon J informed Barwick 
that he did not quite follow Barwick's point. Barwick understood the implications of this, including 
that other judges may not have graspQd his submission and immediately attempted to rectify this.937 
Following this, Barwick attempted to deal with the issues raised by section 46 as well as section 6 of 
the Act which stated that if any provision was inconsistent with the Constitution then the remaining 
provisions will operate to the full extent that they could operate consistently with the Constitution. 
Starke J remarked that Barwick may have obscured his main submission in attempting to do so. In 
response, Barwick demonstrated discretion and flexibility by opting not to make any further 
submissions in relation to section 6 of the Act so as to ensure that he did not detract from his 
previous submissions.938 
Barwick then proceeded to deal with the definition of 'banking' by referring to the Canadian case-
Attorney-General of Alberta v Attorney-General for Canada.'" In so doing, he quoted a lengthy 
passage from this case.940 This is rare in terms of Barwick's advocacy. He chose to do so on this 
occasion because the passage illustrated and encapsulated his submissions in relation to this issue. 
Whilst this is not consistent with citing authority with care due to the fact that it may cause irritation 
to the judges or may cause them to lose interest, it does highlight that, on occasions, advocacy in 
practice will involve a departure from the strict ideals of appellate advocacy. The critical question is 
whether it is a warranted departure; it is probably justified if quoting a passage at length 
demonstrates a point more clearly than paraphrasing it. 
At this point, Barwick indicated that he would deal with the Commonwealth's affidavits in his reply. 
He cleverly took the opportunity at this time to criticise the affidavits on the basis that they 
contained a misconception. Barwick did this to allow the judges to contemplate this criticism during 
936 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, p.261. 
937 Barwick immediately attempted to rectify this: see Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales 
and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 867, p.264. At this point, Barwick acknowledged that if his 
submissions in relation to the invalidity ofthe acquisition sections of the Act succeeded, then it would not be 
necessary for the prohibition sections of the Act to be found to be invalid. Nevertheless, Barwick attempted to 
cover all his bases: see Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth 
of Australia, above n 867, p.265. 
938 Barwick was able to assess the situation quickly and understood when he ought not to persist with a 
particular argument in light of the fact that it may detract from his other arguments. He promptly concluded 
his attack on the actual sections of the Act: see Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and 
Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 867, p.267. 
939 [1943] AC 356. 
940 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, pp.267-268. 
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the Commonwealth's submissions when the Commonwealth would seek to rely upon these 
affidavits. In doing so, Barwick sought to sow seeds of doubt in the minds of the judges as to the 
probative value of the affidavits.'" 
At this point, Barwick's argument progressed to section 92 of the Constitution which is discussed 
later in this chapter. 
Evatt's submissions on behalf of the Commonwealth consumed 17 days of the 39 day hearing and 
were highly repetitive.'42 According to Barwick, Evatt was: 'anything but a born advocate and his 
delivery was dull and tiresome'.'43 Barwick's assessment was scathing. 
7.6 Barwick's First Attack -In Reply 
The Bank Nationa/isation Case was already one of the longest running cases in Australia's history 
when Barwick rose to address the High Court in reply on day 32. Barwick commenced with a 
941 Ibid, p.268. 
942 On behalf of the Commonwealth, Evatt made the following general submissions in relation to the 
interpretation of the banking power: 
1. the Act is within the Commonwealth's legislative power with respect to banking under section 51(xiii) 
of the Constitution, with respect to financial corporations under section 51(xx) and with respect to the 
acquisition of property under section 51(xxxi); 
2. a primary matter dealt with by the Banking Act 1945 and the Banking Act 1947 is the selection of 
those who shall conduct banking business in Australia, and such a measure is plainly a law with respect 
to banking; 
3. the Act provides machinery for bringing under public ownership or control through the 
Commonwealth Bank the conduct of all banking business in Australia except banking business 
conducted by the States, and a law conferring, as this does, on the Commonwealth Bank the necessary 
powers and functions is within the banking power. 
Evatt argued that the ability to nationalise the banks and prohibit private banking came within the ambit of the 
banking power under the Constitution. See Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v 
The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 867, pp.684-1707. See also Galligan, above n 781, p.173; Ayres, 
above n 50, p.189. 
943 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.66. Evatt's advocacy 
was in stark contrast to Barwick's- Evatt had not practised at the Bar for a considerable period of time prior to 
this case. In fact, he had not argued a case before the High Court for 17 years at the time of this case. 
Interestingly, Dixon J disliked Evatt and had told his Associate, lan Spry, that he considered Evatt to be 
dishonest. Despite this, Evatt targeted his submissions at Dixon J believing that he had the ability to exert the 
most influence on other members of the court: see Peter Young, above n 870, 685; Ayres, above n 50, pp.187-
189. Ellicott recalled attending the Bank Nationalisation Case as a student in Sydney and stated that: 'when I 
went Dr Evatt was addressing the Court and he seemed to be just quoting from constitutional text': Interview 
with Hon. Robert Ellicott QC (Sydney, 8 August 2006). It was said that Evatt 'introduced into the record every 
possible argument': Tennant, Famous Australians- Evatt: Politics and Justice, above n 786, p.228. Ross 
Barwick recalled that his father 'treated Evatt with great disdain during the course of the Bank case ... There 
was a lot of jocularity about Evatt's performance in the Bank case': Interview with Ross Barwick (Sydney, 
4 October 2006). Whilst there is no suggestion that Barwick showed disrespect to Evatt before the Court, the 
references to 'disdain' and 'jocularity' suggest that may have also affected their interaction inside the Court. 
Respect between advocates is a key value of advocacy and the legal profession generally. 
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humorous introduction by indirectly referring to the length of the hearing. His use of humour 
offered the Court a light-hearted moment, and his reference to the length of the hearing no doubt 
resonated with the thoughts of many of the judges. It also ensured that Barwick captured the 
Court's attention from the outset of his reply: 
If the Court pleases: After the length of the hearing I suppose the last speaker is at least received 
with some pleasure. I hope that the time which the last speaker has to devote to answering the 
case put by the other side will not wear out his welcome. 944 
Barwick's reference to the fact that he might require considerable time effectively, but subtly, 
forewarned the Court that his reply would not be short. 
After capturing the Court's attention, Barwick outlined from the outset the structure of his reply and, 
in the course of doing so, he criticised the defendants' arguments with some specifically chosen 
language: 
There is a great number of matters to be dealt with in answering a very long, but not always 
coherent, argument put by the defendants. I do not propose to go through the transcript to find 
all the contradictions in the argument. It would not be hard to do. Nor do I propose to deal with 
assertions rather than argument, assertions which only have to be heard, and certainly only have 
to be read, to be denied .'45 
Barwick summarised the defendants' arguments and reduced them to their simplest form whilst 
capturing their essence. This is another example of Barwick's great strength- his ability to 
conceptualise the defendants' arguments in such a simple manner. This provided Barwick with the 
opportunity to illustrate to the Court the consequences of accepting the defendants' arguments: 
Of course the argument for the defendant was a very strong endeavour to increase, beyond 
anything probably that any of us has ever heard suggested, Commonwealth power. It was done 
by an attempt to widen the rules of interpreting the constitution; denying that there are any 
implications from the Federal structure of it; suggesting that the power was plenary, and using 
that word or placard in the sense that there were no bounds to the power; denying that you could 
find any limitation in the particular paragraphs of Section 51; denying that there was an inter-
action between the paragraphs, although at a later stage suggesting that there were inter-acting 
paragraphs; and, having got the meaning of the paragraphs, then attempting to widen the 
application of the law by denying that the real and substantial nature of the law need by (sic) 
looked at .. .'46 
944 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, p.1854; see also Marr, above n 8, p.67. 
945 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, p.1854. 
946 1bid, pp.1854-1855. 
198 
Barwick's suggestion that the interpretation of Commonwealth power that the defendants were 
proposing was more extreme than anyone was likely to have heard before, was an attempt to, 
through the use of language, introduce the 'fear factor' and associate accepting the defendants' 
submissions with venturing into unknown territory thereby also referring to the policy implications 
associated with the Commonwealtlol's position. 
The approach Barwick adopted in the early stages of his reply was indicative of a greater emphasis on 
the policy implications associated with accepting the Commonwealth's submissions. It appears that 
he deliberately chose this at this stage rather than in chief as the Court had now heard the 
Commonwealth's arguments. At this point, it was much easier for Barwick to paint a picture of the 
consequences of accepting the Commonwealth's submissions. It also allowed him to do so without 
the defendant being in a position to respond -giving him the 'last say' advantage. It also illustrates 
his acknowledgment of the importance of addressing the policy implications of accepting a particular 
argument, or set of arguments, and that this is likely to be a strong consideration for the members of 
any appellate court. Barwick stated: 
The noticeable thing about the defendants' argument was a complete refusal to face the 
operation of this Act, a preference to resort to generalities. In particular, there was never a facing 
up to what conclusions flow from giving to the Treasurer the unlimited discretion he has in the 
operation of the various sections. 
There was no endeavour to face up to what I call the minimum operation of the Act. There was no 
endeavour to face up to what will be the operation of this Act in the future and in changed 
circumstances. There was an endeavour to determine the validity of this Act by reference to the 
effects that happen to be here at present. 947 
Barwick sought to alert the Court to the dangerous consequences of providing the Treasurer with 
unlimited discretion under various sections of the Act and the possibility that this discretion could be 
abused by a future government. He specifically alluded to the operation of section 46(4) of the 
Act.948 
947 Ibid, p.1856. 
948 Barwick submitted: 
Section 46(4) is a law which enables [the Treasurer) to choose which bank shall be prohibited and when you 
see that he may use it concurrently or alternatively to the other parts of the Act, the real nature of his 
discretion is disclosed. He can say, for example, "As to Bank A and Bank B, I have some reason to prefer 
them. It has nothing to do with banking. They are all the same as far as banks are concerned. There is no 
banking reason that would differentiate one from the other, but I like the directors of Bank A and I think that 
the shareholders are more meritorious, so I will acquire them and they will get compensation. I do not like 
the other people. They have not been kindly towards me, so I will simply prohibit them". 
Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, p.1964. 
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Barwick was critical of the defendants' submission that section 46 was capable of standing alone, 
that is, the other provisions of the Act could be severed from it. He highlighted the adverse policy 
implications that would flow from accepting this submission.949 This issue was the focus of the 
Commonwealth's appeal to the Privy Council which is discussed in the next chapter. 
The severability of section 46 from the remainder of the Act was a constant issue during the early 
stages of Barwick's reply. The following extract illustrates Evatt's attempts to prevent Barwick from 
addressing the Court further on this issue: 
Evatt: I would refer the Court to p.46 of the transcript about the way it was put in chief 
[referring to section 46]. 
Barwick: There is no doubt about the way I put it in chief. I avowedly said in chief that I 
was going to treat them as severable because of the presence of Section 46, in 
order to enable presentation of the matter. I submitted- and it was submitted by 
others as well as by myself- that it was inseverable. I am now pointing out that 
the defendants never faced up to the difficulties.'" 
This example illustrates the difficulty associated with the reply; a plaintiff's advocate can only raise 
issues which arise from the defendant's submissions and is not able to make fresh submissions so as 
to bolster their submissions in chief. Barwick was aware of the parameters of a reply and, in 
response to this suggestion, he was quick to indicate that he was not departing from his earlier 
submissions but simply identifying problems associated with the defendants' submissions."' In this 
way, Barwick was able to continue with his submissions and also surreptitiously expand upon his 
submissions in chief. This is an example of Barwick 'trailing his coat'. As discussed earlier, this is 
viewed by many as a questionable technique, and it provides a useful contrast between the ideals of 
appellate advocacy and appellate advocacy in practice. Barwick occasionally employed techniques 
and strategies that were available to provide him with a competitive advantage. 
949 Barwick submitted as follows: 
The other noticeable feature was that there was a desire to maintain Section 46 as an independent provision 
at all costs ... That is a very peculiar thing when you look into it; because if the whole of this Act were to go 
and only Section 46 were left you would have such an extraordinary result; you would have no provision for 
the salvage of the bank or the customer or the staff or the assets of the banks; and yet there is a very 
determined endeavour to support Section 46 as an independent and permanent section, when it could never 
be put to any use that one can think of as a proper kind. 
It could be used as a very dangerous bargaining weapon to force people into a sale, or to play one bank off 
against another; but it could have no relation to anything else in this Act as it now stands. 
Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, p.1856. 
950 Ibid, p.1870. The suggestion by the defendants that the valid provisions of the Act could be severed from 
the invalid provisions as stated in section 6 met with opposition by Barwick. 
951 Ibid. 
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Through the use of analogy, Barwick attempted to illustrate the policy implications if one were to 
accept the defendants' 'fallacy', namely, there would be no limit on the Commonwealth's power and 
the Commonwealth could slowly encroach upon other areas: 
That is the fundamental fallacy that has been present in all that has been said by the defendant, 
Your Honor. These are the steps"by which you could slip into such a fallacy: the bank of NSW has 
a tourist agency. The Commonwealth Bank can be given power to be as good as the Bank of NSW. 
If it can be given power to be as good, I suppose it can be given power to be better, so instead of 
having a tourist agency it could have a tourist steamer, and when it has a tourist steamer it is in 
shipping- and then it can take all the ships. There is no limit to it. 
Of course, the answer is "Do not be logical" (sic}. But that is a very poor answer, even from the 
defendant. 952 
Here we find an example of Barwick's 'acid tongue' which could be observed from time to time. 
Images of chaos and anarchy were also evoked when Barwick employed powerful language to 
describe the situation that would arise if the Court accepted the defendants' submissions and 
prohibited the carrying on of banking business by private banks in Australia: 
It does not, I submit, need very much imagination to see what chaos would be caused by the 
exercise of powers under such a law because then there would be no provision, for example, for 
the customers to deal with their current transactions -I suppose all the cheques would have to be 
dishonored (sic), there would be no provision of the Commonwealth Bank to get the records of 
the other bank if the customer desired to shift his account; there would be no provision for staffs, 
no provision in respect of assets and you would have chaos.953 
Shortly after, in response to a question by Williams J, Barwick repeated his point: 
Williams!: 
Barwick: 
If all the banks were closed down at once under Section 46(4), it would become 
impossible for the Commonwealth Bank to handle the business? 
Quite. There would be chaos.954 
Barwick used every opportunity to remind the Court of the 'chaos' that would result if the 
defendants' submissions were accepted, including in his responses to judicial questions or 
comments. Barwick employed strong language955 and repetition effectively to emphasise a point, not 
952 Ibid, p.1872. 
953 Ibid, p.1875. Accepting the defendants' submissions, Barwick suggested, would pose a danger to stable, 
open and accountable government and democracy generally in Australia: see Transcript of Proceedings, The 
Bank of New South Wales and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 867, p.1881. 
954 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, p.1882. 
955 Sometime later in his submissions, Barwick once again raised the policy implications of the legislation in an 
indirect way by employing an analogy. Barwick referred to these policy implications by using powerful 
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in a deliberately repetitive way but in what appears an almost subliminal way. This technique may 
have had an inherently persuasive effect. For example, at one point in his judgment, Justice Starke 
refers to trade and commerce being reduced to 'chaos' if section 46 was allowed to operate.956 
In his reply, Barwick summarised his submission in chief in relation to the banking power and then 
addressed the issues raised by the defendant. At one point, Starke J made a humorous remark to 
Latham CJ. Barwick continued temporarily with a humorous tone to participate in the light-hearted 
moment among his serious submissions: 
Latham CJ: 
Starke J: 
Barwick: 
And there is a great deal of talk about cheques being as good as bank notes. 
Everybody knows that they are not. 
They are often better! 
They might be, too; it depends where they are drawn.'" 
Following on from this, Barwick posed a question for the members of the Court designed to provoke 
thought and, in doing so, to convey the relevant test which, according to him, should be applied in 
this case: 
Can a law which gives that discretion be said to be a law with respect to banking, if the real test is 
the true nature and character of the law and not, as is suggested by the Attorney-General, a law 
that merely touches upon or incidentally concerns the topic of banking?958 
He outlined two classes of American decisions with which he would be dealing. The first class, 
Barwick suggested, would demonstrate the width of the banking power of the Commonwealth and 
the second class related to the issue of a law on the subject matter.'s9 Barwick sought to 
demonstrate that the first class of cases relied upon by the defendants was 'not founded upon any 
matter of banking, as banking law or banking power','60 but was founded on an incidental power and 
therefore was not relevant to the present case.961 On several occasions, Dixon J indicated that he 
was having difficulty understanding Barwick's argument. Barwick responded to this judicial concern 
immediately and summarised his argument for Dixon J's benefit. It is clear that Barwick recognised 
the importance of addressing any difficulties or concerns faced by any member of the Court.962 
language like 'crazy' to illustrate his point: see Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors 
v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 867, p.2013. 
956 Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 324, per Starke J. 
957 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, p.1952. 
958 Ibid, p.1965. 
959 Ibid. 
960 Ibid. 
961 Ibid. 
962 Ibid, pp.1970, 1975. 
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Following a comment, this time by Starke J that he did not understand part of Barwick's argument, as 
well as concerns expressed by Latham CJ about Barwick's argument, Barwick demonstrated both 
honesty and candour by suggesting that he had not expressed himself in a manner that the Court 
could understand. At one point, Barwick stated '[t]hat is the argument, Your Honor, but evidently 1 
have not made something plain' .963• Whilst advocates might routinely make such admissions 
generally, it is worth noting that Barwick was prepared to do so also. 
Barwick continued to encounter difficulties with respect to his arguments on the first class of 
American cases. He appeared to realise this as he promptly concluded his submissions on this issue 
stating: 'I do not wish to say any more about that group of cases' .964 Persisting may have caused the 
justices to become frustrated and irritated. Whilst this demonstrates Barwick's flexibility, discretion 
and tact, it may also reflect his inability to effectively convey his submissions regarding these cases to 
the Court. 
Barwick proceeded to make submissions with respect to section Sl{xiii) of the Constitution, namely 
the banking power. Latham CJ 965 and Starke!"" separately questioned Barwick on his submissions. 
At one point, Latham CJ described Barwick's argument as 'farfetched'.967 This put Barwick under 
considerable pressure. He held his ground: 
Barwick: 
Latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
963 Ibid, p.1976. 
964 Ibid, p.1978. 
So Government participation under "banking" cannot be a banking reason, in my 
submission, because of the presence in paragraph (xiii) of "incorporation of 
banks". 
In the trade and commerce power the Court was able to say in the Airlines Case 
that the incorporation of a body giving it power to trade was trade and 
commerce. But you could not say that the incorporation of a bank and the giving 
to it power to trade was banking, because you have "incorporation of banks" in 
the paragraph. 
You would be able to say it was incorporation of a bank and then you would say, I 
presume, "These banks have already been incorporated, so this Act cannot apply 
to them". Is not the argument you are presenting now rather far fetched? 
No, Your Honor. The "incorporation of banks" being expressed in paragraph (xiii). 
notwithstanding what was said by the Attorney-General he simply "put the 
telescope to Nelson's eye11 so far as those words were concerned. 
965 Ibid, pp.2018-2019. 
966 Ibid, p.2020. 
967 Ibid, pp.2018-2019. 
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There may be overlapping sometimes but when you have the express provision in 
that form, then it goes outside "banking". What was done in the Airlines Case 
with respect to banking would have to be done under "incorporation of banks". 
Therefore the bringing of the Government into the field is not banking within the 
meaning of the first word in paragraph (xiii). It is within the whole paragraph, but 
. 
because it comes within the other words. I mention that particularly in answer to 
His Honor Mr Justice Dixon. 968 
Nevertheless, the comments from Latham CJ should have caused Barwick some concern about the 
prospects of his submissions on this issue. As it turned out, such concern would have been justified. 
Shortly thereafter, Barwick moved to address the Court on the final issue submitted by the 
defendants in relation to section 46 and the definition of 'banking' ."69 From the outset, Barwick 
utilised his ability to conceptualise the case in simple terms by summarising both the plaintiff's and 
defendants' competing views as follows: 
First of all, the plaintiff says "You cannot prohibit", and, on the other hand, "You must look at the 
true nature and character of the law", and there is no criterion at all specified for the operation of 
Section 46(4). 
If there is, it is Section 3, and that has nothing to do with banking as the plaintiff suggests it should 
be defined. So the plaintiff, as a sort of last step in his argument, has resort in the attack on 
Section 46 to the definition of "banking". 
Looking at it from the defendant's point of view, the defendant says, "We can prohibit for any 
reason or no reason", and he uses the American and Canadian cases and the various things I have 
dealt with. On the other hand, as a second line of defence, the defendant says, "If we have to 
have a banking reason, we have one, and the banking reason is Section 3(a). That is to say, 
Government participation and not private profit."970 
Barwick emphasised the contrast between the plaintiffs approach to the definition of 'banking' and 
the defendants' approach. He presented the plaintiff's approach as simple and robust, as opposed to 
the defendants' approach which was flexible and broad to the point that it almost did not provide 
any indication or any assistance as to what 'banking' meant. Barwick suggested that the defendants' 
used whichever definition of 'banking' suited them, and that their approach was illogical and 
laughable. Barwick added cynicism and contempt to discredit the defendants' approach: 
The defendant's answer to that follows these steps broadly, without going into detail for the 
moment: he says that banking is whatever bankers do, and he does not stop to give us any clue as 
968 1bid. 
969 Ibid, p.2052. 
970 Ibid, pp.2052-2053. 
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to what is a banker. It immediately leaps to mind that that statement does not tell us anything. 
But he does not stop there. He says that banking is whatever bankers do provided it is not too 
remote from banking, never having bothered to tell us what banking is. We have no test as to 
how to find out whether it is too remote. He says that it includes everything that is auxiliary to 
banking. We still cannot tell what is auxiliary until we know what is banking. 971 
Barwick continued his attack employing a metaphor to great effect to further discredit the 
defendants' approach: 
What the defendant proffers is a complete circle. You just run around like the dog chasing its tail; 
you never find out what banking is. The very use of the word must mean that there is something 
characteristic. There must be some means by which you can determine who is a banker.'" 
Barwick then referred to the Memorandum titled 'Banking' handed up to the Court which outlined 
the defendants' position on the issue of 'banking'. He indicated that he would like to go through this 
document with the Court 'to show the Court what I have been putting and to show the fallacy of 
what is put by the defendant'.'73 Latham CJ was confused as to whether the other Memorandum 
titled 'Functions of Banking' belonged to the plaintiffs or the defendants. The following exchange 
illustrates Latham CJ's use of humour as well as Barwick's wit in his reply, which suggested that it was 
patently obvious that the Memorandum belonged to the defendants from merely reading it, such 
was the weak nature of the defendants' argument: 
Latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
The memoranda of one side should be printed in red ink and that of the other in 
green ink so that we should be able to distinguish between the gospel and the 
false writings! 
It would not rest with me to say it, Your Honor, but I would attempt to say that 
one only has to read them to see which side they come from. The next sentence 
in this document is perhaps a symptom of it.'" 
Barwick read various extracts from the Memorandum and then commented: 'One has only to stop to 
see how foolish that is';975 'That is a statement of somebody who is living in a world of fantasy'; 
'There is not the slightest shred of evidence of all this';976 and '[t]hat is just too absurd for words'.'77 
971 Ibid, p.2054. 
972 Ibid, p.2055. 
973 Ibid, p.2056. 
974 Ibid. 
975 Ibid, p. 2063. 
976 Ibid, p.2064. 
977 Ibid, p.2065. 
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He then concluded his submissions in reply with respect to section 46 and took the opportunity to 
summarise his submissions.978 
7.7 The High Court's Vie""! on Banking 
While Starke, Rich and Williams JJ agreed with Barwick's formulation for determining whether a law 
was 'with respect to' a particular topicfor the purposes of section 51 of the Constitution and Latham 
CJ provided tacit support (Dixon J and McTiernan J did not specifically address this issue), only Rich 
and Williams JJ were convinced by Barwick's argument that the Act was not a law with respect to 
banking. The remaining judges rejected Barwick's submissions on this issue. 
Latham CJ accepted the defendants' submission that 'banking' included central banking and, 
although accepting Barwick's submissions that the banking power allows the Commonwealth to 
make laws with respect to transactions between banker and customer, he did not believe that it was 
limited to these matters alone. The differing approaches can be traced back to an exchange between 
Latham CJ and Barwick during the hearing. It could be suggested that Barwick's failure to detect 
Latham CJ's reservations with his approach is attributable to a failure to listen carefully to Latham 
CJ's comments or possibly even the result of arrogance or over-confidence. If detected, Barwick 
would have had to address Latham CJ's concerns within the broad parameters of his own approach. 
However, Latham CJ did not agree with the defendants' contention that the creation, expansion and 
contraction of credit constituted the essence of banking.979 While Latham CJ agreed with Barwick's 
submission that the acquisition of a share in a bank or the purchase of assets from a bank by any 
person (whether a bank or not) were not of themselves banking operations and that the taking over 
of the business of another bank probably would not be described as a banking transaction, he stated 
that a law which controlled such matters was a law dealing with the business of banking 'because 
such matters affect the conduct and control of the business and are things which may be done from 
time to time in the course of the business of banking, although they are not banking transactions 
978 Barwick stated: 
That completes what I want to say about 46 viewed as a separate enactment. I have endeavoured to cover 
the various answers that were made by the Attorney-General to our propositions, and I have referred to what 
little use was made of his definition of "banking" in the argument with respect to 46, but if there is some use 
of it which is possible to be made that I have not discovered, then my submission is that it is not a definition 
at all; it is of no aid; it suffers several confusions of thought and the Court cannot derive any benefit in 
particular from this memorandum that is put in about banking. 
Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, p.2070. 
979 Bank of New South Wales & Ors v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 194, per Latham CJ. 
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between a banker and a customer'.980 He added that a law dealing with the management and 
staffing of banks would be a law relating to essential elements in the business of banking though not 
dealing with any transactions between any bank and any customer' .981 This view was shared by 
Starke, Dixon and McTiernan JJ. 982 
The approach adopted by Rich and Williams JJ was heavily influenced by the text of section 51{xiii).983 
Rich and Williams JJ concluded that: 'laws with respect to banking are not therefore laws which deal 
with the incorporation, regulations and winding up of banks, but are laws with respect to the 
conduct of the business carried on by banks' .984 They added that: 'Laws with respect to the conduct 
of the business of banking are laws which operate on persons and corporations while engaged in that 
business'.985 
The references in the conclusion reached by Rich and Williams JJ to the 'conduct of the business', as 
outlined in these statements, can be traced back to Barwick's submission that the term 'banking' 
means that 'there has been an impact upon the characteristic operation of the bank and the 
customer'986 and that the expression 'business of banking', as used by all the judges in the Melbourne 
Corporation Case, was to be understood in terms of the carrying out of the operation of banking and 
the performing of transactions.987 
7.8 Barwick's Second Attack - Section 92 to the Rescue 
On day six, Barwick turned his attention to his argument with respect to section 92 of the 
Constitution. Barwick had led the successful section 92 arguments in the Airlines Case and the 
980 Ibid at 195, per Latham CJ. 
981 Ibid. 
982 1bid at 302, per Starke J; at 334, per Dixon J; at 393, per McTiernan J; Sawer, 'Bank of NSW v 
Commonwealth', above n 860, 214. 
983 Namely, the Commonwealth has the power to make laws with respect to: 'Banking, other than State 
banking; also State banking extending beyond the limits of the State concerned, the incorporation of banks, 
and the issue of paper money'. 
984 Bank of New South Wales & Ors v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 258, per Rich and Williams JJ. 
985 Ibid at 260, per Rich and Williams JJ. 
986 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867, p.133. 
987 Rich and Williams JJ placed considerable emphasis on the text of the Constitution in relation to s 51(xiii) as 
Barwick had done in his submissions which involved developing arguments based on the text of the 
Constitution itself. However, in their reasoning, Rich and Williams JJ placed greater reliance on an analysis of 
the interpretation of 'State banking' to extrapolate from this an approach to apply to the interpretation of 
'banking' generally whereas Barwick relied on the fact that the word 'banking' in section 51(xiii) of the 
Constitution restricted the banking power to the consensual relationship between bank and customer and the 
'incorporation of banks' such that it excluded the idea of incorporating and empowering banks to do 
something. 
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Melbourne Corporation Case and recognised the potential to use section 92 to strike down crucial 
parts of the legislation in the Bank Nationalisation Case. As explained in the context of Barwick's 
preparation, Barwick sought to operate within the existing decisions recognising that any radical 
departure was not likely to be accepted by the High Court. His argument would hinge on the 
proposition that the Act imposed arl absolute prohibition on banking and went beyond mere 
regulation. 
Barwick would proceed on the basis that the 'Transport Cases' and the 'Marketing Cases' were 
irrelevant to the result of the present case and therefore he had reasons for not attacking them.988 It 
appears that one of the primary reasons for not attacking the 'Transport Cases' and the 'Marketing 
Cases' was a strategy to distinguish the present case from those cases. In this way, Barwick would 
avoid the apparently irreconcilable reasoning in those cases being applied to the present case. Also, 
it appears that it was Barwick's view that attacking the 'Transport Cases' and the 'Marketing Cases' 
was more likely to lead to a more uncertain result than that which would arise if his proposed 
approach was successful. In this way, Barwick would also avoid, to the extent possible, embroiling 
the present case in the section 92 quagmire that existed following these cases. Instead, his approach 
rested on 'developing strands from earlier judgments, to advance a view ofthe 'individual right' of a 
trader to engage in interstate commerce unrestrained by undue government interference'.'"' 
Barwick indicated the sections that in his view were obnoxious to section 92.990 
He indicated that he would present the argument on two alternative bases in the event that the 
Court had a different view of the application of section 92. He submitted: 
The first basis is on the assumption, which I will deal with as a separate topic, that a banker who 
engages in the business of banking is engaged in inter-State trade and commerce and intercourse. 
988 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, pp.64-65. 
989 Johnston, above n 783, 85. The earlier judgments referred to were: Fox v Robbins (1909) 8 CLR 115 at 126; 
James v Cowan (1930) 43 CLR 386, approved by the Privy Council (1932) AC 542; 47 CLR 386; Peanut Board v 
Rockhampton Harbour Board (1933) 48 CLR 266. This case included four members of the present Court, 
namely, Rich J at 277, Starke J at 283, 285, Dixon J at 287 and McTiernan J at 313. See Bank of NSW v 
Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 22-23. 
990 Division 4 of Part IV in relation to the taking over of the business of the private banks, section 46 in relation 
to the prohibition of banking business by private banks, sections 13-21 in relation to the acquisition of assets 
and Division 3 of Part IV in relation to the management of private banks. From the outset, Barwick identified 
the limitations in relation to the application of section 92 but indicated that such problems did not arise in the 
context of this case: 
A number of problems that can arise in connection with the application of Section 92 do not, of course, in my 
submission arise in this case- questions as to whether or not any given law goes to the extent of burdening 
or hindering rather than regulating trade and commerce or intercourse. That question does not arise here, 
because in each of those sections or parts to which I have referred on analysis, there is a direct prohibition; 
and it is mere prohibition, or it is acquisition with a view to prohibition, or it is management with a view to 
complete control. 
Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
867,.p.278. 
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Granted that view there would be in my submission no need to canvass or consider or suggest a 
disturbance of any of the decisions on Section 92. 
1 want to present in the alternative and shortly an argument that if a banker carrying on a business 
is said not to be engaged in trade and commerce and intercourse, yet these provisions are 
obnoxious to Section 92 because their necessary effect is to render the trade of inter-State traders 
-persons dealing in goods strictly- unfree.'" 
The attack was supported in two ways: first, on the view that in carrying on banking business the 
banker is engaged in trade, commerce and intercourse and that the Act prevents them from doing 
so; secondly, on the view that a banker's customers, as traders in goods, were deprived of their 
freedom because they were compelled by government authority to use only the government 
facilities. 
Barwick then proceeded to 'go to the simple and direct approach to the problem on the first 
point' .'92 He attempted to suggest that the Commonwealth Parliament was motivated by its desire 
to prevent private banks from carrying on banking business. This raised the evident ire of Starke J 
who suggested that it was the operation of the legislation that was relevant and not the object or 
purpose. While Barwick did not disagree, he suggested that if the object was relevant then it would 
be in relation to his arguments on section 92.993 Despite the rebuke Barwick received from Starke J, 
he continued with this line of argument and showed courage in doing so.'94 
He also foreshadowed the crucial role that the Airlines Case was to play in his submissions: 
Barwick: Once determined that the business of banking (that is the most important thing) is 
trade, commerce and intercourse and that those who are engaged in it are 
engaged in trade, commerce and intercourse, and these things I am saying will 
lead ultimately to the Airlines case which will be, in my submission, decisive of the 
matter- if it is decided that the banker in carrying on the business of banking is 
engaged in interstate trade and commerce. 995 
Barwick's approach was simple- establish that a banker, in carrying on the business of banking, was 
engaged in interstate trade and commerce for the purposes of section 92 and then rely on the 
principle in the Airlines Case. The Airlines Case involved nationalisation and therefore had obvious 
application to the Bank Nationalisation Case. 
991 Ibid, p.279. 
992 Ibid. 
993 Ibid, p.280. 
994 1bid. 
995 Ibid, p.281. 
209 
The Airlines Case 
In 1945, the Chifley government had introduced the Australian National Airlines Act 1945 (Cth) ("the 
ANA Act") which attempted to nationalise the interstate and territorial airlines as well as establish an 
airline owned by the Commonwealth government.'" The legislation was challenged. 
In what became known as the Airlines Case,997 the Commonwealth relied on the 'Transport Cases'998 
as the basis for the survival of the airline nationalisation plans. The 'Transport Cases', which were 
heard in the 1930s, had allowed the States to restrict interstate trucking, and in some instances, ban 
interstate trucking completely, in order to protect their railways from competition. The High Court 
upheld such restrictions and/or bans.'" 
Australian National Airways Pty Ltd retained Barwick to challenge the validity of the ANA Act. It was 
apparent to Barwick that the principal basis for any such challenge rested with section 92 of the 
Constitution. This case began a long-standing affiliation between Barwick and section 92. As Marr 
says, he 'was to become the great advocate of the hidden and extraordinary powers of those words 
[referring to the words in section 92], the patron of section 92'. 1000 Barwick had already had some 
experience with the scope of this section due to his involvement in the preparation of one of the 
'Transport Cases' .'001 
996 1t provided for all other interstate and territorial airlines to be subject to a licensing regime which was at the 
discretion of the government. Prime Minister Chifley had indicated that it was the intention that eventually the 
licences of all private airlines would be withheld and the government airline would then effectively have a 
monopoly in the market. To achieve its aim of a monopoly over interstate airline services, the government 
relied on a regulation under the Air Navigation Act 192D-1936 as well as the introduction of the ANA Act. Trans 
Australia Airlines (TAA) was the government-owned airline: see Coper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the 
Australian Constitution, above n 822, p.90. See also Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & 
Recollections, above n 1, p.51; Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law (1929-1949), above n 143, pp.160, 
168. According to Sawer, it was the socialist side of Labor policy which was reflected in its decision to establish 
a government airline. See also Menzies, The Measure of the Years, above n 203, pp.l37-138. 
997 Australian National Airways Proprietary Limited & Drs v Commonwealth & Drs (1945) 71 CLR 29. 
998 Willard v Rawson (1933) 48 CLR 316; R v Vizzard; Ex parte Hill (1933) 50 CLR 30; D Gilpin Ltd v Commissioner 
for Road Transport & Tramways {NSW} (1935) 52 CLR 189; Riverina Transport Pty Ltd v Victoria (1937) 57 CLR 
327. 
999 Marr, above n 8, p.46. 
1000 Ibid, p.45. Barwick was approached by Jerry Walsh, a partner in Malleson Stewart (a firm of solicitors in 
Melbourne) to provide a written opinion on the validity of the ANA Act. In the initial conversation with the 
partner from the firm, Barwick was surprised that the firm was seeking an opinion as it was his view that the 
ANA Act was clearly invalid: see Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 
1, p.52; National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 18-19. Mr Walsh 
stated that he had 30 opinions that did not agree with Barwick's view that nationalisation was prohibited to 
which Barwick responded 'I can't help that'. Barwick believed that it was because he had been so firm about it 
he was given the leading brief in the Airlines Case (see National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir 
Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 19). 
1001 Barwick worked with Percy Spender in the preparation of Duncan v Vizzard; Green Star Trading Co Pty Ltd v 
Vizzard (1935) 53 CLR 493 although he did not appear in the case. See Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield 
Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.51. 
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In essence, the High Court held that, in relation to airline services between States, the ANA Act in 
general was a law with respect to trade and commerce among the States, within the meaning of 
section 51(i) of the Constitution.1002 That is, the trade and commerce power authorised the 
Commonwealth itself to carry on trade and commerce, including establishing an airline. 1003 However, 
in purporting to confer on the AusUalian National Airlines Commission a monopoly in respect of 
services between States and to create the offences mentioned in section 49 of the ANA Act, the High 
Court held that the ANA Act contravened section 92 of the Constitution. Therefore, section 46(1) 
and sections 47 and 49 of the ANA Act (to the extent that they refer to airline services between the 
States) were invalid but severable. In addition, the High Court held that the Commonwealth could 
operate a territory-States airline service under section 122 of the Constitution1004 
Barwick's first submission failed; the Commonwealth could establish an airline. However, the Court 
unanimously agreed with his second submission in relation to section 92.1005 
Starke J, who had never really accepted the 'Transport Cases',1006 reflected the essence of Barwick's 
submissions in his judgment: 
The object of s. 92 is to maintain freedom of inter-State competition- the open and not the 
closed door- absolute freedom of inter-State trade and commerce. An Act which is entirely 
restrictive of any freedom of action on the part of traders and which operates to prevent them 
1002 The Airlines Case involved two major constitutional questions, namely: did the section 51(i) power in 
relation to interstate trade and commerce allow the government to establish an airline providing interstate air 
transport; and by prohibiting private competition, did the ANA Act contravene section 92. The High Court 
unanimously answered both questions in the affirmative. See Galligan, above n 781, p.160; See also Menzies, 
The Measure of the Years, above n 203, pp.137-138. 
1003 Barwick recalled that Holyman wanted to challenge this aspect of the decision in the Privy Council but 
Barwick thought it would be 'a waste of time' (see National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir 
Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 19). 
1004 Bank of New South Wales & Ors v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 31; 62-64, 69 (per Latham CJ); 71-72 
(per Rich J); 79 (per Starke J); 83-85 (per Dixon J); 102-103 (per Williams J); Sawer, Australian Federalism in the 
Courts, above n 295, p.78. 
1005 Australian National Airways Pty Limited v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29. See also Sawer, Australian 
Federal Politics and Law (1929-1949}, above n 143, p.179. Latham CJ found that the exclusion of competition 
was not regulation but prohibition and was 'directed against' interstate trade. He applied the test from the 
Milk Board Case. See Coper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, p.90; 
Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, (5'h ed), above n 182, pp.150-152; Sawer, Cases on The Constitution 
of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 180, pp.217-234; Sawer, Cases on The Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, (3'' ed), above n 781, pp.180-194. 
1006 Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, (5'hed), above n 182, pp.139-147; Sawer, Cases on The 
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 180, pp.217-234; Sawer, Cases on The Constitution of 
the Commonwealth of Australia, (3'' ed), above n 781, pp.180-194. 
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engaging their commodities in any trade, inter- or intra-State, is, in my opinion, necessarily 
obnoxious to s. 92.1007 
Dixon J distinguished the 'Transport Cases' from the present case.1008 
As the ANA Act effectively prevented every person but the Commission from engaging in the relevant 
interstate trade, the majority held th.at it violated section 92 of the Constitution.1009 The High Court 
believed 'that s 92 guaranteed the right of an individual to carry on the business of transporting 
people or goods for reward from one state to another by air'.1010 However, the question remained: 
how could this be so when section 92 did not guarantee the right of an individual to carry on the 
business of transporting people or goods for reward from one state to another by road?10" 
All judges appeared to accept Barwick's arguments in relation to reading into section 92 the concept 
of private competition and they all held that such private competition extended to the provision of 
airline services. This was the most important constitutional law case of Barwick's career at the time 
and his reputation was greatly enhanced by this case. Barwick had developed a 'keen sense of 
judicial attitudes that were then current on the High Court bench' following the cases he appeared in 
before the High Court opposing the Commonwealth's wartime national security regulations. 1012 This 
knowledge was employed to its full effect in the Airlines Case. Barwick's knowledge of the attitudes, 
personalities and other characteristics of the various members of the High Court also provided him 
1007 Australian National Airways Pty Limited v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29 at 78, per Starke J. See also 
Sawer, Cases on The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 180, pp.217-234; Sawer, Cases on 
The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, (3'' ed), above n 781, pp.180-194. 
1008 Dixon J, whilst accepting the authority of the 'Transport Cases' for the purposes of this case, distinguished 
those cases from the present case on the ground that the 'Transport Cases' involved the means or implements 
of trade whilst the present case addressed actual trade. He then referred to the 'freedom at the frontier' test 
laid down by Lord Wright in James v The Commonwealth (1936) 55 CLR 1 and stated that, if that test is applied, 
it is 'because the business involves crossing the frontier that it is eliminated' (at 90). That is, because it 
prohibited only those air services which crossed state boundaries. Dixon J referred to the fact that transport 
was regulated on a non-discriminatory basis in the 'Transport Cases' whereas in the present case the very basis 
of prohibition was an interstate journey. Williams J relied on Isaacs J in James v Cowan (1930) 43 CLR 386 in 
concluding that the right of interstate trade and commerce protected by s 92 is a personal right attaching to 
the individual and that to 'say to an individual that he may not engage in the business of inter-State air carriage 
is a direct negation of that right' (at 110). He effectively regarded the 'Transport Cases' as based on State 
ownership of roads and railways. See also Coper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian 
Constitution, above n 822, p.90; Galligan, above n 781, p.161; Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, (5th 
ed), above n 182, pp.139-147; Sawer, Cases on The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, (3'' ed), 
above n 781, pp.180-194; Geoffrey Sawer, 'The Privy Council, The High Court and Section 92', above n 841, 156. 
1009 Galligan, above n 781, p.161. Barwick stated 'one of the things that I devoted myself to quite consciously 
and quite largely was the maintenance of the individual's right as far as possible by attacking these 
bureaucratically drawn National Security regulations' (see National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with 
Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 15). 
101° Coper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, pp.90-91. See also 
Sawer, Cases on The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, (3'' ed), above n 781, pp.180-194. 
1011 Co per, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, pp.90-91. 
1012 Galligan, above n 781, p.161 referring to Chapter 6 of David Marr's book. 
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with a distinct advantage when preparing and advancing his submissions and in his general dialogue 
with the members of the Court. It is this knowledge that he sought to rely upon when developing 
and then presenting his section 92 arguments in the Bank Natianalisation Case. 
Before Barwick attempted to establish that a banker, in carrying on the business of banking, was 
engaged in interstate trade and commerce for the purposes of section 92 so as to then invoke the 
Airlines Case, he turned his attention to convincing the Court that section 92 guaranteed the 
freedom ofthe individual to engage in interstate trade and commerce. 
Barwick's 'Individual Rights' Argument 
Marr has suggested that underpinning Barwick's submissions was his belief in the freedom and 
liberty of the individual as well as freedom of enterprise.1013 This is confirmed by comments made by 
Barwick in his autobiography 47 years later, where he indicated his preference for capitalism over 
socialism. 1014 However, it is difficult to gauge whether the fact that Barwick's personal beliefs 
coincided with the underlying basis for his submissions contributed to the persuasive effect of his 
submissions in any way. Emotion and passion can assist the persuasive effect of an advocate's 
submissions, but can also be counterproductive, if the result is a loss of control or objectivity. An 
analysis of the transcript of the Bank Nationalisatian Case suggests that, whilst Barwick's submissions 
were forceful, they did not appear to suffer from these disadvantages. 
Barwick outlined his fundamental proposition, namely, that section 92 guaranteed an individual 
freedom of interstate trade and commerce. He went to considerable lengths to demonstrate that 
section 92 provided this guarantee. 1015 Referring to the above, he succinctly encapsulated his 
submission: 
The next step I take from that general proposition is to say that section 92 is a constitutional 
guarantee to the people or, to put it in another way, that it advances a right or an immunity to 
the individual. let there be no misconception in my use of the word "right" ... I use the 
expression to call attention to the fact that it is the individual's freedom to move from place to 
place, the individual's right to conduct his business across State lines, which is protected by the 
section. 1016 
1013 Marr, above n 8, p.65. 
1014 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.100. 
1015 The 'individual rights' view of section 92 was overturned in Cole v Whitfield ("Tasmanian Lobster Case") 
(1988) 165 CLR 360 (2 May 1988). 
1016 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above 
n 867, p.282. 
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Following this, Barwick then adopted a clever technique to substantiate his general proposition that 
section 92 provided an individual with a constitutional guarantee of freedom of interstate trade and 
commerce: 'I wish to give the Court a series of references to show that every member of this Court 
both past and present has on some occasion subscribed to that view'. 1017 He then referred the Court 
to various cases in which each judge comprising the present Court, as well as previous judges of the 
Court, had agreed with this proposition. This is an example of Barwick's meticulous preparation as 
well as his citing authority with care to support, rather than supplement an argument. 
This technique allowed each judge to reacquaint himself with his earlier views as well as those of 
previous High Court judges with respect to section 92. In this way, Barwick was suggesting, in an 
indirect way, that the Court should adopt a consistent approach. Such a technique would have had a 
significant persuasive effect, and may have militated against disagreement. To ensure consistency as 
well as fairness and justice, each judge would be more likely to agree with their previously expressed 
view unless, of course, they could distinguish the previous case from the present in some way. 
Barwick submitted as follows: 'I read the passages to the Court to show that all the Justices have laid 
emphasis on this right in the individua1'.1018 For example, Barwick cited the judgments of Justices 
Dixon and McTiernan in Peanut Board v Rackhampton Harbour Board.'019 
Barwick also conveyed to the Court the views of former Justice Evatt on this issue. This reference 
was useful, as Evatt was in an invidious position, as leading counsel for the Commonwealth in the 
present case. This was a clever tactical manoeuvre. Barwick made the most of this rare situation. It 
simultaneously had the effect of demonstrating what Barwick implied was the 'actual' view of the 
leading counsel for the Commonwealth, in contrast to the view that Evatt was now propounding. 
Barwick submitted as follows: 
... in Riverina Transport v Victoria, 57 CLR, beginning at page 237, there is a passage at page 367, 
in the judgment of Mr Justice Evatt. He said, -
1017 Ibid. 
"It would be a strange thing if the Parliament of the Commonwealth which for sixteen years 
has sought to confer upon itself an entire immunity from the declaration of freedom in sec. 
92, were made the sole protector of the citizens against infringement of the Section by 
hostile discrimination on the part of the executive or administrative organs of the State".1020 
1018 1bid, pp.282-285. 
1019 (1933) 48 CLR 266. See Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The 
Commonwealth of Australia, above n 867, pp.282-285. 
1020 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above 
n 867, p.285. 
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This is another example of the difference between exemplary advocacy and advocacy in practice. In 
practice, certain unpredictable opportunities may present themselves, and Barwick was sufficiently 
canny to take advantage of such an opportunity, combining it with citing authority with care, to add 
to the persuasiveness of his submissions. 
Barwick continued to outline the view's of both past and present members of the High Court 
indicating their support spanning cases from the earliest years to the James' cases and then to the 
Airlines Case1021 for the proposition that section 92 provided a constitutional guarantee to 
individuals of the freedom of interstate trade. 1022 
He stated his submission in simple terms: 'It is for the benefit of the people, and therefore it 
necessarily follows that a law which forbids a person from engaging in his business of interstate trade 
and commerce is obnoxious to Section 92'.'023 
In response, Latham CJ referred Barwick to the 'Transport Cases'. In accordance with his strategy, 
Barwick had been careful to distinguish his submissions from the principles derived from the 
'Transport Cases' so as to ensure that those principles were not inconsistent with the present case. 
Consistent with his earlier submissions, Barwick maintained the suggestion that the current case was 
more analogous to the Airlines Case and therefore the same principles were applicable. He used 
discretion and tact to do so as evidenced by the following exchange: 
Latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
Does that principle go so far as to apply to any licensing system? You remember 
the transport cases? 
That, Your Honor, involves a question which I submit does not arise here and 
which is perhaps the fundamental question of the transport cases- as to whether 
on the true analysis of those acts they did burden interstate trade or whether they 
did not. The Court took one view. That is not necessarily, perhaps, the only view. 
Nothing I say need disturb any question in connection with the transport cases, 
because in this particular case you have a direct prohibition of the carrying on of 
the business. If the banker is carrying on interstate trade, this is precisely covered 
by the Airlines case. 
There the Court decided that a person carrying goods and passengers as a 
business could not be forbidden. The business of a banker is, I shall suggest, 
fundamentally the business of moving money about; that is his fundamental 
business. If I want to pay a man a debt and he lived in another part of Melbourne, 
1021 Marr, above n 8, p.65. 
1022 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above 
n 867, pp.285-285A. 
1023 Ibid, p.287. 
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I draw a cheque and send it to him, and my banker effects the movement of 
money. It saves my walking around with it in my pocket. 
If that be a right analysis, when the banker transmits or transfers- whatever word 
you use ... when he does any of those things he moves something, whether it is 
tangible or intangible and he becomes exactly in the situation of a carrier. 1024 
Barwick's response to Latham CJ also demonstrated his thorough and extensive preparation. He was 
aware ofthe existing legal authorities on section 92 and the fundamental principles that arose from 
these cases. He was able to adopt a strategy that was consistent with these authorities and pitch his 
submissions in a manner that did not disturb the principles outlined in the 'Transport Cases' at the 
same time as attempting to illustrate the similarities between the present case and the Airlines Case. 
Barwick persisted with his submission that the present case was similar to the Airlines Case. 102s 
Strategically, Barwick relied heavily on the judgments of Dixon J when outlining the relevant 
authorities on section 92 but avoided references to the 'Transport Cases'- a tactic he also adopted in 
the Airlines Case.'026 
Barwick's Argument that 'Banking' was 7rade and Commerce' 
Barwick informed the Court that he would next turn his attention to the issue of whether a banker is 
carrying on 'trade and commerce' for the purposes of section 92. These regular announcements by 
Barwick of the direction of his submissions allowed the Court to see how they fitted into the tapestry 
of his overall argument.'027 
Barwick referred to the definition of 'trade and commerce' which had previously been adopted in 
various cases, quoting only the relevant passages regarding the concept of 'trade, commerce and 
intercourse'. He cited the relevant legal authorities selectively and with care, and avoided reading 
out long passages. He stated, for example: 
I should like to give four references .... First of all, there is the case of Swift v. the United States, 
196 US Reports, beginning at p.375 .... At p.398 this is what is said: "Commerce among the States 
is not a technical legal conception but a practical one drawn from the course of business.111028 
10241bid. 
102s Ibid, p.288. 
1026 b Marr, a oven 8, p.65. 
1027 Consistent with the logical nature of Barwick's submissions, he stated that: 'The first step is that the 
concept of trade, commerce and intercourse is a practical one- not to be confined to legal conceptions, but to 
be a practical one, developed having regard to the course of business'. See Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank 
of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 867, pp.289-290. 
1028 Ibid, pp.289/29Q-291. 
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Barwick then returned to his earlier strategy of reminding the judges of their previously stated views 
on the definition of 'trade and commerce' under section 92. In particular, he selectively cited various 
passages from the Airlines Case .1029 
Barwick also referred to non-legal sources to illustrate that banking was considered to be 'trade' for 
the purposes of section 92. In additi"on to demonstrating his thorough preparation, it also added 
weight to his argument that section 92 was relevant to this case since banking could be categorised 
as a 'trade'. Barwick was also seeking to demonstrate that there was support for the proposition 
that banking was considered 'trade' from a broader policy perspective. In this way, he addressed any 
policy concerns or reservations the Court may have had in reaching this conclusion. For example, 
Barwick referred to the 19'" century English barrister and journalist, Walter Bagehot's influential 
book, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market, (1873) and quoted from page 98: 'Nothing 
can be truer in theory than the economical principle that banking is a trade and only a trade'.1030 
To support this submission further, Barwick referred to a case from the Privy Council called Trinidad 
Lake Asphalt Co Limited v Commissioners of Income Toxfor Trinidad and Tobago [1945].1031 He 
referred to this case at some length to demonstrate that banking involved the transmission or 
movement of money and was therefore to be regarded as 'trade' .'032 
It was questionable whether this technique of simply referring to selected references in support of 
his submission was resonating with the judges. Barwick was selective in the references he chose, but 
there were a large number of sources, occupying numerous pages of the transcript. The Court 
permitted Barwick to proceed in this fashion in a largely uninterrupted fashion. However, Starke J 
made a comment which suggested that he was (and possibly other members of the Court were) 
losing patience with this approach. Barwick picked up the clear signal that Starke J was sceptical of 
the utility of reciting various definitions and his response reflected this: 
Starke J: 
1029 Ibid, p.294. 
The only reason why I intervened is that you are giving us a lot of references to 
definitions of banking and descriptions of their business. It does not appear to me 
to be particularly important. 
1030 Ibid, pp.295-296. Barwick also quoted other non-legal sources such as Gilbart's "History and 
Principles of Banking", Mcleod's "Theory and Practice of Banking" and Marshall's "Money, Credit and 
Commerce''. 
1031 AC l. 
1032 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above 
n 867, p.299. There was also another advantage in Barwick referring to this case in light of the fact that the 
defendants' own evidence, from Professor Melville, suggested that banking involved the transmission of 
money which echoed the proposition from this case. 
Barwick: 
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In one sense one can say that what they state is almost obvious, but they are 
authoritative in their own areas and they do tend to complete this picture that a 
banker, in carrying on his business, is engaged in trade, commerce and 
intercourse, and when he has an interstate transaction he is engaged, we submit, 
in interstate trade, commerce and intercourse. Of course, what is struck at here is 
. 
his whole business, including that part."" 
However, in light of Starke J's comment, Barwick adapted his submissions accordingly. He ceased 
referring purely to the definition of 'trade' and 'banking' from various sources and instead he 
referred to definitions in authorities. In doing so, he demonstrated his flexibility and discretion as 
well as his ability to respond to judicial comments. His attempt to convince Starke J that the various 
references to the definitions of 'banking' were important was clear. 1034 
Shortly before lunch on day six, Justice Dixon referred Barwick to an article which Barwick conceded 
he had not seen thus demonstrating Barwick's candour. 1035 Justice Dixon then relayed to Barwick 
two observations contained in the article. Shortly after lunch, Barwick summarised the morning's 
submissions, as he characteristically did, and then stated 'I shall come later to the United States cases 
and to the article mentioned by His Honor Mr Justice Dixon'. 1036 This suggested that, during the 
luncheon adjournment, Barwick had reviewed the article. While Barwick clearly made an effort to 
review the article and address the Court on it, his unfamiliarity with this article may also imply a 
surprising gap in his preparation, particularly given that he was planning to refer to US cases and the 
definition of 'banking' in the US Constitution. While exemplary advocacy requires a comprehensive 
preparation, in practice, it may not be possible to review every relevant case or article. 
A rapid exchange between Barwick and several members of the Court then took place on the issue of 
the movement or transmission of money, arising from Barwick's reference to United States v South-
Eastern Underwriters Association [1944].'037 Barwick seemed to handle the judicial questions 
comfortably, responding effectively to each question put to him and appearing to address the judges' 
concerns: 
Latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
Latham CJ: 
1033 Ibid, p.304. 
1034 Ibid. 
1035 Ibid, p.305. 
1036 Ibid, pp.307-308. 
In all those instances [in United States v South-Eastern Underwriters Association] 
there is actual transportation of something. 
Not necessarily of money- a message. 
There is a movement across a State line. 
1037 USSC 116; {1944) 322 US 533 (88 Law Ed 1440). 
Barwick: 
Starke J: 
Barwick: 
Starke J: 
Barwick: 
Starke J: 
Barwick: 
Starke J: 
Barwick: 
Starke J: 
Barwick: 
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When he [referring to Justice Black] says he sends the premiums to New York, he 
sends a cheque across the State line. 
When you speak about a movement across a State line, a movement of what? 
I would say substantially a movement of the funds, the money, but it certainly 
involves the send1ng of a cheque- the movement of a cheque. 
But a movement of what- that is only movement of credit? 
One can deal in credit as well as one can deal in goods. 
But what movement- the movement of documents or a movement as the result 
of documents? 
I do not think he was concerned to distinguish; either would have been sufficient 
for his purpose. 
When he says "sends money" I suppose that is sends a credit which will result in 
the payment of money. That is what he means by "sends money". 
Yes. If the company in New York sends money to New Jersey it sends a document 
Such as a telegraphic transmission of authority. 
Yes ... 1o3s 
Barwick relied on various US cases to identify the elements he regarded as important in determining 
the existence of interstate trade and commerce, particularly cases where it was held that the sending 
of telegraphic messages was a business and was interstate commerce. He then attempted to 
demonstrate, by analogy, that banking was commerce. 1039 According to Ayres, Dixon J found 
Barwick's examination of the US cases 'ineffective' .'040 This illustrates that, in practice, even the 
most careful presentation of authorities may be unpersuasive with some judges at least. 
On occasions, Barwick employed humour but did so selectively. An example occurred just after 
Starke J had referred to an argument by an advocate in a US case: 
1038 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above 
n 867, p.309. 
1039 Ibid, p.311. Barwick continued referring to US cases where it was stated, for example, that '[i]nterstate 
communication of a business nature, whatever the means employed, is interstate commerce subject to 
regulation' (such as Associated Press v National Labour Relations Board 301 US at p.103). To demonstrate and 
emphasise his proposition, Barwick described in detail the manner in which banking was conducted to illustrate 
that it involved interstate communication. Barwick also referred to a series of insurance cases to identify the 
similarities between insurance and banking and therefore prove that banking was a form of interstate 
commerce (See Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Drs v The Commonwealth of 
Australia, above n 867, pp.315-316). 
1040 Ayres, above n 50, p.189 and Owen Dixon Diary, 24 and 31 March 1948, Owen Dixon, Personal Papers. 
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Starke J: I see he also had a large collection of Counsel with him. 
Barwick: It is good to know that the Americans have no monopoly in that, Your Honor. 1041 
The moment of light hearted ness allowed the Court to relax briefly and then re-focus their attention 
on the submissions. 
After concluding his submissions on the relevant interpretation of section 92, including that banking 
was 'trade and commerce' for the purposes of section 92 and that section 92 guaranteed the 
freedom of the individual to engage in interstate trade and commerce, Barwick then applied his 
arguments to particular provisions of the legislation. 
Section 92 and the Banking Act 
Barwick addressed the manner in which, in his submissions, Division 3, Part IV violated section 92. 
He employed an appropriate and useful example to illustrate this: 
The submission is that just as much offends Sections 96 and 92 in the case of the company 
engaged in interstate trade and commerce as an outright acquisition or a prohibition. If I were an 
interestate (sic) trader and people came into my business and said: "We are going to take over 
the whole management so that you cannot manage the business yourself; we will run it; we can 
sell your business if we like; we will supersede your own instruments under which you are 
constituted to the necessary extent"- in that case, it would be impossible to say that the trader 
remained free in his trade, in my submission. 1042 
Barwick then proceeded to demonstrate the 'individual rights' aspect of his section 92 argument by 
attempting to show how the Act impinged upon the ability to trade freely.1043 
Early on day seven, Barwick came under a barrage of questioning over the phrase 'whether by means 
of internal carriage or ocean navigation' in section 92. He demonstrated his courage and composure 
by maintaining his position and not succumbing to the pressure exerted, particularly by latham 
CJ:l044 
1041 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above 
n 867, p.320. 
1042 Ibid, p.324. 
1043 Ibid, p.327. At the conclusion of day six, Barwick took the opportunity to summarise his position and once 
again reaffirmed his argument that this case was analogous to the Airlines Case (Transcript of Proceedings, The 
Bank of New South Wales and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 867, p.329). 
1044 During his submissions, Barwick was subject to intense questioning by latham CJ in relation to the meaning 
of the phrase 'whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation' in section 92 of the Constitution. 
The suggestion that inter-State banking was not trade, commerce and intercourse within the meaning of 
section 92 because that section contains the words 1Whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation' 
was dismissed by Rich and Williams J and Barwick's responses to Latham CJ vindicated (Bank of New South 
Latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
Latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
Latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
Latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
Latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
220 
Would you say that the trade, commerce or intercourse of a banker was by means 
of internal carriage or ocean navigation, and which? 
It would not matter whether it was one or the other. 
Which is it? 
. 
It may be neither. Those are not words which mean you can only have that sort of 
trade within Section 92. 
Do you allow those words to mean anything or are you submitting they could 
mean nothing? 
I think they are in the nature of mere precaution or words of emphasis. I do not 
think they have any limiting significance. The word "navigation" might have some 
expansive significance but I would not think very much. 
Is the trade and commerce the trade and commerce which is carried on by certain 
means; and the means mentioned are two- internal carriage and ocean 
navigation? 
I dispute the suggestion that the words "whether by means of internal carriage" 
are words which limit the nature of the trade, commerce or intercourse. 
What do they do? 
They are put in as a precaution so that nobody should think that some one 
particular form of trade, commerce or intercourse is excluded. 1045 
Barwick's Alternative Submission Relating to Section 92 
Immediately following this exchange, Barwick managed to divert attention from this issue, to outline 
the argument that he intended to present on day seven, namely, his alternative submission in the 
event that banking was not considered 'trade and commerce' for the purposes of section 92: 
This argument which I propose to put involves a submission that the real test of whether or not a 
law is obnoxious to Section 92 depends upon its necessary operation and effect, and not in any 
sense upon its subject matter. 1046 
Wales and Drs v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 287). Dixon J also dismissed any suggestion that the phrase 
'whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation' in section 92 of the Constitution imposed any 
limitation or supported any conclusion that section 92 only applied to tangible goods (at 383). 
1045 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above 
n 867, pp.331-332. 
1046 1bid, pp.332-333. 
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By reference to his alternative submission, Barwick attempted to highlight the similarities 
between the present case and the Airlines Case and cleverly referred to Dixon J's comments in 
the latter. In the Airlines Case, Justice Dixon stated: 
If ... the answer is offered that the transmutation of the business into a government undertaking 
means that the function is still fr~ely carried on, it is met by the proposition, so often enunciated 
by Isaacs J, that ins. 92 'free' means free from governmental restriction or obstruction, whether 
legislative or executive. 1047 
Notwithstanding his careful argument,'048 Barwick also came under intense questioning on his 
alternative submission, particularly in relation to the relevance of the legislature's motive or purpose. 
Again, he showed tenacity and courage, maintaining his position and composure in the face of 
considerable pressure. This is evident from the following exchange, particularly taking into account 
Latham CJ's second question which suggests that he could not believe or comprehend Barwick's 
response: 
Starke J: 
Barwick: 
Starke J: 
Barwick: 
Latham CJ: 
If you gave the Minister power to regulate the crossing of cattle from Victoria into 
New South Wales, in accord (sic) with your view he might do it for a perfectly 
legitimate purpose or an unlawful purpose of restraining trade? 
No. 
Would that be bad, too? 
If it were expressed as regulating the passage, I would say it was bad, but it might 
be possible to give to a Minister power to make some laws or orders, and you 
might have to determine whether any given order had progressed to the point 
where it was a burden on interstate trade and commerce. 
Are you replying by saying that it is impossible for any legislature in Australia to 
pass a law saying that diseased cattle shall not cross the frontier? 
1047 Australian National Airways Proprietary Limited & Drs v Commonwealth & Drs (1945) 71 CLR 29 at 91. 
See Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 867, pp.334-335. The last paragraph encapsulated one of three propositions Barwick put 
forward in relation to his alternative submission with respect to section 92. Barwick then outlined the 
remaining two propositions in relation to this alternative submission, namely: 1The second proposition is 
that where the law takes the form of an authority to the Executive to do an act or acts, it will be invalid if 
it authorises acts which have that effect. That harks back to the first proposition. The third proposition is 
to cover incidental effects' (Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Drs v The 
Commonwealth of Australia, above n 867, p.335). 
1048 Barwick outlined the process that he considered the Court should follow when considering whether the 
legislation infringed section 92 of the Constitution. This is clear evidence of his considerable preparation and 
an example of his ability to conceptualise a case. This was a persuasive technique designed to make the judges' 
task easier when considering the validity of the legislation and ultimately when preparing their respective 
judgments (see Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Drs v The Commonwealth of 
Australia, above n 867, pp.339-340). 
Barwick: 
Latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
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Yes, Your Honor. 
You are making that reply? 
Yes, and with respect, I think I have the support of the Privy Council if one looks 
closely at what they did with Tasmania v. Victoria [Tasmania v. Victoria (1935] 
HCA 4; (1935) 52 CLR 157 and Nelson's Case [Ex parte Nelson (No 1) [1928] HCA 
33; (1928) 42 CLR 209]. 1049 
Barwick's definitive response demonstrates considerable confidence in his position. While this may 
also appear not to leave Barwick with room to refine his submissions later if it became necessary, it 
must be counterbalanced by the persuasiveness and attractiveness associated with such positive 
responses. Since the majority took the view that the activity of banking was 'trade and commerce' 
for the purposes of section 92 of the Constitution, 1oso Barwick's alternative submission was not 
considered and therefore it is difficult to gauge whether this technique was successful. 
Barwick's submissions in chief concluded after seven days, 10s1 at which point Dr Cop pel KC and Kitto 
KC then commenced their submissions on behalf of the banks. 10s2 
According to Justice Dixon, on 23 February 1948 (day ten of the hearing), Latham CJ indicated which 
way he was likely to decide the case 1053 On this particular day, Kitto KC completed, in what Dixon 
described, his 'clear and acute' argument for the Bank of Australasia. Taylor KC completed his 
argument for the same plaintiff and Hudson KC commenced his argument for Victoria. Barwick's 
performance during the Bank Nationa/isation Case attracted little comment in Dixon's diary. This, 
1049 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above 
n 867, p.346. 
1050 Bank of New South Wales & Drs v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 284-290 (Rich and Williams JJ), 305-
309 (Starke J), 380-383 (Dixon J). See generally Caper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian 
Constitution, above n 822, pp.92-93; Lane, A Digest of Australian Constitutional Cases, (510 ed), above n 843, 
p.344; Sawer, 'Bank of NSW v Commonwealth', above n 860, 215. 
1051 Shortly before concluding his submissions, Barwick restated his alternative proposition and conceptualised 
his submission then applied his alternative submission to the facts of the case (Transcript of Proceedings, The 
Bank of New South Wales and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 867, pp.352-353). 
1052 Dr Cop pel KC addressed the Court in relation to section 6 of the Act and section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution 
with respect to the acquisition of property on just terms. Kitto KC, on behalf of the three English banks, made 
submissions in relation to various sections of the Act, namely, sections 24, 46(4)- (8), Part VIII and 56 as well as 
section 51(xiii) of the Constitution: Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Drs v The 
Commonwealth of Australia, above n 867, pp.354 and 476-477. Taylor KC made submissions in relation to the 
validity of various provisions of the Act under section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution and also in relation to section 
75 of the Constitution. Hudson KC relied upon the five grounds of attack submitted by Barwick at the opening 
of the case and his arguments in relation to section 92 of the Constitution. However, he made submissions in 
relation to sections 51(xiii) and (xxxi). Hannan KC made submissions in relation to section 105A of the 
Constitution: Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Drs v The Commonwealth of 
Australia, above n 867, pp.539 and 573. See also Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & 
Recollections, above n 1, p.66. 
1053 Ayres, above n 50, p.188. 
223 
given Dixon's comments in other cases suggests Barwick may either not have impressed Dixon with 
his advocacy or that he was not so unimpressive so as to warrant an entry. It contrasts with his diary 
entry on Barwick's advocacy in the Communist Party Case discussed in Chapter 9. Dixon did, 
however, record that he noticed that Barwick 'got under Evatt's skin through ridicule'.'054 According 
to Ayres, Barwick's 'psychological warfare was impressive';1055 Barwick employed his acidic tongue as 
well as his propensity for sarcasm to effectively distract Evatt and cause him to lose focus.1056 
On behalf of the Commonwealth, in relation to the interpretation and application of section 92, Evatt 
submitted that the purpose of section 92 was to ensure that trade and commerce itself remained 
free and not that every person in Australia and every corporation had a constitutional right to engage 
in interstate commerce.'057 
In Barwick's reply he did not address the Court further on his arguments with respect to section 92. 
Barwick had demonstrated his ability to present an argument, however complex, clearly, forcibly and 
succinctly.10s8 Marr described his submissions as follows: 
His exposition was lucid, and pitched with almost conversational ease. His voice at times 
suggested the faint sing-song of a preacher's but his delivery followed naturally the shifting 
progression of his argument. He gave the court the sense of having the subject surely in his grip, 
not through dramatic display but by an unfailing grasp of language and by taking pains to see the 
bench realised at all times the direction in which his huge argument was moving. 10s9 
1054 Ibid, p.189 and Owen Dixon Diary, 24 and 31 March 1948, Owen Dixon, Personal Papers. 
loss Ibid. 
1056 Apparently, Evatt complained to Clyne that Barwick was a 'larrikin bringing the police court to the HCA 
[High Court of Australia]': see Ayres, above n 50, p.189 and Owen Dixon Diary, 24 and 31 March 1948, Owen 
Dixon, Personal Papers. 
1057 Marr, above n 8, p.66. See Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The 
Commonwealth of Australia, above n 867, pp.684-1707. Evatt attempted to convince the Court to return to his 
view of section 92 as he had outlined in R v Vizzard; Ex parte Hill (1933) 50 CLR 30 and which seemed to have 
been accepted in James v Commonwealth (1935) 52 CLR 570, namely, the 'free trade' view, where the free 
trade guarantee was directed at ensuring that the absolute volume of trade between the States was not 
obstructed or hampered by government restriction (see Johnston, above n 783, 94). Evatt relied on James v 
Cowan (1932) 47 CLR 386; (1932] AC 542; James v Commonwealth (1936) 55 CLR 1 and the Privy Council's 
decision in James v Commonwealth (1936) AC 578; 55 CLR 1 which he submitted established that the Act does 
not in any way impair the freedom of interstate trade, commerce or intercourse. During the hearing, Evatt 
provided to the Court a Memorandum on Banking. This was heavily criticised by Barwick. It was described as 
'more a lesson in banking and political economy than anything else' and 'not a lawyer's statement but some 
sort of quasi-political document' (see The Sydney Morning Herald, 2 April1948, referred to in Galligan, above n 
781, p.173). Many thought Evatt, as a former member of the High Court, should not be appearing before it. 
According to Dixon, his advocacy was 'bad'. His poor advocacy could have been attributed to the fact that he 
was ill or that he had not appeared as an advocate for a considerable period of time. Also, although he was an 
able lawyer, Evatt was regarded by some as a poor advocate (see Ayres, above n 50, pp.187-188). 
1058 Marr, above n 8, p.GS. 
1059 . lb1d, pp.65-66. 
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Marr's description refers to the many elements and ideals of appellate advocacy that Barwick 
employed during the course of his submissions which have been identified and analysed. However, 
Barwick's advocacy also contained other features such as 'trailing his coat' and making use of 
references to Evatt's judgments. Together, they contributed greatly to the persuasiveness of his 
submissions. As discussed earlier, these features also highlight the contrast between the ideals of 
appellate advocacy and appellate advocacy in practice. Barwick's advocacy did suffer from some 
deficiencies; he belaboured certain points at times and was disparaging of his opponent on 
occasions. He engaged in what has been described as 'psychological warfare'. These tactics may 
have been manipulative or underhanded, employed to gain an advantage. However, as discussed 
earlier, the adversarial nature of appellate advocacy is such that advocates will inevitably seek to 
make use of the advantages available to them within the bounds of the 'ethical obligations' (it 
remains however, questionable whether such tactics were (or are) ethical). It appears that advocacy 
in Barwick's time was conducted in a more robust environment and such behaviour was tolerated 
whereas, in modern day appellate advocacy, this is less likely. 
7.9 The High Court's View on Section 92 
Section 92 became the decisive issue in the Bank Nationa/isation Case. While Rich and Williams JJ 
held that the Act was unconstitutional on every ground that they addressed,1060 Dixon and Starke JJ 
agreed with Latham CJ and McTiernan J in relation to all issues except the extent of the infringement 
of 'just terms' and the critical question of section 92. Latham CJ and McTiernan J found that the Act 
was valid on every ground except that it infringed section Sl(xxxi) in that it amounted to an 
acquisition of property that was not on 'just terms' in some parts. Dixon and Starke JJ held that 
many parts of the Act were invalid on similar grounds but concluded that this was not irreparable. As 
a result, the decisive issue in relation to the invalidity of the Act was the majority's (namely Dixon, 
Starke, Rich and Williams JJ) ruling on section 92.1061 Importantly, all members of the majority held 
that section 46 of the Act contravened section 92 and that s 46 was not severable. 
The majority held that section 46 infringed the guarantee of freedom of interstate trade in section 92 
of the Constitution. 1062 Essentially, the banks operated a business which was, in material respects, 
1060 They did not find it necessary to determine whether it violated the constitutional integrity of the States. 
1061 Johnston, above n 783, 95; Galligan, above n 781, p.l74. See also Hull, above n 783, pp.26-27; see also 
Ayres, above n 50, pp.189-190; Sarah Joseph & Melissa Castan, Federal Constitutional Law, (2"' ed), (2006), 
lawbook Co., Sydney, p.332. 
1062 In relation to section 92, the majority held that although interstate trade and commerce was to be 
absolutely free, some regulation of activities was permissible which was encapsulated by Dixon J (at 389): 
No doubts. 92 leaves open the regulation of trade and commerce, at all events until regulation is pressed to 
the point of impairing true freedom of inter-State commerce. And there can be even less doubt that a 
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interstate in character, and the prohibition of this business, although not on the basis that it was 
interstate, was invalid. According to Sawer, the decision 'carried further the implications ofthe 
Airlines Case, and the revival of the 'free enterprise' theory of lames v Cowan, and disregarded the 
contrary implications of the 'Transport Cases' and lames v Commonwealth'.1063 This had been 
Barwick's intention. Also, this was the only aspect ofthe decision that the parliament could not 
overcome by amendments to the Act. 1064 
The majority adopted the 'individual rights' approach to the interpretation of section 92. In doing so, 
they relied on those cases which supported this approach, such as the Peanut Board v Rockhampton 
Harbour Boord (1933).1065 Whilst the interpretation of section 92 that was adopted by Starke J 
echoed the submissions made by Barwick, the approach adopted by Rich and Williams JJ closely 
resembled Barwick's 'individual rights' approach, namely, that section 92 was based on a personal 
right of the individual to freely engage in interstate trade.1066 Rich and Williams JJ stated that 'the 
freedom guaranteed by section 92 is a personal right attaching to the individual' .1067 The authorities 
they relied upon corresponded with the various authorities that Barwick quoted during his 
submissions in support of this proposition, and which he introduced by stating: 'I wish to give the 
Court a series of references to show that every member of this Court both past and present has on 
some occasion subscribed to that view' .1068 
The majority took the view that the activity of banking was 'trade and commerce' for the purposes of 
section 92 of the Constitution. 1069 Rich and Williams JJ stated that 'a banker who carries on business 
regulation of some other subject will not collide with s. 92 simply because inter-State trade or commerce may 
be affected consequentially and indirectly. The freedom of inter-State trade, commerce and intercourse 
which s. 92 assures supposes an ordered society where the mutual relations of man and man and man and 
government are regulated by law. 
This is once again a veiled reference to the 'direct prohibition' versus 'incidental prohibition' dichotomy 
referred to earlier. See Hull, above n 783, p.27. 
1063 Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law {1929-1949}, above n 143, p.212. 
1064 Ibid, pp.212-213. 
1065 48 CLR 266; Coper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, p.94. 
1066 Bank of New South Wales & Ors v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 283. See generally Nygh, above n 822, 
341. 
1067 Bank of New South Wales and Ors v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 283; see also Hull, above n 783, 
p.27. 
1068 Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above 
n 867, p.282. One such authority that Rich and Williams JJ relied upon was the statement by Dixon J in D. Gilpin 
Limited v Commissioner for Road Transport and Tramways {New South Wales) (1935) 52 CLR 189 where Dixon J 
stated: 'The object of s 92 is to enable individuals to conduct their commercial dealings and their personal 
intercourse with one another independently of State boundaries' (at 211). This was referred to by Barwick 
during his submissions (Transcript of Proceedings, The Bank of New South Wales and Drs v The Commonwealth 
of Australia, above n 867, p.284). See Galligan, above n 781, p.175; Sawer, Cases on The Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, (3'0 ed), above n 781, pp.195-228. 
1069 Bank of New South Wales & Ors v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 284-290 (Rich and Williams JJ), 305-
309 (Starke J), 380-383 (Dixon J). See generally Coper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian 
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in more than one State is engaged in trade, commerce and intercourse among the States' 1070 and 
that 'in a modern community it is clear, we think, that traffic in intangibles is just as much trade and 
commerce as traffic in tangibles' .1071 Barwick had referred to Trinidad Lake Asphalt Ca Limited v 
Commissioners of Income Tax for Trinidad and Tobago [1945] 1072 at some length to demonstrate that 
banking involved the transmission or movement of money and is therefore to be regarded as 'trade'. 
Rich and Williams JJ agreed. They also referred to this case at great length and relied on Lord 
Wright's comments in this case together with the evidence in the present case.'073 
According to Rich and Williams JJ, 'legislation Commonwealth or State infringes s. 92 where it 
operates directly and not merely incidentally to burden, hinder or prevent persons or corporations 
engaging wholly or partially in trade or commerce across State boundaries'.'074 This statement is a 
reflection of the 'direct prohibition' versus 'incidental prohibition' dichotomy that began to emerge 
in relation to the section 92 case law. Barwick's strategy of drawing parallels between this case and 
the Airlines Case seemed to influence both Rich and Williams JJ who believed that the defendants' 
contention contradicted the decision in the Airlines Case.'075 
Starke J also subscribed to the 'individual rights' theory of section 92.'076 He cited with approval 
Justice Dixon's statement in O.Gilpin to which Barwick had referred during the course of his 
Constitution, above n 822, pp.92-93; Lane, A Digest of Australian Constitutional Cases, (51h ed), above n 843, 
p.344; Sawer, 'Bank of NSW v Commonwealth', above n 860, 215. 
1070 Bank of New South Wales & Drs v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 284. 
1071 Ibid. 
wn AC 1. 
1073 They suggested that (at 289): 
the principal means of payment and exchange is not legal tender in the shape of notes and coin but bank 
credit or bank money as it has been called, and that payment by bank money is a matter of book entries 
involving a debit in one bank to the account of the debtor and a credit in the same or another bank to the 
account of the payer. 
1074 Bank of New South Wales & Drs v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 290. 
1075 They stated that (at 295): 
But in the Australian National Airways Case [(1945) 71 CLR 29] in spite of the opinion that s. 51 (i.) standing 
alone would authorize the Commonwealth Parliament to create a monopoly in inter-State carriage by air, the 
Court was unanimously of opinion that legislation for that purpose infringed s. 92. The only difference 
between the legislation in the Australian National Airways Case and the material provisions of the Banking 
Act 1947 is that the earlier legislation was directed wholly against persons other than the Commission 
engaging in inter-State trade, whereas the present legislation is directed only partially against the private 
banks engaging in inter-State trade. But the intention in each case is to create a monopoly, in the earlier case 
in inter-State trade, and in the present cases in both intra-State and inter-State trade, and s.92 is, for the 
reasons already given, infringed in each case. The difference between the two Acts is explained by the 
difference in the ambit of the trade and commerce power and that of the banking power, the former being 
limited to trade and commerce among the States and the latter extending to all banking either intra or inter-
State. 
1076 Starke J stated that section 92 (at 306): 
is an inhibition addressed to the Parliaments of the Commonwealth and the States preventing them from 
legislating so as to interfere with the freedom prescribed by the section. It gives no rights to the citizens of 
the Commonwealth except the right to ignore and if necessary to procure the assistance of the judicial power 
in resisting any such legislation. 
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submissions. Starke J dismissed any suggestion that section 92 'only applied to the passage of goods 
or visible tangible things and persons across the borders of the States and is wholly inapplicable to 
intangible things or commercial intercourse across State borders' .'077 
Starke J relied on United States v South-Eastern Underwriters Association 11944]1078 referred to by 
Barwick to support his conclusion tnat the business of banking was considered to be commerce.1079 
However, he concluded that the 'Transport Cases' were wrongly decided1080 even though Barwick 
had made no reference to these cases in his submissions. 1081 In reaching his decision, Starke J relied 
heavily on the cases he referred to above which Barwick emphasised in his submissions, particularly, 
the Airlines Case. 
Starke, Rich and Williams JJ all interpreted section 92 as severely restricting the government's 
regulation of trade and commerce. 
Whilst an alleged1082 lack of fondness for the Labor government on behalf of Starke and Rich JJ may 
have contributed to Barwick's success in this case, their respective judgments reflect a level of 
reliance on Barwick's submissions. While it cannot be definitively concluded that they reached their 
conclusions due to Barwick's advocacy, there are significant traces of Barwick's influence and 
submissions in their respective judgments. For example, Barwick's strategy to avoid references to 
the 'Transport Cases' seemed to find favour with Rich and Williams JJ (Starke J referred to them only 
to suggest they were wrongly decided). Further, Barwick's approach of identifying the parallels with 
the Airlines Case to demonstrate that the present case was similar was critical as was the technique 
1077 Bank of New South Wales & Drs v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 305. Starke J also stated that (at 305): 
Trade, commerce and intercourse among the States includes, in my opinion, not only the sale of tangibles but 
also of intangibles by a person in one State to a person in another State and also the transportation from one 
State to another of goods or persons and commercial intercourse whether by air, telegraph, telephone, 
wireless or other means. 
1078 ussc 116. 
1079 Bank of New South Wales & Drs v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 307-308. 
1080 Ibid at 311; See generally Caper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 
822, p.94; Sawer, 'Bank of NSW v Commonwealth', above n 860, 215. 
1081 Starke J also stated that interstate trade (at 309): 
must be free from all restraints, hindrances, obstructions, interferences and devices of every kind employed 
to interfere with that freedom. Those restraints, hindrances and interferences may take many forms such as 
customs and border duties, prohibitions of every kind, compulsory acquisitions of property directed against 
inter-State trade, compulsory marketing schemes entirely restrictive of freedom of action on the part of 
producers and the elimination of the business of inter-State transportation as such in favour of a State 
undertaking and so forth (lames v Cowan (1932) 47 CLR 386; James v The Commonwealth [(1936) AC 578; 55 
CLR 1]; Peanut Board v Rockhampton Harbour Board ((1933) 48 CLR 266]; Australian National Airways Pty Ltd 
v The Commonwealth ([1945) HCA 41; (1945) 71 CLR 29)]. 
1082 Such was their lack of fondness for the Commonwealth Labor governments that it has been suggested that 
both judges delayed their retirement until a conservative government came into power: see Fricke, above n 
801, p.106. 
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of referring the judges to their earlier comments and mounting a formidable argument by pulling 
together the strands from these relevant cases. 
Dixon J stated that trade and commerce covered the movement of intangibles as well as the 
movement of goods and persons and 'to confine the subject matter to physical things and persons 
would be quite out of keeping with.all modern developments'.1083 On appeal, as discussed in Chapter 
8, the Privy Council agreed. 1084 
According to Dixon J, the relevant test in relation to section 92 was outlined in James v 
Commonwealth (1936)108s was as follows: 
the constitutional guarantee of freedom contained ins. 92 amounts to freedom of what 
constitutes trade, commerce and intercourse to pass from one State to another. It is described as 
freedom as at the frontier or border, the crucial point in inter-State trade. But that freedom may 
be impaired by a prohibition, restriction or burden, the application of which is not at the border 
but at some prior or subsequent stage in the course of inter-State trade, commerce and 
intercourse. 1086 
Dixon J stated that 'I cannot see how to close up every bank but a government bank leaves 
inter-State banking free'. 1087 According to Zines, Justice Dixon's views 'were to prove 
dominant' .1088 
The fact that Dixon J did not refer to the 'Transport Cases' may also reflect Barwick's deliberate 
strategy not to refer to these cases in his submissions. This is a decision that seems to have found 
favour with a number of judges, including Dixon J. It also appears to have caused the judges to focus 
on other cases instead, particularly the Airlines Case. Dixon J's interpretation of section 92 was 
1083 Bank of New South Wales & Ors v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 382 but generally see 380-383. See 
generally Caper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, pp.92-93; Lane, A 
Digest of Australian Constitutional Cases, (51h ed), above n 843, pp.344-347; Sawer, Cases on The Constitution of 
the Commonwealth of Australia, (3'' ed), above n 781, pp.195-228. 
1084 Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales (1949) 79 CLR 497 (26 October 1949), 632-633; See generally 
Co per, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, pp.92-93; Sawer, Cases on 
The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, (3"' ed), above n 781, pp.229-249. 
108s 55 CLR 1. 
1086 Bank of New South Wales & Ors v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 384. 
1087 Ibid at 388. Dixon J went on to say that (at 389): 
It has appeared to me that to say that a given branch of inter-state commerce can be carried on only by 
government, so that it may be under governmental control, is inconsistent with the proposition, which I 
understand to be established, that inter-State trade shall be free of governmental prohibitions, restrictions 
and burdens whether they be legislative or executive in character. 
1088 Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, (51h ed), above n 182, p.152. Zines stated, in reference to Dixon, 
that he: 'expounded the individual right interpretation and did not refer to any of the transport cases or indeed 
to any High Court decisions since McArthur's case, apart from one case decided by himself alone: James v 
Commonwealth (1939) 62 CLR 339 at 361, 362'. 
229 
similar to the approach adopted by Starke J. 1089 His interpretation was underpinned by the concept 
of the free market.'090 
Earlier in this chapter, reference was made to Barwick's belief during his preparation for the Bank 
Nationa/isation Case that he would have 'little difficulty in being able to convince the court that 
banking is part of trade etc and that interstate banking, although dealing with the transmission of 
intangibles, is part ofthat interstate trade etc which had the protection of s 92'.'091 Whilst Barwick's 
suggestion proved to be correct in relation to the majority who took the view that the activity of 
banking was 'trade and commerce' for the purposes of section 92 of the Constitution, 1092 the 
dissenting judges (Latham CJ and McTiernan J) did not reach this conclusion. Barwick later stated 
that '[i]n the long run we succeeded, except with Latham who for some reason or other went the 
other way. That, of course, created a bit of a furore for a while'.'093 This suggests that Barwick could 
not understand why Latham CJ did not find in his client's favour, but certainly does not suggest that 
Barwick believed it was attributable in any way to his advocacy. 
Whilst Barwick's prediction that McTiernan J would follow Latham CJ proved to be correct, his 
prediction that Latham CJ was the least likely to find the legislation invalid under section 92 also 
proved correct. As noted, Latham CJ and McTiernan J found that the Act was valid on every ground 
except that it infringed section Sl(xxxi) in some parts, although this was capable of being remedied 
by legislative amendment. Barwick had failed to convince them that the activity of banking was 
'trade and commerce' for the purposes of section 92 of the Constitution; a preliminary matter in 
triggering the application of section 92. 
1089 Galligan, above n 781, p.175; Sawer, Cases on The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, (3'' ed), 
above n 781, pp.195-228. 
1090 Dixon J stated that s 92 (at 388): 'assumes that without governmental interference trade, commerce and 
intercourse would be carried on by the people of Australia across State lines, and its purpose is to disable the 
governments from preventing or hampering that activity'. However, Dixon J made the following observation 
(at 385): 
What, as it seems to me, the judgment in James v. The Commonwealth [1936) UKPCHCA 4; (1936) AC 578; 55 
ClR 1 has corrected is the error of applying the conception of freedom where there was no real burden upon 
and no real obstruction to passing from one State to another or dealing across State lines and in addition the 
failure to recognize that regulation of trade, commerce and intercourse is compatible with freedom of inter-
State passage or converse. 
See also Hull, above n 783, p.27; see generally Co per, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian 
Constitution, above n 822, p.95; Nygh, above n 822, 341. 
1091 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.64. 
1092 Bank of New South Wales & Drs v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 284-290 (Rich and Williams JJ), 305-
309 (Starke J), 380-383 (Dixon J). See generally Caper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian 
Constitution, above n 822, pp.92-93; Lane, A Digest of Australian Constitutional Cases, (5th ed), above n 843, 
p.344; Sawer, 'Bank of NSW v Commonwealth', above n 860, 215. 
1093 National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 21. 
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Latham CJ and McTiernan J held that banking was not itself trade and commerce and suggested that, 
to be characterised as such, there was a need for the sale and transportation of goods or the 
movement of people across a State border.1094 It is clear that Latham CJ in particular was not 
convinced by Barwick's submissions on this issue, including his reliance on various authorities.1095 
Latham CJ was able to find that the.Act was not 'directed against' interstate trade because of his view 
that banking itself was not itself trade and commerce. 1096 McTiernan J agreed entirely with Latham 
CJ's reasons.1097 
The risk with Barwick's strategy of focusing on Latham CJ is that in attempting to convince one judge 
he may neglect the other judges. However, an analysis of Barwick's submissions does not reveal that 
he focused on Latham CJ to the extent that he failed to engage the entire bench; this is particularly 
evidenced by the technique of referring individual judges to their views in earlier cases (of course, 
there is also a risk that a judge may depart from their views in earlier cases). However, while Barwick 
managed to secure the support of the majority for his proposition on the application of section 92, 
his strategy could have proven fatal if he had not been able to achieve the appropriate balance. 
Latham CJ seemed to be the least consistent with his approach to section 92. In the Airlines Case he 
had held that the legislation nationalising the airlines was unconstitutional, while in this case he held 
that the legislation nationalising the banks was constitutional. 1098 
Barwick, as we have seen, dedicated considerable time to demonstrating that 'banking' was 'trade 
and commerce' for the purposes of section 92, including numerous references to US and Canadian 
authorities which Latham CJ did not find of any great assistance.1099 Latham CJ also rejected 
1094 Bank of New South Wales & Ors v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 233-235 (Latham CJ), 398 (McTiernan 
0). See generally Coper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, pp.92-93; 
Sawer, 'Bank of NSW v Commonwealth', above n 860, 215. 
1095 Latham 0 also dismissed Barwick's reliance on Trinidad Lake Asphalt Operating Co. Ltd v Commissioners of 
Income Tax for Trinidad and Tobago (1945) AC 1 and stated that 'the decision has no bearing whatever upon 
the question whether such a transaction is trade or commerce or whether banking is trade or commerce' (at 
235). 
1096 Bank of New South Wales & Ors v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 233-237, 240. See generally Coper, 
Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, p.94. 
1097 Bank of New South Wales & Ors v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 297-398. See generally Co per, 
Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, p.94. 
1098 This inconsistency appears to result from his characterisation approach. In the Airlines Case, Latham 0 
held that the ANA Act was unconstitutional as it contravened s 92 on the basis that it was a law 'directed 
against' competing interstate services. In contrast, in this case, he held that the Banking Act 1947 (Cth) was 
valid because it was a banking law and therefore, was not part of the interstate trade and commerce protected 
by section 92. The characterisation approach adopted by Latham 0 has been criticised as it effectively 
provided him with the discretion to determine whether the particular legislation was constitutional as he saw 
fit, for example, his decisions in the Airlines Case and this case could be reversed without disturbing Latham 
O's reasoning: see Galligan, above n 781, p.176. 
1099 Bank of New South Wales & Ors v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 233-235, per Latham 0. For example, 
Latham 0 stated that (at 233): 
231 
Barwick's alternate submission- in the event that banking was not considered 'trade and commerce' 
for the purposes of section 92 of the Constitution. 1100 
Whilst Latham CJ acknowledged that a 'law which was directed against the use of such facilities in 
inter-State trade and commerce, which had the 'real object' of restricting such trade and commerce, 
would be obnoxious to s. 92'1101 based on James v Cowan (1932)1102 and James v Commonwealth 
(1936), 1103 he rejected any suggestion that the Act was such a law.1104 
The approach of Latham CJ differed markedly from his earlier jurisprudence and it is perhaps 
understandable that Barwick believed that Latham CJ had fundamentally misunderstood his 
proposition: 'In the course of his judgment Latham completely misquoted the proposition that had 
been put to the Court and then demolished the English representation'.110s However, Latham CJ's 
approach may have been due to Barwick's failure to persuade. Alternatively, it may be that Latham 
CJ was not susceptible to being persuaded in this case as he had fairly fixed views. Justice Dixon's 
contemporaneous account of the case in his diary tends to suggest the latter: 
Latham seemed openly to espouse the Govt. & met every contention of the Bank with initial 
disfavour. It is not easy to understand; perhaps due to settling down upon his habitual bias for the 
The authorities in other courts to which reference was made do not give much assistance in the endeavour to 
answer the question whether banking is itself "trade or commerce" as used in the Commonwealth 
Constitution. 
Latham CJ stated that the 'cases in the United States in which reference is made to banking do not include any 
considered decision of the question whether banking is trade or commerce' (at 233). In addition, he stated 
that, whilst the provision with respect to banking in the Canadian Constitution is 'much the same' (at 233) as 
that contained in the Australian Constitution, the decision in the In Reference re Albert Statutes (1938) SCR 
(Can) 100 case 'does not contain any clear decision that banking is trade or commerce' (at 233). Latham CJ 
rejected Barwick's suggestion that banking was interstate trade and commerce because interstate banking 
transactions involved large use of the postal and telegraph systems (at 234-235). 
1100 Latham CJ stated as follows (at 236): 
Section 92 is infringed whenever an individual or corporation is engaged in inter-State trade, commerce or 
intercourse, and, either by a direction, prohibition or acquisition, with the object or purpose of effecting such 
a prohibition, the carrying on of such a business by him or it is forbidden, 
"
01 Bank of New South Wales & Drs v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 236. 
"
02 47 CLR 386. 
1103 55 CLR 1. 
"
04 Bank of New South Wales & Drs v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 236-237. Latham CJ concluded this 
section of his judgment by stating that (at 240): 
For these reasons I am of opinion that the provisions of the Banking Act 1947 do not infringes. 92 of the 
Commonwealth Constitution. In my opinion banking is not itself trade or commerce. It is an instrument used 
by trade and commerce. The legislative control introduced by the Act is a control which is not directed 
against any inter-State element in banking. It is a general provision for the control of banking and is as valid 
as a general money-lending law. In my opinion the objections based on s. 92 fail. 
"
05 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.66. Interestingly, 
Barwick was of the view as he expressed in private correspondence that Chief Justice Latham 'made a first rate 
Chief Justice' (see Letter from Sir Garfield Barwick to Sir Walter Monckton, 19 December 1950 (Papers of Sir 
Garfield Barwick, Personal correspondence [2.0cm], Series No: M3923 (M3923/1), Control Symbol: 14, 
National Archives of Australia, Sydney). 
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Govt & antipathy to what he regards as the bias of Starke & Wms [Williams]. Most of the points 
were disputable but he gave bad answers even to the good ones & before they had been 
formulated. 1106 
McTiernan J's judgment was the shortest of the judgments.1107 In relation to section 92, he stated 
that he agreed entirely with Latham CJ's reasons and adopted them. He dismissed the plaintiffs' 
arguments by simply stating that if the principles in James v Commonwealth (1936)1108 were applied 
then 'the argument for the plaintiffs on this question must be rejected'. 1109 McTiernan J did not 
consider banking to be 'trade or commerce' for the purposes of section 92 but rather something that 
aids 'trade or commerce'-'110 Whilst he acknowledged that section 92 would 'nullify any legislative 
restriction on banking depending for its operation on the relation of any banking transaction to 
trade, commerce and intercourse among the States', 1111 he believed that credit was transmitted 
across a State border only in a figurative sense, as it was not 'a commodity or a physical thing'; 1112 it 
relied on postal services or other means of communication. Therefore, it did not attract the 
application of section 92. 
Neither Latham CJ nor McTiernan J, relied on Evatt's interpretation of section 92 but, in Galligan's 
words, on 'an artificial severance of banking from interstate trade and commerce'.1113 That is, 
banking was not considered interstate trade and commerce for the purposes of section 92. 
In his submissions, Evatt maintained that section 92 safeguarded 'trade, commerce and intercourse 
among the States, not the trade exercised by an individual' .'114 It was an approach he had 
1106 Ayres, above n 50, p.188. 
1107 Bank of New South Wales & Ors v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 391-398. 
1108 55 CLR 1. 
1109 Bank of New South Wales & Ors v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 397. 
1110 Ibid at 398. 
1111 Ibid. 
1112 Ibid. 
1113 Galligan, above n 781, p.173. 
1114 Bank of New South Wales and Ors v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, at 84. In terms of the 
Commonwealth's submissions, Evatt's major arguments in relation to section 92 were not accepted by any of 
the judges. The Commonwealth's main argument was that trade and commerce was left absolutely free by 
bank nationalisation. According to the Commonwealth, it was simply exercising its right to select who would 
be entitled to carry on the business of banking by transferring the ownership of banks from private to public 
and that the business of banking would continue and be enhanced. This reflected Evatt's theory of section 92 
when he was on the High Court- the notion of trade and commerce as a whole and the denial of an individual 
right to engage in interstate trade (see Coper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, 
above n 822, p.93). However, according to Coper, Evatt's argument should have been based on the prevailing 
doctrine at the time such that he had to show that the Banking Act 1947 (Cth) was not 'directed against' 
interstate trade (as per the test in the James v Cowan (1932) [1932] AC 542; 47 CLR 386 and Milk Board (NSW) 
v Metropolitan Cream Pty Ltd (1939) 62 CLR 116] and that it did not interfere with 'freedom as at the frontier' 
(as per the test in James v Commonwealth (1936) 55 CLR 1) (see Caper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the 
Australian Constitution, above n 822, p.93). 
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expounded during his time on the High Court, but which departed from the view of the majority in 
the Airlines Case. To maintain this was both poor strategy and poor advocacy on Evatt's part. It 
departed from two fundamental elements and ideals of appellate advocacy, namely, knowing the law 
(in terms of framing arguments based on the existing law rather than a personal opinion of what the 
law ought to be) and knowing the wurt. In contrast, the interpretation of section 92 that Barwick 
advanced on behalf of the banks, although not universally accepted, became the preferred 
interpretation. Essentially, Barwick submitted that section 92 guaranteed 'the individual's freedom 
to move from place to place and to conduct his business across State lines' such that any direct 
prohibition or acquisition of such business by the State was prohibited.1115 As we have seen, the 
majority of the Court accepted Barwick's submission. 
The interpretation of section 92 was critical in this case but also had wider political and policy 
ramifications. It spelt the end of the Commonwealth Labor government's policy of nationalisation of 
industry. The High Court had suggested that the Commonwealth could operate its own airline or 
bank 'but it could not prohibit others from engaging in that interstate enterprise'."" 
After 39 days of argument beginning on 9 February 1948, the High Court delivered its long-awaited 
judgment in Sydney on 11 August 1948 declaring, before a capacity crowd, that most of the Act was 
invalid. 1117 The views of the judges are summarised in the table in Appendix D. The decision caused 
celebrations around the country. 1118 Robert Menzies, the leader of the relatively recently-formed 
1115 . Bank of New South Wales and Ors v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 22; Galligan, above n 781, p.174. 
1116 Hull, above n 783, pp.26-27. Prime Minister Chifley attempted to put a positive 'spin' on the defeat by 
suggesting that, other than the majority decision in relation to section 92, the legislation was a valid exercise of 
the banking power subject to some minor amendments: see Galligan, above n 781, p.176. Chifley's view was 
valid to some extent in the sense that the majority of the High Court found that the scope of the 
Commonwealth's banking power was wide enough to allow the government to acquire private banks. Also, 
although four of the six judges held that the compensation offered to shareholders for acquisition of their 
shares under the Banking Act was not on just terms, this part of the legislation was capable of being remedied 
by subsequent legislation (see Crisp, Ben Chif/ey: A Political Biography, above n 783, pp.336-337; Marr, above n 
8, p.69). 
1117 The decision has been criticised. For example, in Justice Ronald Sackville, 'Continuity and Judicial Creativity 
-Some Observations', above n 879, 165 it was stated that: 
The broad approach taken by the [High] Court to constitutional prohibitions can be illustrated by the Bank of 
New South Wales v The Commonwealth (the Bank Nationolisation Case) ... There can scarcely be a more 
striking example of the Court overriding the judgment of the elected Parliament on a matter of great 
economic, social and politically importance. One of the grounds on which the Labor Party bank 
nationalisation program was overturned was at Part VII of the Banking Act 1947 (Cth), which prohibited 
private banks from carrying on banking business, infringe the freedom of trade guaranteed by s. 92 of the 
Constitution. 
See also Lane, A Digest of Australian Constitutional Cases, (51h ed), above n 843, p.344. In Michael Kirby, 'Sir 
Edward McTiernan: A Centenary Reflection', above n 879, 178, former Justice Kirby described McTiernan J's 
decisions as 'the least 11pro laissez fa ire" in cases under s 92 of the constitution'. 
1118 Johnston, above n 783, 85; May, above n 778, p.88. 
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Liberal Party, hailed the victory, in Johnston's words, as a triumph of the Constitution over the 
socialist program ofthe Chifley Labor Government.1119 
On the morning following the judgment, the Chairman of the National Bank and the Associated 
Banks, Leslie McConnan was cheered by hundreds of bank employees as he walked to his office, 'as if 
the judgment of the High Court was his personal triumph'.1120 The decision made front-page 
headlines and was the cause for great celebration by the private banks and their supporters, both in 
Australia and overseas.1121 The Sydney Morning Herald carried numerous articles under the headline 
'BANK NATIONALISATION RULED OUT' on the front page and four ofthe first five pages were 
dedicated to the decision.'"' As May describes the reception, a large crowd gathered in Sydney's 
Martin Place to celebrate and speeches by banking executives were met with rapturous applause in 
banking chambers.1123 
Barwick's advocacy was credited for the success, and he emerged following this case with a greatly 
enhanced reputation. Barwick's advocacy demonstrated a close (albeit not flawless) adherence to 
the elements and ideals of appellate advocacy. It was characterised notably by his ability to handle 
judicial questions and utilise his answers as a means of conveying his submissions. In doing so, he 
also employed the use of examples and analogy to great effect. Barwick himself acknowledged that 
'during the Banks case I answered many questions and I think by answering them, made my 
argument clearer to my listeners'.1124 
1119 Johnston, above n 783; L.F. Crisp, Australian National Government, (1972), Longman Australia Pty Limited, 
Camberwell, pp.228-229. 
1120 Blainey and Hutton, above n 783, p.232. It was said that whilst Barwick, and the other counsel for the 
banks, were confident of a favourable outcome, Leslie McConnan, the Chief Manager of the National Bank who 
led the opposition to nationalisation on behalf of the banks, was also hopeful but was reserved by what he 
described as 1Somewhat extreme Scottish caution'. 
1121 See 'Bank Nationalisation Ruled Out', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 12 August 1948, 1; 'News 
Received with Joy- Parties at Banks'; The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 12 August 1948, 1; 'Bank Judgment 
Labour's Reversal Of Policy Since 1941', The Mercury, (Hobart), 12 August 1948, 1; 'High Court Rules Against 
Bank Nationalisation' (Canberra), 12 August 1948, 1; 'Bank Act Invalid: Cabinet Move Awaited', The Argus 
(Melbourne), 12 August 1948, 1; Priest and Williams, above n 77, p.53. 
1122 See 'Bank Nationalisation Ruled Out', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 12 August 1948, 1. 
1123 May, above n 778, p.88. 
1124 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.77. 
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Chapter 8: Barwick and the Bank Nationalisation Case in 
the Privy Council 
"I hear from time to time that people think I came forward, as it were, only at the time of the 
constitutional cases but I had been practising at the High Court, not at the Privy Council, but in the 
High Court for a very considerable time before the Bonk case and had gathered a good deal of 
prominence in the profession." 
Sir Garfield Barwick, 19771125 
After the victory in the Bank Nationa/isation Case in the High Court, speculation began immediately 
as to whether the Chifley Government would appeal the decision to the Privy Council.1126 Two days 
after the decision, the Government announced that it would. Barwick was once again called upon by 
the banks to appear on their behalf before the Privy Council. This chapter is dedicated to assessing 
Barwick's advocacy in the Bank Nationalisation Case appeal before the Privy Council against the 
elements and ideals of appellate advocacy. 
8.1 Preparation for the Special Leave Application 
The Chifley government was disappointed with the High Court's decision and the fact that the High 
Court had hindered its nationalisation agenda. On 13 August 1948- just two days after the High 
Court's decision- the Chifley government announced that it would appeal to the Privy Council. It was 
the government's last resort. 1127 It immediately sought special leave to appeal, specifically, with 
respect to the decision that section 46 infringed section 92 of the Constitution.1128 The Labor 
governments of New South Wales and Queensland joined the appeal. Evatt would once again appear 
1125 National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 15. 
1126 
'High Court Decision Seen As Worst Rebuff Government Has Received', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 12 
August 1948, 1. 
1127 May, above n 778, pp.88-89; Crisp, Ben Chifley: A Political Biography, above n 783, pp.336-337; Marr, above 
n 8, p.69; Galligan, above n 781, p.177. According to Whitlam, Evatt made a mistake by advising the Chifley 
Government that it should appeal the High Court decision to the Privy Council otherwise, in Whitlam's opinion, 
this would not have been an issue at the 1949 election (see Whitlam, above n 81, p.303). Sawer, Bailey and 
others doubted whether such an appeal would be possible due to section 74 of the Constitution but Evatt was 
of the view that a partial appeal to the Privy Council was possible based on previous High Court decisions. It 
was on this basis that Evatt received conditional leave to appeal and the section 92 issue was argued before the 
Privy Council (see Tennant, Famous Australians- Evatt: Politics and Justice, above n 786, p.229). 
1128 Blainey and Hutton, above n 783, p.232. 
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on behalf of the Commonwealth. 1129 Initially, Barwick declined the brief to appear in London to 
oppose the application for special leave but was pressed to accept by the banks.1130 This was to be 
Barwick's first appearance before the Privy Council.1131 
Barwick prepared for the special leave application and held meetings with the English counsel and 
solicitors led by Sir Cyril Radcliffe KC. 1132 The first meeting of counsel occurred on 13 October 
1948.1133 
It was Barwick's view that, in light of the fact that the High Court's decision was not unanimous, the 
Privy Council would not refuse the Commonwealth an opportunity to appeal against the decision, 
particularly since the case concerned an important constitutional power, that is, the banking power 
as well as section 92. However, Radcliffe believed that there was a possibility of persuading the Privy 
Council to reject the Commonwealth's application.1134 
1129 The other members of the Commonwealth team included: which included Kenneth Bailey, Geoffrey Sawer, 
D. N. Pritt KC, P. D. Phillips K.C., Frank Gahan, H.L. Parker and C.I.Menhennit. 
1130 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, pp.66-67. Barwick's 
concern with leaving to go to London was the fact that he had to leave his practice. Barwick stated that 
McConnan, the Chairman of the National Bank, insisted that he went and they attempted to convince Barwick's 
wife. They also booked him and his wife the vice regal suite on the Stratheden, one of the great ships of its 
time, so he eventually agreed to go (see National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield 
Barwick, above n 19, 21-22). Sir Norman Cowper and Barwick travelled together and reached London on the 
Stratheden in October 1948 where they stayed for 9 months (see Alfred James, 'Sir Norman Cowper' {2000) 
86(1) Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society 74, 81). Barwick recalled that it was 'the job of Cowper 
to make sure I got to England safely': Valerie Lawson, The Aliens Affair, 1995, Pan Macmillan Australia, Sydney, 
p.63. According to Norma Barwick's diary, the couple left Sydney on 11 September 1948 and arrived in England 
on 12 October 1948: see Travel Diary -1948 of Norma M. Barwick, 'Sir Garfield Barwick's diaries and other 
personal books, Series No: M3943/2, Control Symbol: 27, National Archives of Australia, Sydney. 
1131 Letter from J.Emrys-Lioyd to Sir Garfield Barwick, 12 October 1948 (Papers of Sir Garfield Barwick, Personal 
correspondence [2.0cm], Series No: M3923 (M3923/1), Control Symbol: 9, National Archives of Australia, 
Sydney). As well as the brief for the banks, Barwick was also briefed to appear before the Privy Council in two 
other applications for special leave to appeal. In the first application, he appeared on behalf of Grace Bros in 
relation to a case concerning the acquisition by the Commonwealth of the Grace Building in King and York 
Streets, Sydney (see Grace Bros Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1946) 72 CLR 269). The second application related to 
the price to be paid for wheat compulsorily acquired under the Wartime Wheat Pool (see Nelunga/oo Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth (1947) 75 CLR 495 and Nelunga/oo Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1950) 81 CLR 144). See Barwick, 
A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.68. 
1132 Sir Cyril Radcliffe KC, Sir Walter Monckton KC, Sir Valentine Holmes KC and Kenneth Diplock were the senior 
English counsel and Brian McKenna (later Sir Brian McKenna, judge of the English High Court) was the only 
junior. Sir David Fyfe KC was briefed for the State of Victoria; with Albert Hannan KC and Douglas Menzies 
together with Mr Barrington were briefed for the States of South Australia and Western Australia. Sir David 
Maxwell Fyfe was a British Conservative Party politician, lawyer and judge. See Commonwealth v Bank of New 
South Wales (1949) 79 CLR 497 (26 October 1949) and also Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's 
Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.69. 
1133 Letter from Sir Garfield Barwick to Crowther, 12 May 1949 (Papers of Sir Garfield Barwick, London file no. 3 
-personal correspondence [3.0cm], Series No: M3923 (M3923/1), Control Symbol: 9, National Archives of 
Australia, Sydney). 
1134 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.69. 
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It was decided that Radcliffe should lead the banks' opposition against the Commonwealth's 
application. Barwick believed that Radcliffe should lead as he was 'the outstanding English advocate 
of the day' 1135, and he also thought the Commonwealth's application might possibly be defeated 
whereas Barwick was not of the same view. 1136 Barwick stated that his main objective at the time 
was to eliminate the influence that.Latham CJ would have on the Privy Council by weakening Latham 
CJ's dissent.'"' He believed that this would be advantageous in opposing the application1138 He 
stated: 'I have only one desire, I want to destroy Latham and take his vote out of this business'. 1139 
He then added: 'What Latham had done was, he had attributed to me an argument I didn't put and 
then knocked it down. Now I hadn't disclosed that but that is what happened'.'140 The language 
adopted by Barwick in this interview almost 30 years later suggests that he was angry with Latham CJ 
and would seek to remedy this in the Privy Council. If exhibiting such emotion were to manifest in 
his advocacy, it could have proved counterproductive, with potential loss of objectivity or a loss of 
control. 
8.2 Presentation and Personation for the Special Leave Application 
The application to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council commenced on 25 October 1948.'141 
The orders from which the Petitioners sought leave to appeal were the declarations of the High Court 
that section 46 of the Act was invalid. 1142 
1135 Ibid. See also National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 22. 
Barwick also believed that, whilst he had the right to open as the Bank of NSW's petition was first on the list, 
'as the local lads were confident on discretion, I thought it better to send one of them in to bat, and in the long 
run I think my decision was right'. 
1136 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.69. 
1137 Ibid. 
1138 Ibid. 
1139 National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 22. 
1140 Ibid. 
1141 There were five Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal. In each of the five petitions, the Petitioners were the 
Commonwealth of Australia, the Treasurer of the Commonwealth, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, and the 
Governor of the Commonwealth Bank and the Respondents were broadly the 11 private banks named in 
Parts 1 and 2 of the First Schedule to the Banking Act 1947. In addition to those 11 private banks who were 
Respondents in the first two Petitions, there were three other Petitions which affected three of the States, 
Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia and their respective Attorney-Generals were Respondents in 
those applications. The petitions were before Lord Wright, Lord Simonds, Lord Uthwatt, Lord Oaksey and Lord 
Morton of Henryton. Interestingly, Lord Wright delivered the leading opinion in James v Commonwealth 
(1936) 55 CLR 1. See 'Hearing of Banking Application', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 26 October 1948, 1 and 
'Banking Act Appeal, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 26 October 1948, 3. A full list of Counsel who appeared 
in relation to the special leave application can be found in Appendix C. 
1142 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Lord Wright, Lord Simonds, Lord Uthwatt, Lord Oaksey and Lord Morton of Henryton, 
Monday 25 October 1948, p.3. 
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Evatt opened on behalf of the Commonwealth. He commenced by referring the Privy Council 
to the decision in the High Court.1143 He emphasised that the case raised issues 'not merely of 
great importance to the immediate subject of banking' 1144 but issues in relation to section 92 
generally. He argued that if the majority of the High Court was correct, then the transport 
legislation of the states was also invalid under section 92.1145 He argued that the decision 
regarding section 92 was wrong, being contrary to previous judgments of the High Court and 
Privy Council, and denying the Commonwealth Parliament legislative power to an extent which 
could not reasonably be regarded as flowing from the Constitution. 
Radcliffe for the Respondents1146 indicated that the first question he wanted to address was whether 
the appeal, in the form proposed, could take place at all.1147 He also addressed the issue of the 
wording of section 74 of the Constitution.""" Barwick described Radcliffe as 'an outstanding 
advocate and a brilliant lawyer. This day he gave a polished performance; his language was clear and 
concise and his delivery easy'.1149 This assessment of Radcliffe's performance provided an insight 
into the elements and ideals of appellate advocacy that Barwick considered important; namely, clear 
and concise language as well as presentation. 
1143 Evatt submitted that: 
the legal question raised by the Petition is of outstanding importance; it goes far beyond the Banking Act. I 
shall submit to your lordships that the reasoning of the majority of the Court in relation to section 92, 
probably does not, de-validate a great deal of the legislation, if it is accepted, which the Privy Council, in 
James v. The Commonwealth. clearly regarded as valid. 
Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and Others 
(Privy Council, Monday 25 October 1948), above n 1142, pp.S, 12. 
1144 Ibid, p.24. 
1145 Ibid. 
1146 Radcliffe addressed the Privy Council on behalf of the Respondents and in relation to the first Petition with 
Barwick addressing them on behalf of the Respondents to the second Petition, the English banks, and Sir David 
Maxwell Fyfe, who appeared on behalf of all the three states, would address the Privy Council in relation to the 
remaining three Petitions. See Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of 
New South Wales and Others (Privy Council, Monday 25 October 1948), above n 1142, p.24. 
1147 Ibid, p.25. 
1148 1bid, pp.34-36. 
1149 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.69; May, above n 778, 
pp.90-91. He stated that 'Cyril Radcliffe was a magnificent advocate with a wonderful gift of language' (see 
National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 22.). Barwick stated that 
Radcliffe was 'extremely smooth and competent' although noted that English counsel 'have nothing to show us 
in the way of courage and reserve': Letter from Sir Garfield Barwick to Bruce MacFarlane, 10 December 1948 
(Papers of Sir Garfield Barwick, London file no. 3- personal correspondence [3.0cm], Series No: M3923 
(M3923/1), Control Symbol: 8, National Archives of Australia, Sydney). This illustrates that Barwick agreed that 
courage was an important element of appellate advocacy. Barwick also added that Radcliffe had left him with 
'a dreadful job in following him. He had been very well taken, and he had of necessity covered much of my 
ground': Letter from Sir Garfield Barwick to Bruce MacFarlane, 10 December 1948 (Papers of Sir Garfield 
Barwick, London file no. 3- personal correspondence [3.0cm], Series No: M3923 (M3923/1), Control Symbol: 
8, National Archives of Australia, Sydney). 
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Barwick succeeded Radcliffe in opposing the special leave application on behalf of the banks.1150 He 
recalled: 
It was in the middle of the afternoon that I had to begin, and I must confess that after the English 
voices and the very splendid exhibition that Radcliffe gave, I felt a little like a shaggy dog. 
However, I got the feel of them and those on the side-line seemed quite satisfied. 1151 
As evidenced by this recollection, Barwick felt uncomfortable from the outset. He had never argued 
from a lectern before a bench that was sitting at the same level as he was standing. On the first day, 
he folded his arms and rested them on the lectern which he later conceded was a mistake, as he was 
unable to make a gesture or emphasise any point: this posture had the effect of almost leaving him 
'tongue-tied' .1152 According to Barwick, the experience was agonising and one of the worst that he 
had experienced.1153 He stated that he 'had never felt so ineffective'.1154 This illustrates the 
importance of an advocate being both familiar and comfortable with their surroundings. Despite 
Barwick's extensive experience, the fact that the layout of the Court and the courtroom environment 
was slightly different was disconcerting. 
Barwick's discomfort and perceived ineffectiveness were exacerbated by the fact that the judges did 
not ask him any questions. As a result, he was unable to use judicial questions to glean or infer the 
judges' thoughts but was left to speculate. This was something to which Barwick was not 
accustomed and he found it difficult. He commented that 'the polite silence of my hearers only 
made matters worse'.'155 This also demonstrates that Barwick's style of advocacy relied heavily on 
judicial dialogue, and that he was perhaps less effective without it. 
The following day, Barwick did not repeat his mistake of folding his arms when making his 
submissions. He presented to the Privy Council 'without script or notes' .1156 It was testament to his 
exceptional memory. 
Barwick continued his submissions on day three by posing an alternative construction for section 74 
of the Constitution. Section 74 states that no appeal is permitted to the Privy Council on any inter se 
1150 Lord Wright indicated during Day 1 that the Board would not be able to sit the following morning (that is, 
Tuesday 26 October 1948) but will resume sitting in the afternoon at 2.15pm: see Transcript of Proceedings, 
the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and Others (Privy Council, Monday 25 
October 1948), above n 1142, p.25. 
1151 Letter from Sir Garfield Barwick to Bruce MacFarlane, 10 December 1949 (Papers of Sir Garfield Barwick, 
London file no. 3- personal correspondence [3.0cm], Series No: M3923 {M3923/1), Control Symbol: 8, 
National Archives of Australia, Sydney). 
1152 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.70. 
1153 b"d I I , pp.69-70. 
1154 Ibid, p. 70. 
1155 Ibid. 
1156 Ibid. 
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question unless the High Court has certified that the question is one which ought to be determined 
by the Privy Council. The Commonwealth had not sought a section 74 certificate from the High 
Court. Barwick's approach to the interpretation of section 74 prompted various questions from the 
Board of the Privy Council and his submissions on the inter se question occupied a significant amount 
of day three. 1157 
Following this, Barwick sought to address Evatt's submission that the decision in this case was 'of 
far-reaching effect and calls in question a large amount of legislation; that it, as it were, flies in the 
face of the Privy Council's own decision in James v. The Commonwealth'.1158 In response to this, the 
following exchange ensued where Barwick demonstrated courage to maintain his position: 
Lord Wright: That is a very serious point. 
Barwick: Quite. I want to deal with that, and deal with it as shortly as I can, because I 
submit the very contrary. This decision [in the Bank Nationalisation Case] was in a 
very narrow compass, and when analysed does not in any sense contravene 
anything that was said in the case of James v. The Commonwealth or James v. 
Cowan. 
Lord Wright: You cannot say that of the various reasons. 
Barwick: I think I could, my Lord; but I do not want to go into the whole merits of it. What I 
want to do is to show what the actual decision did.1159 
After approximately 20 minutes, Lord Uthwatt directed a comment to Barwick who responded in a 
humorous manner. According to Barwick, this changed the atmosphere of the courtroom and he 
broke 'through a barrier and gathered strength with the Privy Council thereafter'. 1160 If this 
assessment is correct, it illustrates the effectiveness of humour and wit when used appropriately. In 
this instance, it had the effect of altering the atmosphere of the courtroom significantly. 
This turning point, based on Barwick's recollection, refers to the following exchange: 
Lord Uthwatt: The point you are on is that you are not fighting about a live matter; you are not 
fighting about a dead body; you are fighting about one which is buried? 
11s7 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Lord Wright, Lord Simonds, Lord Uthwatt, Lord Oaksey and Lord Morton of Henryton, 
Wednesday 27 October 1948), pp.3-12. 
1158 Ibid, p.12. 
1159 'd lbl 'pp.12-13. 
1160 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.70; National Library of 
Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 22. According to Barwick, Uthwatt made a 
remark that he 'facetiously capped, and Valentine Holmes always told me that was one of the remarkable 
moments of his life, he saw everything changed by that bit of humour' (see National Library of Australia, Miller, 
Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 22). 
Barwick: 
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Yes; and more than that, my Lord, if one looks to clause 24 in this petition. It is 
suggested that I am fighting about the gentleman who was buried, and the 
argument for the Commonwealth is: Well, you do not know whether the 
gentleman who was buried ought to be revived or not, unless you see what 
clothes he is to be put in. They say: We are not going to put him in the clothes he 
was in before, but we are going to put him in a new suit; you do not know what 
the new suit is, and they agree it is essential you know the suit if you are able to 
determine the question of whether he ought to be revived .... 
Lord Wright: That is simply an argument on section 92. 
Barwick: The point I desire to make is this. They say that section 92 does not affect 
section 46 because the Act in which it was, was an Act of a particular kind. 
Lord Wright: That is treating section 46 as a somehow standing by itself and alive. 
Barwick: And in an Act that is otherwise dead. 
[Barwick proceeded to outline provisions of the Petition] 
Lord Uthwatt: You say they have to provide a new coffin before they can deal with the old body? 
Lord Wright: You have to get, not a body, but a new infant. 
Barwick: The argument put against me on this point is that you have to say: What is the 
object ofthe Act in which you find the section? They say: You find the object 
from the Act that is dead, although we are going to put it in another Act. 
Lord Wright: He had other reasons as well, had he not? 
Barwick: Not on this point. That is what I want to point out.1161 
Barwick's recollection of the special leave application was as follows: 
I remember the first half hour I spent on the opposition to the grant of special leave. I followed 
Cyril Radcliffe who had been arguing in front of me. He really was tops. The general attitude of 
those (seven of them) on the other side of the table was: "Why have we got to listen to you?" 
They had heard England's best. You know, it was very patent. The next morning I got going and 
Valentine Holmes, who was a good advocate, a very good advocate, always said to me, 11Vou know, 
I've only seen a few magical moments but", he said "the moment you cracked a joke with Andrew 
Uthwatt that morning was magic." He said: "It completely changed their attitude to you." 
1161 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Wednesday 27 October 1948), above n 1157, pp.13-15. 
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... I can't remember [the joke] but I know it happened. Val always said that was a magical 
moment, it loosened everything. The Bank case was fairly difficult. I don't think I ever had as 
difficult an argument. 1162 
In his submissions, Barwick attempted to demonstrate the manner in which Latham CJ's judgment 
had transformed the proposition which he had submitted at the original hearing. Barwick outlined 
the original proposition he had submitted to the High Court and compared it to the proposition that 
Latham CJ had outlined in his judgment.1163 According to Barwick, Latham CJ had misquoted the 
original proposition and then demolished the misquoted proposition. 1164 
Barwick proceeded to refer to various aspects of Chief Justice Latham's judgments, including in the 
Airlines Case.1165 He reacted to a comment by Lord Wright that he did not know enough about the 
Airlines Case and stated that if he 'might read the head note it will put your Lordships in possession 
of the whole case' .1166 He then proceeded to read the entire head note. This is an example of 
Barwick employing flexibility in the delivery of his submissions. Barwick continued to refer to the 
Chief Justice's comments in the Airlines Case. 1167 
Barwick's emphasis on Chief Justice Latham's reasoning was designed to reduce or eliminate the 
possible influence that the Privy Council might place upon it. He suggested that had Chief Justice 
Latham overcome the first hurdle by finding that banking was 'trade or commerce' for the purposes 
of section 92 then he would have also found that the Act contravened section 92 of the Constitution. 
Following Barwick's references to the Airlines Case as well James v The Commonwealth (1936), 1168 
Lord Wright stated 'I can understand this much better than I could before'.1169 It is clear from this 
1162 Molomby & Donohoe, above n 19, 17. Even Barwick's wife recalled on Wednesday 27 October 1948 that 
Barwick 'was right on top': see Travel Diary -1948 of Norma M. Barwick, 'Sir Garfield Barwick's diaries and other 
personal books, Series No: M3943/2, Control Symbol: 27, National Archives of Australia, Sydney. 
1163 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.70. 
1164 Virtue, above n 857, 24. According to Barwick, he 'managed to destroy Latham' (see National Library of 
Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 22-23). 
1165 The exchange proceeded as follows: 
Barwick: He proceeds to consider something else which the majority did not consider, and I want to 
say something shortly about that in a moment; but may I just point this out, that from that 
passage you would infer that had he come to the conclusion that banking was trade and 
commerce, he would have been of the same opinion as the majority, that this section 46 
was bad as being a direct and absolute prohibition of trade and commerce. 
Lord Wright: I do not know that that matters very much. Where is a passage upon which you base that? 
Would you just give the reference? Most of us have read these judgments. 
Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and Others 
(Privy Council, Wednesday 27 October 1948), above n 1157, p.16. 
1166 Ibid. 
1167 1bid, pp.17-18. 
1168 55 CLR 1. 
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comment that Barwick had successfully informed Lord Wright, and in all likelihood the other 
members of the Board, of Chief Justice Latham's position in the Bank Nationalisation Case and the 
Airlines Case. 
Barwick recalled that his submissions relating to Chief Justice Latham's judgment caused some 
consternation amongst the Commonwealth's legal team and eventually prompted Evatt to request a 
copy of the transcript of the argument in the High Court as a matter of urgency, only to find that 
Barwick was correct. 1170 Although it is difficult to assess, Barwick may have achieved his aim of 
reducing, if not eliminating, the Chief Justice's influence in the special leave application. Again, 
Barwick demonstrated his ability to outline clearly and concisely certain propositions as well as the 
importance of a thorough preparation and a clearly defined strategy. Barwick was focused on his 
objective, namely, to reduce the potential influence of the Chief Justice's dissenting judgment and he 
set out to achieve this objective. This also illustrates the importance he attributed to knowing the 
court; he realised that, in determining whether to grant special leave, the Privy Council may place 
considerable weight upon the decision ofthe Chief Justice. 
Shortly prior to concluding his submissions, Barwick succinctly encapsulated his opposition to the 
Petition for Special Leave.1171 During this, Barwick foreshadowed for the Board the policy 
implications associated with accepting or indeed providing an advisory opinion in this context. 
Barwick then concluded by stating: 
Nobody throughout the whole long course of discussion of this section has ever expressed doubt 
that a direct and absolute prohibition of a portion of trade does not leave trade free. That is all 
that this decision actually did. For these reasons, my Lords, I submit leave should not be 
granted. 1172 
Writing to Barwick soon after, Cowper's assessment of Barwick's performance was as follows: 
I have never heard you to better advantage, and can't imagine that anyone could have done 
better ... Your success was due to admirable advocacy, which combined clarity, care, pungency, 
and resourcefulness; and we all know to what extent your brilliant argument was based on 
learning, hard work, and intense thought. 1173 
1169 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Wednesday 27 October 1948), above n 1157, p.23. 
1170 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.70. 
1171 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Wednesday 27 October 1948). above n 1157, p.25. 
1172 Ibid. 
1173 Letter from Norman Cowper to Sir Garfield Barwick, 27 October 1948 (Papers of Sir Garfield Barwick, 
London file no. 3- personal correspondence [3.0cm], Series No: M3923 (M3923/1), Control Symbol: 9, 
National Archives of Australia, Sydney). 
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Having given Barwick the brief, Cowper appears to have thought his choice well vindicated. 
At the conclusion of Barwick's submissions towards the end of day three, Fyfe on behalf of Victoria, 
South Australia and Western Australia, addressed the Board in relation to the Petition for Special 
Leave. Fyfe suggested that he could not add anything to the way in which the issue of regulation was 
dealt with by Barwick, because, in his view, 'it does not need it' .1174 This was an indirect 
acknowledgement of the comprehensive nature of Barwick's arguments and testament to Barwick's 
advocacy. 
Despite the efforts of Radcliffe and Barwick, special leave to appeal was granted to the 
Commonwealth at the conclusion of the submissions on 11 November 1948.1175 The reality of 
advocacy in practice is that even though Barwick was impressed by Radcliffe's performance, as was 
Cowper with Barwick, excellent advocacy on its own does not guarantee success. The Privy Council 
hearing was set down for 14 March 1949. However, although the Privy Council granted special leave, 
it indicated that: 
It shall be reserved to the Respondents to raise as a preliminary point the plea that the appeal 
does not lie without a certificate of the High Court of Australia and if this preliminary point should 
be decided against the Respondents they shall be at liberty to raise all such constitutional points 
as they think fit. 1176 
As a result, whilst special leave to appeal was granted, the banks still had available to them the 
argument that no appeal to the Privy Council was available under section 74. One of the issues the 
Privy Council had to consider was whether the appeal involved limits inter se of the Constitutional 
powers of the Commonwealth and of the States. In such instances, the Commonwealth could not 
1174 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Wednesday 27 October 1948), above n 1157, pp.33-34. 
1175 H.S. Nicholas, 'The Banking Act and the Privy Council', (1949), 23 Australian Law Journal387, 387; Barwick, 
A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.70; see also Galligan, above n 781, 
p.177. According to Barwick, this was unsurprising (see National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir 
Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 23). Barwick also believed that refusing leave in this case on grounds of 
discretion would be 'most impolitic': see Letter from Sir Garfield Barwick to David Maughan KC, 3 January 1949 
(Papers of Sir Garfield Barwick, London file no. 3- personal correspondence [3.0cm], Series No: M3923 
(M3923/1), Control Symbol: 9, National Archives of Australia, Sydney). Interestingly, apparently Lord Simonds 
said 'pleasant things' about the advocacy in relation to the special leave application in a letter sent from Lord 
Simonds to David Maughan: see Letter from David Maughan KC to Sir Garfield Barwick, 4 February 1949 
(Papers of Sir Garfield Barwick, London file no. 3- personal correspondence [3.0cm], Series No: M3923 
(M3923/1), Control Symbol: 9, National Archives of Australia, Sydney). Norma Barwick records that special 
leave was granted on Wednesday 10 November 1948: see Travel Diary -1948 of Norma M. Barwick, 'Sir Garfield 
Barwick's diaries and other personal books, Series No: M3943/2, Control Symbol: 27, National Archives of 
Australia, Sydney. 
1176 Nicholas, above n 1175, 387; May, above n 778, p.90. 
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seek special leave to appeal without obtaining a certificate from the High Court. As noted, the 
Commonwealth had not sought such a certificate from the High Court. 1177 
The appeal to the Privy Council was to be restricted to the validity of section 46 of the Act and the 
application of section 92 of the Constitution. Although this section did not involve any inter se issues, 
the banks attempted to introduce it'as an issue to prevent the Privy Council from hearing the appeal. 
The banks argued that the scope of the banking power might introduce inter se issues. The Privy 
Council was undecided and postponed its decision until the start ofthe hearing.1178 
8.3 Preparation for the Bank Nationalisation Case in the Privy Council 
The hearing before the Privy Council began on 14 March 1949, almost five months after special leave 
was granted. In addition to becoming the longest case in the High Court's history, the appeal 
became one of the longest hearings in the history of the Privy Council. The Privy Council granted 
NSW and Queensland leave to intervene to support the Commonwealth. 
A Federal election was due before the end of 1949 and, irrespective of the result of the appeal 
before the Privy Council, the Chifley government would not be able to nationalise the banks before 
the election. McConnan turned his attention to campaigning against the Chifley government at the 
upcoming election. The Liberal Party, led by Opposition Leader Robert Menzies, recognised that the 
bank nationalisation issue might help defeat the Chifley government at the election. However, 
Menzies acknowledged the difficulty in maintaining the bank nationalisation issue in the minds of 
voters until the federal election, especially if the Privy Council rejected the Chifley government's 
appeal.1179 
Barwick remained in London to prepare for the hearing of the appeal. It was decided that, for the 
purposes of the hearing before the Privy Council, one ofthe English counsel (ultimately, Radcliffe) 
1177 Johnston, above n 783, 96. See generally Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts, above n 295, p.79; 
Brennan, 'The Privy Council and the Constitution', above n 167, 321; Nicholas, above n 1175, 387; S.R. Davis, 
'The Australian Bank Nationalisation Case' (1950) 13 Modern Law Review 107, 108. 
1178 Marr, above n 8, p.70; Nicholas, above n 1175, 387. At the same time, in late 1948, work commenced on 
drafting an amending Bill to address the non-vital objections to the Banking Act 1947 (Cth) based on Latham 
CJ's judgment in the High Court in anticipation of a possible victory in the Privy Council: see Crisp, Ben Chif/ey: A 
Political Biography, above n 783, pp.336-337; May, above n 778, pp.90-91. 
1179 Blainey and Hutton, above n 783, pp.232-233; Galligan, above n 781, p.177. The Federal election was held 
on 10 December 1949; Holder, above n 781, p.887. 
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should deal with the question of jurisdiction under section 74 and the question of the banking power 
under section 51 and Barwick should handle the section 92 argument. 1180 
According to Barwick, the proper approach to adopt on the application of section 92 was: 
To establish the operation of the statute upon interstate trade and commerce and, having done 
so, to ask whether such operation left the trade, etc, free. In other words was the impact of that 
operation on interstate trade compatible with the concept of freedom of the individual in a 
civilised and complex society? That there are restraints which may be imposed in such a society 
which do not deny the individual's freedom, must be conceded. The problem is to develop a 
criterion by which such acceptable restraints may be identified.1181 
In Barwick's view, the High Court had decided the effect of section 92 correctly by acknowledging 
that the concept of freedom of interstate trade and commerce encompassed the freedom of the 
individual to engage in such interstate trade and commerce.1182 
Barwick thought it advisable to provide the Privy Council with a general discussion of the meaning 
and operation of section 92, including the restraints or burdens that the section theoretically 
permitted beyond merely describing the distinction between 'prohibition' and 'regulation'. 1183 
Formulating a universally applicable criterion of freedom would be difficult, as it would depend on 
the facts and circumstances of each case. Therefore, the banks adopted a concept of 'regulation' 
without defining the permissible restraints upon freedom.1184 
Barwick and Kitto were responsible for the preparation of the case book in relation to section 92 of 
the Constitution.118s It was later to be included with other summaries of argument in a case book to 
1180 Letter from Norman Cowper to G. S. Reichenbach, 3 January 1949 (Papers of Sir Garfield Barwick, London 
file no. 3- personal correspondence [3.0cm], Series No: M3923 (M3923/1), Control Symbol: 9, National 
Archives of Australia, Sydney). 
1181 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.72. 
1182 Ibid. 
1183 1bid, pp.72-73. 
1184 1bid, above n 1, p.73. Barwick contended that the legislature could regulate but not prohibit interstate 
trade and commerce. In response, Evatt mocked this submission by suggesting that 'if the impediment is a 
little one it is only a regulation, but if it is a bigger one then it is a burden'. See also Coper, Freedom of 
Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, p.105; Coper, Encounters with the Australian 
Constitution, above n 781, p.277; Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales (1949) 79 CLR 497 (26 October 
1949) at 556 at 600. 
1185 The respondents' case book was divided into seven sections. The first section comprised the provisions of 
the Act and summarised the result from the High Court. The second section outlined the respondents' 
argument on section 74 of the Constitution. The third section was dedicated to a summary of the evidence. 
The fourth section addressed the issue of section 46 of the Banking Act 1947 being beyond power of the 
Commonwealth Parliament. The fifth section was dedicated to section 92 of the Constitution, including 
addressing the important cases involving this section as well as the opinions of the judges in the High Court in 
relation to the current actions. The sixth section addressed the inconsistency of section 46 with the 
constitutional integrity of the States and with s 105A of the Constitution. The last section contained the 
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be filed and exchanged with the other parties.1186 According to Barwick, he provided the ideas for 
the case book and Kitto drafted it. Barwick recalled that their case book 'was praised, the English bar 
said they had never seen as good a case book, and it was a good case book' .1187 
Kitto and Barwick discussed the preparation of the case book on a daily basis and they had a clear 
understanding of the direction tha't the argument should take. 1188 In preparing the case book, 
Barwick spent some time considering the opponent's case and the possible arguments that they may 
raise- an important aspect of preparation in appellate advocacy. Barwick stated that: 'This made us 
very conscious of the risk that would arise if different Counsel expressed views on the s 92 question'. 
But I had no power to keep the argument in our own hands' .1189 
Reflecting on Barwick's approach, Mason stated: 
Now in some cases, in those days you didn't have written argument in the High Court, but in the Privy 
Council, you did have written case books. And he used to put a lot of effort into the written case book 
with a view to identifying the question at issue in a way that would result in a favourable outcome. He 
put a lot of effort into that. That indicates what his approach to oral presentation in an appeal was. 1190 
Former Chief Justice Gleeson agreed: 'Barwick's reputation was that he took enormous trouble about 
the preparation of those printed cases in the Privy Council. They were very highly polished pieces of 
work'. 1191 
Barwick reflected on the preparation for the Privy Council appeal: 
conclusion. It is clear from the case book that it was the result of considerable time and effort. It was succinct 
yet comprehensive and formed the basis for the respondents', including Barwick's, oral submissions. 
1186 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.71. See also Kirby, 
'Kitto and the High Court of Australia', above n 186, 135. 
1187 National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 23. 
1188 Letter from Norman Cowper to G. S. Reichenbach, 3 January 1949 (Papers of Sir Garfield Barwick, London 
file no. 3- personal correspondence [3.0cm], Series No: M3923 (M3923/1), Control Symbol: 9, National 
Archives of Australia, Sydney). Barwick and Kitto were living in the same apartment since 16 November 1948 
and constantly discussed the case with each other: see Travel Diary -1948 of Norma M. Barwick, 'Sir Garfield 
Barwick's diaries and other personal books, Series No: M3943/2, Control Symbol: 27, National Archives of 
Australia, Sydney. See also Kirby, 'Kitto and the High Court of Australia', above n 186, 135 and People In 
Government, 'The Right Hon Sir Frank Kitto KBE' (October, 1968), Management Newsletter 6. According to 
Kirby, Barwick and Kitto had a constructive working relationship. Barwick later paid tribute to Kitto's 
contributions to the banks' arguments. He stated that Kitto: 
showed outstanding skill in the choice of expressions. The need not to go against the interests of the 
supporting States had its influence both on the expression of the argument in the case-book and in due 
course in its presentation. 
Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.74 (and pp.71-72). See also 
Michael Kirby, 'Kitto, Frank Walters' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper & George Williams (eds), The Oxford 
Companion to the High Court of Australia, (2001), Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, p.399. 
1189 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.73. 
1190 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 February 
2006). 
1191 Interview with Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 14 August 2006). 
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I think that was a very difficult task to have to put together the necessary argument. 1 think that 
was more difficult in my case as I had never worked off a transcript of an argument, I had rarely 
put an argument down in writing and I very rarely had many notes. I might have a heading or two 
but not much else so I had to venture myself on a very long argument in a new atmosphere, a very 
new atmosphere, before people whom I didn't know and who didn't know me. 1192 
Barwick thus had to adjust to a written argument as well as a new atmosphere. His reflection 
confirms that he generally relied heavily on his prodigious memory during his advocacy and rarely on 
notes. 
The case book was considered by Diplock KC initially then submitted to the other counsel to review 
individually before discussing it together1193 The case book was an important part of Barwick's 
preparation for the case before the Privy Council. His familiarity with its contents was evident from 
his observation: 'We have been through the Case again and again. I think I can now recite it and I 
believe in its final form it is quite good'.1194 
Following the case book's preparation, several of the counsel, particularly some English counsel, 
requested a copy of the submission that Barwick was to advance before the Privy Council. Barwick 
indicated that he never operated from written submissions and that he only had few, if any, 
notes.1195 According to Barwick, this caused some anxiety amongst the counsel and, in response, 
Barwick offered to gather all of them together one evening to outline the argument he intended to 
advance to the Privy Council. 1196 This approach was consistent with Barwick's conversational style of 
advocacy- that is, not reading from any notes but instead, engaging in a constant dialogue with the 
bench, watching the judges intently, answering their questions and maintaining eye contact. It also 
typified his confidence and his exceptional memory. 
Although Barwick was an experienced advocate, he could still see the benefits in effectively having a 
'practice run' of his argument in front of the other counsel. This is consistent with the elements and 
ideals of appellate advocacy. The opportunity to verba lise his thoughts in front of such eminent 
advocates would have allowed him effectively to practice his submissions, deal with any comments 
or thoughts and also allay any concerns of the other counsel. Rehearsal is an important technique in 
terms of preparation. However, it appears that the 'practice run' in this instance was a response to 
1192 Molomby & Donohoe, above n 19, 17. 
1193 Letter from Norman Cowper to G. 5. Reichenbach, 3 January 1949 (Papers of Sir Garfield Barwick, London 
file no. 3- personal correspondence [3.0cm], Series No: M3923 (M3923/1), Control Symbol: 9, National 
Archives of Australia, Sydney). 
1194 Letter from Sir Garfield Barwick to G. S. Reichenbach (n.d.) (Papers of Sir Garfield Barwick, London file no. 3 
-personal correspondence (3.0cm], Series No: M3923 (M3923/1), Control Symbol: 9, National Archives of 
Australia, Sydney). 
1195 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.74. 
1196 Ibid. 
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the other counsel who sought to understand Barwick's proposed submissions, rather than any desire 
by Barwick to 'practice' his submissions."" 
Douglas Menzies, on behalf of Victoria, expressed concern that he could not support Barwick's 
argument as it would destroy the 'Transport Cases' and 'Marketing Cases'. Despite this, Barwick had 
a strategy which allowed him to arg"ue the case successfully without attacking these cases. He 
proposed that if Menzies, Fyfe, and Hannan would agree to adopt Barwick's argument that the Act 
contained an absolute prohibition, then he would undertake not to attack the 'Transport Cases' and 
'Marketing Cases', unless necessary- something which Barwick recalled he did not foresee as 
likely.1198 This strategy would allow the States' position to be protected and the 'Transport Cases' 
and 'Marketing Cases' treated as no more than 'permissibly regulatory'.1199 That is, the relevant 
State legislation that was the subject of both the 'Transport Cases' and 'Marketing Cases' would be 
protected under section 92 of the Constitution. 
According to Barwick, both Menzies and Hannan agreed to this proposal. He was able to secure the 
support of the two States while ensuring that there would be no separate submissions on section 92 
presented on their behalf. Barwick realised that the strategy imposed upon him a restraint but he 
recalled that he was confident that he could effectively advance the banks' case without the Privy 
Council focusing on the relationship between his argument and the 'Transport Cases' and 'Marketing 
Cases'. In any event, the deal struck between him and the respective counsel for the States 
demonstrated his strategic thinking, tactical nous and negotiating skills during the preparation of this 
case. 
Whilst Barwick was unable to prevent the English counsel from presenting their own submissions on 
section 92, 1200 he reported that Monckton commented to him that his presentation of the case so far 
had been a 'tour de force' and that he would not be making any submissions of his own and nor 
would any other English counsel.1201 This was confirmed by Hughes: 
The late Sir Walter Monckton, who appeared for the English Banks alongside him in the Privy 
Council in the Bank Case, said that he had never heard anything to equal Barwick's 6 day address 
on behalf of the Australian Banks. 1202 
Consequently, Barwick presented the only section 92 argument1203 and both Fyfe and Hannan 
adopted his argument that the Act imposed an absolute prohibition.1204 
1197 Ibid. 
1198 . Ibid, pp.74-75. 
1199 Ibid. 
1200 Ibid, p. 75. 
1201 Ibid. 
1202 Hughes, 'The Rt Hon Sir Garfield Barwick AK GCMG', above n 651. 
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8.4 Presentation and Personation in the Bank Nationalisation Case in the 
Privy Council 
The case commenced on 14 March1.949 before Lords Porter, Simonds, Du Parcq, Normand, Morton 
of Henryton, Uthwatt and MacDermott. The Board adjourned over Easter and during this time, Lords 
Du Parcq and Uthwatt unexpectedly died.1205 Following the recess, the case continued before the 
remaining five Law Lords.1206 According to several commentators, Lords Du Parcq and Uthwatt were 
the two Lords most likely to support Evatt's position.1207 This illustrates that, on occasions, events 
outside an advocate's control can affect the likelihood of the advocate's success. 
Evatt appeared on behalf of the Commonwealth and addressed the Board initially for 14 days and 
then in his reply for 8 days. 1208 It has been suggested by Galligan that Evatt's political judgment in 
insisting on the appeal was deficient. That is, he failed to appreciate that the composition and 
traditions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council meant that it was likely that the 
constitutional validity of the Act would be decided in a technical and legalistic manner. 1209 
Evatt commenced by making submissions concerning the Privy Council's jurisdiction; it is said by 
Tennant (Evatt's biographer) that when he began, his 'voice was so quiet and flat that it could hardly 
be heard in the far part ofthe room'-'210 On the 14th day of Evatt's submissions 'he was still 
1203 Barwick was pleased with this situation and stated whilst he would: ' ... own up to great pleasure on 
receiving such a compliment, particularly from one who was himself a great advocate, [he] was better pleased 
to know that there was no risk of a discordant voice in connection with s 92' (Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield 
Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.75). 
1204 Ibid. 
1205 See Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Lord Porter, Lord Simonds, Lord Uthwatt, Lord Du Parcq, Lord Normand, Lord Morton of 
Henryton and Lord MacDermott, 26 April 1949), pp.3-4 and Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of 
Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and Others (Privy Council, Lord Porter, Lord Simonds, Lord 
Uthwatt, Lord Du Parcq, Lord Normand, Lord Morton of Henryton and Lord MacDermott, Thursday 28 April 
1949), p.1. A full list of Counsel who appeared can be found in Appendix C. 
1206 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.75; Priest and Williams, 
above n 77, p.53. 
1207 Kylie Tennant, Evatt: Politics and Justice, 1970, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, p.243; Galligan, above n 781, 
pp.177-178; Holder, above n 781, p.887. 
1208 Evatt conducted this appeal at the same time as he was President of the United Nations General Assembly 
(see Guy, above n 146, 90). See Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank 
of New South Wales and Others (Privy Council, Lord Porter, Lord Simonds, Lord Uthwatt, Lord Du Parcq, Lord 
Normand, Lord Morton of Henryton and Lord MacDermott, Friday 1 April1949), p.49. 
1209 Galligan, above n 781, pp.177-178; see also Tennant, Evatt: Politics and Justice, above n 1207, p.243. 
1210 Tennant, Famous Australians- Evatt: Politics and Justice, above n 786, p.242. See also Barwick, A Radical 
Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.69; May, above n 778, pp.90-91. 
251 
outwardly fresh, but the law lords were noticeably wilting' .1211 He spoke for 22 days in total. Barwick 
commenced the following week in early April1949 and addressed the Privy Council for 9 days.1212 
The hearing concluded on Tuesday 10 May 1949 after 28 sitting days. 
It is suggested by Tennant that Evatt 'resolved to have read into the transcript every possible 
precedent, because some day this appeal might form the basis for a different judgment'. 1213 During 
Evatt's submissions, he read to the Board the dissenting judgments of Dixon J in the 'Transport Cases' 
and 'Marketing Cases'. 1214 Barwick stated that he formed the opinion at the time that Evatt had: 
destroyed Dixon as a reliable authority. Indeed, I thought him so successful in this respect that I 
resolved not to rely during my own argument on anything Dixon had written; and as well as I 
recall, I did not do so. 1215 
Barwick's observation smacks of sarcasm and suggests that Evatt, through his poor advocacy, 
damaged the prospect of Dixon being used as a credible authority. 
In Evatt's submission, whether section 46 violated section 92 of the Constitution was not a question 
of limits inter se such that a section 74 certificate was required and the test that should be applied in 
relation to section 92 was Lord Wright's 'freedom as at the frontier' test as outlined in lames v 
Commonwealth (1936).1216 In any event, Barwick submitted that the business of banking was not a 
thing which in itself moves so as to attract the application of section 92. 1217 
1211 Tennant, Famous Australians- Evatt: Politics and Justice, above n 786, p.242. 
1212 Crisp, Ben Chi/ley: A Political Biography, above n 783, p.337; Marr, above n 8, p.71; Priest and Williams, 
above n 77, p.53; Fricke, above n 801, pp.105-106. 
1213 Tennant, Famous Australians- Evatt: Politics and Justice, above n 786, p.242. Referring to Evatt, Chester 
Porter QC stated: 
I mean when he argued the famous Bank case, the High Court and the Privy Council had no trouble listening 
to him (Barwick] but when it came to Doc Evatt he just droned on reading case after case to the Privy 
Councillors . ... I haven't heard Doc Evatt in court, as an advocate, but I have heard him address the United 
Nations Association one time and he had the misfortune to have a terribly dull and unpleasant voice. He 
droned on and on. The Privy Council earned their money when they listened to him for over a fortnight in the 
Bank case.1213 
Interview with Chester Porter QC (Sydney, 2 April 2006). 
1214 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Lord Porter, Lord Simonds, Lord Uthwatt, Lord Du Parcq, Lord Normand, Lord Morton of 
Henryton and Lord MacDermott, 16 March 1949 and 17 March 1949). 
1215 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.76. Barwick repeated 
this in correspondence where he stated that 'one clever thing which Evatt did do was to destroy Dixon to a 
large extent, and I really think Dixon suffered a little in loss of standing in several connections': Letter from Sir 
Garfield Barwick to Richard Ashburner, n.d. (Papers of Sir Garfield Barwick, London file no. 3- personal 
correspondence [3.0cm], Series No: M3923 (M3923/1), Control Symbol: 9, National Archives of Australia, 
Sydney). 
1216 55 CLR 1. 
1217 The key aspects of Evatt's submissions were as follows: 
1) a section 74 certificate was not required as the substance of the matter made it plain that the appeal 
is not from any decision of the High Court upon an inter se question; 
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After Evatt's argument had concluded, Barwick recalled that he considered the relative strengths of 
both the Commonwealth's case and the banks' case. According to him, the Commonwealth had a 
distinct advantage in that they were arguing before English lawyers who had become accustomed to 
the power of a Westminster Parliament and 'were naturally disinclined to support restraints upon its 
legislative powers, particularly a relitraint as wide-ranging as the Banks were claiming s 92 to be'.1218 
However, in Barwick's view, the banks had the advantage of being able to rely on the High Court's 
judgments.1219 
Shortly after Evatt's submissions, Pritt KC1220 addressed the Board on behalf of the Commonwealth 
until Tuesday 5 April1949. At this point, Radcliffe opened the case on behalf of the Respondents"" 
and commenced on the issue of section 74.1222 Radcliffe dealt with issues in relation to power, 
compensation and jurisdiction, and based his argument on section 74 of the Constitution. Barwick 
later stated that 'I thought it better that Radcliffe should deal with Section 74, and he did it very 
well'.'223 He added that 'I am quite unconvinced of it myself and I do not think that it will really 
run' .
1224 This demonstrated Barwick's scepticism about the prospects of the section 74 argument 
succeeding, and may also suggest that Barwick preferred to argue causes in which he believed, 
allowing him to channel his emotion and passion into his submissions. 
2) the only question that the appellants seek to raise is whether s 46 of the Banking Act 1947 offends 
section 92 of the Constitution and that is not a question of limits inter se; 
3) James v Commonwealth (1936) 55 CLR 1 answers every question of principle that arises in the present 
case and that the true test is the 'freedom as at the frontier' as per Lord Wright; 
4) section 92 does not have the wide ambit which was sought to be given to it in McArthur's case and 
which Starke and Dixon JJ sought to give it in the 'Transport Cases'. It has a narrower ambit -the 
ambit is fixed at the border. It is not as wide as the field of inter-State commerce and it is a much 
narrower area; when you come to ask what restrictions are forbidden and what prohibitions are 
denied to the legislature, they must be prohibitions and restrictions as the frontier or in respect of 
goods passing into or out of the State; 
5) section 92 is concerned with the flow of trade and banking as well as the business of banking is not a 
thing which in itself moves- it provides facilities, and the course of a banking business moneys are 
remitted, but the essence of banking is the relationship which is brought into existence at the time of 
the deposit; 
6) section 46 of the Banking Act 1947 can operate independently of any of the other provisions which 
have been held invalid. 
1218 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.76. 
1219 Ibid. 
1220 Denis Nowell Pritt (usually known as D.N. Pritt) was a British barrister and Labour Party politician. 
1221 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Lord Porter, Lord Simonds, Lord Uthwatt, Lord Du Parcq, Lord Normand, Lord Morton of 
Henryton and Lord MacDermott, Tuesday 5 April1949), p.7. 
1222 Ibid. 
1223 Letter from Sir Garfield Barwick to Crowther, 12 May 1949 (Papers of Sir Garfield Barwick, London file no. 3 
-personal correspondence (3.0cm], Series No: M3923 (M3923/1), Control Symbol: 9, National Archives of 
Australia, Sydney). 
1224 Ibid. 
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Towards the end of day 16, Radcliffe handed over to Barwick to continue the Respondents' 
submissions on section 92.1225 Radcliffe would later address the Court on section 51.1226 
Barwick's Opening 
In his characteristic manner, Barwick used the opening to outline the structure of his submissions, to 
give the Board clear guidance from the outset: 
The course I propose to take with your lordships' permission is this. I propose to say what, as I see 
it, is the problem in this particular case, to set out what, as I see it, is a proposition of the 
appellant, to say with as much certainty as possible our submission and what we deny and what 
we concede before I develop our argument in support of those propositions. I thought I should do 
that in this case particularly for this reason. The appellant has very largely addressed itself to a 
proposition which the respondent has never put, very largely indeed. The appellant has suggested 
that a number of results follow from the judgments of the majority of the court which in our 
submission do not follow. 1227 
Barwick then neatly conceptualised the fundamental difference between the two parties on 
section 92, as 'the meaning to attribute to the expression "directed at" as it occurs in James and 
Cowan and as used by Lord Atkin'1228 and whether 'James and The Commonwealth resolve[d] the 
suggested contradiction between Section 51(1) and Section 92, that being the proposal in McArthur's 
Case'.1Z29 
ms During the hearing before the Privy Council, the Appellants' prepared detailed documents summarising 
Barwick's submissions on section 92 and Radcliffe's arguments on section 74, as well as their proposed 
response to these submissions. These documents summarised the main arguments and provided proposed 
answers on behalf of the Appellants. Various members of the Appellants' team commented on Barwick's 
argument on section 92 in separate notes although unfortunately, for the purposes of this thesis, the notes 
concerned the substance of Barwick's arguments rather than making any comments or observations in relation 
to his advocacy (see Banking Case- comments [Section 92- pre-Easter- [Banking Act 1947- Bank of New 
South Wales and others v Commonwealth of Australia and others- on appeal to the Privy Council- Barwick's 
arguments on Section 92], Series No: M1506, Control Symbol: 5/18, National Archives of Australia, Canberra; 
Banking Case- daily summaries [Section 92]- Pre-Easter [Banking Act 1947- Bank of New South Wales and 
others v Commonwealth of Australia and other- on appeal to the Privy Council- Barwick's argument on 
Section 92- Radcliffe's argument on Section 74], Series No: M1506, Control Symbol: 5/13, National Archives of 
Australia, Canberra; Banking Case- Barwick's argument- [Banking Act 1947- Bank of New South Wales and 
others v Commonwealth of Australia and others- on appeal to the Privy Council- alphabetical guide to 
argument put to Privy Council by Barwick KC], Series No: M1506, Control Symbol: 5/23, National Archives of 
Australia, Canberra; Banking Case- [Section] 92- comments, conclusions- [Banking Act 1947 -Bank of New 
South Wales and others v Commonwealth of Australia and others- on appeal to the Privy Council- comments 
on Barwick's arguments], Series No: M1506, Control Symbol: 5/24, National Archives of Australia, Canberra). 
1226 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Tuesday 5 April1949), above n 1221, p.54. 
1227 b'd I 1 , pp.54-55. 
1228 Ibid, p.56. 
1229 Ibid. 
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Barwick established his argument based primarily on the decisions of the Privy Council, with 
particular reference to James v Cowan (1932}.1230 He maintained that 'in operating their banking 
business the Banks were engaged in interstate trade and commerce';1231 he then outlined the 
submission as per the case book, and suggested that it was the: 
operation of the statute rather than its subject-matter, its purpose, or motivation [which] was the 
critical fact. What did it do to the individual's capacity to engage in interstate trade etc? Having 
· answered that question, was the trade etc and the individual's capacity to engage in it absolutely 
free? The absolute prohibition of private banking clearly provided a negative answer. 1232 
Barwick submitted that the 'directed against' test from James v Cowan (1932}1233 had crept into use 
following McArthur's Case as a result of the subject-matter approach required by that case.1234 
However, he suggested that James v Cammanwealth (1936)1235 had rejected the subject-matter 
approach and the 'directed against' test was now understood to require some criterion of purpose. 
Ultimately, the Privy Council accepted Barwick's submission that 'directed against' could only mean 
'operates upon to prevent' 1236 and therefore, the earlier cases on section 92 which required a 
legislative purpose were thrown into question.1237 
Barwick then proceeded to address aspects of section 46 in detail.1238 At this point, he identified the 
problem with the operation of the section: 'the problem here is one of straight out, direct and 
absolute prohibition'. He then suggested that the problem could be presented in 3 parts:1239 
1230 47 CLR 386. 
1231 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.76. 
1232 1bid, pp.76-77. 
1233 47 CLR 386. 
1234 Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales (1949) 79 CLR 497 (26 October 1949) at 556. See also Caper, 
Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, p.99. 
1235 55 CLR 1. 
1236 Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales (1949) 79 CLR 497 (26 October 1949) at 558. See also Caper, 
Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, p.100. 
1237 Co per, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, pp.99-100. 
1238 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Tuesday 5 April1949), above n 1221, pp.57-58. 
1239 Ibid, p.60. The following day, Barwick continued: 
One thing that James v The Commonwealth most certainly said was that Section 92 did not mean that the 
individual could disregard all the regulatory laws, Commonwealth or State, and the Respondents have never 
said that at any stage in this litigation. What the Respondents have said is this, that the exclusion of persons 
from participation in trade infringes Section 92 unless in exceptional cases their exclusion, the exclusion of an 
individual or individuals, proves to be no more than a regulation of the activity, that word "regulation" being 
used in the sense in which I used it a moment or so ago. 
Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and Others 
(Privy Council, Lord Porter, Lord Simonds, Lord Uthwatt, Lord Du Parcq, Lord Normand, Lord Morton of 
Henryton and Lord MacDermott, Wednesday 6 April1949), pp.6-8. 
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1. is the exclusion of all individuals from an activity of interstate trade, commerce and 
intercourse compatible with the absolute freedom of interstate trade, commerce and 
intercourse? 
2. is the exclusion of an individual carrying on an interstate activity of trade, commerce or 
intercourse for no reason touching himself or the manner of his carrying on that activity 
compatible with that freedom? 
3. is the subjection of a step which is essential to the sale of goods interstate to the arbitrary 
control of the Executive Government compatible with that freedom? 
Before the Privy Council, Barwick had to adapt his advocacy since he was often in the position where 
his submissions went uninterrupted, or largely uninterrupted, for significant periods of time in 
contrast to his experience in the Bank Nationalisation Case in the High Court,1240 and the judicial 
dialogue to which he had become accustomed. 
When questions did arise, Barwick demonstrated his ability both to watch the bench and employ a 
flexible approach to his submissions. In the following exchange, he also employed a useful analogy: 
Lord Porter: 
Barwick: 
Lord Porter: 
Barwick: 
1240 Ibid, pp.S-13. 
What is troubling me is this. Supposing it had been said, and said honestly and 
with some ground, that the only way to prevent reasonable activities within the 
Commonwealth of Australia is to prevent persons crossing the border, and 
supposing that were a reasonable consideration to have. Would you say that was 
bad? 
I would answer that in this way. It would be very like an illustration my Lord 
Normand gave to the Appellant of some disease in an animal which there was 
only one way to handle, and that was to keep the animal out. If that is the true 
view in fact, not in the opinion of the legislator merely, I would concede that the 
law would be good. 
I want to carry that one step further. Suppose that was a reasonable anticipation 
in the minds of all men, if you like, that is to say, abstractly a reasonable 
anticipation, but suppose that in practice it proved to be wrong. What then? 
I would say, first of all, that if the only method you had of telling whether it was 
likely to happen or not was to take the view of all men, my answer would be the 
same as in the first case. All men can be wrong, and that is just the infirmity of 
the decision of the matter; one cannot have perfect material. But I want to guard 
against any concession that it rests with any Parliament to say: "In our opinion this 
is likely". There is a big difference. I will deal with it in a little more detail later. 
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Lord Porter: It is the answer which you gave to me before: the Court must decide. 
Barwick: Yes, and I want to say something as to why that is in a moment. 1241 
Barwick's practice was to respond to questions immediately. This conveyed to the court a sense of 
confidence and also demonstrated a detailed preparation. He later recollected, in reference to an 
early question from lord Morton, that: 'I managed to answer the question straight away and felt that 
1 had gone at least some distance in satisfying His lordship's concern' .1242 According to Barwick, the 
'feature that distinguished the Australian advocates from both the English and the Canadians was our 
ability and willingness to respond forthwith to questioning' .1243 
Barwick's Submissions on the James' Cases- Part 1 
Barwick's submissions on the various James' cases provided a succinct encapsulation of the relevance 
of the cases to the banks' arguments.1244 This was also an example of citing authority with care by 
grouping together the relevant principles from each case and conveying them in a simple and easily 
digestible manner. A useful illustration was provided to emphasise his submission: 
Barwick: 
1241 Ibid, pp.15-16. 
... I think [it] does come from James and Cowan, that an acquisition, a taking, 
maybe colourless. May I give an illustration. Assume a man has a garage right at 
the border and he is engaged in interstate transport. In that garage he garages his 
vehicles. Let me suppose it is the only suitable land in the district, but the State 
Government want the land for a Courthouse. They come along and take the land 
for a Courthouse. It is true that the effect will be that this man who is in interstate 
trade will lose his garage and he may have to go out of business. That, my Lords, 
in the Respondents' submission, is an illustration of the consequence of the law. 
That is not part of the law's operation. Now let me suppose the same illustration 
and the State Government want to take the garage to put their own vehicles in it 
to run in competition with this man. Now their taking has got another colour, 
because it is inevitable that they are taking it from him not to use it themselves 
merely but to prevent him using it. They are using their power of acquisition as a 
means of affecting- -and if it affects it to the necessary extent it may be bad -
-the interstate trade ... 1245 
1242 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.77. 
1243 Ibid. 
1244 See Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank af New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Wednesday 6 April1949), above n 1239, pp.lS-19. 
1245 Ibid, pp.24-26. 
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At around this time in the proceedings, as Marr reports, a telegram was sent from Britain to Sydney 
stating as follows: 'Barwick has been doing splendidly, and clear propositions and precise answers to 
questions have been appreciated by [the] Board which has given his argument keenly attentive 
hearing' .1246 
Soon after, Barwick discussed the background of section 92, including the influence of the American 
model and made reference to a number of American decisions.1247 His submissions in this regard 
were largely uninterrupted and Barwick adapted his usual style of conveying his submissions in a 
conversational style to doing so in an uninterrupted narrative. 
Barwick addressed the Board at some length on James v South Australia (1927)1248 and James v 
Cowan (1932). 1249 in support of his submission that this latter case 'decided that the section does 
protect individuals, that there is no need for discrimination and the motive or purpose or policy of 
the law cannot be called in aid to validate it'.1250 
Shortly after, the following exchange occurred; Barwick demonstrated his courage and his 
preparedness to disagree for the purposes of maintaining key aspects of his arguments: 
Lord Du Parcq: I am not saying it is this case, but you may have a case where something like a 
monopoly is established in banking by a series of amalgamations, and you might 
have a condition of affairs in which it was said, I am not saying it is this case: The 
public are not being fairly treated, trade is being affected, now the Government is 
going to step in and take it over. 
Barwick: I think the answer to it would not be along those lines. In some sense it is so 
much a matter of method. The legislature I would concede can say this to the 
bankers: Now look, you are not to amalgamate without public consent, because 
that is only a regulation of your particular trade in the colony. If we find you 
grouping together to the detriment of all, well, it is part of the conception of a 
community that we can protect ourselves, not by cutting our heads off, that is 
when the remedy has gone too far, but what you can say is: You stop it, you 
1246 Britain to Head Office, 6 April1949 referred to in Marr, above n 8, p.71. 
1247 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Wednesday 6 April1949), above n 1239, pp.30-41. 
1248 40 CLR 1. 
1249 47 CLR 386. 
1250 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Lord Porter, Lord Simonds, Lord Uthwatt, Lord Du Parcq, Lord Normand, Lord Morton of 
Henryton and Lord MacDermott, Thursday 7 April1949), p.6. Barwick's address in relation to both cases is at 
pp.6-25. 
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uncombine, we will avoid your combine contracts so that you are quite free, and 
you stop it. I would concede that that could be done. 1251 
Barwick summarised the decision in James v Cowan (1932)m2 in clear and succinct terms: 
The effect of this decision is that simply to tell a man- -I put aside all the qualifications which 
come in there from James v. The tommonwealth with the idea of regulating, co-ordinating and 
that sort of thing-- as part of a marketing scheme where he is to sell his goods, is to infringe the 
freedom guaranteed. Lord Atkin is emphatic about that; he says to do anything else is to tear the 
charter up.1253 
He also employed powerful language to describe Lord Atkin's approach and to add to the persuasive 
effect of his submissions: 
The actual decision of this Board in James v. Cowan ... says unmistakeably, I submit, my Lords, that 
a law which empowers the determination of where and in what quantities an individual may sell 
his goods, where there is an inter-State market, is bad.1254 
He then referred to the dissenting judgment of Justice Isaacs in James v Cowan (1930}1255 and the 
fact that the outcome of the case was reversed on appeal in James v Cowan (1932}m6 with Lord 
Atkin delivering the unanimous decision, and the Privy Council appearing to prefer Justice Isaac's 
dissent. Barwick stated, referring to Justice Isaac's judgment, that he had read various extracts: 
to show the very great emphasis on the individual which is present in every line of it. This 
Judgment, of course, is the one which your Lordships' Board found to be convincing, and it would 
be an extraordinary result that your Lordships' decision should mean that by adopting a 
convincing Judgment in these terms you were overturning its basic idea and saying: there is no 
protection of the individual. That would be an extraordinary result to obtain. 1257 
He thus appealed to the Board's notion of consistency and fairness, using the word 'extraordinary' on 
a number of occasions. He also referred to the fact that James v Cowan (1932)m8 was followed and 
applied by the High Court (with Justice Evatt dissenting) in Peanut Board v Rockhampton Harbour 
1251 . lbtd, pp.19-20. 
1252 47 CLR 386. 
1253 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Thursday 7 April1949), above n 1250, p.33. 
1254 Ibid, p.34. 
125s 43 CLR 386. 
1256 4 7 CLR 386 
1257 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Thursday 7 April1949), above n 1250, p.40. 
1258 47 CLR 386. 
259 
Board (1933).1259 In reference to the principles laid down by the Board in James v Cowan (1932), 1260 
he asked: 
What were those principles? The principles were that a law which told a man that he could not 
market the commodity at all except in a way in which somebody else told him, was in breach in 
Section 92, and that is precisely 111hat the Peanut legislation did. The argument in the dissenting 
judgment was that it was doing it from some beneficent motive, was not carrying out a policy or 
. system of restricting hindering or obstructing the marketing of peanuts among other States of the 
Commonwealth. That is what this argument of the Appellant there really has been all the time. 
He is trying to suggest that there has to be some overriding harmful intention, policy or motive 
against inter-State trade. 1261 
In this manner, Barwick attempted to build a compelling case as to why James v Cowan (1932)1262 
should be applied by the Privy Council. Ultimately, in its decision, the Privy Council relied heavily on 
James v Cowan (1932)1263 and James v The Commonwealth (1936),1264 suggesting that Barwick's 
submissions were persuasive. 
The Easter adjournment followed day 18 and on their return, Barwick sought to remind the Board of 
his submissions. 1265 He reminded the Board that section 92 had its origin in the American doctrine 
which depended upon judicial exposition that there was freedom of interstate commerce, freedom 
from state invasion, and an individual right of access to every part of the federation. At this point, he 
indicated that, following general considerations, he would then address the case of James v South 
Australia (1927)1266 as part of the argument to answer the Appellants' assertion that section 92 does 
not protect individuals. 1267 
Barwick was allowed to make uninterrupted submissions and took the court to a series of relevant 
section 92 cases, 1268 identifying key extracts from the judgments and, where necessary, providing the 
Privy Council with some context by outlining the facts ofthe case.1269 
1259 48 CLR 266. 
1260 47 CLR 386. 
1261 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Thursday 7 April1949). above n 1250, p.52. 
1262 47 CLR 386. 
1263 47 CLR 386. 
1264 55 CLR 1. 
1265 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Lord Porter, Lord Simonds, Lord Uthwatt, Lord Du Parcq, Lord Normand, Lord Morton of 
Henryton and Lord MacDermott, Tuesday 26 April1949), p.4. 
1266 40 CLR 1. 
1267 See Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Tuesday 26 April1949), above n 1265, pp.10-11. 
1268 1bid, pp.17-21. 
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Barwick demonstrated honesty and candour, as illustrated by the next exchange in relation to the 
James v Cowan (1932)1270 case: 
Lord Simonds: What is rather puzzling me is what exactly was the doctrine which was repudiated 
by Counsel for the State to which reference is made in the middle of page 558. 
Barwick: I have not looked at the full argument, but I do not find it in the note. 
Lord Simonds: Lord Atkin is saying quite clearly the full doctrine in James and the Commonwealth 
cannot be accepted. The doctrine that the Crown becomes the owner and do 
what it pleases with its own and dispose of it inter-State is repudiated. Where the 
line is drawn one would very much like to know. 
Barwick: From my point of view it does not matter in this case. 
Lord Simonds: I agree it does not really matter. 1271 
Barwick also demonstrated courage and tact in disagreeing with a comment from Lord Porter: 
Lord Porter: 
Barwick: 
I should have thought what he was saying was this: "You may not prevent or 
indeed interfere with inter-State trade but you may canalise it". You may canalise 
it by putting it into a Board or by putting it (as in the present case) into a national 
bank. That is what he is saying; whether it is right or not is another matter. 
Even in this case the Chief Justice does not say this, with respect. When I come to 
his Judgment in this case, if he had found that the banker was a trader he would 
have been bound on his own decisions and his own expressions in this case [Milk 
Board (NSW) v Metropolitan Cream Pty Ltd (1939) 62 CLR 116) to say: "This law is 
bad. You cannot canalise it in that sense at all".1272 
Towards the end of day 20, Barwick recapped for the benefit of the Privy Council the status of his 
arguments."" He then outlined the manner in which he would proceed for the remainder of the 
case. 1274 
1269 Ibid, pp.27-29, 31-32; 35-39; 40-43; 44-48. 
1270 47 CLR 386. 
1271 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Tuesday 26 April1949), above n 1265, p.26. 
1272 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Lord Porter, Lord Simonds, Lord Uthwatt, Lord Du Parcq, Lord Normand, Lord Morton of 
Henryton and Lord MacDermott, Wednesday 27 April1949), p.21. 
1273 Ibid, pp.41-42. 
1274 Barwick stated: 
What 1 propose to do at this point is this. I propose to complete the answer to the appellant on the point of 
choosing actors, that is to say I want to deal with Huddart Parker's case and deal shortly with Vizzard's case. 
Then I want to deal with the argument about the passage of goods and the question as to whether a banker 
is in trade. Although when I do that I would really have answered the whole of what is suggested against the 
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Barwick needed to exercise considerable caution when advancing his submissions so as not to attack 
the 'Transport Cases' and 'Marketing Cases' although out of necessity they were referred to in the 
course of his argument. 1275 For example, Barwick referred to Willard v Rawson1276 then Vizzard's 
case
1277 He then stated that: 
The use that was sought to be made of the transport cases I have indicated. It was sought to be 
said: from them you can extract the principle that the Commonwealth can arbitrarily select the 
actors in trade. I've endeavoured to show that that cannot be got out of the Judgments, nor out 
of anything that Lord Wright said about the Judgments in James -v- The Commonwealth. 1278 
In attempting to illustrate the concept of 'free' in terms of 'freedom of trade', Barwick used both an 
Australian and an English example to add to the persuasive effect of his submissions and, it would 
appear, to make it easier for the members of the Privy Council to relate to the proposition. This is an 
example of knowing the court and tailoring submissions accordingly: 
I can illustrate the idea and perhaps in a more dramatic way by looking at two States. Let me 
suppose that the State of New South Wales decided that there should be a State monopoly in the 
buying of potatoes, and that only the Government Board in New South Wales could buy potatoes. 
Then the State of Victoria decided that it would have a Board for the selling of potatoes so that 
you had one Board in one State and one Board in the other. Would the right conclusion be that 
the trade interstate in potatoes was free? You could say it was carried on. You could say that 
neither of the laws were directed to stopping trading in potatoes, but, in my submission, what an 
abuse of language it would be to say trading in potatoes between the two States was free. I select 
that as an illustration to show that section 92 is not saying it shall be carried on; it says it shall be 
free. 
Suppose the law was that traffic in Whitehall should be free. Would you say a law which said that 
only the King's horses could go down to Whitehall left traffic free provided he had enough to fill 
the street? It is the same sort of illustration. It is not a question of whether it continues, it is not a 
respondents, this argument has ranged over a wider area and I do propose to say something as to James v. 
The Commonwealth. the precise problem which arose in that case which does not arise in this case. 
James v. The Commonwealth was not about a case like this because this question does not raise those 
niceties of deciding when a law burdens, what is its operation and what is it consequential effect. James v. 
the Commonwealth was largely directed to that because of the antimony argument which was suggested. I 
propose to deal with that before I endeavour to conclude my argument. 
Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and Others 
(Privy Council, Wednesday 27 April1949), above n 1272, p.43. 
1275 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.77. 
1276 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Thursday 28 April1949), above n 1205, p.S. 
1277 Ibid, p.21. 
1278 Ibid, p.23. 
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question of its quality or quantity, but is it free? That can only mean, in my submission, are the 
people free to engage in it?1279 
Barwick's Submissions on 'Banking' and 'Trade and Commerce' 
Barwick then proceeded to address the issue of whether banking was 'trade, commerce and 
intercourse' for the purposes of section 92. He outlined how, if his submission on this issue was 
correct, the Respondents must succeed: 
If this step is correctly taken, the actual resolution of this case can be direct and simple, because if 
Section 92 does protect individuals and if this is a law which merely excludes the banker from 
participation in his banking facilities, and if one has not got to find some malevolent motive in the 
legislature and a banker is in trade, then the case for the respondents is complete in a very short 
and direct way. It is the Air Lines case again in a simpler form. 1280 
Barwick then referred to the Commonwealth's argument that whilst a banker is engaged in trade it is 
not engaged in interstate trade. He suggested this was 'puzzling' and employed an example to 
demonstrate this: 
The other aspect of it is that when a banker has an inter-State banking transaction nothing moves 
and because you have no movement you have not got anything inter-State. [This] from a practical 
point of view is very puzzling. If I take £100 down to a banker and say: "I do not want to carry this 
in my hip pocket but I'm going to Paris and I would like to have that £100 in Paris", it is a very odd 
conception that nothing gets over there when I manage to get the £100 or the equivalent in Paris; 
it is an odd conception that nothing moves. 1281 
Barwick then directly referred to what he considered the policy implications associated with 
accepting the Appellant's argument: 
I submit, my Lords, it would be impossible and incorrect to say that these words reduced trade, 
commerce and intercourse in Section 92 to those things which could be carried because one 
would get to precisely the same absurdity in relation to both intercourse and trade as I have 
mentioned you would get to in connection with communication, a moment or two ago, namely, 
that a man could not be prevented from carrying his cow or his stock across the border but you 
could stop him walking across because the limitation is to those things in trade which can be 
carried. Such absurdities, my Lords, quickly dispose of the suggestion, I submit. 1282 
1279 Ibid, pp.30-31. 
1280 Ibid, pp.41-42. 
1281 Ibid, p.42. 
1282 Ibid, p.45. 
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He submitted that 'trade, commerce and intercourse' means the same thing in section Sl(i} and in 
section 92, and further, that the fact that there was a specific provision in section Sl(xiii} of the 
Constitution with respect to banking did not exclude banking from 'trade, commerce and 
intercourse' .1283 
Barwick then referred to numerous cases in support of his proposition in largely an uninterrupted 
submission.1284 Rather than belabour the point in relation to the issue that banking is 'trade, 
commerce and intercourse', he referred members of the Privy Council to his case book and 
summarised his argument: 
I would submit our contentions without actually reading them, as they are set out in the case 
book. The case book is full on the point, and I am content to leave it to represent the conclusions 
which I suggest should be drawn, namely, a banker is in trade; in any case, his transactions are 
interstate intercourse and it is that which is forbidden. 1285 
Barwick's Submissions on the James' Cases- Part 2 
Barwick conceptualised what he regarded as the essential test, which he believed was consistent 
with James v Commonwealth (1936)1286: 
It is a question of law in this sense, that you construe the statute, you apply it to the facts and 
then draw a conclusion which is essentially one of law, but it is in a sense a question of degree and 
you cannot determine it beforehand by any single test, you will have to look at all the 
circumstances at the time, and then answer the question: Is this law in its operation a regulation, 
or is it something which no matter what the object or reason for its passage, be it war or be it 
health or be it something else, no matter what that background is, does it burden the freedom of 
the person to go?1287 
1283 Barwick submitted that: 
The evident purpose of putting a special head in for banking was to enable the Commonwealth to have 
power over the whole of banking whether intra-State or inter-State, whereas its power over trade and 
commerce was limited to a power over inter-State trade and commerce. That indeed has been pointed out 
in Australia in Huddart Parker v The Commonwealth ... It was pointed out that the presence of section Sl(xiii) 
and like provisions did not cut down the content of section Sl(i). 
Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and Others 
(Privy Council, Thursday 28 April1949), above n 1205, p.46. 
1284 b"d I 1 , pp.50-53. 
1285 Ibid, p.53. 
1286 55 CLR 1. 
1287 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Lord Porter, Lord Simonds, Lord Uthwatt, Lord Du Parcq, Lord Normand, Lord Morton of 
Henryton and Lord MacDermott, Friday 29 April1949), p.4. 
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Barwick then referred to James v The Commonwealth (1936)1288 and lord Wright's judgment at 
considerable length.1289 
At times, Barwick read numerous long extracts from previous cases adding to the time taken to 
present his submissions. This suggests that the citation of authority may not have been as discerning 
as it otherwise could have been. 1290 However, Barwick was primarily concerned to ensure that he 
adequately acquainted the Board with the section 92 case law and knew that to do so he would need 
to retite long passages from earlier decisions. He did not enjoy this. He stated that: 'I do not know 
how I will stand up to educating the boys, particularly if it involves reading long slabs out of the 
reports, an occupation which lloathe'.1291 
Barwick referred to Justice Dixon's view of James v The Commonwealth (1936)1292 as expressed in the 
High Court's judgment in the Bank Natiana/isation Case.1293 This contradicted his earlier suggestion 
that he would not refer to Justice Dixon's judgments since, in his view, Evatt had destroyed Justice 
Dixon's credibility. Otherwise, Barwick referred to Justice Dixon rarely throughout his submissions. 
The strong reliance by the Privy Council in its decision on Justice Dixon's judgment in the High Court 
suggests that such a Barwick's strategy was ill-conceived. 
Barwick completed his citation of relevant portions of James v The Commonwealth (1936)1294 and 
stated: 
1288 55 CLR 1. Before referring to James v The Commonwealth (1936) 55 CLR 1 at considerable length, Barwick 
provided the following conceptualisation of the state of affairs prior to this case: 
The problem presented to this board in James v. The Commonwealth was really not a problem which is 
germane to the present case, because before James v. The Commonwealth came to be decided your 
lordships' board had determined those elements which, as I have endeavoured to show, are decisive of this 
case, at least on the basis that a banker is a trader, because, as I endeavoured to show earlier, James v. South 
Australia as approved in James v. Cowan. and James v. Cowan as applied in the Peanut case, had decided that 
you could not exclude individuals from participation in interstate trade, that motive did not matter, that 
discrimination was not necessary, and that you would look to the operation of the law and see what it was 
doing. 
See Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales 
and Others (Privy Council, Friday 29 April1949), above n 1287, p.9. 
1289 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Friday 29 April1949), above n 1287, pp.10-19. 
1290 See Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Friday 29 April1949), above n 1287. 
1291 Letter from Sir Garfield Barwick to Richard Ashburner, 1 March 1949 (Papers of Sir Garfield Barwick, London 
file no. 3- personal correspondence [3.0cm], Series No: M3923 (M3923/1), Control Symbol: 8, National 
Archives of Australia, Sydney). 
1292 55 CLR 1. 
1293 Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 166. See Transcript of Proceedings, the 
Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and Others (Privy Council, Friday 29 April 
1949), above n 1287, pp.25-26. 
1294 55 CLR 1. 
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I have indicated as I went through James and The Commonwealth from time to time the solution 
which I suggested that decision adopted. It adopted the solution of the supposed contradiction, 
the solution of reducing the scope of the freedom perhaps in two respects, although the respects 
are very close to each other. You cannot always split them apart. One is, it reduced freedom from 
all law to freedom from non-regulatory laws, if I may use that phrase, and it added a further 
qualification, if it be a further qualification, that the law must bear upon the movement, it must 
affect the interstate transaction. One must never lose sight of the fact that it was to the interstate 
transaction that the protection was given, not the mere fact that it was a transaction. 1295 
Barwick's heavy reliance on James v The Commonwealth (1936)1296 in his submissions appears 
vindicated as the Privy Council adopted the reasoning from this case in its judgment. 
Barwick's Submissions on the Airlines Case 
Barwick then addressed the members of the Privy Council on the Airlines Case. 1297 The Airlines Case, 
he argued, was right and properly applied the decisions of the Privy Council in the two cases which 
had come before it. 1298 He cited Chief Justice Latham's statement in the Milk Board Case1299 which he 
also referred to in the Airlines Case, namely: 
One proposition which I regard as established is that simple legislative prohibition (Federal or 
State), as distinct from regulation, of inter-State trade and commerce is invalid. Further, a law 
which is 'directed against inter-State trade and commerce' is invalid. Such a law does not regulate 
such trade, it merely prevents it. But a law prescribing rules as to the manner in which trade in 
(including transport) is to be conducted is not a mere prohibition and may be valid in its 
application to inter-State trade notwithstanding s 92. 1300 
In response to a question from Lord Simonds, Barwick highlighted the inherent difficulties of the 
Appellants' submission in light of Chief Justice Latham's approach: 
Lord Simonds: Was it admitted by the Appellants that, upon the footing that the activity of the 
bank is trade, commerce, or intercourse, the Chief Justice could not, consistently 
with his decision in the Airways' case, have decided this case in the way he did? 
1295 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Friday 29 April1949), above n 1287, pp.26-27. 
1296 55 CLR 1. 
1297 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Friday 29 April1949), above n 1287, p.27. 
1298 Ibid. 
1299 62 CLR 116. 
1300 Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29 at 127, per Latham CJ. 
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They say the opposite, my Lord. There are only one or two points in the 
Appellants' case to which I want to draw attention. One of those is that they seek 
to say that the Chief Justice in some way, if he had thought that the banker was in 
trade, would still have decided against the present Respondent. But when one 
looks at this case, I submit that is an impossible conclusion.1301 
Barwick then outlined the position of the other judges in the Airlines Case, 1302 and concluded as 
follows: 
What I submit with respect to that case is that it is correct that it applies the principles which your 
lordships have laid down in the two cases, and that the submission which we have made in this 
case is concerned with it. The steps it takes are these. The man who is in business to carry is 
engaged in trade irrespective of whether what he carries is an article of trade or a person himself 
in trade. To arbitrarily exclude him is to infringe the section even though you take steps which 
may be thought by some, perhaps not by others, to secure that the carrying will still be done by 
somebody else. 
My lords, in this case the simple approach to this present section is to take the same two steps, 
that a banker is in business, a form of carriage if one likes to take the analogy; he is engaged in 
interstate trade and commerce and to forbid him carrying on that business is to infringe the 
section. No distinction can be made between the two cases on the ground that in the one case 
only an interstate activity was being dealt with, and in the other an interstate activity was being 
dealt with along with other activities. Your lordships' decisions in the other cases show that that is 
no ground of distinction.1303 
During this phase of his submissions, Barwick was intent on demonstrating the similarities between 
the Airlines Case and the current case, and he cited from the judgments with close attention and 
care. 
Barwick's Concluding Submissions 
Barwick referred to numerous judgments of Chief Justice Latham to demonstrate, that had the Chief 
Justice found that a banker was engaged in interstate trade, he would also have found that 
section 92 invalidated the relevant Act.1304 Barwick stated: 'The Chief Justice decided ... that a banker 
1301 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Friday 29 Aprill949), above n 1287, p.30. 
1302 Ibid, pp.31-32. 
1303 Ibid, p.33. 
1304 Barwick demonstrated this by referring the members of the Privy Council to two paragraphs of Chief Justice 
Latham's judgment in the Bank Nationalisation Case: Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 
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was not in interstate trade and he did that for the reason that he thought that section 92 only 
applied to the passage of goods across the border'.1305 
He then made reference to numerous aspects of Chief Justice Latham's judgment in the Bank 
Nationalisation Case generally.1306 He concluded that the extracts cited were 'the important points 
of the judgment and I submit it is nof an acceptable view, and, indeed, if His Honour had thought 
that banking was trade and commerce, he would have joined the others'.1307 
It appears that Barwick strategy was to focus on Chief Justice Latham's judgment for two main 
reasons. Firstly, he considered that the Privy Council would be influenced by the Chief Justice's 
judgment and,1308 secondly, to demonstrate that, based on previous statements by the Chief Justice, 
had he found that banking was 'trade and commerce' for the purposes of section 92 then he would 
have joined the majority in finding the legislation to be invalid. 
Towards the end of his submissions, Barwick stated, in plain terms, the manner in which the 
members of the Privy Council could dispose of this case: 'the case can really be disposed of on a 
narrow basis like the Airways case: A banker is in trade; individuals can complain if they are 
excluded, the freedom is theirs and this exclusion ofthe bankers from participation in inter-State 
trade is a breach of the section'.1309 
Barwick concluded his submissions on day 22.1310 
Throughout the hearing, Barwick demonstrated his ability to adapt his advocacy in response both to 
the members of the court and the jurisdiction, despite feeling uncomfortable during his initial 
presentation in the special leave application, and despite appearing before the Privy Council for the 
76 CLR 1 at 62. See Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South 
Wales and Others (Privy Council, Friday 29 April1949), above n 1287, pp.35-36. 
1305 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Friday 29 April1949), above n 1287, p.35. 
1306 . Ibid, pp.39-40. 
1307 Ibid, p.41. 
1308 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.69. 
1309 Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and 
Others (Privy Council, Friday 29 Aprill949), above n 1287, p.42. 
1310 Ibid, p.44. That is, on Friday 29 April1949. See also Travel Diary -1948 of Norma M. Barwick, 'Sir Garfield 
Barwick's diaries and other personal books, Series No: M3943/2, Control Symbol: 27, National Archives of 
Australia, Sydney. Following Barwick, Sir David Fyfe KC addressed the Privy Council on the point that there is 
an implication in the constitution that the Commonwealth cannot pass a law which will make it impossible for 
the States to function properly as self-governing communities. Hannan KC then presented the argument that 
section 46 of the Banking Act 1947 was invalid because it was inconsistent with clause 5(9) of the Financial 
Agreement by reason of section 105A(5). Then Radcliffe addressed the members of the Privy Council on behalf 
of the Respondent banks on points arising with regard to section 51 of the Constitution in relation to section 46 
of the Banking Act 1947. See Respondents' Case Book at pages 57 and 58, paragraphs 140 to 148 and 
Transcript of Proceedings, the Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and Others 
(Privy Council, Friday 29 April1949), above n 1287, p.44. 
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first time. Generally, he adapted his advocacy quickly and this appears to have greatly assisted the 
persuasiveness of his arguments. It was said that he had picked up quickly: 
the English practice of not asserting and repeating the conclusion of a train of argument, instead 
leading their Lordships towards the conclusion and then allowing them the pleasure of seeing it 
for themselves.1311 
According to Marr, those who witnessed Barwick's account of section 92, acclaimed it as a 
'magnificent piece of advocacy: easy, flexible and lucid'. 1312 Monckton declared of Barwick's 
advocacy: 'I have been appearing in the appeal courts for 25 years, and I have never heard anything 
equal to that'.1313 Barwick himself felt, after he had finished his argument, that his 'nose [was] in 
front'.1314 He stated that: 
The Board were extremely nice to me in dealing with 92, and I continue as optimistic of the point 
as I have always been. Being quite convinced of it myself, perhaps something of that conviction 
was transmitted to the Board. 1315 
This assessment by Barwick provides an insight into what may have contributed to the success of his 
argument; his personal belief in the merits of the section 92 argument seem to have caused him to 
convey his submissions with additional fervor to add to the persuasive effect of his submissions. It 
appears from the analysis of the transcript of the case, to the extent that such matters are capable of 
being gleaned from the transcript, that Barwick whilst empassioned generally, remained composed 
throughout his submissions. He enjoyed good fortune as well -an advocate will not always be in the 
position where their case corresponds with their ideological values or beliefs. 
At the conclusion of day 28, the proceedings were adjourned, until no later than Monday 23 May 
1949, to allow the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth to reply for the Appellants."'' The Privy 
Council sat on 23-27, 30, 31 May, and 1 June. 
1311 Sawer, 'Absolutely a Free Man', above n 164, p.10 referred to in Marr, above n 8, p.71. 
1312 Marr, above n 8, p.71. 
1313 Ibid. 
1314 National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 24. 
1315 Letter from Sir Garfield Barwick to Crowther, 12 May 1949 (Papers of Sir Garfield Barwick, London file no. 3 
-personal correspondence [3.0cm], Series No: M3923 (M3923/1), Control Symbol: 9, National Archives of 
Australia, Sydney); see also Letter from Sir Garfield Barwick to Richard Ashburner, n.d. (Papers of Sir Garfield 
Barwick, London file no. 3- personal correspondence [3.0cm), Series No: M3923 (M3923/1), Control Symbol: 
9, National Archives of Australia, Sydney) where Barwick stated that '[I) do feel that, barring miracles, we 
should win, and win I think on 92'. 
1316 Day 28 was Tuesday 10 May 1949. The proceedings were adjourned until after Evatt had fulfilled his public 
responsibilities to the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York: see Transcript of Proceedings, the 
Commonwealth of Australia and Others v Bank of New South Wales and Others (Privy Council, Lord Porter, Lord 
Simonds, Lord Uthwatt, Lord Du Parcq, Lord Normand, Lord Morton of Henryton and Lord MacDermott, 
Tuesday 10 May 1949), p.34. 
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Barwick eagerly anticipated Evatt's reply and stated: 'I will be very interested to hear brother 
Bert'1317 He added tellingly, that '[e]ven ifthere was a good argument in reply, I feel sure he is not 
capable of putting it'. 1318 
In reply, Evatt submitted that whilst the test of burden from James v The Cammanwea/th (1936)1319 
could be applied, the Constitution did not refer to burden or regulation, that section 92 did not 
guarantee an individual a right to trade interstate, that the Airlines Case had reached an erroneous 
conclusion and that banking was not 'trade, commerce and intercourse'. 1320 
The contrasting style of the two advocates, Evatt and Barwick, was stark: 
Evatt lectured their Lordships for 22 days, glowered at them, read them interminable passages 
from decisions, and never presented them with a clear theory about section 92. Barwick, who 
took nine days, followed his High Court technique of careful, patient and amiable explanation, and 
reduced case-reading to a minimum. 1321 
Barwick was later to say that Evatt was 'grossly repetitive ... [and] had a sort of memory which had to 
reproduce everything he had learnt about the thing you asked him at the same time'. 1322 He 
1317 Letter from Sir Garfield Barwick to Crowther, 12 May 1949 (Papers of Sir Garfield Barwick, London file no. 3 
-personal correspondence [3.0cm], Series No: M3923 (M3923/1), Control Symbol: 8, National Archives of 
Australia, Sydney). 
1318 Ibid. 
1319 55 CLR 1. 
1320 Essentially, Evatt's submissions in reply were as follows: 
1) there is no basis for the Respondents' suggestion that section 92 was inserted in the Constitution to 
make applicable the American doctrine of the individual being able to trade from State to State; 
2) you can apply to every case the test in James v Commonwealth (1936) 55 CLR 1 but I do not know how 
a court is to apply the test of burden as distinct from regulation because the Constitution says nothing 
about a burden or regulation; 
3) if the interpretation of section 92 applied in James v Commonwealth (1936) 55 CLR 1 is correct, it 
follows that, except in respect of the prohibited area of the border, both the Commonwealth 
Parliament and the State legislatures possess plenary legislative power for peace, order and good 
government in relation to trade and commerce among the States. The test of detrimental impact upon 
an individual trader of any law challenged under section 92 is quite irrelevant to that section, even 
though such impact includes interference with the trader's operations in interstate trade and may 
effectually obstruct his liberty to trade interstate; 
4) the fallacy of regarding section 92 as affording something in the nature of a guarantee to individuals of 
a right to trade interstate led to an erroneous conclusion in the Airlines Case. However, the only basis 
upon which section 46 could be deemed to infringe section 92 is the contention of the Respondents 
that the section guarantees a positive right in the individual to trade inter-State, and this contention is 
entirely erroneous; 
5) it is not conceded that banking is included in the 'trade, commerce and intercourse' which is protected 
by section 92. It is submitted that it is merely an instrument or concomitant of trade. The banking 
business cannot as a business be regarded as included in the concept of the movement of trade, 
commerce and intercourse referred to in section 92. 
1321 Sawer, 'Absolutely Free Man', above n 164; May, above n 778, p.91. 
1322 Ibid. 
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concluded that Evatt was 'the worst advocate that ever was'.1323 This seems to be a deliberate 
overstatement as, based on Evatt's career, this would not be an accurate assessment. 
More dispassionately, it has been suggested by Tennant that, in comparison to Evatt, Barwick 'better 
judged the temper of the law lords, allowing them to make their own inferences, not underlining' .1324 
8.5 The Privy Council's Decision 
The appeal concluded on 1 June 1949- after 36 days of argument.1325 Judgment was delivered on 26 
July 1949.1326 The Privy Council dismissed the Commonwealth's appeal without providing any 
reasons. 1327 Barwick and other counsel for the banks waited in one of the bank's boardrooms for the 
news. A cable arrived at 7.32pm simply stating 'Appeal dismissed'. 1328 The High Court's judgment 
was upheld.1329 
The Privy Council's reasons for judgment were released on 26 October 1949,1330 shortly before 
Federal Parliament rose for the general election on 10 December 1949 in which the Chifley Labor 
government was defeated. The bank nationalisation issue remained at the centre of the public 
debate throughout the Labor government's last term in office by virtue of the ongoing appeal.1331 
The Privy Council ruled that the case originally raised a direct inter se question with respect to the 
scope of the banking power and that it did not have jurisdiction to hear an inter se matter; the case 
should have concluded at the High Court. Thus, the case was determined on the issue of whether it 
involved an inter se question.1332 
1323 National Library of Australia, Miller, Interview with Sir Garfield Barwick, above n 19, 24. 
1324 Tennant, Evatt: Politics and Justice, above n 1207, p.242. 
1325 Cammon wealth v Bank of New South Wales (1949) 79 CLR 497 (26 October 1949); Nicholas, above n 1175, 
387; Priest and Williams, above n 77, p.S3. 
1326 Where, in Marr's words, the Registrar announced: 
'Appeal Judgment, Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales and Ors' and the chairman of the 
board then stated that the decision of the board was that the appeal be dismissed, the question of costs 
would be gone into later and the reasons for the judgment be given next session. 
Marr, above n 8, p. 72. 
1327 Blainey and Hutton, above n 783, p.233. 
1328 Marr, above n 8, p.73. 
1329 Hull, above n 783, p.28. 
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° Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales and Drs [1949] UKPCHCA 1; (1949) 79 CLR 497. 
1331 Galligan, above n 781, p.177; Coper, Encounters with the Australian Constitution, above n 781, p.273; 
Sawer, Australian Federal Politics ond Law (1929-1949}, above n 143, p.220. 
1332 Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales {1949) 79 CLR 497 at 629. The Privy Council had rejected 
Evatt's argument that the issue as to whether section 92 invalidated the banking power was not primarily an 
inter se dispute, and the Commonwealth did not require a High Court certificate to allow the matter to come 
before the Privy Council. An inter se question is a matter which arises in connection with the federal 
distribution of powers in Australia: Dennis Hotels Pty Limited v Victoria (1961) 104 CLR 621 at 625-6. See also 
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Still, the Privy Council reviewed the remaining issues in dispute. 1333 It outlined its views in the form 
of an opinion rather than a judgment,1334 and indicated that it would review the substantive issues 
since it would have been possible for the High Court to grant a section 74 certificate (although this 
was highly improbable) and thought 'it right to state their views' on section 92 since it had been so 
fully argued;1335 and secondly, it soyght to correct some misapprehensions in relation to the previous 
James' decisions.'336 
The Privy Council had only been concerned with section 46 of the Act and no other sections.1337 
According to the opinion, this section constituted 'a single indivisible scheme' such that no part of 
which could be severed from the rest'. 1338 It found that banking was of itself 'trade and commerce' 
(and within the trade and commerce power under section Sl(i)) and that the prohibition of private 
banking infringed section 92. 1339 The Privy Council affirmed the High Court's reasoning on section 92 
and added its own comments, including its views on the operation of this section. 1340 
These views were favourable to the banks and accorded with many of Barwick's submissions. 
However, due to the Privy Council not having jurisdiction to hear the appeal, this decision did not 
constitute a binding precedent.1341 
Johnston, above n 783, 96; Caper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, 
p.103; Lane, A Digest of Australian Constitutional Cases, (5'" ed), above n 843, p.344; Sawer, Australian 
Federalism in the Courts, above n 295, p.114; Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law (1929-1949), above n 
143, p.213; Nicholas, above n 1175, 387; Davis, above n 1177, 108. 
1333 Lane, A Digest of Australian Constitutional Cases, (5'" ed), above n 843, p.344; Galligan, above n 781, p.178; 
Johnston, above n 783, 96; Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law (1929-1949), above n 143, p.213; Zines, 
The High Court and the Constitution, (5'" ed), above n 182, pp.152-154; Nicholas, above n 1175, 387; Galligan, 
above n 781, p.177. 
1334 Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales and Ors (1949) 79 CLR 497 at 635-636. The opinion or advice 
provided by the Board was provided without jurisdiction. It held that as 74 certificate was probably necessary 
but, despite this, proceeded to offer its 'advice': see Nicholas, above n 1175; Johnston, above n 783, 87 & 96; 
Lane, A Digest of Australian Constitutional Cases, (5'" ed), above n 843, p.344; Nicholas, above n 1175, 387. 
1335 Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales and Ors (1949) 79 CLR 497 at 629. See also Priest and Williams, 
above n 77, p.53; Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law (1929-1949), above n 143, p.213. 
1336 Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales and Ors (1949) 79 CLR 497 at 629. See also Caper, Freedom of 
Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, p.103; Galligan, above n 781, p.179; Sawer, 
Australian Federal Politics and Law {1929-1949), above n 143, p.213; Nicholas, above n 1175, 387. 
1337 Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales and Ors (1949) 79 CLR 497 at 619. 
1338 1bid, at 632. 
1339 Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales (1949) 79 CLR 497at 632-633, 636-637. See also Coper, 
Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, p.103; Lane, A Digest of Australian 
Constitutional Cases, (5'" ed), above n 843, p.344; Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law {1929-1949), 
above n 143, p.213. 
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° Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales and Ors (1949) 79 CLR 497 at 632-642. See also Johnston, 
above n 783, 96; Galligan, above n 781, p.178; Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law (1929-1949), above n 
143, p.213; Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, (5'" ed), above n 182, pp.152-154. 
1341 Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales and Ors (1949) 79 CLR 497 at 632-633. See also Johnston, 
above n 783, 96; Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.78; 
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The opinion essentially adopted Justice Dixon's judgment from the High Court's decision1342 that 
banking fell within section 92 because of the James' precedents, which, according to the Privy 
Council, established that section 92 protected individual freedom. Since the Act restricted the 
interstate transactions of individual bankers it violated section 92. The Privy Council held that 
bankers were in an analogous position to the fruit grower, James, who had been afforded protection 
under section 92 against government interference in private interstate trade. However, bankers 
were different from transport operators who had been denied such protection in the 'Transport 
Cases'.1343 The Privy Council rejected the Commonwealth's suggestion that interstate trade and 
commerce was restricted to the movement of tangible commodities from one State to another and 
that banking, as an intangible instrument of trade and commerce, fell outside of trade and commerce 
and therefore section 92.1344 This vindicated Barwick's approach in his submissions to rely heavily on 
the James' cases and to minimise references, to the extent possible, to the 'Transport Cases'. 
It is notable that the Privy Council placed considerable reliance on Justice Dixon's High Court 
judgment, yet Barwick had resolved earlier, as we saw, not to rely upon Justice Dixon's judgment. As 
evidenced by an examination of his submissions, Barwick relied on the judgments of Justice Dixon 
only rarely.1345 With the benefit of hindsight, Barwick appears to have misjudged the views of the 
Privy Council when making this decision. He may have been too focused in preparation on reducing 
the possible influence of Chief Justice Latham and may not have considered that the Board might rely 
on the judgment of others, including Justice Dixon. 
The Privy Council confirmed Justice Dixon's 'individual rights' theory of section 92, 1346 therefore, 
affirming Barwick's view of section 92, which he propounded during the High Court case. 1347 Evatt's 
Blainey and Hutton, above n 783, p.233; Blackshield, 'Inter se questions', above n 167, p.351; Caper, 
Encounters with the Australian Constitution, above n 781, p.273. 
1342 Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales and Ors (1949) 79 CLR 497 at 632-633. This has been described 
as Justice Dixon's maxima list interpretation of section 92 as a guarantee of the individual citizen's right to 
freedom of interstate trade: Ayres, above n 50, pp.189-190; Lane, A Digest of Australian Constitutional Cases, 
(S'h ed), above n 843, p.345; Sawer, Cases on The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, (3'' ed), 
above n 781, pp.229-249; Nygh, above n 822, 342; Nicholas, above n 1175, 388; Davis, above n 1177, 108. 
1343 Co per, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, p.103; Galligan, above n 
781, p.179; Sawer, Cases on The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, (3'' ed), above n 781, pp.229-
249; Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law (1929-1949}, above n 143, p.213; Nicholas, above n 1175, 388; 
Davis, above n 1177, 109. 
1344 Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales and Ors (1949) 79 CLR 497 at 632-633; Davis, above n 1177, 
109; Menzies, Central Power in the Australian Commonwealth, above n 205, p.145. 
1345 In correspondence, Barwick stated that 'one clever thing which Evatt did do was to destroy Dixon to a large 
extent, and I really think Dixon suffered a little in loss of standing in several connections': Letter from Sir 
Garfield Barwick to Richard Ashburner, n.d. (Papers of Sir Garfield Barwick, London file no. 3- personal 
correspondence (3.0cm], Series No: M3923 (M3923/1), Control Symbol: 9, National Archives of Australia, 
Sydney). 
1346 Johnston, above n 783, 97; Caper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 
822, p.103. Interestingly, in the 35 years following the Privy Council's decision in Commonwealth v Bank of 
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view that there was no breach unless trade and commerce themselves were impeded at the border 
was rejected-""" 
The Privy Council sought to formulate its own test to determine the circumstances where legislation 
would be invalid under section 92 of the Constitution:1349 
the test is clear: does the Act, not remotely or incidentally ... but directly, restrict the inter-State 
business of banking? Beyond doubt it does, since it authorizes in terms the total prohibition of 
private banking. If so, then in the only sense in which those words can be appropriately used in 
this case, it is an Act which is aimed at, directed at, and the purpose, object and intention of which 
is to restrict, inter-State trade commerce and intercourse. 1350 
Traces of the test proposed can be found in the exchange that occurred between Lord MacDermott 
and Barwick during submissions and the surrounding discussion.1351 
New South Wales and Drs (1949) 79 CLR 497, more than 90 High Court cases raised s 92 issues compared with 
just over 40 cases in the 45 years before the decision: Peter Hanks, Deborah Cass & Jennifer Clarke, Australian 
Constitutional Law: Materials and Commentary, (6'h ed), (1999), Reed International Books Australia Pty Ltd, 
Chatswood, p.813. 
1347 Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales and Drs (1949) 79 CLR 497 at 635-636. See also Priest and 
Williams, above n 77, p.53; Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law {1929-1949), above n 143, p.213; Zines, 
The High Court and the Constitution, (5'h ed), above n 182, pp.152-154. The Privy Council found that s 92 
created a personal right in the individual and the direct result of s 46 of the Act was to extinguish the right of an 
individual to engage in the business of banking. That is, s 46 was 'aimed at' or 'directed at' the freedom of 
interstate trade and commerce: see Davis, above n 1177, 110. According to Caper, 'the individual right theory 
was endorsed without satisfactory justification': see Caper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian 
Constitution, above n 822, p.103. 
1348 The Privy Council stated: 'It would be a strange anomaly if a grower of fruit could successfully 
challenge an unqualified power to interfere with his liberty ... but a banker could be prohibited 
altogether from carrying on his business': Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales and Drs (1949) 79 
CLR 497 at 635-636. See also Caper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above 
n 822, p.103; Caper, Encounters with the Australian Constitution, above n 781, p.273; Sawer, Cases on 
The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, (3'' ed), above n 781, pp.229-249. 
1349 The Privy Council dismissed any suggestion that the subjective legislative purpose or intention was relevant 
by referring to the statement of Isaacs J in James v Cowan (1930) 43 CLR 386 at 409. The necessary effect 
refers to 'the necessary legal effect, not the ulterior effect economically or socially' (Commonwealth v Bank of 
New South Wales and Drs (1949) 79 CLR 497 at 637). In this case, it was clear that the necessary legal effect of 
the Banking Act 1947 (Cth) was to restrict interstate trade (see Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales and 
Drs (1949) 79 CLR 497 at 637). See also Caper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, 
above n 822, p.104; Lane, A Digest of Australian Constitutional Cases, (5'h ed), above n 843, p.345; Nygh, above 
n 822,342. 
135
° Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales and Drs (1949) 79 CLR 497 at 637. See also Sawer, Cases on 
The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, (3'' ed), above n 781, pp.229-249; Nicholas, above n 1175, 
388. 
1351 Further, the Privy Council stated that: 
But it seems that two general propositions may be accepted: (1) that regulation of trade commerce and 
intercourse among the States is compatible with its absolute freedom and (2) that s. 92 is violated only when 
a legislative or executive act operates to restrict such trade commerce and intercourse directly and 
immediately as distinct from creating some indirect or consequential impediment which may fairly be 
regarded as remote. 
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One concept that emerged clearly from the decision by the Privy Council was that 'simple prohibition 
is not regulation'. 1352 Their Lordships relied on the comments by Latham CJ in the Airlines Case1353 
and the Milk Board Case1354 to support this conclusion. These were the comments that Barwick had 
thought he could use to persuade Latham CJ during the case before the High Court. The Privy 
Council also suggested that Latham a would have reached a different conclusion in the present case 
had he decided that the business of banking was trade and commerce. 135s The Privy Council's 
conclusions thus accorded with, and vindicated, the approach Barwick had taken in the case before 
the High Court. This also demonstrated that the Board agreed with Barwick's submission that the 
only impediment to Latham CJ finding that the legislation was invalid in the High Court was his view 
that 'banking' was not 'trade and commerce' for the purposes of section 92. 
The Privy Council suggested that the problem to be solved would often not be legal but rather, 
political, economic or social.1356 It outlined two questions to determine validity under section 92: 
'whether the effect of the Act is in a particular respect direct or remote and, secondly, whether in its 
true character it is regulatory'. 1357 Therefore, the test that emerged was: does a law affect trade, 
commerce and intercourse in a way which is direct or remote? If it is direct then it is invalid under 
section 92. Also, does the law restrict or merely regulate trade, commerce or intercourse among the 
Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales and Drs (1949) 79 CLR 497 at 639. See also Johnston, above n 783, 
96; Galligan, above n 781, p.179; Co per, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 
822, p.102 and 104; Lane, A Digest of Australian Constitutional Cases, (51h ed), above n 843, p.346; Sawer, Cases 
on The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, (3'' ed), above n 781, pp.229-249; Nygh, above n 822, 
342; Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, (51h ed). above n 182, pp.152-154; Nicholas, above n 1175, 388; 
Davis, above n 1177, 110. 
13s2 Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales and Drs (1949) 79 CLR 497 at 640. See also Co per, Freedom of 
Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, p.104; Lane, A Digest of Australian 
Constitutional Cases, (51h ed), above n 843, p.346; Sawer, Cases on The Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, (3''ed). above n 781, pp.229-249; Davis, above n 1177, 111; Sir Garfield Barwick, 'Some Aspects of 
Australian Proposals for Legislation for the Control of Restrictive Trade Practices and Monopolies' (1963) 36 
Australian Law Journa/363, 375; Garfield Barwick, 'Sir Garfield Barwick: Speeches 1957-1963', High Court of 
Australia Library, Canberra. 
1353 Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29 at 61. 
1354 At 127. 
1355 Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales and Drs (1949) 79 CLR 497 at 640. See also Co per, Freedom of 
Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, p.104. In the Airlines Case, Latham CJ stated 
(at 61), which has been outlined earlier, that: 'simple legislative prohibition (Federal or State), as distinct from 
regulation, of inter-State trade and commerce is invalid. Further, a law which is directed against inter-State 
trade and commerce is invalid. Such a law does not regulate such trade, it merely prevents it. See also Lane, A 
Digest of Australian Constitutional Cases, (51h ed), above n 843, p.346. 
1356 Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales and Drs (1949) 79 CLR 497 at 639. See also Johnston, above n 
783, 96; Caper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, p.105; Co per, 
Encounters with the Australian Constitution, above n 781, p.145; Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, (51h 
ed), above n 182, pp.152-154; Nicholas, above n 1175, 388. 
1357 Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales and Drs (1949) 79 CLR 497 at 642. 
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States? If it restricts then it is invalid under section 92.1358 The Privy Council continued: 'It appears to 
their Lordships that if these two tests are applied ... the area of dispute may be considerably 
narrower. It is beyond hope that it should be eliminated'. 1359 
According to Barwick, 1360 the Privy Council's reasons for rejecting the Commonwealth's appeal were 
based on its view of the operation "of section 92 and, at some later stage, the Board decided to make 
the fact that the Privy Council did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal the basis of the judgment. 
Barwick also noted that the Privy Council's views on section 92 were obiter dicta at the time but were 
later converted into precedent when he used them to argue successfully the section 92 position in 
Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales (1954)1361 which finally overruled the 'Transport 
Cases' .1362 
Barwick's success in the Privy Council, as well as the High Court, in the Bank Nationa/isation Cases 
owes much to his ability as an advocate, and his ability to employ and apply the elements of 
appellate advocacy as well as, at times, achieve the ideals of appellate advocacy. Despite appearing 
in his first case before the Privy Council and suffering some initial discomfort, Barwick exhibited a 
close adherence to the elements and ideals of appellate advocacy. In doing so, he demonstrated his 
ability to adapt his style of appellate advocacy to the Privy Council setting. His advocacy was 
characterised by his ability both to make uninterrupted submissions, and handle judicial questions; 
1358 The interpretation of s 92 that ended any prospects of nationalisation following the Bank Nationalisation 
Case, that is, the individual right theory, was eventually overruled forty years later in the Tasmanian Lobster 
Case. See also Johnston, above n 783, 97. Prior to this decision, judicial opinion differed on the interpretation 
of section 92. Ironically, the interpretation that ultimately prevailed may have made the nationalisation of 
some industries easier. However, by this time the Labor Party had abandoned its nationalisation objectives, 
and along with the Liberal Party, had embraced the privatisation of government-owned businesses: see Hull, 
above n 783, p.27. 
1359 Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales and Drs (1949) 79 CLR 497 at 642. Whilst the Privy Council 
effectively concluded that the banks could not be prohibited from carrying on business in 1949, it noted: 
For their Lordships do not intend to lay it down that in no circumstances could the exclusion of competition 
so as to create a monopoly either in a State of Commonwealth agency or in some other body be justified. 
Every case must be judged on its own facts and in its own setting of time and circumstance, and it may be 
that in regard to some economic activities and at some stage of social development it might be maintained 
that prohibition with a view to State monopoly was the only practical and reasonable manner of regulation 
and that inter-State trade commerce and intercourse thus prohibited and thus monopolized remained 
absolutely free. 
The Privy Council's reservation, and this seemingly contradictory statement, caused confusion and some 
concern remained that the threat of nationalisation had not completely disappeared. Therefore this 
reservation, to a small extent, clouded Barwick's success. It has been said that the Privy Council's reasons 
'which seemed to anticipate a socialist future, read like a riddle, utterly confusing the High Court in regard to 
their interpretation of section 92'. See Marr, above n 8, p.74; Hull, above n 783, p.28. Ayres, above n 50, 
pp.189-190; Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales and ors {1949) 79 CLR 497 at 640-641. 
1360 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.79. 
1361 Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales [1954] UKPCHCA 5; (1954) 93 CLR 1 {Privy Council). 
1362 Caper, Freedom of Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, p.105; Barwick, A 
Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.7; Nygh, above n 822, 343; Zines, The 
High Court ond the Constitution, (S'h ed), above n 182, pp.139-145. 
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he also utilised his answers as a means of further conveying his submissions. He employed examples 
and analogy to great effect and he demonstrated an extensive preparation, together with courage, 
flexibility, discretion and tact, as well as appropriate respect and wit. 
8.6 The Aftermath 
The Chifley government was required to accept its fate on bank nationalisation. During the 1949 
election campaign, however, the Opposition continued to raise the issue of bank nationalisation as if 
it were an immediate threat. 
Despite the result in the Privy Council, McConnan did not rest. 1363 On 10 December 1949, the 
government was defeated in the federal election and there is no doubt that the resistance to 
nationalisation was a major factor in its loss.1364 Barwick, it has been said 'had raised section 92 
litigation to the highest pinnacle of legal practice'1365 and that as a result 'there was at hand a whole 
bevy of barristers, led by Sir Garfield himself, eager to work this lucrative field'. 1366 Due to the fact 
that he was involved in cases frequently challenging the validity of legislation, Barwick it was said, 
'left the parliamentary draftsmen endlessly papering over the cracks' 1367 
The failure ofthe Chifley government's bank nationalisation legislation spurred an increase in 
litigation challenging government price controls1368, road freight taxes1369, State receipt taxes1370, and 
1363 1n fact, McConnan remarked that '[i]t follows that the only real protection is to toss the Socialists out'. See 
May, above n 778, p.92. 
1364 Crisp, Ben Chifley: A Political Biography, above n 783, pp.339-341. The defeat of the Labor Party at the 
federal election in 1949 was also the result of a desire by the electorate to be free from wartime constraints 
across a broad spectrum of measures such as food and petrol rationing which Menzies exploited. See also 
Johnston, above n 783 & 97; Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law (1929-1949), above n 143, p.220; May, 
above n 778, pp.126-127; Kevin Perkins, Menzies: Lastafthe Queen's Men, (1968), Rigby Limited, Adelaide; 
pp.161-162; Hazlehurst, above n 204, p.308. According to Clyde Cameron, a Labor Member of Parliament from 
1949 to 1980, it was petrol rationing and 'not bank nationalisation which cost Labor the 1949 election' (see 
Clyde Cameron, The Cameron Diaries, (1990), Allen & Unwin Australia Pty Limited, North Sydney, p.436). 
1365 Galligan, above n 781, p.210. 
1366 Ibid. The Bank Nationalisation Case was a major victory for Barwick. Many of the counsel who appeared in 
that case for the private banks were subsequently appointed to the High Court. Frank Kitto, Alan Taylor and 
Douglas Menzies were all appointed in the years that followed and, in 1964, Barwick was appointed the Chief 
Justice of the High Court (See Priest and Williams, above n 77, p.53; Kirby, 'Kitto and the High Court of 
Australia', above n 186, 135). 
1367 Marr, above n 8, p.54. 
1368 For example, Wragg v NSW (1953) 88 CLR 353. 
1369 For example, Hughes & Vale Pty Ltd v NSW (1954) 93 CLR 1. 
137
° For example, Associated Steamships v Western Australia (1969) 120 CLR 92. 
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marketing controls.1371 In 1976, Barwick acknowledged that section 92 'has given rise to almost 
continuous litigation on the extent of the limitation on governmental powers which it contains'.1372 
Following his appearance in the Bank Nationa/isation Case, Barwick appeared in several appeals to 
the Privy Council from which he derived great personal satisfaction. As he stated: 
I appeared at times against leading English Counsel and had many opportunities for exercising my 
persuasive skills as an advocate and demonstrating my knowledge of the law over a wide field. 
From 1948 on I appeared regularly before the Privy Council and became a familiar figure in the 
Inns of Court, where I made many friends. 1373 
Barwick was aware of his own ability to persuade, including in the use made by judges of his 
submissions as the basis for their judgments. After 1948 and following frequent appearances in the 
Privy Council, he would, in his own words, put forward specific propositions and the presiding Lord 
would often say 'at dictation speed'; the Lords would then begin to note down the propositions he 
advanced. Barwick recollected that it was acknowledged that he was the counsel 'from whom their 
Lordships took dictation'.1374 This, if accurate, is the ultimate compliment for an advocate. The fact 
that Barwick's propositions, often involving complex concepts, were expressed simply and eloquently 
made them attractive and appropriate for direct inclusion in any judgment. In this way, Barwick 
made the process of writing judgments considerably easier for the Privy Council, and he did not 
hesitate to affirm this himself.1375 
1371 For example, North Eastern Dairy Co v Dairy Industries Authority of NSW {1975) 134 CLR 559. 
1372 Speech delivered by Sir Garfield Barwick, 'Federation and the Constitution of the Commonwealth', occasion 
unknown, 1976; Garfield Barwick, 'Chief Justice Barwick: Speeches 1973-1981', High Court of Australia Library, 
Canberra. The legacy of the Bank Nationalisation Case remains in terms of the definitions and descriptions 
found in both the High Court and Privy Council judgments about what constitutes 'banking' or 'the business of 
banking'. These terms remain undefined by legislation. As a result, many still refer to the obiter dicta in the 
Bank Nationalisation Case to assist with the interpretation of these terms: see Weerasooria, above n 777, 79. 
For example, it was applied by Newcrest Mining {WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513 and 
Queensland Electricity Commission v Commonwealth ( 1985) 159 CLR 192; it was approved by Concrete 
Constructions {NSW) Pty Ltd v Nelson (1990) 169 CLR 594; it was followed by Attorney-General (Cth) v T & G 
Mutual Life Society Ltd (1978) 144 CLR 161, Bartter's Farms Pty Ltd v Todd (1978) 139 CLR 499; it was referred 
to in Wong v Commonwealth (2009) 236 CLR 573, Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia (2008) 234 CLR 418, White 
v Director of Military Prosecutions (2007) 231 CLR 570, APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner 
{NSW) (2005) 224 CLR 322. 
1373 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.33. 
1374 Ibid, p. 77. 
137s However, it should be noted that this is an anecdote from Barwick himself and it has not been 
independently corroborated. 
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Chapter 9: Barwick and the Communist Party Case 
"My argument about the validity of the Act was unconvincing. Only the Chief Justice was prepared to 
uphold its validity on the grounds set out in his reasons rather than on my argument. Latham CJ, 
while still in office, once told me that my argument in the Communist Party Case was the worst he 
had heard from me. I have no reason to question his judgment." 
Sir Garfield Barwick, 19951376 
Following his success in the Bank Nationalisation Case, Barwick was considered one of the best 
appellate advocates in Australia, particularly in constitutional law cases. The year after the Privy 
Council's decision, Barwick was called upon by the Menzies Government to defend in the High Court 
legislation that it had introduced, banning the Australian Communist Party ("the Communist Party"). 
This chapter is dedicated to assessing Barwick's advocacy in the High Court in the Communist Party 
Case against the elements and ideals of appellate advocacy. The Communist Party Case is regarded 
as one ofthe High Court's 'most significant and celebrated constitutional decisions'.1377 
In the Communist Party Case, Barwick was required to assume the unusual role of defending the 
validity of legislation as opposed to his customary role in his constitutional cases of attacking the 
validity of legislation. 
As with the Bank Nationalisation Case in both the High Court and the Privy Council, a comprehensive 
assessment of Barwick's advocacy in the Communist Party Case requires an assessment of his 
advocacy in terms of preparation, presentation and personation. This analysis draws upon 
observations and commentary about Barwick, and also involves an examination of primary material, 
including the transcript of Barwick's argument. 
9.1 Preparation for the Communist Party Case in the High Court 
Alongside the Bank Nationalisation Case, the Communist Party Case ranks as one of the most 
important constitutional law cases heard by the High Court. It also represents Barwick's greatest 
1376 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.48. 
1377 Michael Coper, 'Constitutional Law' in Tony Blackshield, Michael Coper & George Williams (eds), The Oxford 
Companion to the High Court of Australia, (2001), Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, p.141. 
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defeat as an advocate in constitutional law cases.1378 The assessment of Barwick's advocacy in this 
case will assist in understanding the reasons behind his defeat. 
To understand and appreciate the significance of this case, it is important to understand the events 
that led to it coming before the High Court. The historical context also reveals Barwick's early 
involvement and provides the necessary context to allow an in-depth examination of Barwick's 
advocacy in this case. 
Chapter 6 examined Barwick's approach to preparation generally and the early sections of chapters 7 
and 8 his preparation in the Bank Nationalisation Case before the High Court and Privy Council 
respectively. In this section, Barwick's preparation in the Communist Party Case will be discussed. 
Background to the Communist Party Case 
After World War II, many governments feared that communism was a threat to democracy. This was 
a view also held by many in Australia. Community concern intensified as the union movement was 
thought to be infiltrated by communist elements. A seven-week coal strike in 1949 appeared to 
highlight the industrial power ofthe Communist Party.1379 
Menzies led the newly formed Liberal Party and the Country Party to a resounding election victory on 
10 December 1949. In the lead up to the election, Menzies had campaigned strongly on the promise 
1378 Barwick made little reference to this case in his autobiography despite discussing the Bank Nationalisation 
Case at considerable length: Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, (1995), 
Federation Press, Sydney. 
1379 Williams, 'Communist Party Case', above n 77, p.122; Hull, above n 783, p.28; Maher, 'Menzies, Robert 
Gordon', above n 202, p.478; Winterton, The Communist Party Case' in H.P. Lee & George Winterton (eds), 
Australian Constitutional Landmarks, (2003), Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 108, 114; 'Why Miners' 
Leaders Want Industrial Chaos', The Sydney Morning Herald {Sydney), 23 June 1949, 2; 'Use Of Leaflets To Fight 
Strike', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 8 July 1949, 3; 'This Is Why Communists Plan A Long Strike', The 
Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 9 July 1949, 2; 'Order To Communist Party No Money For Coal Strike Leaders 
Gaoled', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 12 July 1949, 1; 'Communists Defy Court Order', The Sydney 
Morning Herald (Sydney), 14 July 1949, 3; 'Coal Strike {Continued) Leaders May Yield Communist Tactics', The 
Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 4 August 1949, 4; Laurence W Maher, 'Downunder McCarthyism: The 
Struggle Against Australian Communism 1945-1960: Part One' (1998) 27{3) Anglo-American Law Review 341, 
346, 369-372. This article outlines the background to communism in Australia during the mid-1940s and 1950s 
and should be read with the second part: Laurence W Maher, 'Downunder McCarthyism: The Struggle Against 
Australian Communism 1945-1960: Part Two' (1998) 27(4) Anglo-American Law Review 438. According to 
Maher, membership of the Australian Communist Party peaked in 1945 at between 18,000 and 23,000 out of 
population of 7,500,000. In the years that followed, membership steadily declined. Parliament passed the 
National Emergency (Coal Strike) Act 1949 (Cth) in response to the miners' strike of 1949: see Roger Douglas, 
'Cold War Justice? Judicial Responses to Communists and Communism, 1945-1955' (2007) 29 Sydney Law 
Review 43, 50-51 and 67. For further background see generally George Winterton, 'The Communist Party Case' 
in H.P. Lee & George Winterton (eds), Australian Constitutional Landmarks, (2003), Cambridge University Press, 
Melbourne, 108; George Winterton, 'The Significance of the Communist Party Case' (1991-1992) 18 Melbourne 
University Law Review 630, 630-638; lines, The High Court and the Constitution, (5'h ed), above n 182, pp.300-
310. 
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of suppressing communism and banning the Communist Party. 1380 In his policy speech, he stated 
that: 'Communism in Australia is an alien and destructive pest. If elected, we shall outlaw it'.1381 
One of Menzies' first major actions upon becoming Prime Minister was to introduce into Federal 
Parliament the Communist Party Dissolution Bill on 27 April1950. 1382 The Bill, if enacted, would 
dissolve the Communist Party imme"diately and its assets would be appropriated. In addition, any 
person 'declared' to be a communist would be dismissed from the defence force, the public service 
and from a union where the union was in a 'vital industry'. These declarations would be made by the 
Governor-General on advice from the Executive Council.1383 
Following initial rejection by the House of Representatives of amendments proposed by the Senate, 
the Bill was reintroduced on 28 September 1950 and passed by Parliament on 19 October 1950 and 
given royal assent by the Governor-General on 20 October 1950.1384 It was the first significant piece 
of legislation enacted after Menzies became Prime Minister. 
1380 
"'In Your Hands, Australia!'", The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 11 November 1949, 1; 'Drastic Action 
On Communists Party Will be Dissolved', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 11 November 1949, 5; See also 
Winterton, 'The Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 115; Maher, 'Downunder McCarthyism: The Struggle 
Against Australian Communism 1945-1960: Part One', above n 1379, 342, 388-389; Douglas, 'Cold War Justice? 
Judicial Responses to Communists and Communism, 1945-1955', above n 1379, 50; Winterton, 'The 
Significance of the Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 630; Ross Anderson, 'Australian Communist Party v 
The Commonwealth' {1948-1951) 1 University of Queensland 34, 34; Justice Michael Kirby, 'HV Evatt, The 
Anti-Communist Referendum and Liberty in Australia' {1990) Australian Bar Review 92, 94-95. 
1381 
'Drastic Action On Communists Party Will be Dissolved', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 11 November 
1949, 5. See also Winterton, 'The Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 108, 115; Winterton, 'The Significance 
of the Communist Party Case', above n 1379,630-631, 635; Anderson, above n 1380, 34; Williams, 'Communist 
Party Case', above n 77, p.122; Hull, above n 783, p.28; Maher, 'Menzies, Robert Gordon', above n 202, p.478; 
Maher, 'Down under McCarthyism: The Struggle Against Australian Communism 1945-1960: Part One', above n 
1379,388. 
1382 Winterton, 'The Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 115; Marr, above n 8, p.79. See Commonwealth, 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 27 April1950, 1994-2007 (Robert Menzies, Prime Minister); 
Maher, 'Downunder McCarthyism: The Struggle Against Australian Communism 1945-1960: Part Two', above n 
1379, 439; Douglas, 'Cold War Justice? Judicial Responses to Communists and Communism, 1945-1955', above 
n 1379, 50; Winterton, 'The Significance of the Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 638; Williams, 'Reading 
the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in the Communist Party Case', above n 18, 4. 
1383 Winterton, 'The Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 108-110; 115-117; Marr, above n 8, p.80. The 
United Australia Party- Country Party Government led by Menzies, attempted to dissolve the Australian 
Communist Party on 15 June 1940 under the National Security {Subversive Associations) Regulations 1940 {Cth) 
as a body 'the existence of which the Governor-General ... declares to be, in his opinion, prejudicial to the 
defence of the Commonwealth or the efficient prosecution of the war' (reg. 3) as a result of the Australian 
Communist Party's opposition to World War 2. However, the regulations were declared invalid by the High 
Court in Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116 {Latham CJ and 
McTiernan J dissented). See Maher, 'Downunder McCarthyism: The Struggle Against Australian Communism 
1945-1960: Part Two', above n 1379, 439; Roger Douglas, 'A Smallish Blow for Liberty? The Significance of the 
Community Party Case' (2001) 27 Monash University Law Review 253, 258; Winterton, 'The Significance of the 
Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 640. 
1384 Winterton, 'The Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 123-124; Marr, above n 8, pp. 82-83. Dr Evatt, the 
Deputy Leader of the Opposition was so convinced of the Bill's invalidity that he suggested to his colleagues 
that they let it pass through Parliament and let the High Court destroy it (Tennant, Famous Australians- Evatt: 
Politics and Justice, above n 786, p.260). See also Maher, 'Downunder McCarthyism: The Struggle Against 
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The Act featured a preamble containing nine recitals.1385 In the recitals, the Federal Government 
outlined its view of communism and depicted the Communist Party as a danger to Australia. The 
operative provisions of the Act followed the recitals. Section 4 declared the Communist Party to be 
an unlawful association; it provided for its dissolution and made provision for the appointment of a 
receiver to manage its property. Section 5 provided the mechanism for organisations other than the 
Communist Party (but who supported communism) to be declared unlawful by the Governor-
General.1386 A 'communist' was defined in section 3(1) of the Act to mean 'a person who supports or 
advocates the objectives, policies, teachings, principles or practices of communism, as expounded by 
Marx and Lenin'. Once an association was declared to be unlawful, it would be dissolved under 
section 6 and a receiver appointed under section 8. An organisation could be declared unlawful 
under section 5(2) where: 
the Governor-General is satisfied that a body of persons is a body of persons to which this section 
applies and that the continued existence of that body of persons would be prejudicial to the 
security and defence of the Commonwealth or to the execution or maintenance of the 
Constitution or of the laws of the Commonwealth. 1387 
Under section 9(2), the Governor-General could declare any person to be a 'communist' or a member 
of the Communist Party by applying a similar discretion to that outlined in section 5(2). Following 
such a declaration, under section 10, such person could not hold office in the Commonwealth public 
service or in industries declared by the Governor-General to be vital to the security and defence of 
Australia. In the event that a person wanted to contest a declaration by the Governor-General, he or 
she could do so under section 9(4), although section 9(5) reversed the onus of proof by providing 
that 'the burden shall be on him to prove that he is not a person to whom this section applies'.1388 
Australian Communism 1945-1960: Part Two', above n 1379,439-442. For further background see Winterton, 
'The Significance of the Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 638-647; Kirby, 'HV Evatt, The Anti-Communist 
Referendum and Liberty in Australia', above n 1380, 97-98. In this article Kirby also discusses the parallels 
between the Communist Party Dissolution Act 1950 (Cth) and the Smith Act 1946 in the United States and the 
Suppression of Communism Act 1950 in South Africa at 98-101. 
1385 Winterton, 'The Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 108-110; Maher, 'Downunder McCarthyism: The 
Struggle Against Australian Communism 1945-1960: Part Two', above n 1379; Kirby, 'HV Evatt, The 
Anti-Communist Referendum and Liberty in Australia', above n 1380, 95. 
1385 Winterton, 'The Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 121-123; Williams, 'Communist Party Case', above n 
77, p.122; Hull, above n 783, p.28; Maher, 'Menzies, Robert Gordon', above n 202, p.478. 
1386 This provision targeted bodies that supported or advocated communism, were affiliated with the 
Communist Party, or whose policies were substantially influenced by members of the Communist Party or by 
'communists'. 
1387 Williams, 'Communist Party Case', above n 77, p.122; Hull, above n 783, pp.28-29; Zines, The High Court 
and the Constitution, (5'h ed), above n 182, pp.300-310. 
1388 Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in the Communist Party Case', above n 18, 4-5; 
Williams, 'Communist Party Case', above n 77, p.122. See also Hull, above n 783, pp.28-29; Winterton, 'The 
Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 115-122; Douglas, 'A Smallish Blow for Liberty? The Significance of the 
Community Party Case', above n 1383, 258-259; Douglas, 'Cold War Justice? Judicial Responses to Communists 
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Preliminary litigation in the Communist Party Case 
The Communist Party, ten unions and several union officials (some of whom were well-known 
communists) challenged the validity of the Communist Party Dissolution Act 1950 (Cth) ("the Act") 
almost immediately. On the day that the Act came into effect, eight actions were commenced in the 
High Court of Australia against the Commonwealth seeking a declaration that the Act was 
unconstitutional as well as an injunction to defer the operation of the Act until the High Court could 
determine its validity. 1389 
Evatt accepted a brief to appear on behalf of one of the plaintiff unions, the Waterside Workers' 
Federation, and its communist official, James Healy, in the High Court. This was seen as controversial 
in light of the fact that Evatt was a former Judge of the High Court and the Deputy Opposition Leader 
at the time. 1390 
Following his success in the Bank Nationa/isation Case, Barwick was the pre-eminent leader of the 
Australian Bar. Barwick and Prime Minister Menzies had discovered at a meeting that they had 
various interests and values in common.1391 Barwick, it has been said: 'put his skills as an advocate at 
the service of the new government. Of all the clients he acquired in the aftermath of the Banking 
Case triumph, Menzies was the greatest'-'39' In fact, it has been suggested that Barwick disliked 
communism and it was understood that his support for the Act was 'unofficial but not private'. 1393 
and Communism, 1945-1955', above n 1379, 54-55; Anderson, above n 1380, 34; Kirby, 'HV Evatt, The 
Anti-Communist Referendum and Liberty in Australia', above n 1380, 95-97. 
1389 Williams, 'Communist Party Case', above n 77, p.122. Proceedings were instituted three hours after Royal 
Assent was given: see 'Anti-Reds Bill Challenge', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 21 October 1950, 4; An 
intention to challenge the legislation was announced two days earlier: see 'Reds to Fight New Act', The Sydney 
Morning Herald (Sydney), 19 October 1950, 1; 'Reds will Challenge Bill in Court', The Sydney Morning Herald 
(Sydney), 17 October 1950,4. See Winterton, 'The Significance of the Communist Party case', above n 1379, 
647. 
1390 Evatt was also a staunch anti-communist. See Winterton, 'The Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 108-
110; Maher, 'Downunder McCarthyism: The Struggle Against Australian Communism 1945-1960: Part Two', 
above n 1379, 441. 
1390 Winterton, 'The Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 124-126; Williams, 'Communist Party Case', above n 
77, p.122. In the face of verbal attacks in Parliament in relation to Evatt's actions, Opposition Leader Ben 
Chifley defended Evatt's actions on the basis that they were consistent with Evatt's history of defending civil 
liberties. The NSW President of the Labor Party, JA Ferguson, described Evatt's actions as 'ethically correct, 
professionally sound, and politically very, very foolish': Williams, 'Communist Party Case', above n 77, p.122; 
Maher, 'Downunder McCarthyism: The Struggle Against Australian Communism 1945-1960: Part Two', above n 
1379, 441-443; Laurence W Maher and Robert Manne, 'Menzies, Evatt and Petrov: An Exchange' (March, 
1994), 38(3) Quadrant (Sydney) 54, 59; Winterton, 'The Significance of the Communist Party Case', above n 
1379, 648-649; Kirby, 'HV Evatt, The Anti-Communist Referendum and Liberty in Australia', above n 1380, 102. 
1391 Marr, above n 8, p. 77. 
1392 Ibid. 
1393 Ibid, p.79. 
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Once again, there was to be a clash between Barwick and Evatt in a constitutional contest. However, 
the roles in this case were effectively reversed from the Bank Nationa/isation Case. Barwick now 
appeared for the Commonwealth in defending the legislation; whilst Evatt appeared for the 
communist-led Waterside Workers Federation in attacking the constitutional validity of the 
legislation.1394 
On 20 October 1950, writs were filed in the High Court in Melbourne by the Communist Party and six 
other unions seeking an interim injunction restraining the Commonwealth from implementing the 
legislation. On Saturday 21 October 1950, Justice Dixon refused to grant a general injunction; instead 
he granted a limited injunction which prevented the Commonwealth from disposing of any property 
belonging to the Communist Party or 'declaring' any association or person until the High Court had 
determined the validity of the legislation.1395 However, he declined to ban the raids on the 
Communist Party. After granting the interim injunction, Justice Dixon stated a case for the Full Court 
in relation to the various actions as follows: 1396 
1. (a) Does the decision of the question of the validity or invalidity of the provisions of the Act 
depend upon a judicial determination or ascertainment of the facts or any of them stated in 
the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth recitals of the preamble of that Act and 
denied by the plaintiffs, and 
(b) are the plaintiffs entitled to adduce evidence in support of their denial of the facts so 
stated in order to establish that the Act is outside the legislative power of the 
Commonwealth? 
2. If no to either part of question 1, are the provisions of the Act invalid either in whole or in 
some part affecting the plaintiffs? 
1394 Hull, above n 783, p.29. 
1395 
'High Court Judge Issues Orders', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 22 October 1950, 3; 'Anti-Red Act 
Case Adjourned: Injunction Stands', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 26 October 1950, 5. See Winterton, 
'The Significance of the Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 647; Kirby, 'HV Evatt, The Anti-Communist 
Referendum and Liberty in Australia', above n 1380, 102. 
1396 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 9-10; Dixon, McTiernan, Williams, Fullagar 
and Kitto JJ answered the first question 'no' and the second question 'yes'. Webb J answered both questions 
'yes' and Latham CJ dissented and answered both questions 'no'. See also Winterton, 'The Communist Party 
Case', above n 1379, 124; Ayres, above n 50, pp.219-220; Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellant 
Argument in the Communist Party Case', above n 18, 5-6; Marr, above n 8, pp. 82-83; Douglas, 'Cold War 
Justice? Judicial Responses to Communists and Communism, 1945-1955', above n 1379, 55; Winterton, 'The 
Significance of the Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 647; Anderson, above n 1380, 35; Williams, 'Reading 
the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in the Communist Party Case', above n 18, 5-6. 
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Commonwealth officers raided the Communist Party headquarters in Sydney, Melbourne, Perth, 
Hobart and Darwin on 23 October 1950 and seized documents.1397 The Communist Party was 
dissolved immediately and a receiver was to be appointed to deal with the Party's property.1398 
The Act purported to be based on section 51(vi) of the Constitution and on section 51(xxxix) read 
with section 61. The Act sought to justify itself by a series of recited facts in its preamble which 
comprised statements about Marxism-Leninism, communist parties generally, and their desire to 
violently overthrow the capitalist system. The validity of the Act was challenged as well as the 
allegations contained in the recitals."" 
In his autobiography, Barwick stated that the Communist Party Case was an example of a case which 
was difficult to win. It cannot be overlooked that Barwick's recollection might have been coloured by 
the fact that he did not 'win' this case. He also recalled that he was not consulted before being 
briefed to appear on behalf ofthe Commonwealth in the High Court.1400 Barwick noted, further, that 
the Act recited a substantial amount of material of a factual kind but that the High Court could not be 
bound by these recited facts as if they had been judicially established. He suggested that in the 
event that those facts had been able to be judicially established, then the decision may have been 
different.1401 
Given the short turnaround (24 days) between the passage of the legislation and the start of the 
hearing, Barwick had limited time to familiarise himself with the Act and its issues or to prepare 
generally. He would have been required to undertake his preparation rapidly while preparing for 
other matters for which he had already been briefed.1402 
There is limited material available to enable a detailed assessment of Barwick's preparation for this 
case. However, various inferences can be made about the quality of his preparation. 
1397 Winterton, 'The Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 125; Maher, 'Downunder McCarthyism: The 
Struggle Against Australian Communism 1945-1960: Part Two', above n 1379, 441; Winterton, 'The Significance 
of the Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 648. 
1398 Hull, above n 783, pp.28-29; Maher, 'Downunder McCarthyism: The Struggle Against Australian 
Communism 1945-1960: Part Two', above n 1379, 441; Marr, above n 8, pp. 82-83. 
1399 Ayres, above n 50, pp.219-220. 
1400 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.48. 
1401 Ibid. 
1402 For example, Barwick appeared in several High Court cases at the time including: R v Metal Trades 
Employers' Association; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union (1951) 82 CLR 208 and R v Commonwealth 
Court of Conciliation & Arbitration; Ex parte Federated Gas Employees Industrial Union (1951) 82 CLR 267 which 
was heard on 18-20, 23-24 October 1950 and 5 March 1951; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Adelaide 
Electric Supply Co Ltd (1950) 83 CLR 413 which was heard on 28-29 September 1950 and 30 October 1950; 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Adelaide Electric Supply Co Ltd (1950) 83 CLR 413 which was heard on 25-
27 September 1950 and 13 November 1950; Thompson v Armstrong & Royse Pty Ltd (1950) 81 CLR 585 which 
was heard on 14-16 August and 17 November 1950 and Eastaway v Commonwealth (1951) 84 CLR 328 which 
was heard on 5-8 September 1950, 2 October 1950, 20 December 1950, 11-12 July 1951 and 8 October 1951. 
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9.2 Presentation and Personation in the Communist Party Case in the High 
Court 
The constitutional challenge to the Act commenced on 14 November 1950. The anticipation was 
intense. 1403 It attracted widespread interest inside and outside the High Court, and police were 
required to contain the interested spectators attempting to gain access to the court.1404 The case 
concluded on 19 December 1950- after more than 24 sitting days.1405 Barwick led the team on 
behalf of the Commonwealth and, according to Justice Dixon, he was backed by 'a grotesquely large 
number of other counsel'. 1406 However, only Barwick addressed the High Court in support ofthe 
Act.1407 According to Marr: 
Barwick's relations with the High Court Bench in 1950 were excellent. His frequent appearances 
during World War II and in the first Banking Nationalisation case meant that he had developed a 
rapport with the Bench. He was liked with a "special fondness" by McTiernan J, had been a close 
associate of Kitto J and found a sympathy for his political views in the heart of Latham CJ. 1408 
Evatt and eleven other counsel appeared on behalf of the communists and the unions. 1409 
Early in the proceedings, Barwick made an application to alter the sequence in which the parties 
would ordinarily make their submissions so that he could address the Court initially as expected, but 
defer one aspect of his argument until the plaintiffs addressed the Court. Barwick, it appears, 
employed this strategy for the purposes of obtaining a forensic advantage. It was Barwick's 
1403 Ayres, above n 50, pp.219-220. 
1404 Ibid, pp.220-221. 
1405 Hull, above n 783, p.29; Winterton, 'The Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 126; Williams, 'Communist 
Party Case', above n 77, p.122; Maher, 'Downunder McCarthyism: The Struggle Against Australian Communism 
1945-1960: Part Two', above n 1379, 443; Winterton, 'The Significance of the Communist Party Case', above n 
1379,649. 
1406 The Commonwealth's team comprised Barwick, three other senior counsel and six barristers. See Ayres, 
above n 50, pp.219-220. According to Marr, counsel filled the bar table and the first 5 rows of the public 
gallery: see Marr, above n 8, p.83. 
1407 Ayres, above n 50, pp.219-220; Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in the Communist 
Party Case', above n 18, 6. See Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Drs v The 
Commonwealth of Australia, above n 296, pp.15-134, 1034-1289, 1457-1463. 
1408 Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellant Argument in the Communist Party Case', above n 18, 8. 
1409 The parties in the respective actions and their respective counsel are listed in Appendix E. See Transcript of 
Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 296, pp.1-3. 
Twenty-two counsel appeared although only 9 counsel addressed the Court: Winterton, 'The Communist Party 
Case', above n 1379, 126. The Australian Communist Party instructed its counsel to challenge Latham CJ's right 
to hear the case based on his anti-communist bias but Ted Laurie declined to do so because he was 'too bloody 
shy': Cook, above n 518, p.195; Winterton, 'The Significance of the Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 649. 
See also Marr, above n 8, p.83; Williams, 'Communist Party Case', above n 77, p.122. 
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preference to be in a position to have 'the last say' and he attempted to secure this.1410 This course 
of action was vigorously objected to by the plaintiffs' counsel.1411 In response to the first question, 
the plaintiffs sought to adduce evidence to rebut the recitals of the Act to which the Commonwealth 
objected. Latham CJ decided that the Commonwealth would make submissions on both questions 
and that if it decided to leave until its reply a significant part of its material upon question 2 (namely, 
the validity of the Act), the Court would not object although it would protect the plaintiffs' interests 
by allowing them a reply if the Commonwealth introduced new material in its reply. 1412 
Therefore, Barwick succeeded in securing the chance to reply but would not be able to 'trail his coat'. 
As a result of Chief Justice Latham's ruling, Barwick, as the single representative for the 
Commonwealth, would address the Court first followed by the plaintiffs. Barwick would have the 
right of reply, 'but if when he replies matter is introduced as to which it would not be fair not to 
allow the plaintiffs to have a reply, the court may be relied upon to protect their interests'.1413 
From the outset, Barwick conceptualised his case by outlining the central questions, then provided 
the Court with a clear and broad outline of the manner in which he proposed to proceed with his 
submissions: 
The course I want to pursue, if the Court pleases, is this: I want to go through the Act to show 
what the Act does and then to place various submissions before the Court as to the validity of 
the Act, the basis of validity as the defendants see it; and that should lead me to a discussion 
of the preamble and its significance and what weight can be given to it; and from there I 
should be able to pass into submissions as to the sort of issue which the plaintiffs seek to 
raise so as to show that it is not a relevant issue on any view. 1414 
Barwick's principal argument was that 'the Act was an expression of the Parliament's power to make 
laws for national defence, the limits of which power had to be left to the Parliament not the court to 
1410 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, p.7. 
1411 Ibid, p.14. 
1412 1bid, p.15. See also Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in the Communist Party Case', 
above n 18, 5-6. 
1413 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, p.15 and 1287. See also Lloyd, above n 879, 199. The hearing proceeded as per Latham CJ's ruling 
except that after the plaintiffs' reply, the Court allowed the Commonwealth a second reply and then allowed 
the plaintiffs a short reply to the Commonwealth's second reply: Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: 
Appellate Argument in the Communist Party Case', above n 18, 6. 
1414 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, pp.15-16. 
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determine'.'415 However, from the outset, 'it became clear that the Commonwealth would have no 
easy ride' .1416 
Barwick commenced by outlining the recitals of the Act. 1417 He outlined the various purposes of the 
Act and sought to justify it by denying that it was a time of peace, given the expansion of communist 
power in Europe and Asia. Dixon's tiiographer, Phillip Ayres, suggested that his presentation was 
'high on dialectics' but low on any local or international evidence of any specific subversive acts. 1418 
Barwick insisted that the material in the recitals was not opinion but fact. Nevertheless, he argued, 
the Act's validity did not depend solely on the truth of the recitals; the recitals were simply 
Parliament's reasons for legislating, and the validity of the Act rested on the defence power1419 
It was Barwick's submission that the High Court was required to accept the conclusions in the 
recitals; namely, that Australia was at war with communism. From this, it was the Commonwealth's 
contention that the Act was valid under the defence power and all provisions of the Act were 
therefore justified.'420 
Barwick submitted that the High Court was not privy to the evidence which was used by Parliament 
for the purposes of justifying the enactment, and that much of the information used would be 
inadmissible in a court of law since the courts, unlike Parliament, are bound by rules of evidence. He 
1415 Maher, 'Downunder McCarthyism: The Struggle Against Australian Communism 1945-1960: Part Two', 
above n 1379, 444. From the outset, Barwick summarised the actions: 
The actions, as appears from the Case Stated on p.2, fall broadly into two classes. The first is an action 
by the Australian Communist Party, which is the first on the record, and joined with that Party there are 
two personal plaintiffs who are members of the Party. In the case of the seven other actions the actions 
are brought by organisations of which one is not a registered industrial organisation but except for that 
difference there is no other distinction between the action it brings and the actions of the other parties. 
The section that the Australian Communist Party attacks is more particularly Section 4 and the industrial 
unions and the unregistered industrial body attack other sections of the Act but in the long run they will 
probably be relying upon some invalidity of Section 4 as well. Then there are individual plaintiffs along 
with the organisation in the seven actions, these being persons who would have had an interest to 
impugn probably both Section 5 and Section 9 ofthe Act, to which I will make reference in a moment. 
See Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, pp.4-5. 
1416 Kirby, 'HV Evatt, The Anti-Communist Referendum and Liberty in Australia', above n 1380, 103. 
1417 Barwick stated: 
The first step in my argument is to take the Court through the Act to see precisely what it is and what it 
characterises as far as we can. The Act is the Communist Party Dissolution Act 1950. 
The preamble contains in all nine separate recitals. The first three are recitals as to constitutional 
power, the first as to paragraph 6 of Section 51, the second as to Section 61 and the third as to 
paragraph 39 of Section 51. With respect to none of these are any questions submitted but it may be 
profitable if I read these recitals at the outset. 
Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
296, p.17. 
1418 Ayres, above n 50, pp.220-221. 
1419 Ibid. 
1420 Marr, above n 8, p.85. 
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faced increasing questioning from the Court because of the implications associated with attempting 
to exclude the High Court from determining the validity of the Act.1421 
In his habitual manner, Barwick meticulously and methodically outlined and summarised the Act.1422 
He did so by dissecting it and then analysing individual sections with great care and precision. He 
adopted this approach to ensure that the Court was familiar with the entire Act and its operation. 
This also afforded Barwick the opportunity of attributing to the various sections of the Act his own 
interpretation and then conveying this to the Court. 
After he completed his outline of the individual sections of the Act, Barwick summarised the Act with 
great skill in little more than four paragraphs. He demonstrated his ability to simplify complex 
matters. Barwick submitted: 
To characterise the Act I would attempt to sum it up in this way, if the Court pleases. Firstly it 
disbands the Communist Party, disperses it. It makes provision for the realization of its 
property and payment of its debts, with incidental provisions for obtaining possession of it 
and for judicially resolving disputes as to it, and it provides for its forfeiture on, no doubt, the 
common law notions that persons who became in breach of the law or became unlawful lost 
the protection of the State as to their property. Secondly it takes steps to prevent 
re-organization, either covertly or overtly, of the Association- that is by means of Section 7, 
by direct command under Section 7, and also by dispersal of its funds. That is also a step 
towards preventing the re-assembly of the Party in some other way. 
It then authorises the disbanding of any bodies other than registered Unions which (a) 
affiliated with the Party or (b) are likely to be controlled or used by members of the Party or 
by Communists or by others for Communist purposes. 
That, I think, sets aside substantial all the qualifications, basically, of Section 5(1). 
It provides for the disbanding of any of those bodies who qualify in that way, whose 
continued existence may be prejudicial, in the view of the Governor General, to security or 
defence or to the maintenance of the Constitution, and that would satisfy, in my submission, 
all of Section 5 and what flows from it, putting on one side merely machinery results. 
Lastly, it authorises the declaration of persons who are or who have been Communists and 
who may be thought likely to engage in activity -I use the word "subversive" as a general 
description of what is in Section 9- subversive activities, and prevents them from holding 
office under or making certain contracts with the Commonwealth, and from holding office in 
industrial organizations which are connected with vital industries. I am not troubled about 
1421 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, p.l32 referred to in Marr, above n 8, p.85. 
1422 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, p.l8. 
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the trimmings of that, as to how they are declared, but in summation those are the three 
things the Act does- it disbands the Communist Party and disperses its members and its 
funds and takes ancillary steps to prevent it reorganizing. 1423 
Barwick had commenced his submissions in his customary way- designed to seize the attention of 
the decision-makers.1424 His abilit','to employ an apt analogy was again highlighted in his attempt to 
demonstrate the Act's preventative character: 
... the Act could only be characterised, in my submission, as a preventative Act. It of course 
proceeds on the broad theory that you do not have to wait until the contents of the Trojan 
Horse have been spilled into your city, it acts on the theory that you can burn the horse 
before the doors open. 1425 
Barwick also used evocative language to emphasise the dangers of invalidating the Act. 
At an early stage, Barwick indicated to the Court that the Commonwealth would rely on the defence 
power in section 51( vi) of the Constitution to support the main part of the Act as well as the 
executive power in section 61 together with the incidental power in section 51(xxxix) or powers 
arising from the Commonwealth's existence as a body politic. 1426 
Barwick argued that the Act was valid under the defence power and that there was a rational and/or 
logical connection between the purpose, namely, the defence of Australia, and the relevant 
provisions of the Act. 1427 He relied on Farey v Burvett (1916)1428 in support of this proposition.1429 
1423 . lb1d, pp.25-26. 
1424 Marr, above n 8, p.83. 
1425 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, p.27. The Act is preventative in relation to conduct likely to prejudice the defence ofthe country, 
the execution and maintenance of the Constitution and of the laws of the Commonwealth- it is directed to the 
prevention of an apprehended danger. See also Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 
at 18 and 103-104. Barwick relied on R v Hush; Ex parte Devanny (1932) 48 CLR 487 at 506 and 509. Barwick 
employed an excellent analogy to demonstrate his submission that the forfeiture of the property of members 
of the Communist Party is a preventative measure. He submitted: 
Yes, but the reason for adding the taking of the property is not merely to punish, but to prevent. If you 
find a man selling liquor without a licence and you find in his cellar hundreds of bottles you will not 
fin( d) (sic- fine) him the amount of the value of the bottles, you are going to take them to ensure that 
he shall not continue the business the next morning. 
Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
296, p.108. 
1426 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 19, 103-104 and 107. Barwick relied on 
Burns v Ransley (1949) 79 CLR 101 at 109, 111, 115-116 and 120 and R v Sharkey (1949) CLR 121 at 135, 145, 
148, 157-158 and 163 to support this proposition. The creation of the Commonwealth with a Constitution and 
power of law-making necessarily implies a power in the Parliament to pass laws to protect the body politic and 
its system of laws against actual and apprehended threats to its existence. See also Transcript of Proceedings, 
The Australian Communist Party and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 296, pp.28-29; Williams, 
'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in the Communist Party Case', above n 18, 8. 
1427 Only a possible logical connection, not factual, connection with defence need be shown: Australian 
Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 24-25. Whilst Barwick used Australian Woollen Mills Ltd 
v Commonwealth (1944) 69 CLR 476 at 490 in support of this proposition, it may not have been as supportive 
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This submission resulted in a flurry of questions from the Court. 1430 Barwick endured a 'barrage of 
interjections'1431 and, according to Marr, was given a 'rough reception'1432 by the Court. According to 
Williams, '[i]nterjections from the Bench left Barwick on the back foot'.'433 Initially, Barwick 
responded well; he did not wilt under the pressure and was stout in the face of attack.'434 However, 
at the same time, Barwick appear.ed to show signs of impatience and frustration. 1435 As will become 
apparent, this was the first of many instances throughout this case where Barwick appeared to 
become uncharacteristically frustrated with questions from members ofthe Court. This was not 
typical of Barwick's advocacy. According to Williams: 
In order to maintain some semblance of flow in his argument Barwick often found himself 
replying "quite" instead of delving into the question. Barwick was unable to muster the 
brilliant advocacy that brought him victory in the Bank Nationalisation cases. He could not 
as he thought. According to Williams, this case contradicted Barwick's position (see Australian Woollen Mills 
Ltd v Commonwealth (1944) 69 CLR 476 at 488 per Latham 0) and Barwick also ignored several other 
conflicting High Court decisions from the 1940s which established that a connection needed to be real and 
substantial so as to attract the defence power, such as, Victoria Commonwealth (1942) 66 CLR 488 at 506-509; 
Dawson v Commonwealth (1946) 73 CLR 157 at 179; Real Estate Institute of New South Wales v Blair (1946) 73 
CLR 213 at 224; Victorian Chamber of Manufacturers v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 413 at 418. See also 
Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in the Communist Party Case', above n 18, 8. 
1428 21 CLR 433. See Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Drs v The Commonwealth 
of Australia, above n 296, p.1045. See also Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in the 
Communist Party Case', above n 18, 8. 
1429 Barwick submitted that the Act is essentially a defence Act with or without the recitals. However, even 
without the recitals, based upon what the Court should take judicial knowledge, a sufficiently rational 
connection exists between the situation and the law to bring it within power: Australian Communist Party v 
Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 20-22. 
1430 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, pp.29-30. 
1431 Marr, above n 8, p.84. 
1432 Ibid. 
1433 Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in the Communist Party Case', above n 18, 9. 
1434 For example, the exchange between Chief Justice Latham and Barwick demonstrated Barwick's ability to 
think quickly under pressure and respond to judicial questioning: 
Latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
Latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
Who determines whether it is desirable or necessary, whichever may be the proper 
question to ask, to have a fortification? 
Essentially the Executive or the Parliament. That is the necessity in that sense, the 
need for the fort, the kind of fort, how many of them, and all those things are 
exclusively for another branch of the Government. 
How far does that principle go? For the Executive or if the Parliament determines 
that certain acts of defence are necessary, then in what circumstances may a Court 
say, "We do not think so?". 
This point is not an easy one- but at a point where the Court can say from its judicial 
knowledge and nothing more; where it can say, "We can see no rational and no 
logical connection between defence and this provision" 
See Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, pp.29-30. 
1435 For example, in the previous exchange, Barwick interrupted Justice McTiernan. See above from Transcript 
of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 296, 
pp.29-30. 
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make the transition from his accustomed role of attacking legislation to the unfamiliar role of 
defence. 1436 
It appears that Barwick responded this way to allow himself to return to the order of his planned 
submissions; this departed from his typical approach which involved engaging in judicial dialogue. 
At this point, Barwick introduced.one of his fundamental submissions, namely, that the Court 
was unable to interfere with Parliament's power to ban the Communist Party if the law is 
rationally connected with defence.1437 
According to Marr, the fundamental issue was the connection between the legislation and the 
defence power. Barwick needed to draw on all his powers of advocacy to establish this connection: 
Barwick was at the nub of the case: it was a matter of connection. Was it enough that the 
declaration of communists was somehow logically connected to the defence of the nation, or 
was a more substantial and practical connection needed to bring 'declarations' within the 
defence power? What connection did there have to be between strikes on the Cessnock 
coalfields and the war in Korea to make the 'declaration' of a few miners valid? Barwick 
argued a bare logical connection was enough and the rest was to be left up to the 
government. Once the logical connection was there, the court could not interfere. He moved 
on to try to persuade the court that Australia was at war. It called for all his powers of 
advocacy. If he won the point everything else would follow for in all the difficult and 
contradictory cases decided by the High Court during the Second World War (cases many of 
which he had fought), one principle was clear: when the chips are down the High Court is not 
going to stand in the way of the war effort. 1438 
Although his argument rested on the contention that Australia was at war, Barwick cited various 
authorities in support of his submission that the defence power would support many activities in 
1436 Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in the Communist Party Case', above n 18, 9. 
There are numerous examples of Barwick reply 'quite': see for example Transcript of Proceedings, The 
Australian Communist Party and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 296, pp. 13, 27, 29, 39, 44, 67, 
125, 1034, 1045, 1061. 
1437 The relevant exchange that occurred proceeded as follows: 
Barwick: 
latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
... the Court has a function, the Court can say, "granted that you hold that reason, 
yet your law is not rationally connected with defence". It cannot say to Parliament 
"you did not hold that reason". It could say, "you stated your ground, your reason 
for the declaration; we, the Court, have the function of saying whether the law you 
made is a defence law, and the ground for that is to see whether there is any rational 
connection between the reason you had held and the thing you have done. 
Are you submitting that the Court could not challenge the bona fides of Parliament 
by saying that Parliament did not hold ---
---the reason. Yes Your Honor. 
Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
296, p.33. 
1438 Marr, above n 8, p.84. 
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times of peace.1439 He again adopted the technique of referring the Court to what particular judges 
had previously said including that the defence power permitted enactment of legislation in times of 
peace to prevent future threats from arising. 1440 
Barwick requested that the Court take judicial notice of a number of matters relating to the current 
threat of communism. 1441 He submitted that wars do not begin with a formal declaration and that a 
period of 'uneasy apprehension is all that is needed'.1442 Barwick attempted to persuade the Court 
that Australia was at war so as to justify the invocation of the defence power and the introduction of 
the Act. 1443 
He then returned to his main submission that the Act was supported by the defence power.1444 
Barwick cited various authorities to demonstrate that a law which enables the Governor-General to 
make a declaration after being satisfied that the continued existence of a body of persons, such as 
the Communist Party, is prejudicial to the defence and security of the Commonwealth was a law with 
respect to defence. He referred to the case of Lloyd v Wallach (1915)144s and Welsbach Light 
Company of Australasia Ltd v The Commonwealth (1916).1446 However, he misrepresented one of 
the authorities and this was detected by Justice Dixon. Citing an authority incorrectly can damage an 
1439 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, pp.36-37. 
1440 Ibid. For example, Chief Justice Latham in Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth 
(1943) 67 CLR 116 and Burns v Ransley (1949) 79 CLR 101 and Justice Dixon inHume v Higgins (1949) 78 CLR 
116. 
1441 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, pp.38-40. There are 20 principal factors in the public situation as at the date of passing the Act of 
which the Court should take judicial knowledge- such as that it was a period of uneasy apprehension of 
international conflict, communism is a world movement, communists 1march together' and communists 
sympathise with the aims and ambitions of Soviet Russia: Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 
83 CLR 1 at 21-22. See also Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in the Communist Party 
Case', above n 18, 10. 
1442 Marr, above n 8, p.84. 
1443 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, p.39; see also Marr, above n 8, p.85. 
1444 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, p.45. Barwick submitted: 
... I submit that in a situation such as that the defence power is certainly wide enough to authorize the 
disbanding of those associations which may rationally be thought to be a danger to the safety and 
defence of the country or to the maintenance of the Constitution; and that form of statement by me is 
the correct way in which it should be approached- might Parliament rationally think that the then state 
of the country called for the disbanding of the Communist Party, the prevention of communist 
influencing industrial policy of unions closely associated with the vital industries of the country. That is 
the third way in which I wanted to put it. 
Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, p.44. 
144s 20 CLR 299. 
1446 22 CLR 268. 
293 
appellant advocate's credibility, and Barwick moved quickly to correct himself while retaining the 
reference: 
Barwick: 
Dixon J: 
Barwick: 
In Wellsbach light Co. of Australasia v The Commonwealth (22 CLR) -it 
begins at page 268- there are passages at page 273 where the 
proclamatioo in that case is set out in the judgment of the Chief Justice. It 
was a proclamation whereby the Governor General declared certain bodies 
"Under the influence or control or carried on for the benefit of persons in 
enemy countries". 
In that case the proposition was stated in the alternative- the Judge said he 
could not find different facts. 
Yes ... I could not claim that the Wellsbach case is directly in the line of the 
authorities, but it is so close as to warrant the citation. 1447 
Barwick also attempted to introduce humour into his submissions when referring to the Jehovah's 
Witnesses Case!448 In this case, the High Court had held that the National Security (Subversive 
Associations) Regulations (Cth) were invalid on the grounds that they could not be justified as an 
exercise of the defence power:1449 
[The] cases you find with respect to Jehovah Witnesses are completely incommensurate and 
fantastic so far as the consequences are concerned and that serves to show that the thing is 
not conceived as a law of defence at all ... 
I was not thinking for a moment that Your Honor thought Jehovah Witnesses were 
fantastic. 1450 
A short time later, Barwick interrupted Justice Dixon, and showed the early signs of impatience, that 
would plague his submissions throughout the case. Impatience often manifests in a lack of courtesy, 
and this exchange suggests that he began to experience frustration and failed to keep it under 
control: 
1447 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, p.47. 
1448 Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116 (Latham CJ and 
McTiernan J dissenting). 
1449 1bid. Douglas, 'A Smallish Blow for liberty? The Significance of the Community Party Case', above n 1383, 
278. The National Security (Subversive Associations) Regulations 1940 (Cth) held invalid by the High Court in 
this case were introduced by the Menzies United Australia Party-Country Party government in an attempt to 
dissolve the Australian Communist Party. See Winterton, 'The Significance of the Communist Party Case', 
above n 1379, 631-632; Geoffrey Sawer, 'The Defence Power of the Commonwealth in Time of War' (1946) 20 
Australian Law Journal295, 297; Lloyd, above n 879, 194. 
1450 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, p.56. 
Dixon J: 
Barwick: 
Dixon J: 
Barwick: 
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[referring to Barwick's submission that Walsh v Johnson involved an 
immigration law and it didn't matter in this case that the operation of the 
law depended on the Minister's opinion] That did not make it any less 
immigration; that is why. 
It was beca~se you had a law on the subject, simply because aliens were the 
people who could be selected. 
If you said in the opinion of the Governor-General the alien was not born in 
Australia ... 
I will come to say something on that in a moment ... 1451 
The Court was clearly troubled by the powers of declaration granted to the Governor-General. The 
Act did not allow for a Court to make a declaration based on an objective test but instead left this to 
the satisfaction ofthe Governor-General. The 'sections represented a denial of the High Court's role 
as the sole arbiter of the limits of Commonwealth constitutional power and thus challenged the 
Court's position in Australia's federal structure'. 1452 According to Williams it appeared that 'Barwick 
either did not realise or did not initially wish to recognise that the Act breached the constitutional 
maxim that a "stream cannot rise above its source'".1453 Barwick relied on Ex parte Walsh and 
Johnson; In re Yates (1925]1454 to support his submission that 'once an Act is found to be a defence 
Act it is valid despite its operation being dependent upon the opinion of the executive' .1455 However, 
Barwick's ability to encapsulate his submission in simple terms remained, and is evident from the 
following submission: 
The criterion is, is the Governor-General satisfied that the existence of a body is prejudicial to 
defence. It is a body that is, by its very existence, prejudicial to defence. That surely is, to 
1451 Ibid, p.63. 
1452 Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in the Communist Party Case', above n 18, 12. 
1453 Ibid. 
1454 37 CLR 36. Ex parte Walsh and Johnson; In re Yates (1925) 37 CLR 36 affirmed: 
1. the legislative power to delegate to the Executive the selection or identification of the bodies or 
persons upon or with respect to whom a law upon some granted subject matter is to operate; and 
2. that if the only connection of the legislation with the granted power is the unexaminable opinion of 
the Executive as to ambit of the power the Act is invalid. However, the Parliament can validly place in 
the hands of the Governor-General the determination of the facts upon which depends the 
identification or selection of the bodies or persons to be affected by the law. 
See Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 98-99 and 105-106. Barwick relied on 
Lloyd v Wallach (1915) 20 CLR 299; Welsbach Light Company of Australasia Ltd v Commonwealth (1916) 22 CLR 
268 and Ex parte Walsh (1942) 48 ALR 359. See also Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument 
in the Communist Party Case', above n 18, 12. Barwick submitted that the declaration of the Governor-General 
does not involve an exercise of judicial power- the Governor-General is exercising delegated legislative power 
not judicial power: Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 111 and 113. Barwick 
relied upon Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v J. W. Alexander Ltd (1918) 25 CLR 434. 
1455 Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in the Communist Party Case', above n 18, 12. 
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that point, a matter of defence. We will assume that the opinion is rightly and rationally 
given. You start with this, that the existence of the body is prejudicial to the welfare of the 
country, and what the Parliament does about that is, in my submission, entirely its own affair. 
If it says, in its wisdom or unwisdom "We will put that body out of existence ... " 1456 
Barwick's submission was essentiaJiy that the Court could not review the Governor-General's 
opinion. This was not met favourably by the Court and Justice Webb in particular, who did not 
appear to favour Barwick's approach of ousting the Court's involvement. 14s7 
As he made submissions in relation to various sections of the Act, a question from Justice Dixon 
forced him to concede that he had not considered a particular issue. Whilst Barwick demonstrated 
honesty in making this concession it was quite uncharacteristic and may indicate a lack of 
preparation: 
Barwick: 
Dixon J: 
Barwick: 
Dixon J: 
Barwick: 
... my submission is- and I did not want to develop it very much- that 
[recital]4 is sufficiently bound up with 5 and 9 and that there was enough in 
the text to show that 4 was itself a law of defence- that the dissolution of 
this Party was for a reason of defence. 
Having a recital, I do not need to press that argument very far because I 
want to pass to the effect of the recital in relation to that. 
Just before you leave 5, you notice that in that Section there is no[t] any 
express declaration that it shall be an unlawful association; that is left to the 
definition clause. 
Yes. 
And the definition clause says that it has to be declared an unlawful 
association. Do you take the operation of 5 and 4 to mean these bodies are 
unlawful associations for the purposes of Part IIA of the Crimes Act? 
I could not answer that offhand, Your Honor. I had not considered that but I 
shall. I should have thought offhand that the unlawful associations, 
unlawful for this purpose and not for general purposes---
1456 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, p.74. 
1457 1bid, pp.74-75. At one point, Justice Dixon acknowledged the difficulty of Barwick's task as well as one of 
the inherent difficulties of appellate advocacy: 
1 am only saying that it is one of the reasons- of course you have certain Judges to deal with and no 
doubt each has a different mind on these matters. It was one of the reasons why I was drawing your 
attention to the fact that there are three different subjects dealt with in the maintenance of the 
Constitution and the enforcement of the law generally. 
Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
296, p.68. 
Dixon J: 
Barwick: 
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Only for this Act, and it does not generally become an unlawful association 
for Common Law Constitutions. 
That is something I had not considered.1458 
Barwick then moved to his next submission that, even without the recitals, the Court should take 
judicial notice that a sufficient rational connection exists between the facts and the legislation to 
bring it within the defence power.1459 
In response to a comment about recital 9, Barwick employed powerful and emotive language to 
demonstrate the need for the legislation and the imminent danger. 
Well, Your Honor may say that No.9 is a recital of an emergency, but if you have in your midst 
a body devoted to accelerating revolution, and having a design to overthrow and dislocate 
the established system of Government, that is hardly characterised by any other language 
than by saying that you have an emergency, you have a public situation which has to be dealt 
with. 1460 
Barwick's regular use of powerful and emotive language appeared as an attempt to almost 'scare' 
the Court into upholding the legislation. Although when used sparingly, such language can have 
great persuasive effect, when used repeatedly, as Barwick seemed to do here, its effect is inevitably 
diminished. The technique appeared to be overused in this case and may reflect a more 
fundamental deficiency with Barwick's submissions, namely, a lack of substantive arguments. 
Immediately following the exchange, Barwick was asked a question by Justice Dixon that he was 
unable to answer. It was unusual for Barwick not to be able to respond immediately. Again, this may 
suggest that Barwick had not prepared in his usual thorough manner. He responded honestly and 
indicated that he would review this and get back to Justice Dixon the following day: 
Dixon J: 
1458 1bid, pp.81-81A. 
I do not understand the issue in that case [referring toRe Validity of the 
Wartime Leasehold Regulations (1950) 1461]. Was it competition between 
some power in Section 92 and the general overriding power in Section 91, or 
what? 
1459 Barwick summarised his submissions in this regard as follows: 
In my submission, if the Court takes the step with me that the matters to which I have referred are 
within judicial knowledge, then, recitals apart, the necessary nexus between this law and the defence of 
the country is readily seen. 
Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
296, p.97. 
1460 Ibid, p.118. 
1461 2 DLR 1. 
Barwick: 
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I cannot answer Your Honor offhand, because I do not know the detail of 
that. I am told that is right, but I do not know it of my own knowledge. I will 
look at it and answer Your Honor tomorrow as to that, if I may .1462 
For whatever reason however, Barwick failed to address this question the following day and it 
remained unanswered. 
Barwick was followed by Laurie, leading for the Communist Party and then the other counsel for the 
plaintiffs, including Evatt for the Waterside Workers' Federation and the Federated Ironworkers' 
Association.1463 Whilst Barwick had argued on behalf of the Commonwealth that the law was validly 
passed under the defence and nationhood powers, in response, Evatt and others powerfully 
submitted that the Act was invalid due to its derogation of civil liberties and the democratic 
process. 1464 Evatt 'attacked the preamble as a mere series of assertions by which the legislature was 
endeavouring to 'lift itself by its bootstraps', and dwelling on the unchallengeable aspect of the 
power given to the Governor-General to sustain the Act'.1465 In his diary, Dixon noted of Evatt: 'I had 
never heard him to more advantage and he made a considerable impression'. Five days later, 
however, Dixon wrote: 'Evatt continued. A dreary repetitious argument'.'466 
Barwick's Reply 
On resuming his submissions, Barwick employed the use of a powerful opening to criticise the 
plaintiffs' submissions. He also used humour to suggest that the weight of numbers of plaintiff 
counsel had produced submissions that lacked coherence: 
If the Court pleases, my friends have proffered a great number of arguments and between 
the arguments- probably rather due to the numerical strength of my friends than anything 
else- there is very little coherence so far as my task of replying to them is concerned. 
If one were minded to debate the matter with my friends no doubt I could play off one 
argument of one counsel against arguments of other counsel and cancel a lot of them out 
1462 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, p.119. 
1463 On 17 November 1950, Chief Justice Latham repeatedly attacked Laurie. This resulted in Dixon 
commenting in his diary that the Chief Justice 'displayed an unrestrained hostility that I thought very unwise 
not to say unjudicial': Dixon Diary, 17 November 1950, Owen Dixon, Personal Papers; See Ayres, above n 50, 
p.221. 
1464 Williams, 'Communist Party Case', above n 77, p.122. 
1465 Owen Dixon, Diary, 17 November 1950, Owen Dixon, Personal Papers. See Ayres, above n 50, p.221. 
1466 Owen Dixon, Diary, 22 November 1950, Owen Dixon, Personal Papers. See Ayres, above n 50, pp.220-221; 
Wil.liams, 'Communist Party Case', above n 77, p.122. 
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because one cannot help but be impressed by the circumstance that they do not all run in the 
same direction. 
So far as the actual questions are concerned, they all seem- in the main- to have directed 
themselves principally to the question of the validity of the statute. 1467 
Barwick outlined, summarised and conceptualised his approach in his reply, albeit with what appears 
a touch of arrogance: 
I propose to address myself in reply to those arguments which appear to us to be the 
principal arguments placed against us. There are a great number of arguments which in our 
submission answer themselves and as to those, unless the Court has any difficulty with 
respect to them, we do not propose to devote very much, if any, time to them. 1468 
Barwick conceptualised and summarised his submissions into five key propositions (in a similar way 
to what he did in the Bank Nationalisation Case).1469 An interesting exchange between Justice 
McTiernan and Barwick followed in which it appears Barwick lost his composure and used sarcasm. 
1467 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, p.l034. Barwick, through the cunning use of language, made a subtle and sarcastic reference to 
the length of the plaintiffs' submissions: 
May I begin by reminding the Court of the proposition to which the defendant took at the inception. It 
is a long time since and whilst I do not propose in any sense to repeat an argument in chief, nor to 
expand it, it is as well that I should remind the Court of the propositions which I presented to the 
plaintiffs for their treatment, if they felt inclined to treat them. 
Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
296, p.1035. 
1468 Ibid, p.1034. 
1469 The five propositions were as follows: 
The propositions which the defendant put at the outset I think can be broken up into five propositions 
so far as they touch the defence power, two so far as Section Sl(xxxix) is concerned. 
They are these: they first of all submit that the Act in its entirety was upon its face an act within the 
Defence power, without the aid of recitals and without the circumstances at the time of its passage; that 
is to say this Act would be a good act whenever passed. 
The second submission, which was no more than a slight modification of that proposition, was this: that 
the whole Act, excluding Section 4, was an Act plainly, obviously, within the Defence power, and that 
Section 4 with the aid of the recital of the reason for its enactment was an act within the Defence 
power. 
A third submission which perhaps is a further variant of the second- and only a variant of it- is that the 
entire Act with the recitals- those recitals affording the Parliamentary reason for the enactment and no 
more- was a defence act, an act within the ambit of Section Sl(vi). 
The fourth submission, which was different and a departure from the earlier three, was that the Act in 
the then current circumstances as judicially known was a Defence Act, or within the power of Section 
Sl(vi). 
The fifth submission we put was that the Act was valid under Section 51( vi) because there was a 
Parliamentary assertion that it was enacted for defence, and there was at the very lowest no judicial 
knowledge which contradicted that assertion or made it appear untenable. 
We then put two submissions so far as the Act depended upon Section Sl(xxxix); one was that the Act 
was a valid exercise of power under Section Sl(xxxix) because it provided aid to the execution of the 
powers vested in the Executive by Section 61. 
See Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Drs v The Commonwealth af Australia, 
above n 296, p.l035. 
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Latham CJ intervened in an apparent attempt to assist Barwick. 1470 This was a recurring feature of 
Barwick's advocacy in this case. The exchange arose after Justice McTiernan had outlined his 
position to Barwick very clearly: 
McTiernan J: 
Barwick: 
McTiernan J: 
Barwick: 
McTiernan J: 
latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
McTiernan J: 
Barwick: 
1470 Ibid, pp.1049-1050. 
You are asking the Court to take judicial notice of this "public situation" 
when there i~ no war existing. How is to be described in order that the 
Court might be able to say whether a particular measure could reasonably 
be considered as appropriate to meet that application? Is not it necessary 
that the Court should have some appreciation of the nature of the 
application? That is, not simply mentioning the words. That is a vague 
expression. In order to carry out your criterion, the Court must be able to 
compare one thing with the other. 
I will say frankly that the words "public situation" do not convey very much to me at 
the moment. 
If the Executive learn tomorrow that there was an (sic) hostile fleet off the 
coast of Australia, it would mean something to you? 
Yes, it would. 
It would not be war? 
That would be a concrete thing. 
Would the Government have to come to this Court and say, "Here is some 
legislation we have passed: we inform you that there is a hostile fleet within 
200 miles of this country; we do not know what it is going to do, and that is 
why we say this legislation is good?" 
No. If the other view is right, let us hope that nobody like Guy Fawkes gets 
busy here, because we would have to wait until after the gunpowder has 
gone off before we could do anything about it. 
A hostile fleet means something: but what does this statement "public 
situation" mean? 
It may be no more than apprehension of the Executive in some instances. If the 
Executive really thought tomorrow that there was a hostile fleet coming, and they 
were mistaken, can it be said that they have no increase in their defence power 
because there is this apprehension? 
McTiernan J: 
Barwick: 
Latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
Latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
Latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
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I should not think that would be denied for one moment, as far as I am concerned. 
Alii am seeking is some better information as to what is meant by the expressions 
11public situation" or "public apprehension", or is it war, or what? 
May we go back to 1938- Munich. 
Does not yollr argument involve this, and is not this an answer: that in some domains 
of constitutional power the opinion of the Executive, which is responsible, is itself a 
matter of agreement? 
Yes. 
And do you not have to go as far as this: that it may be in some matters the opinion 
of the Government may be the foundation for legislation under a power relating to 
defence? 
I do. 
Whatever the facts may be? 
Whatever the true facts may be. I do go that far. 1471 
Barwick then took the Court to the relevant passages of Ex parte Walsh and Johnson; In re Yates 
(1925)1472 and referred to the relevant passages in great detail.1473 It was authority for the 
proposition that 'if the constitutionality of a measure depended on the existence of a fact, legislation 
would be unconstitutional if it purported to justify the taking of that measure on the basis of the 
Executive's assessment that the fact existed'.'474 Barwick applied the principle of citing authority 
with care by only referring the Court to the most relevant passages and he explained the relevance of 
these passages as well as the manner in which these passages supported his submissions. 
At one point, Barwick failed to pick up a definite signal from Justice Dixon in relation to the 
difficulties he was experiencing in understanding a particular submission. Instead of addressing this 
concern, Barwick ignored it and proceeded to finish his submissions.1475 
1471 1bid, pp.1047-1048. 
1472 37 CLR 36. 
1473 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, p.1062. 
1474 Douglas, 'A Smallish Blow for Liberty? The Significance of the Community Party Case', above n 1383, 277. 
See also Kirby, 'HV Evatt, The Anti-Communist Referendum and Liberty in Australia', above n 1380, 103. 
1475 The exchange proceeded as follows: 
Barwick: The relation of that to this problem is this: it was put to me that it would be unusual 
to regard the Act which gave those powers as valid and unusual to regard the 
satisfaction of the validity of the declaration as examinable. The way I am putting it 
is that the right construction- what this Act does is to give power to make a valid 
declaration, valid qua defence. 
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It is apparent that Barwick was becoming increasingly frustrated with the constant interruptions to 
his submissions and was losing patience with the incessant questioning.1476 
Barwick also refused to address certain issues raised by Chief Justice Latham, apparently from a 
desire to continue with his submissions rather than get distracted by, what were, in his eyes, 
peripheral matters. This was uncharacteristic of Barwick and does not accord with the ideals of 
appellate advocacy: 
Latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
Latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
Whenever an intelligent human being makes up his mind that a proposition 
is true he has to have some idea as to the meaning of the words in the 
proposition? 
He has to construe them for himself but he cannot misdirect - -
Is there any proposition which can be uttered which does not involve a 
proposition of law? 
I do not really want to enter into that. I think I could find a few but that is 
not what I am on. 1477 
In the exchange with Justice McTiernan which followed, Barwick made a sarcastic comment; sarcasm 
began to creep into many of his submissions: 
McTiernan J: 
Barwick: 
You read the section adding the words you think necessary? 
I would not add a word, I think they are there. It is others who add words, 
not me.1478 
Justice Kitto then offered a suggestion in relation to the manner in which Barwick could express his 
argument. Instead of being flexible and altering his arguments based on the clear message from a 
judge, Barwick dismissed the suggestion as too complicated: 
Kitto J: 
Dixon J: 
I suppose you could express your argument by saying that sub-section 2 
should be construed in the same way as the Legislature has it in Section 9 
[referring to section 5(2)), with a new sub-section l(a) to the effect that the 
section applies to activities and to conduct constituting of activities 
... Mr Justice lssacs. I do not feel that I have got a full grasp of what you are saying 
now, but I do not want you to address yourself to it now if you prefer to go on with 
Mr Justice lssacs. 
Barwick: I was contrasting what he said with what Chief Justice Knox said, and I would like to 
finish it. I would prefer to go on now and just contrast the two. 
Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
296, p.1071. 
1476 1bid, pp.1073-1074. 
1477 Ibid, p.1078. 
1478 Ibid, p.1084. 
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prejudicial to security, and the Governor-General is satisfied that the person 
is likely to engage in activities to which the section applies. 
Yes. I have thought of switching my argument to 9(1) but I think it would 
complicate it. 
If the person Is engaged in activities to which this section applies and there 
was a definition prescribed in a different sub-section, that would express 
what I am trying to say. 1479 
On one view, Barwick was exhibiting courage by standing by his argument. However, it can also be 
considered inflexibility and a failure to listen to the Bench. 
Barwick then launched an attack against the plaintiffs in relation to the manner in which they applied 
the propositions that he had just outlined. He adopted this tactic to highlight for the Court the 
differences in their respective approaches and to discredit the plaintiffs' submissions.1480 
In response, Justice Dixon expressed his concerns about Barwick's submissions; however, Barwick did 
not address these concerns or attempt to do anything to alleviate them. He further exacerbated his 
error, by appearing to be discourteous towards Justice Dixon. This is apparent from the following 
exchange: 
Dixon J 
Barwick: 
Dixon J: 
1479 Ibid, p.1085. 
1480 Ibid, pp.1099-1100. 
I am confused as to how you get your construction out of Section 9(2). You 
seem ready to concede this proposition which appears to go a long distance 
against yourself, but I have not a clear idea of how you get out of its 
application. 
I would prefer to say I was never in its application. First of all, I just verbally 
show what is the substitution you have to make in language to get yourself 
within Walsh and Johnson. You have to say that Section 9(2) means "Is 
engaged in activities prejudicial"- you must substitute the words 11Security 
and defence"- "to matters with respect to which the Parliament has power 
to make laws under the power to make laws with respect to naval and 
military defence". You must substitute them to make any sense out of 
Walsh and Johnson because that is the whole point. 
I do not mind Walsh and Johnson; that has introduced a great deal of 
confusion in many cases and not the least in this. I am anxious to find out 
what is really intended by Sub-section 2 of Section 9. 
Barwick: 
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May I proceed, your Honor? My next step is that the Act will not bear any 
construction such as I suggest the plaintiffs have to put upon it. 1481 
One of the most significant problems for Barwick in the Communist Party Case was that he 
inadequately addressed the concerns expressed by Justice Dixon. This was exacerbated by 
responding in what appears to be a discourteous manner. In light of the influence that Justice Dixon 
held over the High Court during his tenure1482 - particularly in the immediate years preceding his 
elevation to the Chief Justiceship- this was a fundamental error and represented a failure to 
recognise and appreciate the relevance of the personalities of the Court. 
In response to a comment from Justice McTiernan, Barwick's response suggests that arrogance was 
also creeping into his submissions: 
McTiernan J: 
Barwick: 
It is suggested that this question of security and defence refers to a subject 
matter within the subject matter of the power- that it is not the subject 
matter of power itself but it is something within the area of the subject 
matter. 
That would not hurt me. 1483 
On a number of occasions during his submissions, Barwick was forced to concede that he may not 
have made himself clear. Such concessions were not made or observed in the Bank Nationalisatian 
Case. Here, however, it appears that the members of the Court were continually trying to grapple 
with Barwick's submissions and were experiencing considerable difficulty in understanding them. 
This resulted in constant judicial intervention. This may suggest that Barwick's submissions were 
based on fragile foundations. 1484 
At one point, Chief Justice Latham conveyed the difficulty that he was experiencing in understanding 
a comment made by Barwick. Barwick attempted to explain this again and, this time, demonstrated 
considerable patience in doing so. Chief Justice Latham referred to it as a 'final effort' suggesting 
that Barwick had numerous opportunities to clarify the comment and this was effectively his last 
opportunity.'"'' 
It is clear that the members of the High Court were finding it difficult to agree with Barwick's 
submission that the Governor-General's decision was not examinable by the Court. In his reply, 
Barwick acknowledged the difficulties associated with maintaining his submission based on Ex parte 
1481 Ibid, p.llOO. 
1482 Ayres, above n 50, pp.221-222. 
1483 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, p.llOl. 
1484 1bid, pp.1109-1110. 
1485 Ibid, pp.llll-1112. 
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Walsh and Johnson; In re Yates (1925)1486 and ousting the High Court from determining the extent of 
the federal Parliament's power. In Williams' words, the 'adroitly reshaped his argument to use the 
case as support for the notion that the Dissolution Act could come within constitutional power where 
the opinion of the Governor-General was reviewable'.1487 He stated that: 
Walsh and Johnson does not fot one moment suggest that you cannot allow the facts to be 
determined by the Governor-General, if the facts with which he is to deal- and they are 
objective facts - really exist and relate to a matter within power. 1488 
In an effort to salvage his argument, Barwick submitted that the satisfaction of the Governor-General 
in ss 5(2) and 9(2) could be reviewed where it was irrational, arrived at as a result of self-misdirection 
or the result of a misconception as to the law.1489 The following exchange summarised Barwick's 
predicament: 
Barwick: 
WilliamsJ: 
Barwick: 
According to Williams: 
They [the plaintiffs] first say it is committing to the Governor-General an 
unexaminable determination of the ambit of power, and the argument falls 
to pieces. 
Supposing that is right. 
Then my argument falls to pieces.1490 
Barwick erred in that he had either underestimated the concerns of the Bench or had failed to 
realise that the Communist Party Case was not merely about establishing a link between the 
Act and the defence power. The validity of the Dissolution Act depended upon his ability to 
convince the Bench that the Act would not compromise the Court's role and, to a lesser 
extent, would not unduly compromise the civil liberties of the Australian people. 1491 
Barwick's responses to questions on this point indeed suggest that he may not have anticipated such 
a response, and this may account for his evident frustration at the raft of questions on this issue. 
1486 37 CLR 36. 
1487 Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellant Argument in the Communist Party Case', above n 18, 12. 
1488 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, p.1186. See also Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in the Communist 
Party Case', above n 18, 12. 
1489 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, pp.74-76, 1036 and 1078. See also Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in 
the Communist Party Case', above n 18, 13. 
1490 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party ond Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, p.1102. See also Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in the Communist 
Party Case', above n 18, 13. 
1491 Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in the Communist Party Case', above n 18, 13. 
305 
Barwick's account of the possible meanings that could apply to sections 5(2) and 9(2), resulted in 
another fiery exchange with Justice Dixon.1492 A question from Chief Justice Latham on this issue 
drew a response that can be construed as either showing courage or arrogance: 
Latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
Latham CJ: 
Barwick: 
When it says "Provided the Governor-General is satisfied he may make a 
declaration" bat that certain material should be considered by the 
committee, are you submitting it was the intention of Parliament that that 
material should be placed before the Court for the purpose of determining 
that it establishes- if leave is granted- that certain persons were engaged 
in fact in activities prejudicial? 
I do not need to put it in that way. Alii need say is that Parliament did not 
intend to give the Governor-General power to make an unlawful 
declaration, it stipulated conditions precedent to the making of the 
declaration. 
The other view, and the view which you are not prepared to submit, is that 
Parliament left the whole matter to the Governor-General? 
It depends upon what Your Honor means. We are getting at cross purposes 
when you say 11the whole matter".1493 
During an exchange with Barwick, Justice Dixon outlined the 'stream cannot be higher than the 
source' approach, 1494 and then attempted to demonstrate to Barwick that certain arguments would 
not assist his case. Barwick failed to heed this advice.'495 
1492 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, p.1123. 
1493 Ibid, p.1124. 
1494 The exchange proceeded as follows: 
Dixon J: The logic of it is that the law could not raise above the Defence Power. 
Barwick: True, but if one steps aside from the constitutional nature of the statutes which are 
being considered and takes the steps from the Constitution Act itself down through 
the National Security Regulations, in each point it can be regarded as a question of 
statutory power and the Governor~General has not been delegated any greater 
power than the Parliament had under the constitutional statute. When you say "If it 
were shown that he reasonably was of opinion that the regulation was necessary or 
expedient for defence purposes" you are really saying, "It is shown that he has not 
the satisfaction which he was required to have under the delegation because what 
was submitted to him on the proper construction was a power to be satisfied that 
the regulations were, within the constitutional power necessary for defence. 
See Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, pp.l129-1129A. 
1495 The exchange commenced with Barwick conceptualising his approach into a fundamental question: 
Barwick: This is what I say it is: "Has the Parliament conferred on the Governor-General a 
power to make an unlawful declaration, or has it confined him to making a lawful 
declaration? The answer is 'yes' to the latter, it must be examinable." ... I am not 
touching any constitutional ground at the moment. 
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Barwick seemed to be constantly at loggerheads with arguably the most influential member of the 
High Court at the time. This is evidenced by the following exchange: 
Dixon J: 
Barwick: 
Dixon J: 
Barwick: 
... Have you any case where you can go behind and Order in Counsel and 
examine the grounds on which it was made; that is, in any dominion or in 
England? 
I suppose regulations are made by Order in Council. Ordinary regulations 
under the National Security Regulations are plain examples. 
They were attacked not because they were outside constitutional power, 
but because the process of reasoning used in arriving at them was wrong? 
No, because you have not an example in the power to give to the Executive 
Council to do something within a limited condition of this kind; that is why 
you cannot point to it. 
I shall go to the case of the Welsbach Light Co. v The Commonwealth, and 
you will see that it was really conceded by the Justices that the proclamation 
could be dealt with; that the Governor-General's proclamation could be 
dealt with for the reason that it was dealing with a matter which the Court 
might think was beyond trading with the enemy. 1496 
At one point, Barwick conceded that he had failed to successfully convey his submission on this issue 
but would make one last attempt at doing so: 
... but I regret that I am completely unable to make this point. It does leave to the Governor-
General the question of determining whether in the particular circumstances that which he 
has seen is conduct prejudicial within the true meaning of those words in the statute, but it 
does not leave to the Governor General the determination of what is the true meaning of the 
Dixon J: 
Barwick: 
I do not think that will help you. It is not giving a power to make a declaration. 
Which declaration, does not answer the question. Is that what you mean? You 
mean "behind it altogether"? 
In point of words, a declaration is unlawful if the condition is not fulfilled. When I 
say "unlawful declaration" I mean "had given him power to disregard the condition 
and make the declaration, and nobody can investigate it". 
In that sense it is an unlawful declaration because he has disregarded the condition. 
My argument is that there is a condition there, which he is not authorised to 
disregard. It must follow that, if in any appropriate proceeding the validity of his 
declaration is called in question, the existence of the condition must come into it-
that is, the satisfaction of it. 
No more than that do I say: I do say that this principle that you have dealt with in the 
case of King and Connell is well known, and there is no limitation in its application to 
statutory powers, no matter to whom they are confided. 
Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
296, pp.ll35-ll36. 
1496 1bid, p.ll37. 
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words in the statute. I have endeavored (sic) to put that, which is no novelty, which is not 
something new and which is not something the Court has never seen before. 1497 
The apparent failure by the members of the Court to understand his submissions may be attributable 
to his submissions being too convoluted or too tenuous or his method of presentation being 
ineffective. It may also have been a combination of all these factors. 
Ultimately, 'the High Court's finding that the satisfaction of the Governor-General was not 
reviewable was crucial to it holding the Dissolution Act invalid'.'"" 
At this point, Barwick contended that the Commonwealth's power expands in time of war and was 
not examinable. 1499 He then employed various illustrations to demonstrate the width of the defence 
power.'")() This submission sparked yet another flurry of judicial questions.'501 
Barwick then employed an aggressive, and possibly arrogant, technique whereby he effectively set 
the Court a challenge, as if he were defying the Court to invalidate the legislation: 
I am putting this argument ... that is, taking the narrowest view of Lloyd and Wallach; this is 
not the view I would advance, but, taking the narrowest view of Lloyd and Wallach, the 
circumstances in October of this year were such that the Court could say "We cannot think 
Parliament was irrational - had no reasonable view- when it thought that in that situation 
legislation on this subject was lawful." 
That is the task of the Court; that is what the Court would have to negative; it would have to 
say that it could not be thought necessary for the protection of this country in October 1950 
to legislate upon the topic .... 
To that you add this element: that this is a preventive act; it is trying to prevent the thing 
from happening. It is not trying the offence after it has happened. How could the Court really 
entertain such an enquiry? 
One of the judgments says that the Court is the least fitted of bodies to try questions of that 
very sort.lso2 
Surprisingly, this technique did not appear to evoke any real reaction from the members of the 
Court. 
1497 Ibid, p.1144. 
1498 Menzies, Central Power in the Australian Commonwealth, above n 205, pp.69-73. See also Williams, 
'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in the Communist Party Case', above n 18, 13. 
1499 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, p.1166. 
1500 Ibid, pp.1167-1168. 
1501 Ibid, p.1168. 
1502 1bid, pp.1172-1173. 
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Barwick then compared the Nazi Party in Germany to the Communist Party. This effectively 
introduced the policy implications of the legislation by default in inviting the Court to consider recent 
history and the mistakes of the past. 1503 
At this point, Barwick took the very unusual step of handing up written submissions and then 
proceeded to outline their contents.1504 Barwick was not an advocate who usually relied on written 
submissions. Shortly before the adjournment on 12 December 1950, Evatt interjected to lodge his 
objection to Barwick raising various issues in his written submissions which he did not outline in his 
opening. Barwick may have been attempting to 'trail his coat', the technique he had used so 
effectively in the past. It was resolved by Chief Justice Latham suggesting to Evatt that he would be 
able to put his 'very best feet forward' in due course.1505 
Justice McTiernan then made a comment to which Barwick responded in a manner which appears 
from the transcript as arrogant and even audacious. Arguably, it epitomised Barwick's frustration in 
this case: 
McTiernan J: 
Barwick: 
I put to you that the Court, speaking for myself, would feel some difficulty 
about the evidentiary position when asked to draw the conclusion from 
other matters outside the Court and say there is this emergency when there 
is no proclamation from the Governor-General declaring a state of 
emergency. 
I put in my five submissions to cover that. If Your Honor knows insufficient, 
and Your Honor has recital 9, and the Parliament says it is necessary for the 
defence of the country to make these laws, then I submit that Your Honor 
has enough. 
If Your Honor has nothing to contradict that insufficient opinion, then that 
recital is Parliament's statement, clearly and ambiguously and this law is 
now necessary. 1506 
Following a question from Justice Dixon as to the extent to which espionage fell within the defence 
power, Barwick and Justice Dixon once again clashed as Barwick attempted to demonstrate that it 
was not the Court's role to interfere with the plenary nature of the defence power: 
Barwick: 
1503 1bid, p.l173. 
1504 Ibid, p.l177. 
1505 Ibid, pp.l182-1183. 
1506 1bid, pp.1195-1196. 
Is not that just usurping the Parliamentary function? It may be that 
Parliament in a time of what looks like peace, with no hostilities -for 
instance, we have a rocket range, if Parliament decided that the only thing 
Dixon J: 
Barwick: 
Dixon J: 
Barwick: 
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to do was to provide that spies in the area were to be executed, one could 
not say "surely that is going too far". 
Defence does not depend to such an extent on the existing circumstances. 
If you take the law passed in 1910 for the execution of any person who was 
suspected o{being a German spy without trial, would it be good? 
In my theory of it, yes, because the topic was within power. 
It is a question whether the topic is within power? 
If the Court said "Spying in time of war is within power and spying in time of 
peace is not within power" I could understand it, but once say (sic) "spying is 
defence" then the Court cannot take the next step and say "We will 
supervise the sort of spying law you make". That is really denying the 
plenary nature of the power. 1507 
Barwick attempted to play down the argument that Parliament was attempting to encroach into the 
sphere of the Court by suggesting that 'when a man is 'declared' and thrown out of his job it was not 
a punishment, but preventive action'.1508 In an earlier submission, he deliberately employed the 
term 'mild' to demonstrate that the preventive nature of the Act was such that its impact would be 
minimal and that any impact was outweighed by the need to protect and defend the country as well 
as in the interests of national security.1s09 
At this point, Justice Dixon made a comment that challenged Barwick's fundamental submission, 
suggesting that Barwick had not addressed whether the legislation fell within the defence power. 
1507 1bid, pp.1207-1208. 
1508 Marr, above n 8, p.86. 
1509 Barwick's choice of language is deliberate in this context and serves its purpose: 
Here is a statute which puts out of organized existence the Communist Party; for the rest it puts out of 
existence any Communist-dominated bodies whose existence may be thought to be prejudicial to the 
defence of the country; as to persons, it takes a very mild step. It simply precludes persons from holding 
very powerful office in industries, which industries are vital to our preparedness. That is a very mild sort 
of thing to do in the circumstances. 
Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, above n 
296, p.1173-1174. In attempting to demonstrate that the Court need not concern itself with whether the 
legislation is morally correct or incorrect but must understand the circumstances of its introduction, Barwick 
alluded to the public policy implications of the legislation not being implemented and employed emotive 
language to do so. He attempted to suggest to the Court that the Court cannot plead ignorance of the 
circumstances. In doing so, Barwick's choice of language and expression may have actually insulted the Court: 
No one for a moment wants your Honor to decide who is right or wrong about this matter or exactly 
how imminent the armed conflict may be, nor how remote. They are not things that concern the Court, 
but on the other hand for your Honor to say that as Judges this Court could say, "We know nothing of 
what is going on, we know nothing of our own national point of view with respect to it", is really, your 
Honor, to engage in the most extreme of cloistered aloofness, to live out of the world and not in it. 
See Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, p.1200. 
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This was met with a measure of surprise by Barwick, and was also particularly concerning for Barwick 
since he had almost concluded his submissions. The exchange proceeded as follows: 
Dixon J: 
Barwick: 
Dixon J: 
Barwick: 
... You begin by saying here is a subject matter within power and Parliament 
can do anything it likes with it, but the question is whether it is a subject 
matter withiA power and you did not deal with that provision. 
I thought I had dealt with it a number of times. In the Jehovah's Witnesses' 
case all the Justices who sat said that Regulations 3 and 4 were matters 
outside power, that Regulation 3 which governed the Governor-General's 
power to declare a body unlawful was on its face as to a subject that was 
not within power ... The judgment proceeds on the fact that general subject 
matter was within power. 
What do you mean by the general subject matter? 
The subversive association and none the less because the choice ofthat is in 
the opinion of the Governor-General the Association which was thought to 
be subversive. I put it and I do not want to go over it again, that conduct 
prejudicial to defence is a topic. If you can see a connection with defence, 
as Isaacs J said about the section in Walsh and Johnson ... then that is power 
on its face- no more. If it is within power on its face the way Parliament 
deals with it must be entirely a matter for Parliament. 1510 
Barwick's remark that 'he did not want to go over it again' suggests a tone of increasing frustration. 
It was clear that Justice Dixon (and possibly a number of the judges) had not grasped or accepted his 
submissions even at this late stage. By not repeating his submissions, Barwick failed to respond to 
the clear signals from the judge. The principle of flexibility suggests he should have presented his 
submissions in another way to ensure that they were understood. 
In relation to the incidental power, Barwick advanced a submission that the constitutional validity of 
some sections of the Act depended upon the incidental power as well as the defence power. Barwick 
is questioned in relation to this by Justice Dixon.'511 Barwick's concluding remark in his exchange 
with Justice Dixon was: 'whether I express it well or not'. This too suggests Barwick's significant 
frustration in his inability to convey his submissions to the Court with sufficient clarity. 
A critical point was reached when Justice Dixon provided Barwick with a line of argument, which 
would have assisted him. Barwick stated that he had not considered the point and would give it 
1510 Ibid, p.1230. 
1511 1bid, pp.1260-1261. 
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some thought and return to it later. However, although Barwick did address the issue, he failed to 
adopt Justice Dixon's line of argument: 
Dixon J: 
Barwick: 
Dixon J: 
Barwick: 
Dixon J: 
... The more you consider that [namely, Executive power for the 
maintenance of institutions] the more you are driven to the American line of 
thought and away from the formal method of dealing with it which you have 
adopted. In the first place you have singled out the Executive as the person 
protecting the execution, merely because of the reference to the 
maintenance of the Constitution under Section 61. Institutions are not 
confined to the Executive and on the recent cases it is suggested that 
perhaps an attack on the institutions may be used by the Executive and then 
there might be attacks on other elements ofthe Constitution, and the 
Constitution has to be maintained in all its respects. It seemed to me, as I 
have said in this judgment [Ransley's case], that there is a necessary 
implication of legislative power to deal with attacks on institutions which 
were an essential part of the Constitution and the power was to be found in 
the necessary implication of fundamental characteristics. That may be 
wrong, but that is the way I reasoned it out. That line of thought makes it a 
little easier to get rid of this water-tight compartment between the 
legislative power and so treat the legislature as exercising a power which 
resolves independently, whether it is external or internal. That may perhaps 
make it easier to get out of this dilemma which is set by 5(2) and 9(2). 
I have put the authority for the other view on p.29 but I have not considered 
it from the point of view Your Honor mentions. 
It struck me that the essential feature is to discover where the line is to be 
drawn between the objective tests of the application of power and tests 
which are not necessary, being the two extremes. At the one end you must 
take care of a great number of powers and at the other end there are 
characteristics of defence power which are not necessary in some 
circumstances. 
I had not considered this alternative view of a possible reading in dealing 
with 5(2) and 9(2). Perhaps I can give it some thought and return to it later 
on it. I will give it some consideration, your Honor. 
I am sorry to take so much time to explain the idea. You cannot exclude 
from any such test this parallel question of judicial notice because it 
immediately gets mixed up with it. 
Barwick: 
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Quiet, Your Honor. Well, at any rate, your Honor I have not given it 
sufficient thought - - -1512 
In addition to Justice Dixon providing Barwick with an alternative line of argument, Barwick once 
again conceded that he might not have given this issue 'sufficient thought'. This suggests that 
Barwick's preparation was not as comprehensive as it might have been. 
Realising the importance of Justice Dixon's suggestion, Barwick repeated that he would give some 
thought to what Justice Dixon had put to him and would return to it later on. He then moved to 
address the issue of severability. 1513 He indicated that Justice Dixon's submission might be relevant 
to this issue also but that he would proceed nonetheless.1514 The final matter with which Barwick 
dealt was the 'invasion of State powers' argument put by the plaintiffs.1515 
Following the luncheon adjournment on 14 December 1950, Barwick indicated that he had given 
some thought to the comments made by Justice Dixon before lunch and sought to address these.1516 
He referred to the policy implications associated with the legislation, but still did not develop the line 
of argument suggested by Justice Dixon, namely, that there is a 'necessary implication of legislative 
power to deal with attacks on institutions which were an essential part of the Constitution and the 
power was to be found in the necessary implication of fundamental characteristics' .1517 
Although Dixon acknowledged the general quality of Barwick's advocacy, he was not always 
impressed. In his diary, Dixon commented that Barwick 'did his case a great deal of harm by his 
approach, based on impossible constructions to save the Act'.1518 Justice Dixon it seems considered 
many of Barwick's arguments to be tenuous. On 14 December 1950, he reluctantly offered Barwick a 
stronger line of reasoning to support the validity of the legislation: 
lSl21bid, pp.1277-1278. 
1513 Barwick's main submissions in relation to the issue of severability were contained in his written 
submissions. This argument is directed to whether certain provisions of the Act are capable of being severed 
from the remainder of the Act in circumstances where certain provisions are found to be constitutionally valid 
and other provisions are not: see Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The 
Commonwealth of Australia, above n 296, p. 1278. 
1514 Ibid. 
lSls Barwick dealt with this argument briefly and succinctly: 
I deal with that shortly by submitting that the basis of the argument is not there, that the political 
parties are not part of a Constitutional frame-work of the States. And the second view is that these 
provisions of course are not dealing with the parties as political parties at all: they are dealing with them 
for activities which are not the political activities of which my friend spoke. 
See Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, p.1283. 
1516 Ibid, p.1288. 
lSl71bid, p.1277. 
1518 Owen Dixon, Diary, 11 December 1950, Owen Dixon, Personal Papers; See Philip Ayres, 'Dixon Diaries' in 
Tony Blackshield, Michael Caper & George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia, 
(2001), Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, p.224; Ayres, above n 50, p.221. 
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I made a feeble attempt during the morning to direct Barwicks thoughts on the lines of (1) 
power consisting of implication of legislative authority to repress sedition &c annexed 
(without destruction) to 51 (vi) as (2) basis of an Act hanging on s 4 & s 5 (1) & 5 (9) (not 5 (2) 
& 9 (2)). (3) with recitals as decision of a question arising from conflict & emergency. He made 
no fist of it. 1519 
Dixon's comment that Barwick 'made no fist of it' clearly reflects Dixon's beliefthat he had offered 
Barwick a stronger argument which Barwick had chosen to ignore. This suggests Barwick's failure to 
effectively 'watch the bench' and might reflect a certain arrogance that his line of argument was 
superior. 
According to Dixon, Evatt's reply 'made hay' of Barwick's case. 1szo On 15 December 1950, Dixon 
stated: 'I felt it necessary to say that there was another case than that B[arwick] had argued & the 
unexpected course he had taken placed us in a position of peculiar responsibility'.1521 This statement 
has been described by Ayres as 'a devastating indictment of the Commonwealth's leading 
counsel'.1522 Chief Justice Latham was also unimpressed with Barwick's advocacy. In fact, Latham 
had told Barwick that his argument in this case was the worst he had heard from him.1523 
Barwick's advocacy in this case was not infrequently characterised by frustration. He often appeared 
to lose patience with the judges and, although he tried at times to engage in dialogue and adopt his 
usual conversational style, he did not welcome judicial questions but seemed to find them disruptive. 
The impression is that he resented them. He became irritated and even sarcastic at times- traits 
that he naturally possessed but which he was generally able to control during his advocacy. 
Barwick's statement to the Court typified this frustration: 'let us hope that nobody like Guy Fawkes 
1519 Owen Dixon, Diary, 14 December 1950, Owen Dixon, Personal Papers. Note that the reference to "5 (9)" 
appears to be an error and the reference should instead be "9 (1)". See Ayres, above n 50, p.221; See also 
Ayres, 'Dixon Diaries', above n 1496, p.224. 
1520 Owen Dixon, Diary, 15 December 1950, Owen Dixon, Personal Papers. See Ayres, 'Dixon Diaries', above n 
1496, p.224; Ayres, above n 50, p.221. 
1521 Owen Dixon, Diary, 15 December 1950, Owen Dixon, Personal Papers. See Ayres, 'Dixon Diaries', above n 
1496, p.224; Ayres, above n 50, p.221. 
1522 Ayres, above n 50, p.221. In fact, in 1952, Dixon revealed his dislike for Barwick in his diary. He stated that 
Barwick proposed the toast of Bar and Bench: 
in terms which threw me off balance. I tried to deal with the offensive undertones or implications of his 
speech but did it all badly .. .'. I said [to Kitto]! thought [Barwick] was a declared enemy of the Court 
and of me particularly and said how I hated being a judge for such reasons {19-20 September 1952). 
See Owen Dixon, Diary, 19-20 September 1952, Owen Dixon, Personal Papers. See Ayres, 'Dixon Diaries', above 
n 1496, p.224; Ayres, above n 50, p.235. It is understood that Dixon deplored Barwick's appointment as his 
successor as Chief Justice. 
1523 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.48. 
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gets busy here, because we would have to wait until after the gunpowder has gone off before we 
could do anything about it'.1524 
In this case, Barwick did not exercise his usual discipline and control for which he became renowned. 
His responses to judicial questions were often short, sharp and even curt. According to Williams: 
Barwick found himself bogged in the mire of questioning which, as it progressed, made it 
increasingly apparent that the Dissolution Act was anything but a simple piece of legislation 
promoting the defence of Australia. At times, it was only interjections by Latham CJ over the 
questioning of other judges that enabled Barwick to get back on track.1525 
Williams' observation is correct, but Barwick became increasingly agitated with the incessant 
questioning generally, including questions from Chief Justice Latham, even though these may have 
been designed to assist him. As Williams observes: 'Whether Latham CJ's Dorothy Dix questions 
were designed to enable Barwick to regain his feet or were out of sympathy for Barwick's subject 
matter, or both, is unclear' .1526 The fact that Latham felt it necessary to intervene to assist Barwick 
on occasions also suggests that Barwick's advocacy was less than effective. Although Williams does 
note that 'Latham CJ's interjections occasionally led [Barwick] into difficulty',1527 Latham's 
intervention required Barwick to explain his submissions further and his responses often attracted 
the attention of other judges which then frequently resulted in further questions. 
Another significant aspect of Barwick's advocacy in this case was his failure to detect key messages 
from the judges and tailor his submissions accordingly, becoming instead, obstinate and inflexible. 
The starkest example occurred towards the end of his submissions on 14 December 1950 where he 
seemed to ignore the alternative line of reasoning offered by Justice Dixon, a fatal error that 
prompted comment by Justice Dixon in his diary. Also, although Barwick's knowledge of the High 
Court was significant due to his frequent appearances and the fact that he had practised with various 
judges during their time at the Bar, he failed to appreciate the influence Justice Dixon exerted over 
the other members of the Court. 
Frequently, during his submissions, Barwick would concede that he had failed to make himself clear. 
This was unusual and the fact that it occurred regularly was symptomatic of the problems Barwick 
was having in conveying his case to the Court. 
1524 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, p.1048. See also Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in the Communist 
Party Case', above n 18, 14. 
1525 Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in the Communist Party Case', above n 18, 9. 
l5261bid. 
1527 Ibid. See, for example, Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The 
Commonwealth of Australia, above n 296, p. 58. 
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His advocacy in this case reveals a less than thorough preparation and that his presentation at times 
lacked its usual persuasiveness. At various stages during the case, Barwick did not effectively apply 
the elements of appellate advocacy and fell short of the ideals of appellate advocacy. This cannot 
have failed to contribute to his most significant loss in his career as an advocate. 
Despite Barwick's failure at times au ring this case to achieve exemplary appellate advocacy, he did at 
other times demonstrate a mastery of some of the elements of effective appellate advocacy. He 
often conceptualised his case with simplicity and clarity; he referred the Court to the policy 
implications of invalidating the legislation; he employed powerful language to convey the threat 
posed by communism and regularly employed useful analogies to demonstrate his point. 
As the analysis of the transcript suggests, Barwick's performance could be described as inconsistent; 
at times he employed and applied the elements of appellate advocacy in a masterful way (and 
conformed to the ideals), whereas at other times he failed to do so and even acted inconsistently 
with these elements. Overall, this case represented a disappointing performance by Barwick. 
Barwick later stated that: 
My argument about the validity ofthe Act was unconvincing. Only the Chief Justice was prepared 
to uphold its validity on the grounds set out in his reasons rather than on my argument. Latham 
CJ, while still in office, once told me that my argument in the Communist Party Case was the worst 
he had heard from me. I have no reason to question his judgment. 1528 
9.3 The High Court's Decision 
On 9 March 1951, 10 weeks after the 24 day hearing concluded, the High Court handed down its 
decision to a full court room in Melbourne. Most of the leaders of the Australian Communist 
movement were in attendance. By a majority (Latham CJ dissenting), the Act was held to be 
invalid. 1529 In effect, the High Court asserted its authority to determine the scope of the defence 
power. Five members of the majority (namely, Dixon, Fullagar, McTiernan1530, Williams and Kitto1531 
1528 Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick's Reflections & Recollections, above n 1, p.48. 
1529 The report in the Commonwealth Law Reports runs to 285 pages. 
1530 Despite his strong opposition to Communism, Justice McTiernan also declared the Act to be invalid. He 
stated that (at 206): 'The Constitution does not allow the judicature to concede the principle that the 
Parliament can conclusively "recite itself" into power'. He was 'most relieved' when he realised that he would 
not be alone in making such a declaration (see Michael Kirby, 'McTiernan, Edward Aloysius' in Tony Blackshield, 
Michael Co per & George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia, (2001), Oxford 
University Press, South Melbourne, p.468). 
1531 Justice Kitto was fresh from his success as an advocate in defeating the Chifley Labor government's bank 
nationalisation legislation. He declared the Act invalid and in doing so 'demonstrated his allegiance to no 
political side and no social philosophy- only to his view of the Constitution and the law'. See Kirby, 'Kitto, 
Frank Walters', above n 1187, p.399. 
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JJ) had agreed that the Act would have been a valid exercise of the defence power had Australia been 
at war. However, in peace time, it was unconstitutional."" 
Of the six justices who formed the majority, five (Dixon, McTiernan, Williams, Fullagar and Kitto JJ) 
gave similar reasons. Webb J came closest to upholding the Act on the basis of a considerably limited 
operation.1533 The five justices concluded that the provisions of the Act purporting to declare 
individuals and bodies to be communists were not supported by the defence power, the incidental 
power or the implied power. In reference to the two questions posed by Dixon J for the Full Court, 
the five justices answered 'No' to the first and 'Yes' to the second. Webb J answered 'Yes' to both 
questions1534 and Latham CJ answered 'No' to both questions.'535 
1532 Justice Dixon accepted the broad definition of the defence power during wartime, following the wartime 
decisions, and the validity of Jaws conferring a power on a minister to 'order the detention of persons whom he 
believes to be disaffected or of hostile associations and whom he believes that it is necessary to detain with a 
view to preventing their acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety and the defence of the 
Commonwealth'. See Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 195, per Dixon J. See 
also at 206 (McTiernan), 227-228 (Williams J), 258 (Fullagar J). See Douglas, 'Cold War Justice? Judicial 
Responses to Communists and Communism, 1945-1955', above n 1379,81. Justice Dixon and most of the 
other judges accepted that the Commonwealth could use other powers in its possession to discriminate against 
communists and their allies: Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 203-204, per 
Dixon J. See also at 213 (McTiernan), 269-270 (Fullagar J) and 284 (Kitto J). During wartime, the High Court had 
conceded to Parliament a broader defence power than in times of peace although there were still constraints 
to such power. In addition, the Act did not address specific acts which were illegal but individuals and bodies 
whose actions were to be characterised by the Legislature and the Executive: see Anderson, above n 1380, 38; 
Ayres, above n 50, p.223. 
1533 Justice Webb considered that, following the Jehovah's Witnesses Case, a ban on the Australian Communist 
Party could be justified if there was evidence that it posed a permanent threat which could not be assumed 
and no evidence was presented to suggest that it was the case (Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth 
(1951) 83 CLR 1 at 243-245). 
1534 Justice Webb's reasoning differed from the other members of the majority in that he believed that, 
following the wartime cases, Parliament and the Executive could take preventive measures based upon their 
approach to defence policy provided that the facts that support the reasonableness of the policy are either 
within judicial notice or are proved. His Honour held that the Act was invalid because he would not take 
judicial notice of the matters contained within the preamble of the Act and the Commonwealth would not 
undertake to prove them. See Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 243-245, per 
Webb J and Geoffrey Sawer, 'Defence Power of the Commonwealth in Time of Peace' (1953) 6 Res Judicata 
214,218. 
1535 Latham was a member of the Lyons Government that attempted to ban communists but was unsuccessful 
in doing so. See for example R v Hush; ex parte Devanny (1932) 48 CLR 487 in which the High Court (including 
Evatt J) allowed an appeal following the appellant's conviction under s 30D of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) of a 
charge of soliciting contributions of money for an unlawful association, namely, the Communist Party of 
Australia. In effect, the High Court rejected the conservative federal government's attempt to ban the 
Australian Communist Party using the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). See Winterton, 'The Communist Party Case', 
above n 1379, 108; Maher, 'Downunder McCarthyism: The Struggle Against Australian Communism 1945-1960: 
Part One', above n 1379, 350. In a debate about the Crimes Bill in 1936, Latham as Attorney-General stated 
that the Commonwealth was not able to use a recitation of facts in a preamble to lay claim to powers it would 
not otherwise have: see Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 28 January 1926, 
472 (Latham, Attorney General). In the 1930s, Latham believed that this principle prevented legislation aimed 
at outlawing the Australian Communist Party (see Latham to Stevens, 6 April1933 National Archives of 
Australia: A467 BUNDLE 28/SF10/15). See also Douglas, 'A Smallish Blow for Liberty? The Significance of the 
Community Party Case', above n 1383, 277-278; Winterton, 'The Significance of the Communist Party Case', 
above n 1379, 630-631. For a detailed discussion of Latham's involvement in attempts to suppress 
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The common view of the majority was that there was insufficient judicially noticeable evidence to 
link the Act with the defence power and the recitals were not of probative value. The majority held 
that a real or specific rather than logical connection with defence was necessary to support a law 
under the defence power.1536 Webb J was the only member of the Court to conclude that the 
Commonwealth had to adduce evidence to prove the accuracy of the recitals. Latham CJ was the 
only member of the Court to conclude that the Act was valid without proof of the recitals. 1537 
Dixon and Fullagar JJ concluded that there was no mechanism for the Governor-General's decisions 
to be reviewed.1538 According to Williams, the finding that ss 5{2) and 9(2) 'gave to the executive an 
unexaminable ability to extend the reach of the Commonwealth into fields not otherwise within its 
power' underpinned Dixon J's decision.1539 It also mirrored Evatt's submissions and represented a 
rejection of Barwick's approach. 1540 McTiernan, Williams and Kitto JJ concluded that ss 5{4) and 9(4) 
'precluded any judicial review of the Governor-General's decision that a person or body posed a 
security risk' .'541 
At one point, Barwick argued that the Governor-General's decision could be reviewed on the grounds 
of irrationality, misdirection or error of law. 1542 Only Webb J accepted the Commonwealth's 
submission that the provisions empowering the Governor-General to make declarations did not 
exceed the defence power as the declaration was not conclusive, and it was open to the declared 
person or body to challenge the declaration on the basis that they were not engaged in any activities 
which could attract the operation ofthe defence power.'544 In addition, Webb J considered that 
Communism, see Lloyd, above n 879; Kirby, 'HV Evatt, The Anti-Communist Referendum and Liberty in 
Australia', above n 1380, 102. 
1536 Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in the Communist Party Case', above n 18, 23. 
1537 Ibid. See Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 161, per Latham CJ. 
1538 Australian Communist Part¥ v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 180 (per Dixon J) and 257-258 (per 
Fullagar J). See also Anderson, above n 1380, 40. 
1539 Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in the Communist Party Case', above n 18, 23. 
1540 Ibid, 23-24. 
1541 Douglas, 'Cold War Justice? Judicial Responses to Communists and Communism, 1945-1955', above n 1379, 
57; Anderson, above n 1380, 39-40. Under the Act, the decision that a body or individual was a communist was 
reviewable yet the decision as to whether the body or the individual posed a security risk was not. 
1542 See Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Drs v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, pp. 74-76, 1036, 1078. 
1543 Dixon, McTiernan and Fullagar JJ held that decisions by the Governor-General were neither directly nor 
collaterally reviewable (178-180, 201-211 and 257-258 respectively). Dixon, McTiernan, Williams and Kitto JJ 
concluded that the Act made it clear that decisions under the Act were not reviewable (180, 211, 221-222 and 
279-280 respectively). However, Webb J believed that there was authority for the proposition that the 
Governor-General's decision was judicially examinable and held that ss 5(4) and 9(4) should be read down 
accordingly. See Douglas, 'A Smallish Blow for Liberty? The Significance of the Community Party Case', above n 
1383,280. 
1544 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 198-201, per Webb J. See also Anderson, 
above n 1380, 39. 
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there was authority to judicially examine the Governor-General's discretion and that ss 5(4) and 9(4) 
should be interpreted on the basis that Parliament would have been aware of this. 1545 
Dixon, McTiernan, Williams and Kitto JJ did not believe it was necessary to address whether the Act 
was invalid on other grounds.'546 
The decision, a major victory for Evatt, represented 'the most significant defeat of Barwick's 
distinguished career as a barrister' .1547 According to Williams, the 'views expressed by the majority 
judges during argument, especially when intervening during Barwick's submissions, were clearly 
reflected in their separate reasons"54' 
From the High Court's perspective, the central issue in the case was one of constitutional 
interpretation- namely, did the Commonwealth government have the legislative power to enact the 
legislation? The Court held that it did not. However, the Court held that it determined the ambit of 
the defence power and not the Commonwealth Parliament. The critical issue was that the legislation 
did not purport to ban organisations which were in fact a threat to the security of the 
Commonwealth based on contestable facts but instead simply declared the Communist Party a 
threat and banned organisations which, in the opinion of the Commonwealth government, were a 
threat to the security of the Commonwealth. 1549 
All judges agreed that the Commonwealth had the legislative power to defend itself from subversion 
-whether the source of the power was the defence power, the incidental power applying to 
executive power or, as Dixon and Fullagar JJ suggested, the implied legislative power.'550 However, 
Parliament was unable to declare that constitutional facts1551 existed.1552 Fullagar J stated that 'a 
1545 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 235-240, per Webb J. 
1546 Williams J seems to have assumed that if the Act was supported by the defence power then acquisition of 
property would have been governed by s 51 (xxxi) of the Constitution (at 214 -232). Fullagar J briefly 
considered and dismissed the argument that in making this law, the Parliament had usurped the judicial power 
of the Commonwealth (at 229). See Douglas, 'Cold War Justice? Judicial Responses to Communists and 
Communism, 1945-1955', above n 1379, 60. 
1547 Williams, 'Communist Party Case', above n 77, p.122. 
1548 Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellant Argument in the Communist Party Case', above n 18, 24. 
1549 Hull, above n 783, p.29 
1550 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 187-188, 260. Dixon and Fullagar JJ 
regarded the defence power ins 51 (vi) as applying only to external enemies: see 194 (per Dixon J), 259 (per 
Fullagar J) respectively. See Winterton, 'The Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 126; Winterton, 'The 
Significance of the Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 649-650. For discussion of earlier cases involving the 
defence power, see B. Sugerman, W.J. Dignam, 'The Defence Power and Total War' (1943) 17 Australian Law 
Journal 207 and Sawer, 'The Defence Power of the Commonwealth in Time of War', above n 1449. 
1551 Constitutional facts are the facts 'the existence of which is necessary in law to provide a constitutional basis 
for the legislation'. In cases involving the defence power, the Court is often confined to taking judicial notice of 
facts due to the fact that canvassing the facts in open court would prejudice Commonwealth security. See 
Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 222, per Williams J. See P.H. Lane, 'Facts in 
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stream cannot rise higher than its source','553 and 'Parliament cannot recite itself into a field the 
gates of which are locked against it' .1554 
Justice Dixon observed:1555 
History and not only ancient history, shows that in countries where democratic institutions 
have been unconstitutionally superseded, it has been done not seldom by those holding the 
executive power. Forms of government may need protection from dangers likely to arise 
from within the institutions to be protected. In point of constitutional theory the power to 
legislate for the protection of an existing form of government ought not to be based on a 
conception, if otherwise adequate, adequate only to assist those holding power to resist or 
suppress obstruction or opposition or attempts to displace them or the form of government 
they defend.1556 
Constitutional Law' (1963) 37 Australian Law Journal108, 110 and generally for a detailed discussion of 
constitutional facts in the Communist Party Case. 
1552 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 193 (per Dixon J), 206 (per McTiernan J), 
222, 225, 226 (per Williams J), 258, 263 (per Fullagar J) and 272-275 (per Kitto J). See Winterton, 'The 
Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 127; Winterton, 'The Significance of the Communist Party Case', above n 
1379, 650-651. 
1553 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 258, per Fullagar J. See Winterton, 'The 
Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 127; Winterton, 'The Significance of the Communist Party Case', above n 
1379, 651. 
1554 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 263, per Fullagar J. Anderson, above n 
1380, 36. Justice Fullagar stated that: 
The validity of a law or of an administrative act done under a law cannot be made to depend on the 
opinion of the law-maker, or the person who is to do the act, that the law or the consequence of the 
act is within the constitutional power upon which the law in question itself depends for its validity. A 
power to make laws with respect to lighthouses does not authorize the making of a law with respect to 
anything which is, in the opinion of the law-maker, a lighthouse. 
Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 141, per Latham CJ. See Winterton, 'The 
Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 128; Winterton, 'The Significance of the Communist Party Case', above n 
1379, 651. In his argument, Evatt stated that this was well-established and recognised since Ex parte Walsh 
and Johnson; In re Yates (1925) 37 CLR 36, 67-68, 71 per Knox CJ and 96 per Isaacs J; Winterton, 'The 
Significance of the Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 651; Kirby, 'HV Evatt, The Anti-Communist 
Referendum and Liberty in Australia', above n 1380, 103; Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 
83 CLR 1 at 49. 
1555 Justice Dixon reached his decision after 'much consideration' (at 199) and commenced his judgment with 
the observation (at 174-175): 
The primary ground upon which [the Act's) validity is attacked is simply that its chief provisions do not 
relate to matters falling within any legislative power expressly or impliedly given by the Constitution to 
the Commonwealth Parliament but relate to matters contained within the residue of legislative power 
belonging to the States. 
Justice Dixon began his judgment with an outline of the facts and then proceeded to analyse various sections of 
the Act (at 186): 
Unlike the power conferred by s. 5 of the National Security Act 1939-1943, the present power is 
administrative and not legislative, it is not directed to the conduct of an existing war, and its exercise is 
not examinable and is not susceptible of testing by reference to the constitutional power above which 
it cannot validly rise. 
1556 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 187-188, per Dixon J 
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Justice Dixon referred to the decisions in Burns v Ransley (1949)1557 and R v Sharkey (1949).1558 In 
both cases, it was held that various sedition offences under the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) were within 
the legislative powers of the Commonwealth based on section 51 (xxxix) and section 61 of the 
Constitution in the former case and sections 51 (xxxix) and 51(xxix) of the Constitution in the latter 
case or by necessary implication.'559• He then 'savage[d] Barwick's case by setting out the case he 
should have made'1560: 
As appears from Burns v Ransley (1) and R v Sharkey (2). I take the view that the power to 
legislate against subversive conduct has a source in principle that is deeper or wider than a 
series of combinations of the words of s. 51(xxxix.) with those of other constitutional 
powers. I prefer the view adopted in the United States, which is stated in Black's American 
Constitutional Law (1910), 2'' ed., s. 153, p.210, as follows:-" .... it is within the necessary 
power of the federal government to protect its own existence and the unhindered play of its 
legitimate activities. And to this end, it may provide for the punishment of treason the 
suppression of insurrection or rebellion and for the putting down of all individual or 
concerted attempts to obstruct or interfere with the discharge of the proper business of 
11 1561 government .... 
This passage from Justice Dixon's judgment reflects the alternative line of argument that he had 
offered Barwick, but which Barwick had chosen to ignore. Recognising where a judge may be giving 
an advocate a signal and possessing the flexibility to tailor their submissions accordingly are 
important attributes in appellate advocacy. Ultimately, Barwick's failure to do either proved fatal. 
However, the Act as such was flawed in many respects and it is possible that, even if he had followed 
Justice Dixon's 'signal', the case may still have been lost. 
Chief Justice Latham provided the only dissenting opinion- he would have upheld the Act. According 
to Clem Lloyd, 'Latham's judgment synthesised two crucial issues in his long career: his loathing of 
Communism, and a long-sustained association with the Constitutional defence power'.1562 Generally, 
Latham 'was sympathetic to an expansive view of Commonwealth legislative power, especially in the 
1557 79 CLR 101. 
1558 79 CLR 121. 
1559 Burns v Ransley {1949) 79 CLR 101 at 110 (Latham CJ), 111 (Rich J), 116 (Dixon J) and 120 (McTiernan J); R v 
Sharkey {1949) 79 CLR 121 at 135-138 (Latham CJ), 145 (Rich J), 148-150 (Dixon J), 157-158 (McTiernan J), 159-
160 (Williams J), 164 {Webb J). See also Douglas, 'A Smallish Blow for Liberty? The Significance of the 
Community Party Case', above n 1383, 278. For a detailed discussion of the background to both cases, see 
Douglas, 'Cold War Justice? Judicial Responses to Communists and Communism, 1945-1955', above n 1379, 61-
66; Anderson, above n 1380, 36; Lloyd, above n 879, 196-197; Kirby, 'HV Evatt, The Anti-Communist 
Referendum and Liberty in Australia', above n 1380, 103. 
1560 Ayres, above n 50, p.223; Laurence W Maher, 'Owen Dixon: Concerning his political method' (September, 
2003) 6(2) Constitutional Law and Policy Review 33, 35. 
1561 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 188, per Dixon J. 
1562 Lloyd, above n 879, 188. 
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defence context'.1563 The fact that Australian troops were involved in the Korean War and that the 
Cold War was escalating were critical. This case was to be his last on the High Court. He 'alone in the 
Court strenuously maintained the right of the Parliament to ban the Communist Party under the 
defence power. He failed to carry with him any of his six colleagues on the Bench'. 1564 
Chief Justice Latham started from the perspective that defence policy and policy relating to how to 
deal with an internal enemy was inherently political, and believed it was for the executive and 
Parliament to resolve these questions. 1565 
Latham accepted Barwick's submissions on the 'unfettered ability of the Commonwealth to legislate 
with respect to defence' .1566 However, he rejected the 20 factors Barwick outlined for the purposes 
of the Court taking judicial notice and stated: 'The Court can take judicial notice of notorious facts, 
and one thing which is notorious about what Mr. Barwick has submitted is that the allegations are 
matters of vigorous dispute' .1567 His Honour also rejected Barwick's submission that only a rational 
or logical connection with defence was required for the purposes of an Act being valid under the 
defence power.1568 
1563 Cowen, 'Latham, John Greig', above n 863, p.421. 
1564 1bid. 
1565 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 142, per Latham CJ where he stated: 'The 
question is- "By what authority- by Parliament or by a court?" Latham CJ also stated (at 152): 
No distinction can be drawn between defence against external attack and defence against internal 
attack, which is more insidious than direct external attack and in some respects, because it is often 
secret, more difficult to combat. If Parliament decides that there is an internal danger sufficiently 
serious to justify legislation, in my opinion the Court has no authority to overrule Parliament upon the 
ground that Parliament has made a mistake as to "the facts", or that, even if Parliament is right as to 
the facts, the facts show no real danger to Australia. The Government is responsible to Parliament and 
Parliament is responsible to the people for such decisions. If Parliament disagrees with the 
Government, or the people disagree with either the Government or the Parliament, our system of 
government provides a political means of changing the policy. The courts have nothing whatever to do 
with such decisions. 
Latham CJ believed, as stated in the present case, that the principle of judicial review did not apply as 
the defence and anti-subversion powers are 'essentially different in character from most, if not all, of 
the other legislative powers ... [and] perhaps the most important powers intrusted to the Parliament 
of the Commonwealth' (at 141) and the 'only question for a court, therefore, is whether the 
provisions of the Act have a real connection with the activities and possibilities which Parliament has 
said in its opinion do exist and do create a danger to Australia' (at 154). See Winterton, 'The 
Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 128; Winterton, 'The Significance of the Communist Party 
Case', above n 1379, 651-652; Laurence W Maher, 'Tales of the Overt and the Covert, Judges and 
Politics in Early Cold War Australia' (1993) 21(2) Federal Law Review 151, 182-183; Winterton, 'The 
Significance of the Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 651-652; Anderson, above n 1380, 41-42; 
Lloyd, above n 879, 194. 
1566 Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellate Argument in the Communist Party Case', above n 18, 24. 
See Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 161, per Latham CJ. 
1567 1bid. See Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellant Argument in the Communist Party Case', above n 
18, 24. 
1568 Williams, 'Reading the Judicial Mind: Appellant Argument in the Communist Party Case', above n 18, 24. 
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Latham CJ's draft judgments and notes, 1569 show that he was critical of the Commonwealth's case 
presented by Barwick. In Lloyd's words: 
Latham implied that Barwick had made a major tactical error by basing his argument on two 
sections of the Act which permitted the Governor-General to make declarations about 
Communist organisations, unlawful associations and individual Communists. He felt that 
Barwick had made heavy weather out of using these declarations as a link with the defence 
power so as to validate the legislation. Barwick's action required 'tortured construction' of 
subsections of the Act, and he had encountered much difficulty in using those sections to 
establish a connection with defence ... Latham asserted scathingly that the defendants had 
shown no conception of the nature of executive and parliamentary power and 
responsibility.1570 
Latham CJ 'was just as critical of Barwick's efforts to use the recitals in the Act's preamble to provide 
the 'real connection"1571 and stated that '[a]lternatively the connection was to be found in the 
recitals, but the defendant's arguments on the recitals seemed to me to get nowhere'.'572 Although 
Chief Justice Latham found in favour of the Commonwealth, his comments suggest that he was not 
persuaded by Barwick's submission, but perhaps more fundamental convictions of his own regarding 
constitutional validity. 
Barwick greeted the decision with disappointment; this was his first brief to defend a major piece of 
legislation and he was unsuccessful. Although defending the validity of the Act was always going to 
be difficultfailure 'demonstrated weaknesses in his technique'.'"' However, based on the reception 
Barwick received from the Court, it seems clear that Barwick was always going to face considerable 
difficulty in attempting to persuade the Court of the constitutional validity of this legislation. 
As has been discussed above, although Barwick's advocacy conformed to the ideals of appellate 
advocacy at times, he did not reach this standard of excellence consistently throughout his 
submissions. It was his ability to achieve these ideals consistently in other cases which resulted in 
him being regarded as the leading advocate of his time. 
1569 Lloyd, above n 879, 201. 
1570 Ibid. 
1571 Ibid. 
1572 See National Library of Australia: Sir John Latham's Papers' MS 1009, Chief Justice, Series 62, Draft 
judgment, Item 978, 3; Lloyd, above n 879, 199-200. 
1573 Marr, above n 8, p.87. 
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There is a view that Barwick was more successful and effective when he was briefed to attack the 
validity of legislation rather than defend the validity of legislation. 1574 The result in this case certainly 
adds credence to this view, as does the observation by Mason: 
My view is that he was an outstanding deconstructive advocate in the sense that he was very 
effective in demolishing anothe~'s argument and identifying the perceived flaws in their 
argument. However, he was not as effective when presenting a constructive case. 1575 
In relation to this case, Marr suggests that: 
The central forensic challenge had been to sweep the court off its feet with the vision of the 
world on the brink of war but it hadn't worked. His ability to dissect legislation, to find the 
fatal technicality to bring an Act down, was not matched by an equal skill at knitting 
legislation schemes together in a persuasive way before a court. His technique of 
simplification, of finding a fresh and simple principle to support his argument when tracing a 
new path through the cases to develop the newly-discovered principle, did not really work in 
defence of large and complex pieces of legislative machinery" .1576 
According to Marr, to: 
defend the Communist Party Act by claiming that it was simply preventive, that the 
connection between 'declaration' and defence power need only be 'logical' and that troubles 
on the coal fields and in Korea were one and the same was, cumulatively, absurd.1577 
Marr's criticism of Barwick's arguments in this case echo (albeit more colourfully) the criticism of 
Chief Justice Latham and Justice Dixon. 
At the time of this case, it was clear that Justice Dixon exerted considerable influence over the other 
judges on the High Court. 1s78 If this was in any doubt, it was confirmed by the events leading up to 
the judgment being handed down.1579 Justice Dixon had formulated the fundamental components of 
1574 Sawer G, 'Absolutely Free Man', Nation, 4 June 1960, p.10, referred to in Marr, above n 8, p.88. See also 
Winterton, 'Barwick, Garfield Edward John', above n 2, p.57. 
1575 Interview with Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (Sydney, 21 August 
2006). 
1576 Transcript of Proceedings, The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia, 
above n 296, p.39 referred to in Marr, above n 8, p.88. 
1577 Ibid. 
1578 Chief Justice Dixon's influence over the other judges on the High Court increased when he assumed the 
Chief Justiceship in 1952. His influence was evident in the courtroom where the atmosphere became more 
civilised and less threatening as well as behind the scenes with his ability to unite and control the judges: see 
Fricke, above n 801, p.118. 
1579 On 13 December 1950, Chief Justice Latham read to Justice Dixon the opening section of the judgment he 
had been preparing. Justice Dixon stated: 'It sickened me, with its abnegation of the function of the Court & I 
said so'. Justice Dixon was a passionate advocate of the notion of judicial review, that is, the High Court's role 
under the Constitution to determine whether legislation was supported by the powers granted under the 
Constitution. Justice Fullagar held a similar view. However, based on the early draft of his judgment, Chief 
324 
his judgment whilst the case was being heard. Apparently, Chief Justice latham did not convene a 
meeting of the judges to discuss the case prior to the respective judgments being written. 1580 Justice 
Dixon discussed his views of the case with the other High Court judges, particularly Justice Fullagar 
and Justice Kitto, the two judges he respected the most. Both judges wrote their judgments 
throughout January and February 15151; Justice Dixon's views would have been foremost in their 
thinking during this time.1581 
Justice Dixon was highly critical of Barwick's arguments in this case and this view may have 
influenced the other judges. For this reason, Barwick's inability to convince Justice Dixon of the 
merits of the Commonwealth's case may have contributed significantly to him losing this case. This 
failure could be attributed to a combination of a number of factors, such as a lack of preparation, a 
failure to welcome judicial questions and comments, a failure to watch the bench and tailor his 
submissions accordingly as well as, possibly discourtesy and arrogance. All such factors represent a 
failure to achieve the ideals of appellate advocacy. 
There is an alternative explanation. It is clear that this case, probably more than any other in the 
High Court's history, was polarising, controversial and politically sensitive. As such, it could be 
suggested that the case was not decided purely on the arguments put forward by the respective 
counsel, or at the very least, with less reliance on counsel's arguments than usual. It is readily 
apparent that Justice Dixon could find no way to validate the Act, irrespective of Barwick's arguments 
Justice Latham did not hold the same view but was 'notoriously ambivalent' (see Owen Dixon, Diary, 11 
December 1950, Owen Dixon, Personal Papers; See Ayres, above n 50, p.221). Prior to the judgments being 
delivered, Chief Justice Latham circulated a memorandum to all the other judges. The 25 page memorandum 
defined the issues as Latham CJ saw them (see National Library of Australia: Sir John Latham's Papers' MS 1009, 
Chief Justice, Series 62, Memorandum, 11 January 1951; Lloyd, above n 879, 199-200). According to Justice 
Dixon, Justice Fullagar was concerned and upset by it. Meanwhile, Justice Kitto expressed concern for the 
mental state of Chief Justice Latham and 'whether it meant that he had something wrong with him' (Owen 
Dixon, Diary, 2 March 1951, Owen Dixon, Personal Papers- see Ayres, above n 50, p.223), while 'Dudley 
Williams considered him mad' (Owen Dixon, Diary, 2 March 1951, Owen Dixon, Personal Papers. See Ayres, 
above n 50, p.223). On 13 February 1951, Justice Dixon spoke to Justices McTiernan and Webb in relation to 
the case and discovered that they both 'vacillated'. Justice Fullagar had completed his draft judgment by 12 
February 1951 and provided it to Justice Dixon to read- he had concluded that the entire Act was invalid. In 
the meantime, external pressure was being exerted on Justice McTiernan to uphold the Act's validity. On 1 
March 1951, Justice Dixon read Justice Fullagar's revised judgment. Justice Dixon thought that it was very good 
and that he 'showed his view of Barwick's argument by ignoring it' (see Ayres, above n SO, pp.222-223). 
1580 At the end of 1951, Menzies and Justice Dixon discussed the case. According to Justice Dixon, Menzies: 
mentioned Comma case and said he was shocked on reading my judgment to find what I said[.] I answered it 
was presented only dialectically and Barwick had no general knowledge. We needed international facts. I 
added that latham had avoided having a cfce [conference]. He said he could understand him [because) he 
preferred to dissent like Isaacs. 
See Ayres, above n 50, pp.223-224. There is a suggestion that Chief Justice Latham generally opted not to have 
a conference as he preferred not to voice his arguments against Justice Dixon's in front of the other judges: see 
Ayres, above n 50, pp.223-224. 
1581 For example, see Owen Dixon, Diary, 15 December 1950, Owen Dixon, Personal Papers where Justice Dixon 
stated that 'Fullagar & Kitto came to dinner with me at 52 & we had a good talk about the case, on the lines I 
suggested, but inconclusive'. See also Ayres, above n 50, pp.221-222. 
325 
and, with this in mind, he wrote his judgment. Perhaps the other judges followed Justice Dixon's 
approach; there is certainly evidence that Justice Fullagar adopted a similar approach. Chief Justice 
Latham was profoundly opposed to communism- it has been said that 'he was obsessed by and 
loathed Communism'.1582 This was apparent from comments he had made, both during his time in 
Parliament and as Chief Justice. 158~ Latham also believed that Barwick's argument in this case was 
the worst he had ever heard from Barwick. Yet despite this, Chief Justice Latham found in favour of 
upholding the Act. This adds weight to the proposition that the case was not decided purely on the 
arguments advanced by counsel. Maher described Chief Justice Latham's judgment as 'an example 
of judicial policy preferences infected with partisan political sentiment' and a case 'in which he 
expressed himself with the deepest personal involvement and that this demonstrated an inadequate 
regard for fundamental liberties' -'584 
According to some, Justice Dixon disliked Barwick1585 and this may have affected the reception 
Barwick received from the other judges. For these reasons, it was always going to be difficult for 
Barwick's arguments to succeed. This was exacerbated by Barwick's inability to employ the elements 
of appellate advocacy at times and his failure to achieve the ideals of appellate advocacy at other 
times. 
Justice Dixon's dislike of Barwick continued after he became Chief Justice, and even possibly 
intensified.1586 In Ayres' words, Dixon thought Barwick 'a declared enemy ofthe Court and of himself 
in particular'.1587 In fact, Dixon lamented that he 'hated being a judge for such reasons'-'588 
1582 Lloyd, above n 879; Maher, 'Tales of the Overt and the Covert, Judges and Politics in Early Cold War 
Australia', above n 1565, 176. 
1583 See above n 1535. 
1584 Maher, 'Tales of the Overt and the Covert, Judges and Politics in Early Cold War Australia', above n 1565, 
153 and 200-201. See also Cowen, Sir John Latham And Other Papers, above n 400, pp.47-48. Maher also 
stated, in reference to Latham CJ's judgment that, 'both its structure and execution, it directly reflects the 
political rhetoric which Menzies had been using steadily since 1948' (at 178). Maher contended 'that Latham's 
willingness to defer to Parliament on this occasion only make sense when it is viewed in the context of 
Latham's long-held set of uncompromising anti-Communist beliefs and his anti-Communist activities prior to 
his appointment as Chief Justice' (at 178). Latham's dissent has also been described as 'almost incredulous' 
(Cowen, Sir John Latham And Other Papers, above n 400, p.43), 'forceful' (Galligan, above n 781, p.204) and 
'rather tired' (Winterton, 'The Significance of the Communist Party Case', above n 1379); see also Douglas, 'A 
Smallish Blow for Liberty? The Significance of the Community Party Case', above n 1383, 279. 
1585 In fact, it is suggested that Justice Dixon never liked Barwick: 
Dixon had a poor opinion of most of his fellow lawyers, and especially of his predecessor John latham 
and successor Garfield Barwick. He regarded latham as a usurper and was very curt with Menzies at 
the swearing-in. He never liked Barwick, who had often appeared before him as an advocate. 
See Frank Brennan, 'Tales from the Bench', <http:// http://www.eurekastreet.com.au/article.aspx?aeid:1204> 
at 7 March 2012, p.l. 
1586 Chief Justice Dixon recounted an occasion in mid-September 1952 where he, along with other judges of the 
High Court, as well as Barwick attended the Law Society dinner in Adelaide. Barwick proposed the toast of the 
Bar and the Bench 'in terms which threw me off balance. I tried to deal with the offensive undertones or 
implications of his speech but did it all badly. I felt tired off colour and worried at the sense of judicial failure 
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9.4 The Aftermath 
One observation in the aftermath of the case was that: 
Just as the Bank Nationalisatton Case dealt a blow to a major policy aim of the Chifley Labor 
Government, another milestone case -the Communist Party Case- dealt a blow to a major 
policy aim of the new Liberal Government led by Robert Menzies. 1589 
The result surprised Menzies. He responded by approaching the Governor-General, William McKell, 
for a double dissolution following Parliament's failure to pass the Commonwealth Bank Bill 1590 of 
Parliament to give him the opportunity to control both Houses of Parliament. His intention was then 
to hold a referendum to amend the Constitution and grant the Commonwealth increased power to 
address the communist threat, including passing the Act.'"' As a result, Menzies called an early 
election. The issue of communism dominated the election campaign."" The election was held on 
28 April1951 and the Menzies Liberal government was returned with control of the Senate.1593 
Menzies called a special Premiers Conference on 18 June 1951 to request that the states refer their 
powers to deal with communism to the Commonwealth but the Labor governments in NSW and 
Queensland refused to do so. 1s94 A referendum under section 128 of the Constitution was 
subsequently held on 22 September 1951; its objective was to alter the Constitution to enable the 
once more': Owen Dixon, Diary, 19-20 September 1952, Owen Dixon, Personal Papers. See Ayres, above n 50, 
p.235. 
1587 Ayres, above n 50, p.235. 
1588 Owen Dixon, Diary, 19-20 September 1952, Owen Dixon, Personal Papers. See Ayres, above n 50, p.235. 
1589 Hull, above n 783, p.28. In a memorandum of advice to the Solicitor-General following the Communist 
Party Case, Barwick wrote: 'I have re-read the judgments. I must confess that views which take so long to 
express, hedged round with so much explanation, naturally excite comment. However, let bygones be 
bygones. At least I have been patient enough to re-read them': Barwick to Bailey, 26 June 1951, National 
Archives of Australia (NAA): A467/1 BUN20/SF7/51. See Douglas, 'A Smallish Blow for Liberty? The Significance 
of the Community Party Case', above n 1383, 253. 
1590 Just a week after judgment was delivered in the Communist Party Case, and while Menzies was seeking a 
double dissolution, Latham informed the Government that he was taking a year's furlough and then retiring: 
Ayres, above n 50, p.224; Kirby, 'HV Evatt, The Anti-Communist Referendum and Liberty in Australia', above n 
1380,105. 
1591 Ayres, above n 50, pp.223-224. See also Hull, above n 783, pp.29-31; Fricke, above n 801, p.170. 
1592 \n Tasmania, the Liberal Party's campaign slogan was ,,Menzies or Moscow". 
1593 World War II hero, Nancy Wake, contested the seat of Barton against sitting member Evatt. Her campaign 
slogan was "I am the defender of freedom; Dr Evatt is the defender of communism". Evatt retained his seat by 
a mere 243 votes: See Williams, 'Communist Party Case', above n 77, p.123; Maher, 'Downunder McCarthyism: 
The Struggle Against Australian Communism 1945-1960: Part Two', above n 1379, 444. 
1594 Winterton, 'The Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 130. See also Maher, 'Tales of the Overt and the 
Covert, Judges and Politics in Early Cold War Australia', above n 1565, 189; Maher, 'Downunder McCarthyism: 
The Struggle Against Australian Communism 1945-1960: Part Two', above n 1379, 447; Douglas, 'A Smallish 
Blow for Liberty? The Significance of the Community Party Case', above n 1383, 282; Winterton, 'The 
Significance of the Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 654-655. 
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Commonwealth to ban the Communist Party and overcome the High Court's decision in the 
Communist Party Case.1595 
The referendum failed by a narrow margin- 2,317,927 'Yes' votes to 2,370,009 'No' votes, 1596 and 
failed to be carried in a majority of States. Menzies was disappointed with the result. Nevertheless, 
the anti-communist measures suosequently adopted by his government contributed to the 
membership of the Communist Party declining, and it was voluntarily disbanded in December 
1989.1597 
1595 It has been suggested that Menzies received the assistance of Chief Justice Latham when drafting the 
constitutional amendments. Sir Earle Page, a senior minister in the Menzies Government, approached Latham 
to advise on the relevant constitutional amendment who responded that he had already had an informal talk 
with Prime Minister Menzies: see Lloyd, above n 879, 202; Kirby, 'HV Evatt, The Anti-Communist Referendum 
and Liberty in Australia', above n 1380, 116; Williams, 'Communist Party Case', above n 77, p.123. See also 
Hull, above n 783, pp.29-31; Fricke, above n 801, p.170; Michael Sexton & Laurence W Maher, 'The Secret 
Seven: The High Court of Australia', in Michael Sexton and Laurence W Maher, The Legal Mystique: The Role of 
Lawyers in Australian Society, (1982), Angus & Robertson, Sydney, pp.39-40; Maher, 'Downunder McCarthyism: 
The Struggle Against Australian Communism 1945-1960: Part Two', above n 1379, 445; Kirby, 'HV Evatt, The 
Anti-Communist Referendum and Liberty in Australia', above n 1380, 106. 
1596 Hull, above n 783, pp.29-31; Winterton, 'The Communist Party Case', above n 1379, 131; See also Williams, 
'Communist Party Case', above n 77, p.123; Maher, 'Downunder McCarthyism: The Struggle Against Australian 
Communism 1945-1960: Part Two', above n 1379, 444-446; Douglas, 'A Smallish Blow for Liberty? The 
Significance of the Community Party Case', above n 1383, 282; Douglas, 'Cold War Justice? Judicial Responses 
to Communists and Communism, 1945-1955', above n 1379, 51; Winterton, 'The Significance of the Communist 
Party Case', above n 1379, 654-655. 
1597 Williams, 'Communist Party Case', above n 77, pp.123-124. See also Hull, above n 783, pp.29-31. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
"He was obviously very sharp; and the stories go that he had a great ability to pick out just the right 
example at the right time. He was the sort of advocate who could always pick a point that would 
serve to demonstrate his argument io a way that just made it seem right, he seemed to have that 
knack. And if you read some of his advocacy from some af the earlier cases, say early on from the 
Banking Nationalisation case, you'll also see that he had an immense rapport with the judges 
themselves. He seemed almost to be able to work out what was the best line to take to pull the 
disparate judges on the High Court together. And he was just immensely persuasive, in a way that 
say some other advocates, particularly Evatt, when he appeared in the same case, the Banking 
Nationalisation case, was not. Evatt seemed more to antagonise the Bench, whereas Barwick was 
very much almost on their side and simply leading to them what was obviously the right result". 
Professor George Williams, 19971598 
The core question which this thesis sets out to answer is whether Sir Garfield Barwick's reputation as 
one of Australia's greatest appellate advocates, especially in constitutional law cases, was justified. 
This required an examination of the elements of effective appellate advocacy focusing on Barwick's 
advocacy in constitutional law cases, particularly, the Bank Nationalisation Case and the Communist 
Party Case. 
Specifically, this was undertaken by: 
1. establishing a methodology for assessing appellate advocacy following the critical 
exploration of the elements of appellate advocacy and the identification of the ideals of 
appellate advocacy; 
2. employing this methodology for the purposes of assessing the appellate advocacy of a 
leading appellate advocate and using this to contrast the ideals of appellate advocacy to 
appellate advocacy in reality; 
3. providing an insight into Barwick's advocacy in the lead-up to, and in, the Bank 
Nationalisation Case; and 
4. providing an insight into Barwick's advocacy in the lead-up to, and in, the Communist Party 
Case. 
The thesis attempted to identify 'effective appellate advocacy'; that is, the ability to apply, employ or 
adhere to the elements of appellate advocacy in reality in a manner that approximates the ideals of 
1598 ABC Radio National, 'The Adversarial System' The Law Report, 15 July 1997, 
<http://www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/8.30/lawrpt/lstories/lr970715.htm> at 18 November 2004, pp.1-2. 
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appellate advocacy or typifies exemplary appellate advocacy to the extent possible. As discussed in 
the Introduction, effective appellate advocacy does not necessarily equate to success in terms of 
winning. 
From the material relating to advocacy and appellate advocacy emerged a number of elements of 
appellate advocacy (that is, the basic and fundamental principles of appellate advocacy) and a 
number of ideals (that is, the ability to apply, employ or adhere to those principles in a manner that 
exhibit standards of perfection or excellence). The most revealing aspect of the research was the 
almost universal acknowledgment of the elements and the ideals amongst judges, former judges, 
barristers and legal commentators, based on their respective research, experiences, observations 
and anecdotes. It is this confluence of thought and commonality of perspectives about appellate 
advocacy that this thesis attempted to capture and classify. 
The process of developing the methodology resulted in the identification of the elements of 
appellate advocacy and the ideals of appellate advocacy. In light of the crucial role that appellate 
advocates play in the legal system and the administration of justice, recognising the elements and 
aspiring to attain the ideals of appellate advocacy, will result in effective appellate advocacy as well 
as facilitate the efficient and effective administration of justice. Ultimately, this serves the greater 
public interest. 
Relevant background information about Barwick's advocacy and his early years at the Bar provided 
an insight into the manner in which he developed and acquired an understanding of the elements 
and ideals of appellate advocacy. It also provided a foundation for analysing his advocacy specifically 
with reference to the ideals captured in the 'three category analysis'. 
Barwick acquired early the ability to conceptualise a case and reduce complex propositions into 
simple terms. This was a key feature of his advocacy throughout his career. Ironically, during his 
early years at the Bar, he received feedback that his submissions were often too brief. It was also in 
his early years of practising in the High Court that he experienced rigorous judicial questioning of 
advocates, a style he enjoyed. Later, Barwick's interaction with the Court became a hallmark of his 
appellate advocacy as well as being a key element and ideal of appellate advocacy. During his early 
years at the Bar, Barwick recognised and applied many of the elements of appellate advocacy. 
Barwick's 'ground up' approach was the cornerstone of his preparation. It ensured a thorough and 
meticulous presentation which prepared him for presenting his case as well as gave him confidence. 
However, the reality of appellate advocacy which Barwick experienced was that often a detailed or 
comprehensive preparation was not possible. He acknowledged this but he also developed the 
ability to listen to his opponent and work on the next case. 
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Barwick's confidence and knowledge of the law and relevant procedure, however, led to occasional 
bouts of arrogance, and even occasions where he appears to have shown a lack of respect for the 
court. 
While Barwick placed great emphasis on knowing the court and the likely attitudes of each judge, 
this knowledge was only effective if, in practice, judges approached similar issues consistently. 
Barwick's ability to conceptualise a case in simple terms and advance succinct arguments was 
exceptional and he often used his opening as an opportunity to conceptualise the case. In reality, 
the danger was over-simplifying certain issues and not accurately conveying the totality of the 
relevant issue. His reply was more controversial, due to his renowned technique of 'trailing his coat'. 
Whilst this worked on occasions for Barwick and allowed him to have the 'last say', in reality, it was a 
questionable (some may say underhanded) tactic and unlikely to be available or tolerated in modern 
day appellate advocacy. 
In his presentation, Barwick focused on the substance and was not considered an elegant advocate. 
He thrived on judicial dialogue and generally welcomed questions from the bench. He used his 
response to questions as an opportunity to clarify and reiterate his main propositions. He often 
employed useful illustrations or analogies when doing so. He considered the questions an insight 
into the thinking of the judges. He cited authority with care by extracting the relevant principle for 
the benefit of the court rather than reading long passages from a judgment. His ability to do so was 
aided generally by his comprehensive preparation. 
Courage is an aspect of personation and Barwick demonstrated this in his advocacy. He was willing 
to disagree with judges and engage in fiery exchanges when the situation warranted. This was 
widely admired. However, he was not always tactful and he was on occasions perceived as 
discourteous and arrogant. This relates to the next aspect of personation, namely, honesty, respect 
and candour. Whilst Barwick was considered honest, his combative and argumentative character led 
to him being considered disrespectful at times. 
Barwick generally controlled his emotions and maintained objectivity. However, at least one 
anecdote reveals a loss of temper and another, where Barwick caused another advocate to lose 
control of his emotions. 
Barwick's ability in terms of 'the extras' also aided his advocacy, particularly his presentation. His 
voice was not a feature although many found it sufficiently interesting. However, he was skilled in 
the use of language and spent considerable time during the preparation phase considering his choice 
of language. His use of wit occurred mainly through sarcasm and led to acidic or acerbic comments 
on occasions. Despite not being tall, he had a presence which derived from his confidence, much of 
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which can be traced back to his comprehensive preparation. His exceptional memory allowed him to 
process and recall enormous amounts of information and then use it effectively during his 
submissions or in response to judicial questions. 
Barwick's presentation in the Bank Natiana/isation Case included effectively all the elements of 
appellate advocacy identified (in relation to presentation and personation) and his presentation 
largely conformed to the ideals of appellate advocacy. His presentation also demonstrated the 
effectiveness of his preparation. 
His submissions were characterised by his ability to conceptualise complex concepts in simple terms 
and utilise answers to judicial questions as a means of conveying his arguments and his submissions. 
His submissions were primarily delivered during the course of judicial dialogue and he adopted a 
'pleasant conversational style' when doing so. He employed examples and analogy to great effect to 
support his arguments, to attack his opponent's arguments or to respond to judicial questions. He 
also repeated his submissions periodically to reinforce the main tenets of his argument. 
His submissions included selective use of humour and sarcasm which he used to great effect. He 
cited authority with care, including the clever technique of referring the judges to their previous 
statements on relevant issues. When, at one point, his references to a series of cases seemed to 
irritate the judges, Barwick detected this and initially persisted, but then ceased. 
Barwick also referred the Court to Evatt's previous statements as a judge of the High Court since he 
was now representing the interests of Commonwealth in this case. This last aspect demonstrates 
that advocacy in reality sometimes presents unexpected opportunities which can be capitalised 
upon. 
Barwick seemed to control his emotions at all time, even where he was subject to intense judicial 
interrogation. He handled such instances delicately, exercising flexibility, discretion and tact as 
required. However, he also demonstrated courage to maintain his key arguments. He utilised 
language appropriately, including powerful language when required, and referred to the policy 
implications in upholding the validity of the legislation. He did, however, engage in what was 
described as 'psychological warfare' to distract Evatt and possibly other counsel. This may be 
considered an underhanded tactic designed to derive an advantage and one that does not conform 
to the ideals. 
Overall, Barwick's advocacy in the Bank Nationalisation Case was consistent with the ideals of 
appellate advocacy, despite the fact that he did not succeed on every argument. 
When Barwick was briefed to appear in the Bank Nationa/isation Case before the Privy Council, a 
significant amount of his preparation had already been done in the lead-up to the case in the High 
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Court. Following the special leave application, Barwick remained in London and prepared for the 
hearing for almost five months. His presentation suffered initially as a result ofthe discomfort he 
experienced in the unfamiliar surroundings and was also affected by the non-interventionist 
approach of the judges. However, he quickly adopted a different posture and started feeling more 
comfortable in the surroundings, evan responding to a judge in a humorous way and altering the 
atmosphere of the courtroom. This indicates how an element of appellate advocacy such as wit can 
be used effectively to assist in altering the dynamic of advocacy and, in doing so, attains the status of 
an ideal of appellate advocacy. 
Barwick's presentation was also characterised by other elements and ideals of appellate advocacy 
such as flexibility, his ability to refer to the policy implications of upholding the validity of the 
legislation, as well as his ability to conceptualise the case by advancing propositions in a clear and 
concise manner. The many who witnessed Barwick's advocacy in the special leave application also 
confirmed its effectiveness and their plaudits included references to a number of the elements and 
ideals of appellate advocacy. 
Barwick used the opening to outline the structure of his submissions then succinctly conceptualised 
the difference between the two parties. His style of presentation had to adjust to the Privy Council 
where the judges would ask questions infrequently and he seized upon any question asked. 
Barwick's advocacy required him to demonstrate courage and tact on occasions to disagree with 
judges for the purposes of maintaining the key aspects of his arguments. At times, he employed 
powerful language to enhance the persuasive effect of his submissions. As he had become 
renowned for, he was able to draw upon relevant examples or analogies to illustrate a point and 
assist the Privy Council to understand, and be persuaded by, his submissions. 
In his submissions, it became necessary for Barwick to assist the judges of the Privy Council navigate 
the case law with respect to section 92. In doing so, he was able to cite authority with care, 
providing sufficient information to allow the judges to gain an understanding of the relevance of the 
case law without providing excessive or tedious information. However, on occasions, Barwick failed 
to get this balance right which led to him reading long passages from previous judgments. 
Again, the assessment of Barwick's advocacy in the Bank Nationa/isation Case before the Privy 
Council suggests that it was consistent with the ideals of appellate advocacy. However, some of the 
strategic decisions Barwick made in preparation may not have been sound, although these did not 
affect the final outcome. This also illustrates the difficulties associated with appellate advocacy in 
reality where it is difficult to predict, with any level of certainty, the extent to which an appellate 
court will be persuaded by certain judgments of other courts. 
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Barwick's advocacy in the Communist Party Case was characterised by its inconsistency. At times, he 
employed and applied the elements and ideals of appellate advocacy, whereas at other times, he 
failed to do so and even acted inconsistently with the ideals of appellate advocacy. 
His advocacy in this case reveals a less than thorough preparation. Unlike his preparation in the Bank 
Nationalisation Case, Barwick was engaged at a relatively late stage and had to prepare amongst his 
other commitments. Consequently, his preparation was limited. This also highlights the reality of 
appellate advocacy. In addition, Barwick's preparation was not assisted by having already been 
involved in a series of relevant cases as he had been in the lead up to the Bank Nationa/isation Case. 
At times, Barwick's presentation lacked its usual persuasiveness. One of the notable features of this 
case was his failure to detect key messages from the judges and tailor his submissions accordingly; at 
times, instead he appeared obstinate and inflexible. Rather than welcoming judicial interruptions 
and engaging the Court in dialogue, he seemed to become impatient with such questions, and 
appeared almost to resent judicial comments or questions. He was also too focused on returning to 
his planned order of submissions rather than weaving his submissions into his responses. On 
occasions, Barwick failed to address the concerns of the judges and appeared arrogant. He also used 
sarcasm in response to some questions and in his submissions generally. 
In addition, although Barwick's knowledge of the Court was significant he failed to appreciate the 
influence that Justice Dixon exerted over the other members of the Court. This must be counted as 
one of Barwick's major miscalculations. The possibility remains, however, that, even if Barwick had 
adopted the line of reasoning offered by Justice Dixon he may still have been unsuccessful. This also 
highlights another one of the difficulties with appellate advocacy in reality; it is often difficult to 
know or appreciate the other factors that may influence the judges or that may bear upon a decision. 
At various times, however, Barwick did demonstrate a close adherence to the elements of appellate 
advocacy as well as the ideals of appellate advocacy. He conceptualised his case and key 
propositions succinctly and with both simplicity and clarity; he cited authority with care and referred 
the judges to their previous statements on relevant issues; he referred the Court to the policy 
implications of invalidating the legislation; he used humour and emotion appropriately; he employed 
powerful language to convey to the Court the threat posed by communism, and regularly employed 
compelling analogies to demonstrate his point. Generally, he would respond to judicial questions 
immediately and, where possible, sought to convey his submissions via his answers. There were 
some occasions however, where Barwick could not respond immediately and indicated that he would 
return to the question at a later point but never did so. He was required to demonstrate courage on 
a number of occasions in the face of judicial interrogation; however, this is where he appeared to 
become increasingly frustrated. 
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Overall, in relation to the Communist Party Case, he failed consistently to apply the elements of 
effective appellate advocacy, or attain the ideals. 
Following the Communist Party Case, Barwick continued to appear in a range of constitutional cases 
in the High Court and Privy Council until winding down his practice after becoming a federal member 
of Parliament in 1958. In this period, he continued to achieve great success in constitutional cases 
(for example, Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales (1954}1599} and also appeared for ASIO in 
the Royal Commission on Espionage (1954-55}. The earlier reference to the Privy Council noting 
down his propositions word for word was evidence of his ongoing success and exceptional 
reputation. Barwick's success post-Communist Party Case indicates that his performance in the 
Communist Party Case was most certainly uncharacteristic. 
Overview 
The assessment of Barwick's appellate advocacy using the 'three category analysis' in the Bank 
Nationalisation Case and the Communist Party Case, reveals that Barwick was an accomplished 
appellate advocate who regularly and almost routinely applied the elements and ideals of appellate 
advocacy. The Bank Nationalisation Case in both the High Court and Privy Council demonstrated his 
ability to apply, employ and adhere to the elements of appellate advocacy, and conform largely to 
the ideals. It was indeed the high watermark of Barwick's career. Barwick demonstrated a similar 
ability, albeit less consistently, in the Communist Party Case and at times acted contrary to the 
elements of effective appellate advocacy. It is not possible, however, to know to what extent his 
less-than-effective advocacy impacted upon the ultimate result. 
Barwick's performance in both cases, as well as an assessment of his overall approach, suggest that 
his reputation as one of Australia's greatest appellate advocates was justified. 
However, this assessment has to be considered in its historical context. There are a number of 
reasons for this. Barwick's period at the Bar during the late 1930s and early 1940s was uninterrupted 
by military service; there were fewer barristers (although some would also argue that there was 
proportionately less work} and few (if any} female barristers. 1600 
1599 93 CLR 1. See also Hughes & Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales (1953) 87 CLR 49 and Hughes & Vale Pty Ltd v 
New South Wales {No 2) (1955) 93 CLR 127. 
1600 According to statistics provided by the NSW Bar Association on 25 July 2011, at the time Barwick was: 
1. admitted to the Bar in 1927- there were only 2 female barristers admitted (it is not recorded how 
many of these were still practising); 
2. appointed Senior Counsel in 1941- there were 7 female barristers admitted (unknown how many of 
these were still practising); 
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In addition, as outlined earlier, appellate advocacy in the years that Barwick was at the Bar was 
conducted in an atmosphere different from today. Today there is more reliance on written 
submissions and therefore less opportunity for oral advocacy; also, in many jurisdictions, time limits 
are now imposed on appellate advocates. In many respects, the greater dependence on written 
advocacy has led, in the view of som&, to the decline in the skills associated with rhetoric and 
persuasion compared with appellate advocates in the past who enjoyed frequent opportunities to 
practise and refine these skills. 
However, the elements and ideals of appellate advocacy that have been explored {and contrasted to 
reality as appropriate), are as relevant today as they were at the time Barwick practised at the Bar. 
Whilst the pendulum may have swung from a greater reliance on oral advocacy to written advocacy, 
many of the elements and ideals of appellate advocacy are equally applicable to written submissions. 
For example, it remains important that an advocate conceptualise their case in simple terms. More 
importantly, with the reduced opportunity to engage in oral advocacy, some of the elements and 
ideals have assumed even greater significance as appellate advocates have a narrower 'window' by 
which to convince an appellate court. For this reason, elements and ideals such as conceptualising 
the case, the use of opening and reply and watching the bench, are arguably now of greater 
significance and importance than ever. 
This discussion inevitably leads to the question: would Barwick's ability as an appellate advocate 
have ensured success in the present day environment? In my view, the question can be answered in 
the affirmative since many of the strengths and features of his advocacy are still regarded as 
elements and ideals of appellate advocacy in the modern appellate advocacy setting. Nevertheless, 
for Barwick to be an effective appellate advocate in the current environment, he would have to 
adapt his style to the time limits imposed and the greater reliance on written submissions. In saying 
this, in light of Barwick's ability to adapt his style of advocacy, as evidenced in the Privy Council in the 
context of the Bank Nationa/isation Case, one would expect he would have little difficulty doing so. 
In conclusion, Sir Garfield Barwick was regarded as one of Australia's greatest appellate advocates 
because his style of advocacy incorporated the key elements and ideals of appellate advocacy and, to 
some extent, his success as an advocate, can be traced to a close adherence to these elements and 
ideals. His reputation as one of Australia's greatest appellate advocates this thesis concludes was 
justified. 
3. involved in the Bank Nationalisation Case- there were 12 female barristers admitted (unknown how 
many of these were still practising); and 
4. involved in the Communist Party Case- there were 15 female barristers admitted (unknown how many 
of these were still practising). 
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Barwick's advocacy, is best encapsulated by the following passage from the eulogy delivered by 
Robert Ellicott at Barwick's State Memorial Service in July 1997: 
Much has been written of Barwick as an advocate. I have tried to sum it up by saying that 
Barwick was to advocacy what Bradman was to cricket. On a number of occasions I 
appeared against him but only .once with him. 
His memory, his rapier fine intellect, his 'indomitable spirit' as Jim Killen recently described 
it, his will to win, led him constantly to pursue his clients' interests through excellence in his 
advocacy and, to an extent rarely seen in others. He was not flamboyant. Rather he was 
quiet, incisive, extremely persuasive and he always had an answer for the Bench. He was 
cocky at times and could be scathing in his criticisms of the opponent's case. You always 
knew you had a fight on your hands. He was one of several Australians of his generation 
who performed at the cutting edge of excellence. They were intensely independent and 
committed Australians, unstoppable in their chosen endeavours and pathfinders for others-
men like Kingsford-Smith, Bradman and Mawson. Barwick as an advocate was, I think, in 
that mould.1601 
1601 P. W. Young, 'Sir Garfield Barwick' (1997) 71(9) Australian Law Journa/653, 653. 
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Appendix A 
At the time of Barwick's death in July 1997, many prominent persons reflected on his life and 
inevitably his advocacy. Despite these tributes occurring in an eulogistic setting, the comments 
pertaining to Barwick's reputation are supported by the sources. At his State Memorial Service, Bob 
Ellicott QC in his eulogy, gave the following fitting tribute: 
Much has been written of Barwick as an advocate. I have tried to sum it up by saying that 
Barwick was to advocacy what Bradman was to cricket . 
... He was one of several Australians of his generation who performed at the cutting edge of 
excellence. They were intensely independent and committed Australians, unstoppable in 
their chosen endeavours and pathfinders for others- men like Kingsford-Smith, Bradman 
and Mawson. Barwick as an advocate was, I think, in that mould. We will not see the like of 
any of them again.1602 
The Governor-General at the time, Sir William Deane, described Barwick as 'probably the leading 
appellant advocate our country has produced'.1603 Sir John Kerr described Barwick's achievements at 
the Bar as 'brilliant achievements as a barrister' .1604 The President of the NSW Bar Association at the 
time, Mr David Bennett QC, paid tribute to the late Sir Garfield Barwick and stated that he ' ... was, 
with little doubt, the greatest advocate this country has ever produced'. The then Prime Minister, 
The Honourable John Howard, paid tribute to Barwick in a speech in the House of Representatives. 
He stated: 
Before he entered federal politics, Sir Garfield had already established a remarkable career 
as a pre-eminent barrister and advocate, and as an undisputed leader of the Australian bar. 
I doubt that, in the period since World War II, anybody has so dominated so completely the 
Australian bar as did Barwick at the time of his entry into federal politics in 1958. You can 
reel off any other names you like but none would go within a bull's roar of the ascendancy 
that Barwick had established within the legal fraternity of Australia at the bar when he 
entered parliament in 1958.1605 
At the time Barwick entered parliament, the then young member for Werriwa, Mr Whitlam 
made the following remarks following Sir Garfield's maiden speech: 
1602 Ibid. 
1603 Winterton, 'Barwick the Judge', n 701, 25. 
1604 Kerr, above n 116, p.35. 
1605 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 25 August 1997, 6694-6696 (John 
Howard, Prime Minister). This was followed by a speech from the Honourable Kim Beazley, Leader of the 
Opposition, at Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 25 August 1997, 6696-6697. 
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Honourable members have listened to the maiden speech of the greatest lawyer to enter 
this chamber since the Leader of the Opposition (Dr Evatt), and the greatest advocate to 
enter it since the Prime Minister (Mr Menzies).1606 
Subsequently, Whitlam also considered Barwick 'the most successful barrister in Australian 
history'.'607 
Justice Peter Young observed that: 
There will never be another Sir Garfield Barwick. Of course, we are all unique. I mean 
something more than that. He was a true one-off original- in most respects never to be 
repeated. There are many people in public life of whom one could say- the original thing 
about them is original sin- all their ideas are borrowed. 1608 
Barwick has also been described as 'the most brilliant advocate of his generation .. .' .''09 
Ray Reynolds, a former Judge of Appeal, in his obituary emphasised Sir Garfield Barwick's dazzling 
career as counsel. Ray Reynolds concluded, 'He was in every respect, a great counsel. The Bar of 
NSW will claim him as their own long and proudly'. 1610 In a statement released by the Law Council of 
Australia following Barwick's death, they described him as' ... a great barrister; probably the leading 
appellant advocate our country has produced' .'611 
1606 Referred to in Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 25 August 1997, 6756-
6759 (Ross Cameron, Member for Parramatta). 
1607 E.G. Whitlam Sydney Morning Herald, 23 May 1980, p.7. 
1608 Young, 'Sir Garfield Barwick', above n 1601, 654. 
1609 J H Kennan, 'Review of Sir John Did His Duty' (1984) 14 Melbourne University Law Review 735, 735. 
1610 Young, 'Sir Garfield Barwick', above n 1601, 653. 
1611 Law Council of Australia, 'Law Council Saddened by Loss of Sir Garfield Barwick', (Press Release, 15 July 
1997) <www.lawcouncil.asn.au/read/1997/1957000625.html> at 9 November 2005. 
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Appendix B 
Some of the key provisions of the Banking Act 1947 (Cth) were as follows: 
• Section 3 outlined the objects of the Act as: 
(a) the expansion of the banking business of the Commonwealth Bank as a publicly-owned 
bank conducted in the interests of the people of Australia and not for private profit; 
(b) the taking over by the Commonwealth Bank of the banking business in Australia of private 
banks and the acquisition on just terms of property used in that business; 
(c) the prohibition of the carrying on of banking business in Australia by private banks. 
• Section 6 provided that if any provision of this Act was inconsistent with the Constitution, that 
provision and all the other provisions of this Act shall nevertheless operate to the full extent to 
which they can operate consistently with the Constitution.1612 
• Section 13 empowered the Treasurer to publish a notice in the Gazette declaring that, as at a 
particular date, the shares in a private bank are to be vested in the Commonwealth Bank. 
• Section 14 provided that the Commonwealth Bank was to be the holder of the shares and could 
transfer those shares. 
• Section 15 stated that the Commonwealth Bank was to pay 'fair and reasonable compensation' 
for the acquisition of those shares. Under sections 37-41, the amount of compensation was, 
unless agreed to, determined by the Federal Court of Claims. 
• Section 17 provided that the directors of the Australian private bank in relation to the shares in 
which the notice was given were to cease to hold office. Section 18 provided that the Governor 
of the Commonwealth Bank, with the approval of the Treasurer, could appoint directors for the 
relevant Australian private bank. Under section 19, the newly appointed directors would have 
full power to manage, direct and control the business and affairs of the Australian private bank. 
• Section 24 provided for the business of an Australian Bank to be compulsorily taken over by the 
Commonwealth Bank and all its assets and liabilities to be vested in the Commonwealth Bank. 
Under section 25, the Commonwealth Bank was required to pay 'fair and reasonable 
compensation' in relation to the acquisition of property. Under sections 42-45, the amount of 
compensation was to be agreed between the Commonwealth Bank and the Australian private 
bank or determined by the Federal Court of Claims. 
1612 Co per described this as 'one of the widest severability clauses conceivable': see Co per, Freedom of 
Interstate Trade under the Australian Constitution, above n 822, p.92. 
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• Section 46 provided that the Treasurer could, by notice published in the Gazette and given in 
writing to a private bank, require a private bank to cease carrying on banking business in 
Australia.1613 
1613 Sawer described the prohibition of non-government banking in section 46 as 'part of a complex programme 
for vesting the business of the non-government banks in the Commonwealth Bank, and then confining banking 
business to government-owned institutions': Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts, above n 295, p.114. 
See also May, above n 778, pp.65-76; Blainey and Hutton, above n 783, pp.230-231; Hull, above n 783, p.25; 
Weerasooria, above n 777, 78-79; Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law {1929-1949}, above n 143, 
pp.194-195; Crisp, Ben Chif/ey: A Political Biography, above n 783, pp.333-334. At the time, there were 14 
named private banks in existence. 
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Appendix C 
In relation to the Bank Nationa/isation Case before the High Court, the parties in the respective 
actions and their respective Counsel were as follows: 
The Bank of New South Wales and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia and Ors 
Counsel for the plaintiffs: Mr G E Barwick KC and Dr E G Coppel KC (with them Mr AD G Adam, Mr R 
M Eggleston, Mr RAsh burner and Mr R B Riley). 
Counsel for the defendants: Dr H V Evatt KC (Attorney-General), Professor K H Bailey {Solicitor-
General) and Mr C A Weston KC (with them Mr J D Holmes and Mr D G Benjafield). 
The Bank of Australasia and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia and Ors 
Counsel for the plaintiffs: Mr F W Kitto KC, Mr A R Taylor KC, Mr A Dean KC (with them MrS Lewis, 
Mr J A Spicer and Mr T W Smith). 
Counsel for the defendants: Dr H V Evatt KC, Professor K H Bailey and Mr H H Mason KC (with them 
Mr B P Macfarlan). 
The State of Victoria and Anor v The Commonwealth of Australia and Ors 
Counsel for the plaintiffs: Mr E H Hudson KC (with him Mr D I Menzies). 
Counsel for the defendants: Dr H V Evatt KC, Professor K H Bailey and Mr J V Tait KC (with them Mr G 
Gowans). 
The State of South Australia and Anor v The Commonwealth of Australia and Ors 
Counsel for the plaintiffs: Mr A J Hannan KC ·(with him Mr K J Healy). 
Counsel for the defendants: Dr H V Evatt KC, Professor K H Bailey, Mr P D Phillips KC (with them Mr C 
I Menhennitt). 
The State of Western Australia and Anor v The Commonwealth of Australia and Ors 
Counsel for the plaintiffs: Mr A J Hannan KC (with him Mr K J Healy). 
Counsel for the defendants: Dr H V Evatt KC, Professor K H Bailey, Mr P D Phillips KC (with them Mr C 
I Menhennitt). 
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In relation to the special leave application in the Bank Nationa/isation Case before the Privy Council, 
the parties and their respective Counsel were as follows: 
1. The Right Hen. H.V. Evatt, K.C. (Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia), Professor 
K.H. Bailey (Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia), Mr D.N. Pritt, K.C., Mr P.D. 
Phillips, K.C. (of the Australian l!ar), Mr Frank Gahan, The Hen. H.L. Parker and Mr C. I. 
Menhennitt (of the Australian Bar), instructed by Messrs Coward, Chance & Co., (Agents for 
Mr H.F.E. Whitlam, Crown Solicitor for the Commonwealth of Australia) appeared for the 
petitioners; 
2. Sir Cyril Radcliffe, K.C., Dr E.G. Cappel, K.C. (of the Australian Bar), Sir Valentine Holmes, K.C. and 
Mr B.J.N. McKenna (instructed by Messrs Linklaters & Paines (Agents for Messrs Allen Allen & 
Hemsley of Sydney, New South Wales) appeared for the Bank of New South Wales and Others; 
3. Sir Walter Monckton, K.C., Mr G.E. Barwick, K.C. (of the Australian Bar), Mr F.W. Kitto, K.C. (of 
the Australian Bar) and Mr Kenneth Diplock, K.C., instructed by Messrs Farrer & Co., appeared 
for the Bank of Australasia, instructed by Messrs Bircham & Co., for the Union Bank of Australia 
Ltd, instructed by Messrs Slaughter & May for the English, Scottish and Australian Bank, Ltd; and 
4. Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, K.C., Mr D.l. Menzies (of the Australian Bar) and Mr J.H. Barrington, 
instructed by Messrs Freshfields, appeared for the States of Victoria, South Australia and 
Western Australia. 
In relation to the Bank Nationalisation Case before the Privy Council, the parties in the respective 
actions and their respective Counsel were as follows: 
1. The Right Hen. H.V. Evatt, K.C. (Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia), Professor 
K.H. Bailey (Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia), Mr D.N. Pritt, K.C., 
Mr P.D. Phillips, K.C. (of the Australian Bar), Mr Frank Gahan, The Hen. H.L. Parker and Mr C. I. 
Menhennitt (of the Australian Bar) instructed by Messrs Coward, Chance & Co., appeared for 
the appellants; 
2. Sir Cyril Radcliffe, K.C., Dr E.G. Cappel, K.C. (of the Australian Bar), Sir Valentine Holmes, K.C. and 
Mr B.J.N. McKenna (instructed by Messrs Linklaters & Paines, appeared for the Bank of New 
South Wales and Others; 
3. Sir Walter Monckton, K.C., Mr G.E. Barwick, K.C. (of the Australian Bar), Mr F.W. Kitto, K.C. (of 
the Australian Bar) and Mr Kenneth Diplock, K.C., instructed by Messrs Farrer & Co., appeared 
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for the Bank of Australasia, instructed by Messrs Bircham & Co., for the Union Bank of Australia 
Ltd, instructed by Messrs Slaughter & May for the English, Scottish and Australian Bank, Ltd; 
4. The Rt. Hon. Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, K.C. and Mr Douglas I. Menzies (of the Australian Bar) 
instructed by Messrs Freshfields, appeared for the State of Victoria; 
5. Mr A.J. Hannan, K.C. C.M.G (of the Australian Bar) and Mr J. Harcourt Barrington (instructed by 
Messrs Freshfields) appeared for the States of South Australia and Western Australia; and 
6. Mr D.N. Pritt, K.C. and Mr Frank Gahan (instructed by Messrs Light & Fulton) appeared for the 
Interveners, the States of New South Wales and Queensland. 
Grounds of challenge 
l(a). The Act is not a law with 
respect to banking (section 51(xiii)) 
l(b). The Act is not a law with 
respect to acquisition for lawful 
purpose (section 51(xxxi)) 
2. Acquisition, management and 
prohibition contrary to the absolute 
freedom of section 92 
3. Acquisition infringes just terms 
requirement of section 51(xxxi) 
4. Infringes constitutional integrity 
of the States 
5. Violates Financial Agreement 
between Commonwealth and 
States under section 105A 
Key: 1614 
X 
./ 
0 
• 
= 
= 
= 
= 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Not decided 
With reservations 
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Appendix D 
Latham McTiernan Dixon Starke 
X X X X 
X X X* X** 
X X v"'*** ./ 
Partly Partly Virtually all Virtually all 
X X X X 
X X X X 
•• 
••• 
= 
= 
section Sl(xxxix) needed as well to support takeover of bank liabilities 
prohibition only 
1614 Galligan, above n 781, p.174. 
Rich & 
Williams 
./ ./ 
./ ./ 
./ ./ 
./ ./ 
0 0 
./ ./ 
351 
Appendix E 
In relation to the Communist Party Case before the High Court, the parties in the respective actions 
and their respective Counsel were as follows: 
The Australian Communist Party and Ors v The Commonwealth of Australia and Ors 
Counsel for the plaintiffs: Mr Paterson, Mr Laurie, Mr Julius and Mr Hill. 
The Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia and Healy v The Commonwealth of Australia and 
Ors 
Counsel for the plaintiffs: Dr Evatt KC, Mr Isaacs KC and Mr Sullivan. 
The Australian Railways Union and Brown v The Commonwealth of Australia and Ors 
Counsel for the plaintiffs: Mr Ashkanasy KC and Mr Laurie. 
Bulmer and Ors (suing for the Building Workers' Industrial Union) and Purse v The Commonwealth 
of Australia and Ors 
Counsel for the plaintiffs: Mr Ashkanasy KC and Mr Laurie. 
The Amalgamated Engineering Union (Australian Section) and Rowe v The Commonwealth of 
Australia and Ors 
Counsel for the plaintiffs: Mr Weston KC and Mr C.M. Collins. 
The Seamen's Union of Australia and Elliott v The Commonwealth of Australia and Ors 
Counsel for the plaintiffs: Mr Isaacs KC and Mr Julius. 
The Federated Ironworkers' Association of Australia and McPhillips v The Commonwealth of 
Australia and Ors 
Counsel for the plaintiffs: Dr Evatt KC, Mr Isaacs KC and Mr Sullivan. 
The Australian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation and Williams v The Commonwealth of 
Australia and Ors 
Counsel for the plaintiffs: Mr Webb KC and Mr Sullivan. 
Sheet Metal Workers' Union v The Commonwealth of Australia and Ors 
Counsel for the plaintiffs: Mr Isaacs KC and Mr Julius. 
Federated Clerks' Union of Australia (New South Wales branch) and Hughes v The Commonwealth 
of Australia and Ors 
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Counsel for the plaintiffs: Mr Hardie KC and Mr Sullivan. 
Commonwealth 
Counsel for the defendants: Mr Barwick KC, Mr Taylor KC, Mr Windeyer KC, Mr Lewis KC, Mr 
Ashburner, Mr Riley, Mr Macfarlan, Mr Mcinerney, Mr Menhennitt and Mr Lush. 
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